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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the nature and extent of ‘social capital’ of the urban poor 
in Bangladesh. Major theories of social capital have been reviewed for a general 
understanding of the subject, while a review of other relevant literature has also helped 
develop measures of aspects of social capital: social networks, trust and cooperation. 
Broader literature on poverty and urban housing in Bangladesh are also reviewed. These 
measures have been used in a structured questionnaire survey. Approximately1800 
households were interviewed using this questionnaire in a two-stage sample design 
process, in which 18 primary sampling units (PSU) were selected from three categories 
of cities (one is the capital city, one from the metropolitan cities and one from the 
secondary cities). Then 100 households were selected from each of the 18 PSUs, 
including 11 ‘poor neighbourhoods’ (informal or ‘slum’ areas)’ and 7 ‘comparator 
neighbourhoods’.  
The socio-economic and demographic information from the survey responses have been 
analysed to understand the profile of the study population. The data on social capital have 
been analysed in two stages: (a) using descriptive statistics, and (b) using the Probit/Logit 
and structural analytic approaches. In the former case, the analysis looks particularly at 
the socio-economic vulnerabilities of the urban poor affecting social capital, as well as 
the nature and extent of different kinds of social networks, trust and cooperation. The 
Probit/Logit and structural analysis explores the direct and indirect relationships between 
various socioeconomic characteristics of urban poor households and individual 
behavioural outcomes (trust and cooperation). 
The analysis suggests that the nature and extent of social capital of the poor are somewhat 
distinctive; the poor groups are more interdependent on their neighbours, so that their 
social capital primarily relies on their ties with them. These findings suggest that the 
higher level of trust and cooperation among neighbours may address some of the critical 
issues in affordable housing and slum redevelopment policies in Bangladesh. This 
implication is discussed through a suggested  quasi-market approach that may help 
achieve financial feasibility of affordable housing supply. The approach may contribute 
to the current ‘market enabling’ housing policies of the country as well as providing  
pointers to the international development agencies for investment in housing for the urban 
poor in Bangladesh or elsewhere. 
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Chapter 1: Overview of Research Aims and 
Objectives 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Although it is one of the world’s poorest countries, Bangladesh has exhibited 
impressively rapid economic growth over the last 20 years.The current GDP growth rate 
is more than 6.5% annually. However, the contemporary growth paradigm and political 
economy of Bangladesh have arguably enabled a particular group to direct the growth of 
the market economy in particular directions. Growth under such an economic structure 
has undermined the ‘quality’ of development through an unfair distribution of income 
and wealth (Sobhan, 2010). Clearly there is a small group of business people who are 
doing very well. There are also quite large groups ‘in the middle’ who are benefiting to 
some extent from greater economic opportunities as well as from other policies like 
education and healthcare. However, a significant proportion of the population has been 
marginalised (Matin, 2014); these are landless and assetless poor people concentrated in 
densely populated urban slums where the per person housing space can be as small as 
1.2sq. meters (Rahman, 2001; GoB&ADB, 1996). Such socioeconomic inequality 
potentially generates a number of social concerns.  
The fact is that some Bangladeshis are poorer than is generally thought (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2010). The contemporary growth paradigm does little to  guarantee a fair 
distribution of resources, so inequality between rich and poor in Bangladesh continues; 
the Gini-coefficient, which was .43 in 1995, was .46 in 2010 (BBS, 2010b; Ferdousi and 
Dehai, 2014). As a result, the prevalence of urban poverty has become a distinctive feature 
of cities across the country. In addition, the established trend of urbanisation 
accompanying economic development is associated with the dangers of climate change, 
particularly from rising sea levels and river erosion. These changes may well lead to an 
additional threat to the poor populations, which are moving into the cities, resulting in 
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ever larger slums (Annez and Linn, 2010). This influx of the poor into cities has been 
accompanied by the lack of a minimum standard of housing (Begum, 2007b).  
The scarcity of urban land is acute in many cities in developing countries like Bangladesh; 
therefore urban public space is a contested resource, with various interests defining its 
shape, its accessibility and its suitability for livelihood-related use (Hye, 2014). In such 
circumstances, the urban poor command little in the way of land and services to allow 
them a reasonable standard of living. This situation threatens the progress of 
multidimensional anti-poverty measures, which perceive development to be a sustained 
improvement in the ability to meet basic human needs (Streeten, 1981).  
Neither a market-enabling approach (which is reflected in the country’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and promoted by the WB and IMF), nor the forceful 
eviction of the urban poor from land (Khan, 2012a; Hye, 2014) addresses the real problem 
of proper distribution of resources. Housing markets tend to follow the logic of maximum 
profit margins to the developers, focusing on the housing demands of the higher-income 
population, and this process could never meet the housing needs of the urban poor. A 
typical explanation of this failure is that the poor simply cannot afford the housing 
supplied via the usual market. On the other hand, forced evictions from their slum 
dwellings push the poor into even deeper poverty, destroying the little economic progress 
they may have made through various national and international efforts. Such evictions 
have displaced the urban poor to new locations and have potentially disrupted any social 
capital that they have managed to build through social exchanges and social relationships 
at work (Stanley and Currie, 2006). This destruction of economic progress, combined 
with the disruption of social capital, can arguably have serious negative consequences for 
those trying to achieve sustainable poverty reduction.  
 
1.2 Government and NGO interventions in urban poverty 
Previously, government interventions in Bangladesh were implemented to provide proper 
housing for the urban poor. However, such initiatives are both isolated and very few 
compared to the scale and needs of the urban poor. Also, these interventions often failed 
to reflect the aspirations of the targeted poor; they tried to resettle them either in rural 
areas or on the outskirts of the city, and thus failed to address labour market needs (Khan, 
2012b). Consequently, a large majority refused to move to the new locations, and many 
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of them who did move simply came back to be nearer to job opportunities. Nonetheless, 
if the new location was considered ‘suitable’, political and administrative interference 
went ahead, resulting in misguided distribution of land and housing to the targeted poor 
(Khan, 2012a).  
The limitations of the public sector have prompted Non-Governmental Organisations  
(NGOs) and Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) to take an active role in socio-economic 
development (Mahmud, 2008). Many of the NGOs/MFIs are working primarily to 
facilitate income generation, to improve health and education, and to provide legal 
support to the disadvantaged poor. However, these activities are interplayed between 
most of the NGOs, but they have little involvement in providing proper housing for the 
poor.  
A considerable number of studies argue for, and evaluate the positive impact of 
‘microfinance’, particularly looking at how such a model facilitates the ability of the poor 
to increase their income and accumulate assets through entrepreneurship development 
and employment generation (Khandker, 2001; Wright, 2000; Yunus, 1999; Nelson et al., 
1996). It is true that NGOs’ activities in Bangladesh, particularly in the microfinance 
sector, has helped reduce social vulnerability to some extent, and has improved the social 
welfare of the poor, but this has taken place primarily in rural rather than urban areas 
(Zaman, 2000; Wright, 2000; Khandker, 1998). Moreover, those gains are arguably 
fragile, and they help little in sustainable urban poverty reduction. 
However, the positive impact of microfinance may imply a higher role for the NGOs. The 
studies suggest that the ways in which NGO activities are run, and the usefulness of their 
methods of achieving success, may indicate the notion of ‘social capital’(Ito, 2003). The 
group-based credit of the ‘Grameen Bank’, focused on collective social 
behaviour/responsibility, is considered a driving factor for the explosive growth of 
microfinance in Bangladesh (Dowla, 2006a). Therefore, the effectiveness of social capital 
(collective behaviour and relationships of trust) may be a potentially critical factor in 
measures to achieve a proper standard of housing by and for the urban poor in 
Bangladesh.  
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1.3 Social capital and housing for the urban poor  
Notwithstanding the possibility of the negative impact (e.g. social exclusion, anti-social 
activities) of social capital, it might be argued to be a major non-market force that may 
offer a potential pathway to affordable housing for the urban poor in Bangladesh. The 
poor may, in many instances, be relatively strong in collective social action, just as they 
are weak regarding financial resources. The World Bank study hints that social capital is 
a pervasive ingredient and determinant of progress in development projects as well as 
being an important tool for poverty reduction (WB, 2001). The study insists that social 
capital can affect income and welfare through improving the ‘management of common 
resources’ and ‘energising federation’. Such evidence encourages the argument that 
social capital may be useful to some extent in the market solution for the provision of 
affordable housing to the poor. 
Social capital is grounded in social relations, which is the interplay of a complex set of 
socio-economic variables. The precise notion of social capital is based on the differing 
but influential theories of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. However, the theoretical 
proposition of social capital is also deeply rooted in social class and cultural norms and 
values. Social capital could be seen as social virtues built on trust (Fukuyama, 1996; 
Knack and Keefer, 1997a) and cooperation (Coleman, 1988a), which are facilitated by 
social networks and social interactions (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995). Those aspects 
of social capital are generated from intensive social exchanges linked to social class. 
A small section of the literature has explored empirically the underlying relationship 
between social capital and positive (as well as some negative) socio-economic outcomes. 
Goldin and Katz (2001) explored the contribution of social capital to secondary education. 
Fukuyama (1996) analysed how the social capital of trust could reduce the costs of 
transactions. However, the social capital phenomena informing these theoretical 
propositions and empirical evidence come largely from western contexts.  
 
1.4 Scope for the research 
Both public and private sector interventions have failed to address the root causes of urban 
poverty in Bangladesh, and are wholly focused on the association between housing and 
sustainable poverty reduction. Thus, the urban poverty-reduction policy has barely 
appreciated the challenging issue of affordable housing supplies to the urban poor. Again, 
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the policies of the authorities concerned have neglected the perspectives of the urban poor 
themselves. The urban policy in Bangladesh has a long tradition of focusing on 
investment in physical and human capital interventions; this has arguably underplayed 
the importance of social capital. Social capital might complement those interventions, 
since it might support measures aimed at affordable housing sustainable urban poverty 
reduction in Bangladesh. 
Major barriers to affordable housing for the urban poor include unaffordability, land 
scarcity,  higher land values and low capital. Looking at the problems, the existing 
housing condition of the urban poor might be improved through: 
 developing the physical condition of the existing dwelling units 
 extending dwellings  
 attaching or improving basic utility services 
 improving security of tenure 
 redevelopment of sections of settlements with medium- and higher-density 
housing of modest specifications 
 enabling the construction of relatively affordable medium-density housing on 
serviced land.  
However, interventions for specific groups would differ depending on the nature of the 
problem.   
Social capital of the poor might arguably address some of the barriers and affect the ability 
to achieve different types of housing improvement. Collective trust and cooperation might 
help realise local resources (e.g. by land pooling and mobilising capital as well as labour) 
as well as facilitating fair distribution of land and housing. Those social virtues might also 
help with the financial viability of the projects. In both cases, the role of intermediaries 
are perhaps crucial.   
The potential role of intermediaries to mobilise social capital has never been explored. 
The non-profit intermediary might play an important role in mobilising local resources 
and negotiating various options for the supply of affordable housing. These roles entail 
collective efforts in small-parcel land pooling, bargaining for subsidised land, generating 
capital from the secondary market, technical support for building construction, 
infrastructure, management, and loan recovery mechanisms. All of these require the 
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intermediary and necessitate the engagement of the poor in the whole process of housing 
delivery. 
Various options regarding the housing of the urban poor are being suggested by 
academics, field practitioners and development organisations. The World Bank (WB) and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have been experimenting with a variety of ways to 
provide housing and infrastructure to the urban poor; however, no effective model has 
emerged. The literature on housing of the urban poor has largely advocated for a non-
market solution involving free distribution of land and housing to the poor. But those 
actions require huge public resources which are unaffordable for a country like 
Bangladesh. Also, such distribution is fraught with large-scale corruption and inefficient 
use of scarce land (Khan, 2012a).  
While many of the studies on social capital have been conducted in a broader range of 
countries, primarily in the West, very few studies have focused on particular groups such 
as the marginalised urban poor in Bangladesh. Also, most studies on social capital have 
focused on the economic implications on health, education and income; few have 
addressed the implications on the supply of affordable housing for the poor of 
Bangladesh. This study intends to addresses that gap.  
 
1.5 Research aims and questions 
This study aims to investigate the nature and extent of social capital based on the primary 
data collected from 1,800 households across three cities in Bangladesh. Then the key 
findings on social capital are intended to inform the affordable housing policy in a quasi-
market context. The study addresses the following specific research questions to achieve 
those aims:  
1. How is the socio-economic condition of the urban poor linked to their socio-
economic vulnerability?  
2. What is the nature and extent of social capital of the urban poor?  
3. How is individual experience of social capital (e.g. trust, cooperation) affected 
by the context in terms of collective social capital at neighbourhood level? 
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4. How might social capital address the major market and non-market barriers to 
affordable housing for the urban poor in Bangladesh?  
 
1.6 Study hypotheses 
Presumably, a certain level of social capital exists among the urban poor in Bangladesh. 
This capital could be useful in addressing barriers to the delivery of affordable housing 
to (or by) the poor. However, there still remains a question about how much social capital 
could be mobilised and how much would be needed, for different levels of investment in 
this delivery.  
There is also the question of the physical form of housing investment, and how far this 
necessitates moving, temporarily or permanently; this particularly relates to the issue of 
how feasible that is, given that employment is precarious. In some informal settlement 
upgrading, individual families can improve their own plot using a self-build approach. 
But given the population density, land scarcity and capital market for housing finance in 
Bangladesh, this approach might well lead to an inefficient use of land. Such 
considerations would suggest a medium- or high-rise building approach in a necessarily 
collaborative undertaking, requiring a complex two-tier tenure that would ensure efficient 
use of scarce land as well as the financial viability of the project.  
In such circumstances, the study conceives four principal hypotheses in line with the 
research aims: 
1. The urban poor have limited access to socioeconomic opportunities, and this 
inflicts persistent poverty and social vulnerability on them 
2. Poverty and social vulnerability of the urban poor presumably facilitate a certain 
level of interdependency 
3.  Such interdependency among the poor may offer a level of social capital (trust 
and cooperation) which has implications for neighbourhood development 
4. In particular, such social capital might address the market and non-market barriers 
of affordable housing supply to the urban poor; however, there is a need for an 
‘intermediary to facilitate and negotiate the issues surrounding the process. 
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1.7 Rationale of the study 
Given the current financial weakness of the Government of Bangladesh, the non-market 
solution to the informal housing of the urban poor is perhaps implausible. Thus financial 
viability is presumably critical to affordable housing interventions for two particular 
reasons: the need to attract capital from public, private and international money market 
sources; and the effective functioning of the particular housing market, based on 
efficiency and equity, to meet the need.  
The current pure market policies of housing supply seem unresponsive to the housing 
needs of the urban poor in Bangladesh; therefore there is a need for an alternative market 
solution to improve the housing situation. Quasi-market housing policies may be 
pragmatic, where social capital can be exploited to address some of the market problems 
as well responding to the housing needs of the poor.  
The study is based on a field survey conducted on 1,800 households across three cities of 
Bangladesh. The findings from the field data could add value to the pragmatic notion of 
social capital in the context of the urban poor in Bangladesh. Moreover, implications of 
such findings for affordable housing policies could attract international development 
agencies such as WB, DfID (UK Department for International Development) and ADB, 
working for the livelihood development of the urban poor. In conclusion, the study 
intends to shed light on ways of achieving proper housing for the poor; an outcome that 
could potentially contribute to sustainable urban poverty reduction. 
 
1.8 Organisation of the thesis 
1.8.1 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 reviews the relevant international literature on social capital, and more specific 
literature on housing of the urban poor, particularly in Bangladesh. It provides an 
overview and insight into the existing knowledge relevant to this study. It has particularly 
helped in the preparation of the structured questionnaire which is used to carry out the 
field survey for this study. The review has also helped to inform the choice of analytical  
approaches underpinning the quantitative investigation into the research hypotheses. In 
addition, a brief review of housing policy and the literature on housing, informs the 
knowledge base upon which the implications of social capital are examined.  
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1.8.2 Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion on the methodology employed for conducting 
this research. It sets out the philosophical assumptions underlying both the research 
design and methodology. The research methodology is presented under four main 
headings:  
 Participants: the details on the study population are presented in this section. The 
study cities, the Primary Sampling Units (PSUs), and the sample ‘poor’ and 
‘comparator’ households are discussed. 
 Measures: the section enlists the variables adopted from the literature on social 
capital. In addition, it includes demographic and socio-economic variables used 
in this study that are linked to social class and social capital. 
 Procedure: this section discusses the data collection process used for the study. It 
involves the selection of study, Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and sample 
households. 
 Analysis: the analysis encompasses the methods used for analysis of data in the 
different chapter of this thesis. 
1.8.3 Chapter 4: Study Areas Profile 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the study population, as well as the study neighbourhoods, 
based primarily on the field data, but with contextual and comparator information from 
other published sources. The chapter consists of four primary sections:  
 Urban poverty dynamics: this section discusses the growing presence of the urban 
poor in Bangladesh. 
 Household characteristics: the household characteristics related to demography, 
education, household income and assets, household expenditure, household 
saving and debt are analysed. 
 Neighbourhood characteristics: relevant issues include land ownership patterns, 
availability of utility facilities, and the costs of living in urban poor 
neighbourhoods. 
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 Migration:  the section discusses the origin and pattern of migration of the urban 
poor. It also analyses the reasons for and costs of forced migration inflicted on the 
poor. 
 
The chapter draws a comparison between the ‘poor’ neighbourhoods and their 
‘comparator’ areas across three study cities where appropriate.The analysis has also tried 
to link with the previous studies carried out in this particular field, in order to have a 
broader perspective on the subject discussed. 
It addresses research questions 1 set out for this study, which were aimed at providing a 
general understanding about socioeconomic characterstics of the study population. The 
chapter also provides a context for the rest of the analysis of social capital addressed in 
chapter 5, 6 and 7. It also helps to contextualise the issues underlying affordable housing 
for the urban poor in Bangladesh discussed in chapter 8. In addition to these more specific 
aims, the chapter will attempt to provide a detailed general description of the urban poor 
in Bangladesh.  
1.8.4 Chapter 5: The nature and extent of social capital: a descriptive analysis 
This chapter analyses the responses to social capital in a descriptive manner, and this 
informs a general understanding of the nature and extent of the social capital of the urban 
poor in Bangladesh. The descriptive analysis of social capital underpins the  analysis of 
trust and cooperation that are addressed in Chapter 6 and 7, and so the chapter addresses 
research question 2 on the nature and extent of social capital.  
1.8.5 Chapter 6: The behavioural outcome of social capital: trust 
This chapter addresses research question 3. It analyses trust in the bonding and 
bridging/linking networks in relation to the network structure, income and living period 
of households. The analysis is primarily based on the estimates revealed from the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions, which help to identify neighbours as an 
important social network of the urban poor. Individuals’ trust in neighbours is analysed 
at the end of this chapter, using Probit and Logit estimation.  
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1.8.6 Chapter 7: The behavioural outcome of social capital: cooperation 
This chapter also addresses research question 3. It analyses individuals’ cooperation in 
relation to the network structure, trust, income and living period of households separately, 
for the bonding capital. As with the treatment of trust, the analysis is based on the 
estimates revealed from the OLS regressions. 
Structural Analysis: in this section the researcher provides a structural analysis of social 
capital, which interlinks  the different effects of individuals’ social behaviour and 
neighbourhood/group-level effects. The individual social capital outcomes are explored 
using a structural analysis of various aspects of social capital; this reveals the direct, 
indirect and correlated effects of various social and economic factors on individual 
cooperation. 
1.8.7 Chapter 8: Implications of social capital for housing the urban poor in 
Bangladesh 
This chapter offers a policy direction for affordable housing to the urban poor, which is 
informed by social capital. The major market and non-market barriers for affordable 
housing delivery are discussed. How social capital could address those issues is  brought  
into focus through the concept of a quasi-market approach, which might provide insights 
for Bangladesh’s national housing policy, as well as for the international development 
agencies. 
1.8.8 Chapter 9: Conclusion 
This chapter examines the extent of the study’s achievement of its research aims and 
objectives. How such achievement might contribute to the literature, and to stakeholders 
interested in the policies offered, is discussed. The knowledge acquired through 
conducting this study, that might help advance the research field, is noted. The limitations 
of the research, which might have affected the inferences made from the findings, are 
drawn out. Finally, it offers indications of future research development. 
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Chapter 2: Social Capital, Urban Poverty and 
Housing: A Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The review of literature is an important aspect of conducting any research. An integrative 
review contains the research results and critiques available in the literature (Jaidka et al., 
2013). It also informs about the methods applied in conducting similar studies, and about 
the controversies and key contributors (Bryman, 2012a). Thus, this chapter is intended to 
inform the study of the existing knowledge relating to the topic, concepts and theories. 
The following discussion provides a review, primarily of social capital, but also of the 
issues of poverty and housing in relation to the urban poor in Bangladesh. 
This chapter reviews the theoretical aspects of social capital and urban poverty 
underpinning the framework of analysis for this study. As stated above, the major aims 
of this research are: 
(i) to investigate the nature and extent of the social capital of the urban poor in 
Bangladesh, 
(ii) to explore the potential of social capital to inform affordable housing policies for 
the urban poor in Bangladesh.  
These aims have driven the review of the relevant literature on social capital, urban 
poverty and housing. This chapter is divided into two parts. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature on social capital, including major theories, its development, and issues 
concerning measures, criticisms and implications for social wellbeing. Section 2.3 
reviews the literature related to urban poverty and housing with particular focus on 
Bangladesh. 
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2.2 Review of social capital 
The concept of social capital can be defined as “the aggregate of the actual or potential 
resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationship of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986: 
248). Social capital has attracted much attention in sociology in the last two or three 
decades; however, the topic can be found in 1960s literature linked to both sociology and 
anthropology. Max Weber and Karl Marx are generally acknowledged to have brought 
the issue to the public’s attention at the end of the 19th century (Woolcock, 1998b). 
Theorists from different academic disciplines have modified the term to fit their own 
disciplinary perspectives; hence one expert’s view has been criticised by others with 
regard to what could be the causes or effects in understanding the notion of social capital. 
Sociologists have led the theoretical development, whereas others have extended the 
implied notion to different aspects of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001; Coleman, 
1990; Ports, 2000). These developments have improved the meaning of social capital, 
adding scholarship to the notion of social virtues (Woolcock, 1998b). Because of its 
implications in socioeconomic development, social capital has also been a subject of 
study in other disciplines. 
A few theorists have been particularly influential in defining social capital. Pierre 
Bourdieu, James S. Coleman and Robert Putnam are among those frequently 
acknowledged by most authors who have studied social capital. Other scholars and 
sources, such as Fukuyama, Lin, Burt and the World Bank, are also important for their 
contribution to the shaping of the concept. However, the definition of social capital varies 
widely in terms of its implication for development policies (Knack and Keefer, 1997b). 
Moreover, debates also arise from different perspectives relating to whether social capital 
refers to an individual subject or whether it is a collective issue (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Coleman, 1990). In the following section, I review the major theories of social capital 
that are particularly relevant to this study. 
2.2.1 Important theories of social capital 
There are two major camps in social capital literature. One, led by Bourdieu, argues that 
social capital is formed within the norms of social class, where the dominant class gains 
access to economic and/or cultural capital through mutual recognition and the 
acknowledgement of others (Bourdieu, 1986).  
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According to Bourdieu, social capital is made up of social obligations and connections. 
More precisely, he argues in his paper that social capital consists of collective assets 
shared by individuals with defined groups and boundaries, obligations of exchange and 
mutual recognition. The group provides credit from the collectively-owned capital to its 
members. He considers social capital as an implicit form of economic capital. In his 
analysis of the ‘form of social’ in the reproduction of advantage within the social class, 
he took neo-classical assumptions of economics which are closely linked to Becker 
(1964) theory of human capital. However, his theory is based on the analytic approaches 
of social theory.  
Bourdieu argues that the social order facilitates the dominant class to maintain the social 
hierarchy. His argument is primarily based on the network size and the amount of 
resources available in the networks, which are common among the members within a 
particular social class. His argument relies largely on the political and economic capital 
in the individual network in a social group. 
Another camp, led by James Coleman and Robert Putnam, argues that social capital is a 
collective resource available to the members of a group. According to their argument, the 
quality (strength) of social capital depends on each individual’s efforts and actions, which 
ultimately form the collective social virtues, such as trust and cooperation, in a group. 
This argument assumes that social capital can be generated in a small group such as family 
or a religious community, or among schoolmates or tradesmen. The argument highlights 
that social ties promote the norms of reciprocity and mutual obligation. Unlike Bourdieu, 
Coleman and Putnam view the origin and development of social capital as an incidental 
phenomena arising out of social interactions. Coleman (1988a) defines social capital as 
an aspect of the social structure which facilitates the individual’s actions. 
Individual agents within a society collectively create social structure, whereas the social 
norms and culture allow individuals scope to reshape society. Coleman uses social capital 
to explore the differences in educational outcomes among children attending different 
schools. He argues that action is required to gain resources from social capital embedded 
in social exchanges. However, through analysing the social system using rational 
choice/behavior theory, he reveals that his assumptions have been imported from 
economics.  
According to the above statements, individuals, through their behaviour, collectively 
create structural norms, whereas structural factors facilitate the social interaction and 
exchanges that shape collective social virtues. The nature of the relationship between 
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individuals and society, as defined by Coleman, can be explained by the following 
diagram: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 →
← 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠 
 
Individuals collectively create structural norms, whereas structural norms facilitate 
individual exchanges; these, in turn, shape collective social virtues such as trust and 
cooperation. Coleman’s view is clearly more useful than Bourdieu’s when applied to the 
urban poor in Bangladesh. 
Following Coleman’s concept, Putnam defines social capital as the social networks that 
generate values (Putnam, 2001: see p. 18-19). He has argued that social capital is formed 
within associations among a group of people; the interactions and exchanges among 
members facilitate and promote the development of collective norms of reciprocity, 
which are necessary for maintaining collective social wellbeing (Putnam, 1995; Putnam, 
1993). Putnam has extended his concept to civic and political engagement in society, and 
measures it based on membership of groups such as sporting clubs, parent-teacher 
associations, unions and neighbourhood groups or organisations. He argues that the 
negative economic performance of a country is a consequence of declining social capital. 
Putnam believes that the cause of a decline in civic engagement is correlated to the 
development of television, which reduces social connectedness. However, his views on 
the decline of social capital have been strongly criticised on the grounds that he does not 
take account of other social and political forces which might influence his findings 
(Boggs, 2001). It is important to understand whose social capital is being eroded, rather 
than focusing on the total stock (Li et al., April 2005). Held (1996: reported in Gray, Shaw  
& Farrington 2006) argues that social capital is not in decline, rather that it is changing 
through globalisation and use of the internet. 
Fukuyama (1996) has also reinforced the recognition of the collective nature of social 
capital. He has defined social capital as shared social norms and values that generate 
collective social virtues in the form of trust. He has insisted that such social virtue is 
important for collective co-operation on a broader scale (e.g. states and large 
corporations). He argues that members of a social organisation learn how to behave, and 
that this is reflected in reciprocity and mutual expectation among the members. He also 
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claims that the costs of social exchanges are less in those societies where social trust is 
present, and that this is one of the ways in which it supports higher economic growth. 
Lin (2001) has argued that information, influence, social credentials and reinforcement 
are four elements of social capital. Frequent social interactions help members gain access 
to information and grant influence and credentials to members of the society. This 
formulation of social capital seems closer to the Bourdieu’s concept, i.e. more relevant to 
higher social class. Lin has explained why these elements are essential for accomplishing 
social actions, which are not attainable by physical capital.  
The World Bank (2001) has defined social capital from its practical manifestations in 
development interventions. It has added insight into the notion of ‘dimensions’ of social 
capital, explaining that social capital produces different dimensions as it develops within 
the macro and micro social structures. Again, within the social boundary, social capital 
has structural dimensions. The state institutions and rules of law constitute the macro-
level structural dimension, whereas the social institutions and norms are the micro-level 
structural dimensions. This can be shown by the following diagram. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from WB (2001) 
Figure 2.1: Dimensions of generating social capital 
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Moreover, social capital has cognitive dimensions, such as state governance at the macro 
level (which is about conscious decisions) and at the micro level of social trust. It has 
been argued that social capital is a pervasive ingredient and determinant in development 
policies (WB, 2001). Such argument is linked to protection against  corruption and 
ensuring transparency through the participation of the local community (refer toCallahan, 
2005). The World Bank Development Report 1997 notes: 
…study of villages in rural Tanzania found the households in villages with high levels 
of social capital... have higher adjusted incomes per capita than do households in 
villages with low levels of social capital. When other non-social capital determinants 
are controlled for, there also appears to be a strong correlation between a village's 
wellbeing and its level of social capital. (p. 115) 
This note suggests that social association, which is formed on the basis of the informal 
rules, norms and values of the society that facilitate coordinated action for members, 
enables cooperative ventures in development.  This implies that social capital is important 
to economic development. Development policies need to appreciate the role of  social 
capital for effective development through improvements in management of shared 
resources (Fedderke et al., 1999). However, such an approach might lead to a double-bind 
for development if it relies on family, clan or neighbourhood networks, because these 
networks are often fueled by political clientelism and corrupt payments. 
Naughton (2013) introduced new ideas about social capital, linking it to ‘socio-spatial’ 
attributes. In her study, social capital is viewed through the filter of neo-classical 
economic assumptions, thereby challenging the existing pro-market social capital 
theories, which have overlooked spatial aspects. She insists that spatial context-specific 
and context-explicit social capital provides a deeper perspective than the existing theories. 
She claims that social capital varies from one place to another, so spatial aspects have 
been proposed for inclusion in any study on social capital. 
Akcomak (2011) has systematically reviewed the social capital literature across 
disciplines. He found no agreement between disciplines in how they treat social capital. 
He suggests the need for strong links among disciplines towards a deepening, rather than 
a broadening, of the understanding of social capital. 
From the theoretical context, it is perhaps clear that social capital is grounded in social 
relationships, which involve an interplay of a complex set of socio-economic variables 
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surrounding an individual. The notion of social capital is deeply connected with social 
and cultural norms and values: (a) some cultures value social cooperation and trust more 
than others; (b) social cooperation and trust will only arise if certain cultural values are 
present/strong; (c) there may be a symbiotic, self-reinforcing relationship between 
cooperative behaviour and social/cultural norms. Nonetheless, the formation of social 
capital relies on individual efforts (Coleman, 1988b) as well as on collective social norms 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Moreover, social capital can be perceived as a 
composite form of different aspects that may be separated out as: (i) socio-economic 
characteristics of individuals (markers of social class) that provide context in the 
formation of social capital, such as networks, trust or cooperation (Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000; Bourdieu, 1986); (ii) social networks,  which are the primary manifestation of social 
capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Putnam, 1995);  (iii) trust (Fukuyama, 1996; Knack and Keefer, 
1997a);  and (iv) cooperation (Coleman, 1988a), which can be viewed as the outcomes of 
social capital. So, all of these aspects of social capital are generated through social 
transactions that may provide feedback to each other. In the following section, I address 
some of the more interesting developments in this literature, in line with the aim of this 
study. 
2.2.2 Key points 
Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam, Fukuyama and Lin share the view that social capital relies 
strongly on social relationships, as well as on the resources embedded in social 
relationships and social structure. More precisely, social capital is generated within a set 
of structural factors, such as social position, network intensity and diversity. Social 
exchanges ensure that capital grows at an individual or collective level, through utilising 
embedded resources in the networks. That means the resources are present and useful for 
purposive actions; whereas social relations and social networks facilitate such actions.  
There are primarily two motives for actions: expressive action and instrumental action. 
Expressive action is employed by the agents to create a visible, noticeable message or 
signal, typically for defense purposes and to maintain resources. Its typical motive is to 
minimise loss in social exchanges. In contrast, instrumental action is less about 
symbolism and more about actual results, and is typically employed to gain and expand 
resources (Lin, 2001).  
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This means that agents undertake action to maximise gains from exchanges. The urban 
poor are assumed to have limited or no choice for expressive action, because of limited 
economic power. If the poor act to express a demand (e.g. through a demonstration), this 
has little effect on the government’s decision. Their voting power to elect the government 
might be influenced by the corrupt money. Arguably their structural and cultural position 
limits them to instrumental action. The rational choice theory of actions for social and 
economic behaviours  posits that, though their scope is limited, the poor tend to exert 
more efforts in instrumental actions to maintain social relations and networks (Goode, 
1997).  
2.2.3 Further theoretical issues 
It is argued that  social interactions facilitate key social outcomes (e.g. trust and 
cooperation) at various levels (Tenzin and Natsuda, 2016). Interactions start at home with 
the parents (family), and this helps to build strong relationships and provide a basic norm 
of social behaviour (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Parcel and Bixby, 2016). However, the 
maintenance of such familial relationship is less costly (it may not require regular 
interactions) (Roberts and Dunbar, 2011). Other formal and informal social institutions, 
such as educational institutions or playing fields, provide or reinforce the norms of shared 
social behaviour. Yet, the nature of individuals’ social behaviour may vary because of the 
inherent nature of their social orientations (White et al., 2009). Rothstein and Uslaner 
(2005) argue that social inequality is linked to differential social norms of trust in people 
or public institutions, which may affect individuals’ social behaviours. They illustrate 
their argument with an example of the Nordic countries, where social trust is higher 
compared to other countries lacking social equality. There are, however, other 
characteristics of these Nordic societies, such as ethnic homogeneity and a relatively 
stable, non-feudal background, which may affect this. Greater equality may not be the 
only cause, or it may be a consequence, of social trust and other background factors. In 
the context of political reform in Thailand, Callahan (2005) argues that social capital can 
reproduce, and that the democratic achievement of the country is intimately tied up with 
the dynamics of social capital and corruption. The outcomes of social capital are thus 
contextualised in the varied political and cultural spectrum, and the norms of trust and 
reciprocity would vary across contexts (Fukuyama, 2001; Cheong et al., 2007). 
Social context is very much linked to other aspects of social capital: network structure 
(type, size and strength of networks), trust and cooperation. Higher socio-economic status 
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may help facilitate higher social networks (Bourdieu, 1986). Cox (1995) links social 
capital with social cohesion. She analyses what holds society together, and what might 
constitute a truly civil society in which people can trust each other and face future 
challenges together.  Giddens (1991) insists that social capital is a concept of institutional 
development and cultural systems, which enable social participation of members of that 
society. He argues that social capital offers an effective tool for social change in the 
context of globalisation and political and cultural change. This ‘institutional’ approach 
may map onto Putnam’s ‘civil society’ organisations; however, it may also be a 
conservative tool that resists change.  
The concept of trust is both vague and used variably in the literature,  although it is 
generally understood as a latent psychological phenomenon, some combination of feeling 
and judgement and more or less positive (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Oye, 1985). Frequent 
interactions and strong social relations may potentially develop higher interpersonal trust 
among the members in a society (Lewis and Weigert, 1985). Putnam (2001; 1993) defines 
trust in terms of civic trust. While some researchers use this definition, they tend in 
practice to view civic trust as a generalisation of many possible forms of trust (Fukuyama, 
1996; Francois and Zabojnik, 2005). Co-operation is a more factual/behavioural outcome, 
referring to  reciprocal activities (Buckley and Casson, 2010; Oye, 1985). Implicitly, to 
engage in cooperation, which involves reciprocal actions, is an act of putting trust into 
practice. Therefore, a positive relationship between trust and cooperation is expected. 
2.2.3.1 Social class and social capital 
Social class is an important basis for the analysis of social capital. An understanding of 
the social class of the study population is perhaps required to understand social capital. 
Though the specific criteria to determine social class may never be achieved, the literature 
of social class could provide an idea. According to Weber (1924), 
We may speak of a “class” when (1) a number of people have in common a specific 
causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented 
exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for 
income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. 
This is “class situation….  
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It is the most elemental economic fact that the way in which the disposition over 
material property is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting competitively in 
the market for the purpose of exchange, in itself creates specific life chances.... 
But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of 
chance in the market is the decisive moment which presents a common condition for 
the individual’s fate. Class situation is, in this sense, ultimately market situation. (pp  
917-28) 
Marx’s theory views social class in relation to the impact on the material wellbeing – both 
‘exploitation’ and ‘life chances’ – of inequalities in access to social opportunities. The 
concept underlies to the process in distribution of wealth. Conflicts of interest between 
classes are generated not simply by what people have, but also by what people do with 
what they have. The concept of exploitation, therefore, points attention to conflicts within 
production, not simply conflicts in the market (Wright, 2003). 
Also, the notion of class can be understood in terms of job classification (DiMaggio, 
1997; Bourdieu, 1986; Bernstein, 2002). This might imply that it is largely rooted in the 
economic thresholds and linked to education and culture; historically it was more linked 
to property and to ‘power’ i.e. position in the military/aristocratic hierarchy. Social class 
in the context of Bangladesh can be understood through Marx and Weber’s perspective 
of social class, suggesting that the higher the class, the more secure the position in society 
and the less vulnerable to random events.  
The people in a particular social class have similar socio-economic and cultural 
backgrounds, which define their social values and social class. Because of this similarity, 
members of a particular social group are more likely to stay socially close and to interact 
within the same social group, which facilitates social relations and networks (DiMaggio, 
1997; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000).  
Socio-economic and cultural contexts of groups vary with a number of social and 
economic factors; so these factors are expected to affect social capital at both individual 
and group levels. Factor like household assets, the nature of jobs held by the heads of 
household, household income, household expenditure, and a number of other socio-
economic opportunities and challenges that might indicate the household’s social class 
are expected also to affect aspects of social capital. Again, the group might have some 
common factors that might also affect the individual’s social capital. Therefore, social 
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capital would have relationships with the other forms of capital – human capital 
(education), economic capital (wealth) or cultural capital. Human capital broadly 
corresponds to any stock of knowledge or characteristics a worker has that contributes to 
his or her “productivity”. This largely underlines the acquired skills; some of the 
differences in earnings across workers that are not accounted for by skills differences (e.g. 
year of schooling) alone, but linked to other characteristics including (school) quality, 
training, and attitudes towards work (Becker, 2009). Cultural capital refers to capital 
beyond economic means. Such capital may be generated in three forms: in the embodied 
state, e.g. in the form of long lasting disposition of mind and body; in the objectified state, 
in the form of cultural goods (e.g.pictures, books, instrument, etc.); and in the form of the 
institutionalised state, as seen in the case of educational qualification (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Economic capital simply refers to the financial means (e.g. income, assests) required to 
ensure financial transactions in market. Abbott & Sapsford (2005) also include ‘symbolic 
capital’, by which they mean prestige and personal qualities, as another way to try to 
understand social class.  
Social interactions and social exchanges are more likely when a group of people are living 
together, which facilitates social relations (although it can also generate friction). Such 
social relations are crucial in the formation of social capital (Manski, 2000; Weerdta and 
Derconb, 2006; Broecka and Derconb, 2011). The social institutions for social 
interactions are thus important, but they vary in different social contexts; so variation in 
social networks and ties, trust and cooperation, is expected. The socio-economic 
circumstances of a particular class, which facilitate social interactions and relationships, 
are expected to affect the social behaviour of individuals (Hall, 2008; Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2000; Fiske and Markus, 2012).  
 
Argument 1: A relationship exists between the socio-economic variables and other forms 
of social capital (the manifestation and outcomes). 
We address this argument in Appendix B where, to understand in the socio-economic 
vulnerability of the urban poor in Bangladesh, we analyse how various social 
vulnerabilities are linked to the economic uncertainty of the urban poor. The relationships 
between the socio-economic attributes of the urban poor, the network structure and the 
outcomes of social capital are shown in chapters 5 and 6 respectively.  
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2.2.3.2 Network structure and social capital 
Social network theory 
Social network theory has a longer history of academic interest than social capital does. 
Social networks are said to be about linkages and connectedness (Phillipson et al., 2004: 
p. 2). Social network theory has been used to look at impacts of informal ties, the impact 
of particular configurations of social networks, the role of networks and support, the 
implications of social networks for public policy and, more recently, the link between 
social networks and social exclusion (Phillipson et al., 2004).  
Crow (2004: 7) argues that the challenge for policymakers is to find ways to “enhance 
disadvantaged people’s access to social networks that will empower them”. He points out 
that networks relate to individuals rather than groups, and they may not necessarily be 
restricted to one’s local community. Crow argues that reciprocity is not a necessary 
component of networks; for example, networks may provide status and respect. However, 
he does argue that it is important for trust to be present for the network to function; trust 
being particularly present in family networks. Networks vary along many variables, such 
as gender, age, geographical location and social class. Certainly some social networks 
may be antisocial (Forrest and Kearns, 2001), in that they may be formed for anti-social 
purposes; they may exercise undue control on their members, and social support in the 
group may be used to reinforce conformity, dependence and obligation.  
In general, poor people with smaller social networks are more likely to have poorer health 
and wellbeing than those with larger social networks. A correlation is found between 
social capital and social wellbeing ((Wilkinson and Wilkinson, 2002: reported by Crow 
2004). Middle class people are more likely than working class people to participate in 
community groups, voluntary associations and other semi-formal relationships (Black et 
al., 2002: reported by Crow 2004). This may be because middle class people are less 
likely than working class people to be immersed in local kinship networks, and are more 
likely to have employment-based networks. 
Network structure 
Stone (2001) offers a broader perspective on social capital, where it is important to 
understand the structure, including type, size and spread of networks, as well as a need to 
understand the issues of trust and reciprocity. Different networks create different types of 
24 
 
social capital (Stone et al., 2003). The network structure may be viewed as a manifestation 
of one’s social capital, which includes the type, size and strength of social networks; 
different networks may generate different kinds of social outcomes (Stone et al., 2003; 
Burt, 2000; Montgomery, 1992). There are primarily three kinds of networks evident in 
the literature of social capital: bonding, bridging and linking.  
Bonding social networks develop trust and reciprocity in closed social networks, such as 
the family, neighbourhood and perhaps at work, and assist with the process of ‘getting 
by’ on a daily basis. A bonding network is formed with people in close contact, such as 
family members, neighbours, friends, co-workers or community leaders. Frequent 
interactions between group members (e.g. a firefighting crew) help form this close 
relationship and denser ties, which are perhaps necessary for getting by each day (Nelson, 
1989). Bonding generates closer and denser ties, but may lead to exclusionary practices 
as well.  
Bridging social networks spread resources among networks, allowing people to ‘get 
ahead’ by accessing multiple networks and therefore resources and opportunities. Bridges 
are made between groups which are different in age, social position, ethnicity, or other 
features (Ferlander, 2007; Adler and Kwon, 2002). A bridging network is formed between 
more heterogeneous groups, where the connection is more fragile, but also more likely to 
foster social inclusion; this outcome contrasts with bonding networks, which may 
increase social exclusion (Schuller et al., 2000). A bridging network forms distant 
relationships with distant persons, and is generally more formal than a bonding network 
(Granovetter, 1983). 
A linking social network is created through networks with those in authority or who have 
power, and who are useful for obtaining resources. These networks commonly involve  
institutional connections between individuals and community groups, which reach 
beyond community boundaries (Schuller et al., 2000). The manifestation and outcomes 
of social capital variables can be found more fully set out in Section 4 of Appendix A. 
The manifestation of social capital through interactions and networks facilitates social 
outcomes such as trust and cooperation at various levels (Tenzin and Natsuda, 2016). 
Interactions and ties with parents provide a foundation of expected social outcomes 
(Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Parcel and Bixby, 2016). Other outside, formal and informal 
social institutions, such as educational institutions and playing fields or clubs, provide a 
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shared norm of behavioural expectation. Nonetheless, the inherent nature of individual 
characteristics may influence social behaviour (White et al., 2009). Therefore, there are 
issues arising from the various socio-economic and inherited resources that together 
affect behavioural outcomes. Moreover, social inequality is related to social trust in both  
people and public institutions, and therefore affects social behaviour (Rothstein and 
Uslaner (2005). Social trust is argued to be higher in the people and public institutions 
where there is lower social inequality. Callahan (2005) suggests that civil and non-civil 
social capital can reproduce each other. He argues that the democratic achievement of a 
country is intimately tied up with the dynamics of social capital and corruption (in the 
context of the political reform in Thailand). The outcomes of social capital are thus 
contextualised in the varied political and cultural spectrum; the norms of trust and 
reciprocity would vary across contexts (Fukuyama, 2001; Cheong et al., 2007).  
  
Argument 2: The individual network is potentially influenced by the interactions and 
broader social and economic context 
This argument can be found in the analysis of relationships between various networks and 
socio-economic factors in Chapter 6 and 7. 
2.2.3.3 Trust—the intermediate outcome of social capital  
Trust might be considered as an intermediate outcome of social capital. The concept of 
trust is both a vague and a much-used variable in the literature. However, Putnam (1993) 
defines trust in terms of civic trust. Civic trust is generated in organisations of civil society 
and in the political regime. While some researchers use this definition, they tend in 
practice to view civic trust as generalising many other possible forms of trust. Putnam 
believes that trust takes a long time to develop; perhaps generations. 
Trust recognises that we are exposed to  risk and vulnerable to the effects of  action taken 
by others, but entails an expectation that those others will not exploit this vulnerability 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). Trust can be divided into two types: competence trust 
and goodwill trust (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998; Sako and Helper, 1998). Competence 
trust refers to transactions where the person or organisation is assumed to be capable of 
meeting the commitment, notwithstanding the risk and vulnerability. On the other hand, 
goodwill trust has an emotional acceptance of the moral commitment of the other not to 
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exploit vulnerability. It can be in the forms of honesty, respect or belief (Huxham and 
Vangen, 2000). Trust may be seen as depending on rational prediction of the economic 
and non-economic payoff to the participants in collaboration; however, such trust also 
depends on shared norms (Lane and Bachmann, 1998) and may, as noted above, entail an 
emotional act of faith. 
In general, trust depends on the rational perception of a belief in others that resembles 
confidence (Pahl, 2000; Giddens, 1991), theoretically to be developed through frequent 
social exchanges. That means there might be an interrelation between trust and a network 
structure, which can be developed through experience and moral reputation. However, 
trust accepts vulnerability, assuming shared values and goals, and refers to reciprocity 
although the commitment is open and not formally conditional. More discussion on trust 
can be found in chapter 6. 
 
Argument 3: Trust is an intermediate outcome of social interactions and varies with the 
network type and other socio-economic characteristics of the group. 
This argument can be found in Chapter 6, which analyses how trust is linked to social 
interactions within the networks and the various socio-economic factors that influence 
the individual’s cooperation. 
2.2.3.4 Cooperation 
Cooperation can be viewed as a tangible outcome of social capital. The individual’s 
cooperation may vary, depending on their network structure. The collective cooperation 
is developed through the exchanges as the subject changes behaviour, informed by others’ 
defection or cooperation, and later acts accordingly. Such experience forms a shared norm 
of general expectation from others in a group. Cooperation occurs under the possibility 
of continuation and the payoff from cooperation (Bo and Frechette, 2011).  
An association between ‘trust’ and ‘cooperation’ is established in the literature of social 
science: (Fukuyama, 1996; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 
1995; Bo and Frechette, 2011). Trust seems more abstract, a latent psychological 
phenomenon, a combination of feeling and judgement, one which is more or less positive. 
However, cooperation is more of a behavioural action, and is more tangible. Implicitly, 
engaging in cooperation involves a kind of give and take, and is an act of putting trust 
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into practice in a particular circumstance. Thus, both economic and non-economic 
cooperation is assumed to be facilitated or stimulated by implicit or explicit trust.  
Again, a higher trust is expected within a group that shares similar socioeconomic 
characteristics, and less within a group which has  diverse socioeconomic characteristics 
(Bouma et al., 2008). Thus, a higher degree of cooperation is expected among the poor 
than the non-poor. Carpenter et al. (2004) observed a high (economic) contribution among 
participants in a study on voluntary cooperation among Thai and Vietnamese poor in 
slums. However, they also argued that individual behaviour varies with social factors and 
depends on the role of culture in a group (see Carpenter et al., 2004). 
However, individuals’ psychological orientation towards social value differs, and this 
influences their cooperative behaviour (Kollock, 1998; Dawes and Messick, 2000). 
Cooperative behaviour may also be driven by goals and expectations, particularly within 
the context of interdependence, where trust may be one of many contextual moderators 
affecting cooperation (Bogaert et al., 2008). 
 
Argument 4: Higher trust may have significant implications for higher cooperation in a 
group; however, that cooperation is contingent on other socio-economic 
factors. 
This argument will be addressed in detail in Chapter 7, where individual cooperation is 
analysed in relation to other aspects of social capital. 
2.2.3.5. Implications of social capital  
Most of the literature on the concept of social capital refers to the value of the concept in 
terms of how it can be used to obtain resources. Mohan and Mohan (2002) believe that 
there is an interest in social capital because it is used to explain three areas of variance 
among countries: uneven development and economic growth, the comparative 
performance of governments and spatial variations in health. However, Mohan and 
Mohan note that there may be two distinct forms of social capital: that used by the 
economic elites, and the form associated with the interpersonal networks of 
neighbourhood life. In relation to spatial variations in health, Wilkinson (1996: referred 
to by Mohan and Mohan (2002)) claims  that the highest health standards are found in the 
most egalitarian societies, not the richest ones. Here, social capital is viewed as the 
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mediating link between income and health (Kaplan et al., 1996: referred to by Mohan and 
Mohan 2002). So, social capital refers to the value of how it can be used to obtain 
resources. Manderson (2005) points out that it facilitates ‘eudemonic wellbeing’, which 
can be described as personal growth and development and positive interactions with 
others which build self-acceptance and personal capabilities (Kaplan et al., 1996; Mohan 
and Mohan, 2002). As mentioned by Currie and Stanley (2008), Putnam argues that where 
social capital exists, there is better neighbourhood functioning and wellbeing. On this 
ground we argue that social capital may have implications in relation to housing for the 
urban poor. The trust and cooperation of the poor may be useful for collective effort to 
resolve some of the housing market and non-market challenges that exist in Bangladesh.  
 
Argument 5: Trust and cooperation may have potential implications for resolving some 
of the market and non-market barriers for affordable housing supplies for the urban poor 
in Bangladesh. 
This argument suggests a possible theoretical model offering affordable housing for the 
urban poor in Bangladesh, which will be addressed in chapter 8. 
2.2.4 Critical issues 
2.2.4.1 Capacity to develop social capital and the use of it is different 
Stone et al. (2003) point out an important distinction between measures of social networks 
and their outcomes. Much of social capital research has relied on its outcomes as the 
indicators of social capital itself. However, although a person has a range of networks in 
which they are involved, unless they use these networks to gain benefits, they are not 
gaining the outcomes of trust and cooperation. Social capital is a latent quality that 
subsumes in networks of relationships and beliefs about trust and mutual obligations. The 
capacity to generate social capital may reduce where it is not used. It seems that there is 
an important difference between the proposition ‘use it or lose it’ and the concept of a 
finite resource or reservoir of goodwill which can be used up. Social capital is non-rival 
to some extent; it may be viewed as the public goods. Such a notion provides a wider 
welfare economic perspective (Woolcock, 1998b). Second, there is a sense that just 
having social contacts is likely to have personal benefits in terms of reduction of personal 
isolation and the psychological advantages of membership of a group; together with gains 
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obtained from information exchange. This is the case even where social capital is not 
actively sought. 
2.2.4.2 The spatial extent of social capital 
Although social capital is measured at a national level, it may  be focused on and extend 
over a much smaller socio-spatial  context (Mohan and Mohan, 2002).  An important 
Australian study was undertaken by Onyx and Bullen (2000) who surveyed five areas, 
with contrasting urban and rural environments. Rural areas showed higher levels of social 
capital in the form of participation in community activities and mutual support, but a 
lower tolerance of diversity (e.g. ethnic), partly owing to lack of exposure/experience and 
a more general social conservatism. 
2.2.4.3 Social capital is not necessarily positive 
Some scholars’ perspectives assume that the positive aspects of social capital dominate 
or outweigh any negative aspects. Putnam assumes that all social capital is necessarily 
good (Winter, 2000). However, much of the literature points out that social capital can be 
both a positive and negative force (Portes, 2000; Fukuyama, 2001; Knack and Keefer, 
1997a). Social capital is positive where it gives group members access to privilege, 
resources and psychological support, but may be negative where it places high demands 
on group members and restricts individual expression and liberty (Ports, 2000).  
Bourdieu (1986) argues that social capital in elite or well-resourced circles may act as a 
closed system, excluding others from gaining their privileged access to similar social 
capital. In addition, some networks may not be of benefit to either the individual or 
society. Examples most often used relate to criminal networks: Internet networks of child 
sexual abusers are a major problem within society which has not, as yet, been even partly 
addressed (Stanley et al., 2012). Equally, an intimate group of drug dealers in a 
neighbourhood is assumed to be harmful to society. Some of the negativity may be 
attributed to the inwardness of close ties in poor communities (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; 
Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001). 
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2.2.4.4 The role of the state in the creation of social capital 
Putnam’s argument perhaps bypasses the ways in which social capital can be created and 
destroyed by structural forces and institutions (Mohan and Mohan, 2002). Indeed, there 
is little discussion about the role of the state in the creation of social capital, nor of the 
interrelationships among the various forms of capital, beyond noting that synergy is 
needed between accountable states and their societies (Woolcock, 1998b). Crow (2004) 
does note that governments are able to facilitate the growth of social capital by provision 
of a favourable environment for its development; for example, improved safety through 
crime reduction, better planning of housing developments or the provision of universal 
education . 
However, as Mohan and Mohan (2002) remind us, much social organisation and 
development work in third-world countries has the tacit, if not explicit, understanding that 
it is the re-establishment of social capital and trust that is, and will be, the backbone of 
reconstruction and survival of the neighbourhoods. Mohan and Mohan refer to the work 
of Skocpol (1997) who believes that any change in social capital is not so much a result 
of individual change, but rather due to the changes in state policies. He refers particularly 
to the decline in local campaigning and a proliferation of nationally organised special 
interest groups, as well as new connections between elites.  
Mohan and Mohan (2002) offer the argument that any neighbourhood development 
approach would be at risk if participation of the grassroots people fails. Indeed, such a 
neighbourhood development approach seems to create a contradiction, where there are 
tacit discourses about blaming disadvantaged people for their own consequences. This 
discourse advocates the reduction of the role and responsibility of the government in 
facilitating the wellbeing of the poor. Mohan and Mohan illustrate an outcome of this, 
noting that local participation allows maintenance of “continuity with most of its practices 
and prejudices which include benign neglect of macro-relations of power” (Mohan and 
Mohan, 2002: quote Fine 1999 p.12).   
2.2.4.5 Others 
Social capital literature, particularly the literature produced within the discipline of 
economics, has given an account of the notion of capital, and thus is concerned whether 
it carries any characteristics of ‘capital’ in the normal economic sense of the word. The 
question is whether social capital is useful for economic gain or the changing of 
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ownership of resources (Quibria, 2003). However, social capital may also be viewed an 
an asset which generates a stream of benefits over time. 
There are some demerits too. Social capital may lead to the monopoly of business in 
societies, with elite social capital leading to monopolists colluding (Bourdieu, 1986). It 
implies that the potential of entrepreneurship will be hampered by underwriting the 
indolence and insolvency of those who fail, e.g. easy bankruptcy laws encourage 
entrepreneurship. In addition, strict social norms and customs may create suffocating 
situations for members that can hinder the dynamics of the individual’s potential for 
economic development.  
Measuring the implicit relationship between economic performance and trust is complex. 
Heterogeneous societies tend to have less social capital. Social capital (trust) facilitates 
business/trade by reducing transaction costs. Corruption implies too much of the wrong 
kind of social capital, acting as a dead weight on economic development. Some countries, 
which leverage access to credit, help reduce the transaction costs of screening, monitoring 
and enforcement, through such initiatives as mutual insurance, risk sharing, and help in 
collective action (Quibria, 2003). 
 
2.2.5 Measures of social capital 
A set of measures of various aspects of social capital may be found in some of the 
literature, which typically measure the concept by responses to specific items in a 
questionnaire. Those indicators are then rating scaled, with respondents grading how they 
feel in relation a particular situation (e.g. choosing one of the following ratings: very bad, 
bad, average, good or very good). Details of this approach can be viewed in the review of 
literature on social capital (Stanley et al., 2012; Acquaah et al., 2014; Akcomak, 2011). 
2.2.5.1 Stone’s measures  
Stone (2001) has reviewed the approaches used to measure concepts of social capital. She 
notes a deficit in how the measures of social capital relate to the theoretical definition. 
This has led to questionable indicators of social capital and therefore to inconsistent 
results, as well as to confusion between measures, indicators and outcomes. Stone 
believes that there should be a distinction between measures of social capital and its 
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outcomes. Much social capital research has relied on its outcomes as indicators of social 
capital itself. 
Stone has developed a framework for the measurement of social capital, which is based 
on the perspective that social capital consists of networks characterised by norms of trust 
and reciprocity. These social networks may be assumed to represent the manifestation of 
social capital. Strategic, or longer term, goals of research on social capital include impacts 
on the following issues: life expectancy; health status; suicide rates; teenage pregnancy; 
crime rates; participation rates in tertiary education; employment and unemployment 
rates; family income; marital relationship formations and dissolutions; business 
confidence; job growth; growth in GDP; and balance of trade (Stone, 2001: 5 reporting 
Spellerberg 1997, pp. 43-44). While strategic goals are not addressed in her framework, 
Stone notes that these outcomes should be empirically related to measures of the core 
components of social capital and the intermediate outcome of trust. Thus, as social capital 
is a multi-dimensional concept, the networks, and norms of trust and reciprocity need to 
be measured.  
Networks 
Stone sees networks as the structural elements of social capital, within which the norms 
of trust and reciprocity develop. Understanding about networks is often drawn from the 
contemporary use of social network analysis, such as the study by Bowling (1997) of 
networks and social support. The structure of networks or social relationships can be 
characterised as follows: 
 
 Type: informal to formal 
 Size/capacity: limited to extensive 
Social capital is not restricted to networks of any particular size. Size refers to 
the number of people maintaining social contact; this can include those who are 
only called on when needed. 
 Spatial: household to global 
 
The literature talks about social capital around the family, community, region and nation. 
Social capital may be spatial/neighbourhood-based, or it may be based on a ‘community 
of interest’ (e.g. people interested in cycling, walking, sailing), in which case propinquity 
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is less important. It involves not only mobility, but also communication, which is opened 
up by email and the internet. 
 
 Structural: open to closed; dense to sparse (the extent to which network members 
are in each other's networks); homogenous to heterogeneous; similarities between 
members (age, socioeconomic status, etc.).  
 Relational: vertical between citizens and people in authority, or horizontal  
  
 
Other aspects which could be included are: 
 Frequency of contact between members  
 Strength of ties: degree of intimacy, reciprocity, expectation of durability and 
availability, emotional intensity  
 Social participation: involvement in social, political, educational, church and 
other activities  
 Social anchorage: years of residence and familiarity with neighbourhood, 
involvement in community 
 
Stone offers a range of questions which have been used in interview surveys to measure 
each of these structural aspects of networks. In general the techniques used involve 
interview questions to explore the nature and scale of networks.  
Norms of trust and reciprocity 
Stone defines trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest 
and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other 
members of that community” (Fukuyama, 1996: 26). Thus trust and reciprocity are 
closely related. 
 
The means of measuring norms of trust and reciprocity are less well developed than are 
the measures of the structural characteristics of networks. Three broad types of trust are 
identified in the literature: 
 Trust of familiars or particularised trust: this exists between established relationships 
and social networks. 
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 Generalised trust: this trust extended to strangers on the basis of expectations of 
behaviour or a sense of shared norms within a community, with the implicit sanction 
of exclusion from that community for those who abuse trust. 
 Civic or institutional trust: this refers to the basic trust in institutions of governance, 
including fairness of rules, official procedures etc. 
 
As with networks, Stone gives a range of questions which have been used in studies to 
measure trust. She notes the ad hoc approach to trust measurement, where measures of 
norms, attitudes and the outcomes of norms are not clearly delineated. In addition, the 
measurement of generalised trust often fails to specify a special dimension, such as, 
within a community, town or country. 
 
As noted early in this report, reciprocity is viewed as the process of exchange within a 
social relationship, whereby goods and services (meaning exchange of any kind) given 
by one party are repaid to that party by the party who received the original goods and 
services. Expectations about reciprocity will vary between the types of networks, such as 
family and non-family networks. Norms about reciprocity vary, for example they may 
involve direct or indirect exchanges of favours for others; equally, they may involve the 
expectation of immediate or future exchanges. 
 
Stone recommends adhering to the following aspects for the measurement of social 
capital: 
(i) Identify the types of social networks, as well as the network characteristics said 
to influence social capital  
(ii) Investigate norms of trust and reciprocity 
(iii) Seek links between each of the above factors; in particular how network types 
relate to norms of trust. 
2.2.5.2 Johnson’s measures  
Johnson et al. (2003) consider community, social networks and social capital as 
interchangeable terms. The researchers have established the following principles of 
measurement: 
 
1. Distinguish between structure and content 
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 Structure: measures which are easily available and therefore commonly used and 
are reliable and valid:  
 measures of membership – social, occupational and political organisations 
 Measures of voluntary work 
 Measures of informal networks – family and neighbourhood linkages 
 
These are considered along the lines of content, density and openness or closure. 
 
 Content 
 Trust and reciprocity 
 Measures of friendship and intimacy 
 Measures of participation/activism 
 
2. Specify the arena or area of activity to which measures apply: 
 Political organisations 
 Economic and occupational organisations 
 Voluntary work 
 Social organisations or informal neighbourhood and friendship networks 
 Family networks 
 
The authors note that trust is likely to vary according to which network is being 
considered. 
 
3. Measures of community/networks/social capital can validly be presented at any level 
of aggregation. 
 
4. The costs and benefits of social capital can always be assessed empirically and should 
not be assumed to be benign. Also, it cannot be assumed that more is better. 
 
2.2.6 Other measurements of social capital 
The measurements of social capital have been found to vary in the literature, depending 
on the purposes of the studies. Furstenberg and Hughes (1995) analysed family and 
neighbourhood level variables -  such as the duration of schooling, membership of the 
church, frequency of contact with friends, belief that someone would help at critical 
moments, educational outcomes, school quality, and parents’ participation in 
neighbourhood activities – to measure the subsequent social capital outcomes associated 
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with youth. To estimate social capital at individual and neighbourhood levels, 
Furstenberg and Hughes ran separate regressions on family human capital, and 
parameters were interpreted for the success of young people, suggesting that the parents’ 
human capital helps the youth to negotiate their way out of disadvantage. Again, Narayan 
and Pritchett (1999) used an expenditure model to study the role of social capital in 
influencing household outcomes in rural Tanzania. Their estimation of social capital is 
constructed on the weighted average of responses about membership of various groups, 
the characteristics of those groups, and attitudes relating to trust. Membership and 
household characteristics are used as associational activities, and trust has been 
instrumented as an endogenous variable. However, both these methods of measuring 
social capital are criticised by others. 
The other major problem involves the analysis of cause, manifestation and prediction of 
the outcomes of social capital. It is potentially problematic to characterise collective 
behaviour like trust and cooperation as an aggregation of individual social behaviour 
(Durlauf, 2002), because the relationships between individual and group characteristics 
are associated with, and reconstruct, each other. Moreover, various aspects of social 
capital (e.g. causes, manifestation, trust and cooperation) are not only the reflection of 
socio-economic factors, but also a reflection of the social norms and culture of social 
psychology (though socio-economic factors act to some extent to reinforce and shape 
norms and culture). Thus there is concern about ‘endogeneity’. Estimation of behavioural 
outcomes of social capital, in relation to various explanatory variables (e.g. socio-
economic variables, social networks) is an issue. The inferences from theoretical 
exploration of game theory1 might be drawn to predict possible patterns of relationship, 
i.e. factors associated with trust and cooperation. In this process, the implication of 
cooperative, repeated game theory may help understand optimal social behaviour at an 
individual level (Gibbsons, 1992). Given such theoretical assumptions, the outcomes of 
social capital involve an interactive decision-making process under uncertainty; therefore, 
this is an issue like those examined in game theory (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; ; Bo and 
                                                 
1 Game theory is the science of interactive decision making, used largely in behavioural economics. This 
strategy attempts to determine the actions that agents should take to secure the best outcomes for themselves 
in a wide array of games, mathematically and logically. That is, the outcome for each participant depends 
on the choices (strategies) of others. In the early years the emphasis was on games of pure conflict (zero-
sum games). Other games were considered in a cooperative form. That is, the agents were supposed to 
choose and implement their actions jointly. Recent research has focused on games that are neither zero sum 
nor purely cooperative; instead, the agents choose their actions separately, but link to others elements of 
both competition and cooperation. 
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Frechette, 2011). However, such an approach requires advanced studies to assess 
collective social behavior. The major problem involves the analysis and prediction of 
collective behaviour as an aggregation of, or derivation from, individual-level data 
(Durlauf, 2002). Game theory also tends to rely on rational maximising behaviour, yet 
confronts many indeterminate situations. Thus it is likely that other factors – cultural, 
emotional, etc. as well as shortcut heuristics – will play a strong part in actual behaviour. 
Sociologists tend to be critical of the over-individualistic/hyperrational approach of 
economists. 
The implications of game theory are not common in the literature on measuring social 
capital. However, game theory is commonly used in the study of trust and cooperation, 
which are assumed outcomes of social capital. Critics have put forward their concern 
about the fuzzy definition of social capital (Quibria, 2003; Durlauf, 2002; Ports, 2000). It 
could be argued that game theory is partially useful in exploring the outcomes of social 
capital, on the grounds that rational psychological behaviour may be facilitated by trust 
and cooperation. 
An estimation of relationships between variables representing different aspects of social 
capital requires careful analysis in order to make valid inferences concerning the 
underlying relationships. The method of estimation, based on the instrumental variables 
technique (as discussed further in Chapter 7), often suffers from econometric problems. 
 
2.3 Review of urban poverty and housing 
In this section we review the literature and data on urban poverty and housing, targeting 
mainly on Bangladesh, but also making some comparisons with the South Asian 
countries. There is a dearth of literature on urban poverty in Bangladesh, though a handful 
of literature is available on rural poverty. The literature on housing markets in Bangladesh 
is really scant. We illustrate this section with the help of tables, charts and diagrams based 
on data from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), the World Bank and the UN. 
2.3.1 Urbanisation 
Urbanisation in Bangladesh has accelerated; the annual rate of increase of the urban 
population was 2.4% during the period 2010—2015; this is higher than in other South 
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Asian countries (Islam et al., 2007; Hossain, 2008). Urban population growth is 1.1% in 
India and Pakistan and 2.0% in Vietnam (UN, 2014). Bangladesh’s growth is almost equal 
to the pace of urbanisation in China and Thailand. Such acceleration is primarily 
attributed to: (a) the persistent economic growth of the country (as discussed in a later 
section); and (b) a large proportion of the people still living in rural poor areas (see Figure 
2.2 below). Compared with 31.2 % and 36.2% in India and Pakistan respectively, 
Bangladesh’s urban population is 28.4%. Migration to cities is expected to be further 
accelerated by the situation facing rural people (Rana, 2011; Dewan et al., 2012).  
 
 
Source: UN (2014) 
Figure 2.2: Share of the urban population by country/region in 2014(%) 
 
In a densely populated country with one of the lowest GDPs in South Asia (see Table 2.1 
below), such urbanisation is accompanied by lack of basic infrastructure and services 
(Islam et al., 2013). Economic migrants to cities are most affected by these circumstances. 
The new migrants are mostly unskilled, which means they have little or no opportunity 
in the formal job market (see Appendix E). The informal job market pays lower wages to 
unskilled labourers than they need to maintain a standard living in cities (Sharit, 2005). 
Arguably, the government’s public policy is yet to fully appreciate the significance of the 
urban influx, exacerbating urban poverty (Banks et al., 2011b; Hossain, 2010). 
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Table 2.1: Population and growth rates in South Asia 
Country  Population Density  
 
Urban 
population 
GNP (based on PPP) 
($) 
(millions) 
2013 
(per sq. km.) 
2013 
(% of total)  
2013 
(billions) 
2013 
(per capital) 
2013 
Bangladesh 156.6 1203 33 498.8 3,190 
India 1252.1 420 32 6700.1 5,350 
Pakistan  182.1 236 38 881.4 4,840 
Sri Lanka 20.5 327 18 194.1 9,470 
Source: WB (2015) 
 
Along with economic factors, multiple other factors contribute to the growth of urban 
populations, including natural factors such as river erosion and flooding (Shachi, 2015; 
McPherson, 2015). Since formal and informal job markets are largely concentrated in 
cities, most of those affected migrate there, particularly to Dhaka. This phenomenon is 
found to some extent across the world, where economic opportunities are centralised 
(Chen and Rosenthal, 2008; Iversen et al., 2009). So the population growth rate in cities 
is faster compared with the growth in rural areas (see Figure 2.3 below). If these trends 
continue, the urban population of Bangladesh is expected to be half of the total population 
of the country by the end of 2040 (Banks et al., 2011a). 
 
 
Source: BBS (2011b) 
Figure 2.3: Trend of population growth of Bangladesh 
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With economic growth of a country comes the need for adequate infrastructures and 
services to cope with the situation. The influx of landless poor to cities creates the need 
for affordable housing and other basic urban services (Begum, 2007b). In the absence of 
such housing services, the urban poor are living in substandard informal housing, 
typically with no security of tenure, and major cities are overcrowded with poor people 
living in slums (see Table 2.2 below). In the absence of security of tenure, especially on 
public land, they are often forcefully evicted by government agencies or by the de facto 
owners who control such public land (Rahman, 2001). Sometimes, slums are burnt to 
reclaim control of the public land for new legitimate or illegitimate development (Rashid, 
2009a). All of this would aggravate the living conditions of the poor. 
 
Table 2.2: Slum settlements in major cities in Bangladesh 
City Dhaka Chittagong Khulna Rajshahi Barisal Sylhet 
City population (estimate) 9,136,182 4,133,014 966,837 489,514 365,059 356,440 
Number of slum population 3,420,521 1,465,028 188,442 156,793 109,705 97,676 
Slum population (% of total 
population) 37.4 35.4 19.5 32 30.1 27.4 
Number of slums 4,966 1,814 520 641 351 756 
Slum population density 
(per sq.km) 220,246 255,100 132,988 67,236 133,730 154,741 
Non-slum density (per sq 
km) 19,677 15,543 16,884 6,796 5,084 9,630 
Source: (Hossain, 2014) 
 
Socioeconomic vulnerabilities experienced by the urban poor originate from a number of 
sources, which, it may be argued, require to be addressed by public policies. 
Understandably, the economic vulnerability of the urban poor is the primary source of 
most, if not all, other vulnerabilities. Uncertainty of regular and adequate income is 
pushing the poor into, or keeping them in, slum neighbourhoods, which leads to other 
vulnerabilities, stemming from inadequacy of social opportunities and discriminatory 
social attitudes (Hossain, 2005; Lloyd-Jones and Rakodi, 2014), as well as public health 
hazards, poor infrastructure and difficulties of daily living. 
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2.3.2 Poverty and inequality in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh’s GDP is around $500 billion, which is less than one-tenth of India’s GDP. 
However, the country’s GDP has consistently grown over the last couple of decades (see 
Table 2.3 below). Compared with 4.8% annual growth in the 1990s, it has grown to a rate 
of 5.9% in the 2000s. The recent growth is even faster, at over 6% annually. Such growth 
is comparable with the average growth of South Asian countries, but it still lies behind 
that of Indian and Sri Lanka.  
Table 2.3: GDP Growth in South Asian countries 1990—2013 
Country Average annual % growth 
 1990-2000 2000-2009 2009-2013 
Bangladesh 4.8 5.9 6.2 
India 6.0 7.6 6.9 
Pakistan  3.8 5.1 3.1 
Sri Lanka 5.3 5.5 7.4 
Source: WB (2015) 
 
Household income has increased from BDT 5,842 (approx. £590) in 2000 to BDT 11,479 
(approx. £1150) in 2010. Over this period, such increases have simultaneously happened 
in both urban and rural areas. However, the annual percentage increase of household 
income is higher for rural households than for urban households. In the period between 
2000 and 2010, the average annual increase of rural household income was 10%, 
compared to a 6.7% annual increase in the incomes of urban households (see Figure 2.3 
below). 
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Source:(BBS, 2010c) 
Figure 2.3: Trend of household income over the period by urban/rural area 
 
Yet a significant proportion  of the  population  (17.6% by lower poverty line and 31.5% 
by upper poverty line in 2010) lives below the poverty lines (BBS, 2010a). The proportion 
is even higher according to the World Bank’s estimates.  Bangladesh has one of the 
highest poverty levels in South Asia (see Figure 2.4 below). Compared to 1.9% in Sri 
Lanka and 7.9% in Pakistan, 18.5% of people in Bangladesh live below the lower poverty 
line (WB, 2015). The percentage of people in Bangladesh living below the upper poverty 
line is also high compared to other South Asian countries.  
 
Source: World Bank (web database) 
Figure 2.4: Poverty head count ration (PPP) (% of population), 2010 
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The above discussion might imply that, though household income has increased and 
poverty has reduced significantly over the period, the reduction in poverty has been 
disproportionately low compared to the country’s economic advancement. Such a 
scenario is blamed on the unequal distribution of income and wealth (Sobhan, 2010). 
Thus poverty remains a major public policy concern in Bangladesh. In the following 
section, we discuss the income distribution and its historical trend. 
 
2.3.2.1 Income share of households 
The income share accruing to different household quintiles is presented below (Table 2.4 
below). Over the period, income share has declined in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles. In 
contrast, the income share in the top quintile has continuously increased during the period 
between 1983 and 2010. This means that not only the poor, but also the middle class 
suffered losses from the distribution of income. The income share of households in the 
bottom quintile decreased by two percentage points during the same period, with an 
annual average decline of .71%. Annual rates of decline in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles 
are .54%, .32% and .27%, respectively. This implies that the poorer households are, the 
more they suffer in terms of share in income.  
 
Table 2.4: National income share (1973-2010) 
Year Quintile 
 1st(bottom) 2nd 
 
3rd 
 
4th 
 
5th 
(top) 1973-74 7.0 11.3 15.1 22.8 44.4 
1981-82 6.6 10.7 15.2 22.1 45.3 
1983-84 7.2 11.8 15.9 21.7 43.4 
1985-86 7.0 11.2 15.1 20.7 46.0 
1988-89 6.6 10.9 15.1 21.2 46.2 
1991-92 6.5 10.9 15.5 22.2 45.0 
1995-96 5.7 9.8 13.9 20.5 50.1 
2000 6.3 9.7 13.2 18.8 52.0 
2005 5.3 9.1 13.1 19.8 52.7 
2010 5.2 9.1 13.3 20.6 51.8 
Annual 
change of 
share (%) 
-0.71  -0.54 -0.32 -0.27 0.46 
 
Source: Matin (2014) 
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Source: Worlds Bank (web database) 
Figure 2.4: Distribution of income by quintile in South Asia 
 
This situation is perhaps common in all South Asian countries where the lowest four 
quintiles hold less than 60% of the total income (see Figure 2.4 above). Clearly, the 
declines of income shares of the lower quintiles are attributed to the share gained by the 
5th quintile. During the period between 1983 and 2010, the gain of income share by the 
richest quintile is 8.4 percentage points, with an annual rate of increase of 0.31%.  
 
Source: (Matin, 2014) 
Figure 2.5: Ratio of income share (top 10% / bottom 10%) 
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The upward trends of the ratio of income shares between the top 10% and bottom 10% 
are displayed in Figure 2.5 above. The trend of the ratios is steeper in urban areas than  
the national trend, which means that income inequality is growing faster in urban areas 
than in rural ones (Matin, 2014). 
Income inequality in Bangladesh has continued to grow since its independence in 1971, 
and particularly since 1983. During the period between 1973-74 and 2010, national 
inequality increased from .36 to .46, with an average increase of 0.77% per year (see 
Table below). No significant difference in overall inequality is observed between rural 
and urban areas during the period. The Gini coefficient increased from .35 to .43 in rural 
areas, while it increased from 0.38 to 0.45 in urban areas, though a downward trend of 
Gini values is evident in urban areas between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Table 2.5: Gini index (household income) 
Year National Rural Urban 
1973-74 0.36 0.35 0.38 
1981-82 0.39 0.36 0.41 
1983-84 0.36 0.35 0.37 
1985-86 0.38 0.36 0.37 
1988-89 0.38 0.37 0.38 
1991-92 0.39 0.36 0.4 
1995-96 0.43 0.38 0.44 
2000 0.45 0.39 0.5 
2005 0.47 0.43 0.5 
2010 0.46 0.43 0.45 
Source: Matin (2014) 
 
However, the values of Gini concentration ratio is higher in urban aresa compared to their 
corresponding values of rural areas in all the corresponding years, suggesting the 
prevalence of higher income inequality in urban areas (Matin, 2014). By and large, the 
overall trend of income inequality in Bangladesh is upward. Such income inequality leads 
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to different levels of access to social opportunities. In the absence of equal social 
opportunities, the acquisition of human and physical capital is challenged by the low 
incomes of the urban poor, who are mostly engaged in the informal labour market (Lloyd-
Jones and Rakodi, 2014; Azam and Imai, 2009). Physical labour in the informal sector 
provides few opportunities to earn money even for daily subsistence, resulting in 
sustained poverty and inevitable ill health. Lack of human and physical capital forces the 
poor to rely on physical labour, and so they suffer when the income earner of the 
household gets sick. (Hossain, 2011b).   
In the absence of necessary social opportunities, the poorest quintiles in urban areas are 
more vulnerable and follow different strategies to tackle their livelihood challenges. They 
also lack assets that could be converted into cash during an emergency (Hossain, 2005). 
Their assets commonly include a cheap bed to sleep in, a table, cloths, a TV, a mobile 
phone and, more rarely, some gold ornaments. Low incomes and poor assets do not offer 
sufficient economic power to live beyond poverty and social vulnerability in the slums 
(Ahmed, 2015).  
2.3.3 Housing poverty 
The National Housing Policy, first prepared back in 1993, can be viewed as a major 
landmark in the field of housing. However, the effectiveness of the housing policy is 
insignificant, and it largely failed to ensure affordable housing to the large majority. In 
contrast, the evictions that took place in Dhaka between 1999 and 2001 affected hundreds 
of thousands of the poor (Hossain, 2010; Islam et al., 2007).Without particular attention 
to the issue of unaffordability inflicted from various sources, there is little hope that the 
housing problem in Bangladesh, particularly of those living in slums, will be solved in 
the near future. There are some isolated initiatives to accommodate the poor, but those 
are located in rural settings (GoB, 2011; Rahman, 2012). 
One of the policy principles was effectively to  involve the private sector and NGOs in 
the improvement of slums (Rahman, 2012; Rahman, 2010). This was expected to achieve 
some success in dealing with the problem of affordable housing to the poor. But due to 
large-scale finance requirements and risks associated with investment in such 
development, the involvement of the private sector was almost nil, and the involvement 
of NGOs was limited to raising awareness of housing rights. The Coalition of the Urban 
Poor (CUP) is one such NGO, working to protect the urban poor from potential eviction. 
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The only public/private partnership, the Vashatek housing project, aimed to build 9,024 
flats; 60% of these were intended to accommodate 9,000 urban poor, but they failed to 
reach those targeted because of political administrative interference and corruption in 
distribution (Khan, 2012c).  
Some changes were made to the subsequent Housing Policies in 2004 and 2012, which 
paid particular attention to the housing issues of the urban poor (Rashid, 2009b). 
However, according to this source, those policies still have no significant effect on the 
housing conditions of the urban poor. The key policies include: 
(i) Accommodation for the urban poor through the building of multi-storied and 
low-cost housing 
(ii) Sites and service schemes for low- and middle-income people 
(iii) Developing condominiums for low- and middle-income people 
(iv) Multi-storied flats to accommodate government employees 
(v) Housing for working women 
(vi) Low-cost housing in coastal areas  
(vii) Private sector involvement through necessary incentives and subsidies from the 
public sector 
(viii) Private and NGO involvement in ‘slum improvement’ 
 
The seventh five-year plan (2016-2020) has introduced some policy changes that are 
expected to improve the housing sector in Bangladesh. The policy includes improving 
residential infrastructures: housing, water, sanitation and the environment. Also, a strong 
multidisciplinary urban planning system is proposed for planning, implementation and 
management, so that well-coordinated housing planning and urban management can be 
achieved (Rahman, 2012).  
2.3.3.1 Housing market condition  
The National Housing Policy proposed to improve the housing market, but in practice it 
has achieved little. Therefore, housing supply in the market is very limited, resulting a 
huge shortage (5 million housing units) in the country. The situation in urban areas is 
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aggravated by increased housing needs each year. With existing housing needs, the 
housing market of Bangladesh faces a number of challenges2.  
(a) Housing shortage 
The large housing deficit is obviously a problem in all cities in Bangladesh, particularly 
in Dhaka. The estimated deficit in urban areas grew from 1.13 million units in 2001 to 
4.6 million units in 2010, and is estimated to be 8.5 million units in 2021 (GoB, 2015). 
The estimated annual housing demand is between 300,000 and 500,000. The housing 
demands of the lower- and lower-middle-income groups remain unmet, despite a great 
demand for low cost housing (BDT 600,000—100,000) (HBFI, 2014). Market response 
to affordable housing demand is almost zero; this is primarily attributed to high land 
prices in cities, particularly in Dhaka. Land is comparatively cheaper on the outskirts, but 
due to the poor transport system, this land has little practical value in responding to 
affordable housing demand. This situation exists to a greater or lesser extent across South 
Asian countries; however, Bangladesh’s shortage is 7% percentage points higher than that 
of India (see Figure 2.6).  
 
 
Source: WB (2009) 
Figure 2.6: Housing shortage in South Asia (share of total population) 
                                                 
2There is a dearth of research on the housing market in Bangladesh; therefore the following analysis relies 
primarily on the World Bank’s housing market research on South Asia, referred to in Nenova T. (2010) 
Exanding Housing Finance to the underserved in South Asia: Market Review and Forward Agenda, 
Washington World Bank . 
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There are more than 800 real estate developers in the country; however, they deal in 
luxury apartments (1000—15,000 sq. feet) to cater to the upper-income group. This 
formal housing market is relatively competitive, but accounts for only 3% of all housing 
being built in the country and is concentrated in Dhaka. Formal housing purchases are 
made for investment and rental purposes, and most formal housing units are built by 
private land owners. The low-cost housing demand is met by informal housing being 
constructed outside regulatory frameworks, either on private land or on the land where 
occupiers have no formal title; this accounts for one third of all housing built in the 
country (Nevona, 2009).  
(b) Limited housing supply  
Only 23% of urban housing is permanent, made of a variety of materials ranging from 
brick masonry and reinforced concrete pillars to tin roofs and tin walls. Approximately 
3.3 million housing units are made of temporary materials which require replacement 
every 1—5 years after construction. The condition of the slums or squatters’ housing is 
miserable; the materials used for building houses are very cheap and fragile and easily 
destroyed. The common housing materials are bamboo, mud, polythene and corrugated 
iron sheet; such housing provides little security from theft or adverse calamities like 
torrential rain and flooding. Those housed in such slums lack proper urban services, such 
as electricity, water, and sewerage. (Hossain, 2011b). 
Higher- and middle-income groups are housed in low-level buildings or multi-storeyed 
apartment buildings. The low-income groups (70% of total households) are housed in 
variety of houses. Half of them live in slums; some are private, others are built on public 
land illegally occupied by local power brokers. Conventional tenement slums contribute 
another quarter of low-cost houses. Other low-cost houses include government-provided 
squats, plots with basic services (given on a leasehold basis), employee housing, 
makeshift houses and pavement dwellings.  
The formal housing development process in Bangladesh is slow and costly due to poor 
master planning and a shortage of planning professionals in the public sector, as well as 
inadequacies of infrastructure, land acquisition, development, construction and mortgage 
financing. High land value is another important challenge to affordable housing supply. 
Residential land value in Dhaka is roughly $60 per square foot, which is significantly 
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higher than in any other city. However, this varies depending on location (a separate 
discussion of the trend of land and housing prices in Dhaka follows). The land price in 
Chittagong is 15% less than in Dhaka, and 30-40% less in other cities. 
Residential land in Dhaka is supplied by RAJUK (the capital development authority). 
There are similar authorities for each of the divisional cities, but they are merely 
functional.  RAJUK regulates city development, plays a role in planning, supplies land 
for housing having providing residential infrastructures, and carries out residential 
construction in its own right. Each of these could facilitate the private development and 
supply of housing, but in the way it actually functions, it constrains the supply of housing 
by private developers. It supplies land at an artificially low price, which distorts the 
market. 
The private development process is inefficient. Permits are required from at least eight 
different agencies, each of which involves delay, lack of transparency and governance 
problems. Additional delay is caused by inadequacies of legal and financial frameworks. 
The underlying risks involved in housing development limit the developers’ financing. 
Usually, housing loan-to-value is 50%, compared to closer to 100% in most other 
countries (Nenova, 2010). Moreover, the interest rate is as high as 16%, which is much 
higher than the interbank rate. So the development is mostly financed by private equity 
from the developers or from the buyers. This financial market condition delays the supply 
of housing.  
Bangladesh has a very limited secondary property market. The flawed land development 
process and speculative attitude to property prices are the primary reasons for this. There 
is a shortage of real estate brokers and appraisers, and poor information on market prices 
and valuation. The transfer tax rate is as high as 12.5%. There is no House Price Index in 
Bangladesh; India is the only country in south Asia with such an index, having introduced 
it in 2007 (Nenova, 2010). 
(c) Limited housing finance 
Three specialised housing finance institutions, the state-owned BHBFC, Delta-BRAC 
Housing (DBH) and National Housing Finance (NHF), have been established. They play 
a role in housing finance, along with the state-owned commercial banks (SCBs), private 
commercial banks (PCBs) and foreign commercial banks (FCBs). MFIs have also made 
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some contributions to housing finance. From the fiscal year 2005-06 to the fiscal year 
2013-14, the total outstanding housing finance increased from BDT 100,800 (£988) 
million to BDT 455,440 (£4,465) million. In 2013-14, the contribution of the specialised 
institutions, SCBs, PCBs and FCBs was BDT 60,900 (£597) million, BDT 100,100 
(£981) million, BDT 235,600 (£2,310) million and BDT 31,100 (£305) million 
respectively; whereas the total outstanding housing loans of MFIs amounted to about 
BDT 27,740 (£272) million. The growth of housing finance is satisfactory, particularly 
the growth of housing finance from PCBs (see Figure below). However, current housing 
investment relative to capital demand remains low  (BB, 2001-02 to 2013-14a; Kamal 
and Kamruzzaman, 2015). 
 
 
Source: Bangladesh Bank (2001-02 to 2013-14b) 
Figure 2.7: Outstanding loans (BDT in billion) of specialised housing finance 
institutions, PCBs, SCBs, FCBs, Non-bank Financial Institutions and MFIs 
 
The terms and conditions for mortgage finance in Bangladesh are expensive and complex. 
The average mortgage amount for housing finance varies between $36,000 and $43,600. 
The loan-to-cost is restrictive at a highest limit of 70%, but in practice it is 50%. The 
interest rates also vary between 14% and 15% with a maturity of period between 10 and 
15 years. Such terms and conditions vary little in other South Asian countries. The 
average mortgage in India is $30,000 which is capped at 85%, and the interest rate is 12% 
over 13 years of the maturity period. The corresponding figures are $21,000-$44,000, 15-
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17% and 12.5 years in Pakistan; and $10,000-$40,000, 15-17% and 15-25 years in Sri 
Lanka (Nenova, 2010). However, the ratio of housing debt to GDP is very low compared 
with many developing countries (see Figure 2.8 below).   
 
Source: Nenova (2010) 
Figure 2.8: Ratio of housing debt to GDP 
 
2.3.3.2 The housing market in Dhaka 
This analysis  relies on the data of Sheltech, one of the major real estate developers in 
Bangladesh, presented at a REHAB (association of real estate developers) seminar (Seraj, 
2014). Nominal prices per square foot of eight residential neighbourhoods at prime 
locations3 across the city are presented in Figure 2.10 below. The lines show the trends 
of prices over the past 25 years. Figure 2.11 represents the trends of land values per 720 
square feet.  
The average prices of housing sold at different locations increased little between 1990 
and 2005. However, prices increased sharply, by 2-6 times, thereafter, and this continued 
until 2012. House prices in Baridhara increased by more than six times between 2005 and 
                                                 
3‘Prime location’ means that the presence of real-estate developers is evident, presumably because of better 
locational attributes (i.e. well connected with the major part of Dhaka, services are available, etc.) relative 
to other locations. All of these attributes lead to a higher preference for those locations in Dhaka where the 
roads are generally congested because of higher population, services are distributed disproportionally, and 
so on. 
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2012, compared to only a twofold increase (from BDT 1,850 to 4,000) between 1990 and 
2005. After 2012, house prices started falling, and this continues to the present. There 
was an obvious bubble, inflated by the speculative housing price and followed by the 
market correction thereafter. There was also political instability in 2012, which might 
also have influenced the falling market price (Kamal and Kamruzzaman, 2015). Yet 
current prices remain much higher than those of 2005; the market price of per unit housing 
in Baridhara was BDT 18,000 in 2015, which is 4.5 times the price of 2005. The house 
price in Mirpur (a relatively little-preferred location among the eight) increased by 
double, from BDT 1,250 in 1990 to 2,500 in 2005 and then to 7,500 in 2012; however, in 
2015 the price decreased to BDT 5,500, which is still higher than it was in 2005. Housing 
prices in Uttara and Mohammadpur remain almost the same at all times; however, the 
price in Uttara started falling in 2014.  
Per unit housing prices in Baridhara and Dhanmondi (comparable locations) were BDT 
4,000 and 4,500 in 2005. But the prices variations between neighbourhoods and among 
different locations started widening after 2005. Exceptionally, the price in Baridhara 
increased from BDT 4,000 to 25,000 in 2012, exceeding that of its rival Dhanmondi. That 
price remains on top of the list of Dhaka’s housing market, followed by Gulshan, Banani 
and Dhanmondi where the prices varied between BDT 15,000 and 15,500. Other 
neighbourhoods offered comparatively cheaper housing, ranging between BDT 7,500 and 
8,000 in Uttara and Mirpurand and BDT 10,000—12,000 in Lalmatia and 
Mohammadpur.  
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Source: Sheltech’s presentation, The Prospect of Real Estate Sector in Bangladesh, at the 
REHAB seminar Seraj (2014) 
Figure 2.9: The trend of house price at 8 prime locations in Dhaka 
 
With the exception of Mirpur, all are planned neighbourhoods where RAJUK (the capital 
development authority) supplied land through ‘site and services’ schemes. Those planned 
neighbourhoods have failed to offer cheaper housing. But Mirpur has offered cheaper 
housing, which suggests that neighbourhoods that develop spontaneously are more 
affordable. Generally in these areas, installation of residential infrastructures and services 
is made on demand once housing is developed. Planning controls and regulations such as 
building height and setback compliance are still enforced, but infrastructures and service 
conditions are poor, with irregular street patterns, no public space and insufficient 
sunlight.  
Land values started to increase in 2000. In 1990, the land value in Baridhara, Gulshan, 
Banani, Dhanmondi and Lalmatia was BDT 0.6 million per 720 sq. feet. It was 0.5 
million, 0.3 million and 0.2 million, respectively in Mohammadpur, Uttara and Mirpur. 
In 2000, the land value in Baridhara increased from 0.5 million to 5 million, which is 
more than eight times than in 1990. It was also increased in other locations. Between 1.8 
and 2.2 million per unit land was sold in Gulshan, Banani, Dhanmondi and Lalmatia,  1.2 
million in Mohammadpur, 1 million in Uttara and 0.7 million in Mirpur. Land values in 
the planned neighbourhoods increased substantially in the later period. In 2012, per unit 
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land in Baridhara, Gulshan, Banani and Dhanmondi was sold at 70 million, 60 million, 
40 million and 50 million respectively. The trend in house prices could suggests that the 
change in land values may be driven by the change in house prices – since the construction 
element of cost is less volatile, the ‘residual’ land value is more volatile.  
 
 
 
Source: Sheltech’s presentation, The Prospect of Real Estate Sector in Bangladesh, 
at the REHAB seminar (Seraj, 2014) 
Figure 2.10: The trend of land value at respective locations in Dhaka 
The estimated annual average increase of house price is 19%. However, the highest 
increase is 35% in Baridhara, 17%—21% in Gulshan, Banani, Dhanmondi and Lalmatia, 
and 11%—15% in Mohammadpur, Uttara and Mirpur. 6—8% inflation could be one 
reason for such increase; however, a large part of the problem is attributed to the 
speculative land prices driven by the house price bubble of 1990—2010 (Das, 2014). It 
may be that the price boom between 2005 and 2012 was driven by international events 
and financial flows, especially by investment by richer people, than by real/demographic 
demands – which have been steadily increasing for decades.  
As well as land value, the incremental prices of construction materials have also 
contributed to housing price increase. The annual price is increased by 30% on brick, 
17.5% on coarse sand, 9.5% on cement, and 15% on steel-rod, over the last 25 years. The 
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price of construction materials has increased sharply, particularly the price of brick. 
However, unlike land prices (which shot up until 2012 and fell thereafter), the prices of 
the construction materials has increased consistently since 1990.  
The average apartment size produced in in the market was substantially high for the 
middle class, at approximately 1300 sq. feet (Chowdhury, 2013). Such an apartment 
would cost BDT 23.4 million in Baridhara and 7.15 million in Mirpur, which is obviously 
unaffordable for the middle-income group. Market trends are perhaps similar in other 
large cities.  
(e) Major barriers to delivering affordable housing for the urban poor 
There are many NGOs working for the livelihood improvement of the urban poor; 
however, none of them is working directly in affordable housing development (Rahman, 
2002). There are a few initiatives by the local NGOs which include special dormitories 
for garment workers, mentally or physically disabled people, street children, orphans, and 
working mothers, as well as slum development, housing rights and management support. 
But most of those initiatives are one-off, suggested and supported by international 
development; this overlooks the issue of long-term financial viability (Stiles, 2002; Islam 
et al., 2007).   
There are several problems regarding non-involvement of NGOs in housing. The high 
prevalence of urban poverty undermines housing need, so the priority mainly lies in 
facilitating income generation. Government policy has yet to recognise housing in the 
sustainable poverty reduction strategy (Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2013), thus policy support 
for subsidised land and finance for housing has not been addressed. Moreover, the 
majority of the urban poor, do not have legal land title (Rashid and Hossain, 2005). This 
situation is not favourable for the financing of housing. There are some specific concerns 
regarding affordable housing for the urban poor.  
1. Policy problems. Affordable housing for the urban poor has always been undermined 
in housing policy (NHA, 1999). Housing policy has not addressed residential land supply 
for the urban poor, finance for construction, or recovery of such finance. Effective 
strategies could have significant impacts on affordable housing for the urban poor. Their 
relocation to peri-urban areas, or city fringes, appeared to be unsuccessful; the lack of 
income opportunities in the new areas ultimately push back the poor households to the 
city centre.(Ullah, 1994; CUS, 1988).  
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2. Poor market infrastructures. There are limited opportunities for housing construction 
and mortgage finance; in reality the urban poor have no access to financial markets 
(HBFI, 2014). The absence of clear land titles, higher interest rates, short term loan 
periods, higher transfer fees, the absence of a secondary housing market, and poor market 
regulations not only prevent housing supply, but also makes housing expensive (Mu, 
2007; Kamal and Kamruzzaman, 2015). 
3. Lack of affordability. The urban poor cannot afford formal housing at market prices. 
At the same time,  the housing market cannot respond to the housing need of those poor 
(Khan, 2012a; Zaman, 2000; Sobhan, 2010), so a subsidy is expected at some stage of 
housing production. 
4. Local powerbrokers. Slums in cities are controlled by local powerbrokers (Mollah, 
2008; Hye, 2014). Any housing development on existing slum land is potentially 
challenged by those influential people affiliated with the political party in power. Political 
interference in housing plans may be expected in this regard.  
5. Urban Form. The density of populations in major cities, particularly in Dhaka and 
Chittagong, complicates responses to the issue of housing upgrading. A gradual in situ 
upgrading of informal housing is unlikely to work; there is a need to undertake cellular 
redevelopment of apartment buildings, with relocation of residents at least temporarily. 
There are also issues around the allocation and control of land across the city e.g. vast 
areas are controlled by military and are not in productive urban use (Ahmed et al., 2014).  
Various housing improvement strategies are practiced internationally. Chile adopts a 
holistic approach to affordable housing by policing land and finance (Rojas, 2001). 
Singapore adopted such policy in the 1960s (Phang, 2001). Other strategies include 
increasing of supply and regularising and improving existing slums (Sivam, 2014). A 
self-help approach has been adopted by many countries across the world as a way of 
improving the housing conditions of the urban poor (Berner and Phillips, 2005). For a 
poor country like Bangladesh, with scarce land and capital, no suitable solution has 
emerged. The approach to regularising slums could have merit, but such an approach 
might be challenged by the large concentrations of urban poor in cities, particularly in 
Dhaka and Chittagong.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
Social capital has been the subject of increasing governmental interest in the last few 
years, particularly in Australia, the UK and Europe, because of its implications for, and 
association with, social wellbeing. The theory and concepts have significantly informed 
many government policy debates. The concepts are increasingly being seen as an 
important ingredient of personal and community wellbeing, which facilitates many 
outcomes of government policy. International agencies, such as the World Bank and the 
OECD, now view social capital as an important emerging area of inquiry, and 
international research institutes are presently exploring the concepts.  
Figure 2.1 illustrates some of the key definitions, links, benefits and issues identified. The 
concept explores the interaction between people, and the value of this interaction in 
promoting trust and co-operation. It would appear that this interaction is important; 
however, there is less clarity about the optimum form of this interaction and the factors 
necessary to maximise its outcomes. It would appear that some interactions are more 
profitable than others in achieving particular goals and certain conditions.  
There appears to be a close relationship between social capital and housing development. 
Social capital is generally thought to be a component of community cooperation; 
however, strong cooperation is thought to be more than networks of people who develop 
trust and reciprocity. A strong community is said to need a range of different capitals to 
engender a sense of belonging and participation.  
The persistent economic growth of the country, which is largely driven by the urban 
economy, is attracting the poor to cities. The changing economy thus creates an ever-
increasing demand for more low-income housing in cities for the poor households. 
Therefore, failure to ensure an adequate supply of affordable housing means that the 
additional poor would be obliged move to informal housing, generating social costs.  
The uneven distribution of income and wealth has further hampered  the poor in the 
acquisition of a minimal standard of housing (Rao and Hassan, 2012). The market 
economy has ensured housing for the upper-income group but has failed to deliver 
affordable housing to the poor (UN-Habitat and UNESCAP, 2008; Sobhan, 2010). 
Market mechanisms and institutions contribute to the choice of housing, while household 
income and house prices have pushed the poor into informal housing (Huang and Clark, 
2002). It is unlikely that the poor can achieve adequate housing in the market process. 
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However, given the government’s financial constraints and the scarcity of urban land, the 
non-market approach may undermine the potential to house the large volume of poor 
people. This situation would seem to indicate the need for an approach in which the 
benefits of a market approach are retained while delivering affordable housing to the 
urban poor in Bangladesh. The implications of social capital in such approach may have 
merits. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has discussed the theories of social capital and the approaches undertaken in 
its quantitative measurement (see Section 2.2). This chapter discusses the detailed 
methodology used in conducting this study. In Section 3.2, we discuss the philosophical 
ground for choosing the methodology, which is based on perspectives within social 
science research. This is then followed by a discussion of detailed methodology in Section 
3.3. The methodology section discusses the quantitative approach which has been 
followed in the conducting of this study. The major aspects of the quantitative approach 
are discussed under the following headings: (i) the process of selecting the study 
participants; (ii) the measures used to address the research questions; (iii) the procedures 
followed in field survey; and (iv) the techniques employed in data analysis. Section 3.4 
discusses the ethical considerations that have been taken into account in the whole process 
of this study. Finally, we discuss the different stages of the research. 
 
3.2 Philosophical ground 
Social research can be defined as  the gathering of information on the social world, in 
order to better understand the real world (Hitchcock and Hughes, 1995: p. 5). The 
investigative process of conducting scientific social research is thus an important aspect. 
Depending on the academic discipline and the nature of the research topics, the deductive 
and inductive approaches are widely followed in scientific social research; though each 
approach has its limitations; there is also an interactive process, weaving back and forth 
between real world and theory, this is sometimes called the mixed method (Bryman, 
2012b; Creswell, 2013). The researcher’s perspectives on the relationship between the 
theory and intended social inquiry also influence the process. These are broadly defined 
as a system of beliefs or practices that influence researchers to select a particular method 
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for the study; these beliefs or perspectives guide the investigation and are views and 
beliefs about the nature of reality, knowledge and values (Morgan, 2007; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994). Research philosophy encompasses two broad dimensions: ontology, and 
epistemology (Bryman, 2012b). Epistemology is the theory of knowledge, whereas 
ontology is the theory of reality, the fundamental nature of social phenomena. Ontological 
assumptions can be based on social phenomena, either independent of social actors 
(objectivism) or entirely dependent on the perception and interactions of social actors 
(constructivism). Such assumptions lead researchers to follow a particular methodology, 
in turn giving rise to issues of instrumentation and data collection (Hitchcock and Hughes, 
1995).  
In this study social capital is viewed as a social phenomenon generated through social 
interactions among social actors within social institutions (see Chapter 2). The norms and 
values of social institutions are constantly changing through social reconstruction and 
reaffirmation and through practices and modifications (Bicchieri, 2005). This study 
investigates the real world on the basis of theoretical assumptions about social capital, so 
the approach may be viewed as social constructivism. Theory has played an important 
role, and influenced the formulation of research enquiry (Fetterman, 2010) and the 
development of specific research instruments to attempt to capture the social 
phenomenon. The study relies on the participants in gaining the perspective to interpret 
the findings from a third person perspective.  
The theoretical concepts in this study are derived from previous researchers’ work 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988a), some of which could be seen as grounded theory or 
constructivist in approach. These concepts have gained mainstream recognition, and this 
enables this study to treat them as relatively objective phenomena with generally accepted 
properties, and to proceed to measure them using large scale social survey techniques (see 
Maanen, 1988). The study measures relatively subjective phenomena, following the 
theoretical proposition to derive answers to the research questions. The approach may 
also be viewed as traditional positivism, as it relies on a set of empirical data. This 
approach assumes that the social world is fundamentally similar to the natural world, so 
in reality the social world is governed by social laws and values which explains the social 
life (Bryman, 2012b; Ryan, 1970). The perspective of the researcher in interpreting the 
real world is critical in the study, and may be viewed in line with the critical realism.  
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3.3. Research Method 
This study has used a cross-sectional household survey designed to collect data on 
different aspects of the social capital of the urban poor in Bangladesh. Approximately 
1,800 households from 18 clusters across three cities have been sampled, and data has 
been gathered via face-to- face interviews. In the following four sub-sections, details 
about the methodology carried out for this study, are discussed: 
 Participants 
 Measures 
 Procedure 
 Data analysis 
3.3.1 The Participants 
This study uses primary household level data. The survey was conducted in a 
collaboration between the Institute for Inclusive Finance and Development (InM), 
Bangladesh, formerly known as the Institute of Microfinance, and Heriot-Watt 
University, Edinburgh, UK. The households were interviewed in a two-stage sample 
design process. First, 18 primary sampling units (PSU) were selected from three cities 
representing different categories (the capital city, metropolitan cities and secondary 
towns). Then, 100 households were selected from each of the 18 PSUs, which included 
11 poor slums and 7 comparator neighbourhoods. The poor neighbourhoods are 
essentially informal housing areas which largely lack proper utility services, and the land 
ownership is mixed, but is typically controlled by the local power-brokers, who rent 
informal housing to the urban poor. The comparator neighbourhoods were selected from 
slightly better-off areas nearby, where the next stage of mobility of the urban poor might 
have taken place. The purpose of selecting comparator neighbourhoods was to provide a 
comparison with the poor/slum neighbourhoods. Such distinctions might be obvious 
largely by the legal right to land, the availability of services (e.g. electricity, gas, school), 
and the somewhat higher income of the residents. Therefore, the characteristics of the 
comparator neighbourhood might indicate a comparatively better standard of living 
among the residents, which the poor households could aspire to. It should be noted here 
that the residents of the comparator neighbourhoods are also poor, but have access to 
higher social opportunities such as the legal connection of water, electricity, and gas, as 
well as access to schooling. Such conditions offer better livelihood opportunities to the 
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residents compared to those in poor/slum neighbourhoods. Therefore, the selection of 
comparator households was carefully drawn to capture those criteria. 
The households were selected from both owner-occupiers and tenants. However, very 
few households in poor neighbourhoods own the land (CUS, 2006); it is either public or 
extended to the surrounded private land, where the de facto or private owners build 
substandard housing for rent. Field investigators visited the sample households physically 
to conduct the face-to-face interviews. 
3.3.2 Measures 
(Refer to Appendix A and Chapter 2 for details) 
Measures are adopted based on the literature i.e. where some past study on the urban poor 
in Bangladesh influenced possible characteristics/questions/categories etc. The 
researcher’s previous experience in field research with the InM also informed the research 
design. The study adopted a number of variables relevant to the research questions. Those 
variables are derived from social capital theories and literature which can be linked with 
Chapter 2. The variables can be grouped under the following four headings. Their names, 
natureand the type of data are presented in the tables below in the respective heading. 
 Socio-economic and demographic characteristics   
 Social network 
 Trust 
 Cooperation  
3.3.2.1 Socio-economic and demographic variables  
(see also Appendix A, Sections 1, 2 and 3 for details) 
This part of the questionnaire aimed to collect responses on demography, community 
attachment, assets, expenditures, savings and debt.  
 
Demography 
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Table 3.1: Demographic information of the households  
Variable Variable Type  Data Type 
Sex of the household member dichotomy numeric 
Age continuous numeric 
Relation to the household head categorical numeric 
Marital status categorical numeric 
Level of education categorical numeric 
Nature of educational institution  categorical numeric 
Occupation of the member categorical numeric 
Nature of occupation categorical numeric 
Daily trip distance   continuous numeric 
Monthly income  continuous numeric 
 
Different scales were used to obtain answers on seven categorical variables. For example, 
answer options for sex are male and female, whereas the answers options for the relation 
with household head or level of education are more than two and differ. For the 
continuous variables, the answer options were open.  
 
Community involvement 
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3.2: Community involvement and housing  
Variable Variable Type  Data Type 
Duration of living in the community continuous numeric 
Whether born in the community dichotomy numeric 
Sense of belongingness in the community  dichotomy numeric 
Ownership of land on which the HH is living categorical numeric 
Status in the house   categorical numeric 
Person who collects the house rent categorical numeric 
Number of rooms used continuous numeric 
Average size of rooms continuous numeric 
Duration of living in the previous community continuous numeric 
Number of migrations in last 20 years continuous numeric 
Reason for migration categorical numeric 
Socio-economic loss from the displacement categorical numeric 
Whether having National Identity Card dichotomy numeric 
 
Multiple answers were possible for variables such as reason for migration and socio-
economic loss. 
Other financial variables  
Household assets 
Examples of household assets include land, rickshaw/van, bicycle, small machinery, 
furniture, TV, computer, mobile phone, ornaments and fridge. The number/amount and 
present market value were collected in numeric form. 
Monthly expenditure 
This variable includes expenditure on food, house rent, children’s education, utilities, 
transportation, healthcare, mobiles, garments, loan and insurance instalments,  incidental 
expenditures and others for the last year Data were collected in numeric form. 
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Financial debt and savings 
This data includes debt and savings with the NGO/MFI, cooperatives, relatives, 
neighbours, friends and banks. In addition, data relating to debts with informal money 
lenders and to cash in hand wre also collected. All responses are in numeric form. 
Vulnerability in terms of income, healthcare, housing, social justice 
To assess the socioeconomic challenges and opportunities of the urban poor, the 
following issues were asked about; these are linked to social position and thus assumed 
to contribute to social capital (see Section 2.2.1, Chapter 2). A six-category Likert scale 
was used to record respondents’ perceptions regarding the possibility of experiencing:  
 risk of loss of job or income  
 risk of eviction from the land  
 risk of being affected by flooding  
 risk of fire  
 risk of the house being damaged by strong wind or rainfall 
 risk of receiving unequal treatment in workplace/education/health services/public 
transport 
 risk of being accused of theft or crime 
 risk of being harassed by the police, local leaders or political leaders  
 risk to health from daily work 
 risk to health from living environment 
 improving social dignity 
The highest order of 6 in the Likert scale was employed for the ‘highest possibility’, 
and in contrast, the lowest order 1 was employed if there was ‘no possibility’. 
Vulnerability if attempting to access local government services 
To assess such vulnerability three questions were asked:  
 whether, in the last year, any member of the household sought services from the 
police, hospital, court of justice, or other government branches  
 if sought, whether the member received any service or not  
Answers to both questions were either ‘yes’ or ‘no’  
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 in cases where member sought the services of any of these three organisations but 
did not receive them, then they were asked to select the reason for this from a list 
of five answer options4 (see Appendix A) 
 Access to finance 
If any member of the household was involved with the Microfinance Institution (MFI), 
the data on the following variables were collected (Table 3.3). 
 
Table 3.3: Access to finance 
Variable Variable 
Type  
Data 
Type 
Frequency of visit by MFI official continuous numeric 
Year of joining in MFI  continuous numeric 
Number of MFIs involved with continuous numeric 
Number of family members involved continuous numeric 
Total debt with MFIs continuous numeric 
Frequency of MFI group meeting  categorical numeric 
 
Data on MFI involvement (where multiple MFIs were found) were recorded for a single 
member of a household. The frequency of MFI meetings was coded into seven categories, 
between 1 for ‘daily meetings’ and 7 for ‘no meetings’ at all. 
Again, to assess access to formal finance from banks, data from the following questions 
were collected:  
 whether the respondent sought any loan from the formal bank  
 if sought, whether the loan was granted  
 the perception on whether the participants would get a loan, if they asked for it 
                                                 
4 1= no reason; 2=wanted bribe; 3=didn’t take my complaint seriously; 4=the mediator wanted a bribe; 
5=other 
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The answer formats were ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Again, perceptions regarding the difficulties 
of getting a loan were divided into six categories. 
3.3.2.2 Social Networks 
Various aspects of social networks were taken into consideration while preparing the 
research questionnaire. If the perceived scope for socialisation and social interaction, the 
actual bonding network, the bridging and linking network and cultural capital were 
known, then an overall notion of social capital could be achieved. Therefore, questions 
were prepared to look at those aspects (see Section 2.2.4, Chapter 2). 
Scope for socialisation or social interactions 
To understand the scope for socialization, data were collected using the questions below 
in addition to the data collected on formal education and occupation in the social identity 
section. 
 
Table 3.4: Scope for socialisation 
Variable Variable 
Type  
Data 
Type 
Whether living in a joint family dichotomy numeric 
Whether sharing with another family dichotomy numeric 
Number of families living together continuous numeric 
Number of members if living together continuous numeric 
Number of relatives living in the community  continuous numeric 
Whether neighbours invited to occasion like marriage  dichotomy numeric 
Where they celebrated Eid/Puja in last five years categorical numeric 
 
Information on the scope for social interaction is captured by a number of questions on 
whether the participants attended various social gathering in the community, or outside 
of it, and whether they received any help last year. 
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Table 3.5: Scope for social interactions 
Variable Variable Type  Data Type 
Number of family members attending mosque/Madrasa continuous numeric 
Frequency of attending mosque/Madrasa categorical numeric 
Time spent in mosque/Madrasa on each visit  continuous numeric 
Number of neighbours’ households visited daily  dichotomy numeric 
Time spent on each visit to neighbours continuous numeric 
Number of persons met through daily work  continuous numeric 
Time spent with each person  continuous numeric 
Frequency of meeting in the community categorical numeric 
Duration of the community meeting continuous numeric 
Frequency of attending the community meeting  categorical numeric 
Time spent on a community meeting continuous numeric 
Frequency of attending meetings outside  categorical numeric 
Time spent at an outside meeting  continuous numeric 
Frequency of attending if any other meeting held categorical numeric 
Time spent at other meetings continuous numeric 
 
Frequency codes assigned as 1 for ‘never’ attended/visited/met, and, in contrast, 6 for 
attended/visited/met once every two years. 
Bonding and bridging or linking networks  
To obtain perceptions of bonding networks (See Section 2.2.2.2, Chapter 2), the 
participants were asked whether they maintained any contact with the persons in the table.  
 
Table 3.6: Bonding networks 
Variable Variable 
Type  
Data Type 
Relatives dichotomy numeric 
Friends dichotomy numeric 
Neighbours dichotomy numeric 
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Variable Variable 
Type  
Data Type 
Coworkers dichotomy numeric 
Parents of children’s friends dichotomy numeric 
Community leaders dichotomy numeric 
Others (if any) dichotomy numeric 
 
If the participants answered ‘yes’, then they were further asked about the number of 
persons in each of the above categories with whom they maintained contact, and whether 
those contacts were living in the same community. Also, the question was asked of how 
frequently these others were contacted in the last year, and a list of coded answers was 
given. 
The question further moved to extract the notion of ‘help received’ in the past year from 
those persons listed. There was a list of eleven co-operations, from which the participants 
chose one or more cooperative interaction (see Appendix A). 
To obtain views about bridging and linking networks, a similar set of questions examined 
whether the participants involved or maintained contact with a party, group, organisation 
or persons with higher social status; the answer  options to these were ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
 
Table 3.7: Bridging and linking networks 
Variable Variable 
Type  
Data 
Type 
Member involved with a political party dichotomy numeric 
Relative involved with a political party dichotomy numeric 
Member maintained contact with any professional  dichotomy numeric 
Member maintained contact with any businessman dichotomy numeric 
Member maintained contact with any govt. service provider 
(water, gas, electricity, etc.) 
dichotomy numeric 
Member maintained contact with any voluntary organisation 
(legal, healthcare, education support)  
dichotomy numeric 
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Variable Variable 
Type  
Data 
Type 
Member maintained contact with any NGO dichotomy numeric 
Member maintained contact with any local government 
employee 
dichotomy numeric 
Member maintained contact with the police or justice dichotomy numeric 
 
If the participants answered ‘yes’, then, they were asked about the number of the party, 
group, organisation or persons in each of the above categories with whom they kept 
contact, and whether the person/persons were living in the same community. Moreover, 
the question was asked of how frequently the respondent made contact during the last 
year, and coded answers were given as with the bonding network. 
Similarly to the bonding network, the question further moved to enquire about the nature 
of any help received from the party, group, organisation or persons over the last year.  
Cultural capital 
The cultural content, or the associations of social interactions which help build social 
networks, is considered an important aspect of social capital (see Section 2.2.3.4, Chapter 
2). Perceptions of cultural capital were captured through the lens of culture, relating to 
issues such as: attending religious meetings or religious group meetings, political 
meetings or demonstrations, voluntary work, social clubs, national celebrations such as 
Independence Day, language day and environment day. The participants were asked 
whether they attended those events and gatherings. If so, the frequency of attending those 
meetings, demonstrations, clubs and celebrations was recorded, following a frequency 
code similar to the one used in the social network section. 
3.3.2.3 Trust  
Trust in People and Organisations 
To gain an idea of the participants’ trust in networks, they were asked to rank among 
relatives, friends, neighbours, coworkers, group members, community leaders, political 
leaders, NGO officials and religious leaders, whom they trusted. The three questions 
asked were:  
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 who they would prefer to lend money to, if they could 
  who they would trust to look after their house in their absence 
  who they believed would help them in an emergency situation  
These questions helped to rank the trust in bonding networks. 
Then, to assess trust in public and formal institutions, the participants’ opinions were 
sought on a 6-point Likert scale between ‘agree’ and ‘disagree’ with the following eight 
statements:  
 the local government provided necessary services in the community  
 services from the police were available if needed  
 the justice system was impartial to all 
 the water supply authority provided necessary services 
 the electricity distribution authority provided necessary services 
  the political party worked for the wellbeing of the common people  
 the national NGO worked for the economic development of the people 
 the international NGOs worked for the economic development of the 
common people 
  
3.3.3.4 Cooperation 
How trust and reciprocity may be translated into cooperation can be found in the literature 
(see Section 2.2.4, Chapter 2).  Based on an understanding of the literature, several 
questions were asked on how the urban poor cooperate with each other. The questions 
had two aspects: a) financial cooperation and b) non-financial cooperation. 
The participants were asked:  
(i) whether any incidence of financial cooperation occurred in the community in 
last one year   
(ii) if so, what kind of cooperation   
(iii) whether any member of the household took part in that cooperation  
(iv) whether any member received any financial cooperation from the community 
(v) whether the participants cooperated with others in the community  
(vi) if they received cooperation, then who cooperated  
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(vii) who the participants believed would help in future financial cooperation in an 
emergency  
(viii) and (ix) asked for details about how much money, and the level of cooperation, 
if the participants received any financial cooperation or believed they would 
do so in an emergency. 
 
A similar set of questions to those used in the financial cooperation section was employed, 
and answer options were provided to access data regarding non-financial cooperation. 
The only difference was that ‘the amount of financial cooperation’ was replaced by ‘the 
nature of non-financial cooperation’ and interviewees picked one or more appropriate 
answers from a list.  
3.3.2.5 Housing and services  
Since the study intends to inform affordable housing for the urban poor, the participants 
were asked questions relevant to the scope for housing development.  
 
Table 3.8: The scope for housing development 
Variable Variable 
Type  
Data Type 
Problems of living in the community  categorical numeric 
Desire to live in a house/flat with essential facilities categorical numeric 
Intended duration of living in such house/flat  interval numeric 
Opinion on ‘no objection to shared kitchen’ ordinal numeric 
Opinion on ‘no objection to shared toilet’ ordinal numeric 
Opinion on ‘care of shared facilities’ ordinal numeric 
Suitable location of the desired house/flat ordinal numeric 
Capability to make a deposit on desired house/flat  continuous numeric 
Capability to pay the balance over next 30 years categorical numeric 
Capability to pay instalments of more than the house rent  dichotomy numeric 
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Variable Variable 
Type  
Data Type 
Trust in organisations for the development of such house/flat   ordinal numeric 
Preference for important facilities ordinal numeric 
 
A list of eighteen issues that might create problems for residents living in the community 
was given to answer question 1. For question 2, the participants were asked to rank their 
preference for the present community location, a location close to the current community, 
the outskirts of the town, or a place where the opportunity for earning is secured. 
For the question on trust in organisations, the respondents were given a list of six options 
and asked to rank them:  
(i) central government  
(ii)  local government  
(iii) national MFI/NGO  
(iv) international NGO 
(v)  private developer  
(vi) other, if mentioned 
Distance from major community facilities  
Locational attributes are an important aspect of housing upgrading, because these 
attributes affect the suitability of the housing. The poor typically prefer their housing to 
be near the city centre, where the access to opportunities is greatest (see Section 2.3 of 
Chapter 2). For the question on preference to important facilities, respondent were asked 
to rank services like grocery shops, bus stops, work facilities, schools, shops, playing 
fields, security, railway stations, good transport facilities, hospitals, mosques/mondirs, 
local environments, and others, if any, that were important to a community. Also, the 
important facilities of the current community were listed in the format below, and 
respondents were asked to estimate the distance to these facilities in kilometres. 
 
Table 3.9: Distance from major community facilities 
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Variable Variable 
Type  
Data Type 
Grocery shop continuous numeric 
Bus stop continuous numeric 
Railway station continuous numeric 
School continuous numeric 
Government hospital continuous numeric 
Community clinic continuous numeric 
Government offices continuous numeric 
Shops continuous numeric 
Playing field continuous numeric 
Mosque/mondir continuous numeric 
 
3.3.3 Procedure 
3.3.3.1 Sample size calculation  
The aim was to have a sufficiently large sample to draw reasonably confident conclusions 
on the incidence of particular phenomena, to compare different groups/areas, and to 
estimate effective models to explain and predict variations in aspects of social capital. 
The target household sample size was calculated based on 18 sample clusters selected 
from three cities having more or less 1,000 households, allowing for a 95% confidence 
level of the study neighbourhoods resulting in 807 HHs. Since the survey is a cluster 
sample rather than a simple random sample, the sample size has been multiplied by the 
design effect (D), which is commonly ranged from 1.5 to 3.0 to correct the difference in 
design. In this study, D value was considered 2 as the population characteristics are truly 
homogenous: n*2 =807*2= 1614. The sample size was further increased by 10% to 
account for contingencies such as non-response or recording error. Thus, the final sample 
size was: n + 10% = 1775 households from 18 PSU. 
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3.3.3.2 Sampling errors and precision  
Since the study does not include every household within the population of interest, the 
sample mean might differ from the population mean. This difference is attributable to 
sampling error. The margin of error is a broader way of expressing sampling error, which 
measures an uncertainty about the estimates.   
The term ‘social capital’ is a collective measure of a number of qualitative variables such 
as social identity, mutual trust, social networks and cooperation; perceptions in relation 
to those psychological attributes vary widely. Therefore, it seems imprudent to be 
restricted within the lower level of precision. Thus a 5-10% margin of error in estimation 
has been targeted, which seems to have been reasonable for the qualitative nature of the 
data set, to obtain a convincing statistical inference.  
The response rate was very satisfactory. More than 90% of the sample households, in 11 
target clusters of urban poor, participated in the interviews. Almost certainly, 
compensation (BDT 100 (£1) for 45 minutes interview) for participation boosted the 
response rate. But the response rate was mixed in seven immediate higher income 
clusters, where households were somewhat more reluctant to participate in the interviews. 
In such cases, the surveyors were asked to approach the next sampled household until 
they found one that would participate. Finally, they managed to interview 100 households 
from each of 18 clusters. Moreover, non-response error was taken into account while 
calculating sample size; therefore, the initial sample size was increased by 10% to account 
for contingencies such as non-response or recording error.  
3.3.3.3 Sampling distribution  
Certain assumptions were made while selecting and calculating the sample size, in order 
to get a general picture of social capital of the urban poor in Bangladesh. Different groups 
were assumed to have different levels of social capital, based on the premise that the 
social capital of the urban poor in Dhaka city would differ from that of the urban poor in 
other cities; or that the social capital of the urban poor living on their own land would be 
different from that of tenants. Again, the tenant group living on public land would be 
different from the tenant group on private land within the same city. Differences are also 
likely to be found between the social capital of microfinance borrowers and non-
borrowers within the same community.   
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This study has tried to include as many dimensions of groups as possible, in order to 
obtain comparable data sets for a deeper understanding of the extent and nature of the 
social capital of the urban poor. 
The study adopted a multistage cluster sampling design. At first, two metropolitan cities 
(different in the nature of their socio-economic conditions), and one secondary city (with 
the highest per capita income in Bangladesh) were selected in consultation with local 
experts.  
The clusters were selected on a random basis in two metropolitan cities. Primary sampling 
units (PSUs) have been used for a sampling frame of clusters, based on the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS) and the publication/report “The Slums of Urban Bangladesh 
in 2006” from the Center for Urban Studies (CUS). It is worth noting here that no other 
such census on urban poor clusters was carried out between the 2006 CUS study and BBS 
census survey in 2014. The official report from the BBS survey had not been published 
when this survey began in September 2014.  However, I took the opportunity to use the 
unofficial record to sample the households in the study areas. 
The CUS study provided a list of PSUs throughout the six metropolitan cities, each 
containing varying numbers of households in the cluster. However, this study has 
considered those PSUs as having, more or less, 1,000 households.  
No such sampling frame for the selection of PSUs was available to choose clusters from 
the secondary town, Kushtia. However, the Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP), a 
confederation of all NGOs working for urban poor, had reasonable numbers of 
households for conducting this survey, and so provided a basis for the selection of the 
PSUs.   
Moreover, in the process of selecting comparable clusters, the study also tried to capture 
some clusters with attributes such as being economically adjacent to the sample clusters, 
so that comparisons could be drawn regarding social capital among clusters with differing 
socio-economic status.  
In the second stage of the research project, 11 sample PSUs were selected randomly from 
the lists of 141 clusters from three cities. In addition, seven sample clusters from 
immediate higher-income groups were selected based on contextual knowledge. The 
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rationale of selecting 18 clusters is to make the project feasible in terms of reliability, 
time limits and resource constraints.  
In the third stage, 1775 households were divided by 18 clusters, which yielded 99 
households per PSU, then rounded to 100, to be selected on a random basis. Dhaka’s 
PSUs were the highest in number because Dhaka alone accommodates around 55% of the 
total urban poor in the country.  
Only one eligible representative from each sample household was interviewed. If an 
indexed household representative was not available for the interview, the next sample 
household became involved.  
3.3.3.4 Sampling bias 
There was a discrepancy between the BBS census and CUS study pertaining to the 
demarcation of the cluster. I followed the BBS demarcation model, which is based on 
local administrative units. However, it was very difficult to follow the exact demarcation 
of the clusters in Chittagong and Kushtia. Given time restrictions and limited resources, 
the surveyors were able to gather major information on up to one thousand households, 
at best, from one side of the communities. Then random sampling of households was 
made from the lists. In a few clusters, and particularly in the higher income clusters, there 
would be more than one thousand households. Also, non-response rates in the higher 
income clusters might have an effect on sampling bias. 
3.3.3.5 Inclusion criteria 
The study interviewed participants living in the urban poor clusters in Dhaka, Chittagong 
and Kushtia. Participants also included households from immediately adjacent 
economically developed clusters, where the social mobility of the urban poor is supposed 
to be evident (comparator areas). The research surveyors only interviewed those who gave 
verbal consent to participate. 
3.3.3.6 Exclusion criteria 
The surveyors excluded those participants who were reluctant to participate in the 
interview (self-exclusion). 
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3.3.3.7 Survey instrument  
Face-to-face interviews were conducted on the basis of a structured paper questionnaire. 
This was initially developed in English; however, considering the local circumstances of 
the study area, and the surveyors’ capacity to explain and communicate with the 
participants, it was finally translated into Bengali before sending it for the field test, and 
then to the press for printing. It was really helpful for the surveyors to communicate some 
of the questions with the participants. Simple and plain language was used to construct 
the questions, and the possible answers options were available immediately thereafter.  
The questionnaire consisted of five major sections. The first, second, and third parts were 
on demographic, social and economic characteristics of the household. The fourth section 
consisted of various aspects of social capital: networks, trust and cooperation. The fifth 
and final section was about the scope for housing development for the urban poor, where 
the respondents’ opinions on how they wanted to improve their housing were sought. 
3.3.3.8 Surveyors and training  
To collect data, ten surveyors and one research assistant, all graduates willing to do a full-
time job for two to three months for this survey, were recruited on a contract basis. An 
intensive three-day training course was provided, which explained the detailed objectives 
of the study as well as the contents of the questionnaire. Training also included lectures 
on ethical issues in research, on how to communicate with participants and on how to 
complete the questionnaires; mock interviews; and adherence to institutional compliance 
with recruitment. Based on the performance and sincerity of the training participants, an 
assessment was made for the final selection.  Finally, ten surveyors were recruited, 
provided with necessary field kits and a salary advance, and sent into the field for 
interviewing. 
Considering the low literacy rates of many of the poor respondents, surveyors were asked 
to explain each question politely to the participants during a face-to-face interview. Each 
interview took an average of 40-45 minutes to complete the questionnaire.  The survey 
itself was extensively supervised and monitored by the research assistant as well as the 
principal researcher, who is also the thesis author.   
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3.3.3.9 Risk assessment and risk management   
Risk for the interviewers 
The potential risks for the participants might be personal. For instance, participants might 
not feel comfortable disclosing financial information. On the other hand, potential risks 
for the interviewers might be in reaching the sampled households due to disappearing 
pathways and the slippery roads around the slums. As the survey was conducted by both 
male and female interviewers, there might be some potential risks for the females. So 
interviewers were sent in groups in which female interviewers were accompanied by a 
male. This had the added advantage of female resident householders perhaps being more 
willing to speak with a female interviewer. 
Risks for the investigator (myself) 
There were no risks perceived for the investigator in relation to this field study, since the 
survey was conducted in his home country and since the respondents do not belong to any 
specialised group. Moreover, he had had extensive field survey experience with the same 
groups while working with the Institute for Inclusive Finance and Development (InM). 
Risks to the Participants  
The study participants may have felt discomfort in answering some confidential personal 
questions. The interviewers were asked to take necessary steps to protect respondents’ 
privacy and confidentiality. 
Other Risks 
Natural calamities, particularly flooding, are very common in Bangladesh during the 
monsoon season, and rain in particular might have an impact on the data collection 
process. Therefore this survey was conducted in the late winter season, when rain and 
other natural calamities are unlikely; this timing avoided any climate/weather-related 
interruptions to data collection.  
3.3.3.10 Risk management  
The investigator did not conduct the actual interviews due to other managerial 
responsibilities.  Interviewers were recruited and trained to sensitise them to the potential 
personal and psychological risks for the participants. Since the interviewers were trained, 
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they could explain the importance of this research and ask for permission to begin the 
survey. They explained the nature of the survey so that the interviewees knew what to 
expect. They also explained that an individual respondent might be embarrassed or feel 
uncomfortable during the interview. If the interviewer felt that interviewing a particular 
respondent might compromise his/her privacy, s/he did not continue the interview, and 
went on to approach the next respondent. If a participant became uncomfortable during 
the interview, the interviewer stopped questioning.  
Interviewers’ safety  
Since the investigator had previous experience of conducting surveys on sensitive (slum) 
populations in Bangladesh, he trained the interviewers on how best to safely approach the 
households. Also, local political and social leaders (ward commissioner and slum leader) 
were contacted before interviewers visited households in a particular PSU. When the 
survey process is supported by the community leaders, there are fewer risks for the 
personnel involved in the survey, and this researcher is well aware of these issues. 
3.3.3.11 Data collection period  
Initially, the data collection period was scheduled for between May and July 2014.  
However, due to unavoidable circumstances relating to the external funding body, there 
was a substantial delay in the process of starting the field survey. It was not possible to 
start interviewing until the funds were released in the middle of September 2014. 
Later, the survey period was shortened to finish within two months, therefore lasting from 
September 15th to November 14th 2014. However, various field circumstances led to an 
extension of a further five weeks.  
In the first phase, between September 15th and October 2nd, the survey was started 
simultaneously in the two cities of Chittagong and Kushtia. The surveyors interviewed 
600 sampled households from 6 PSUs before they returned for the Eid holiday. The 
survey could not resume until 18th of October because all offices were closed for national 
holidays, and a portion of the urban poor households moved to celebrate Eid.  
The second phase of interviewing started on October 18th. The surveyors again went to 
Chittagong and Kushtia to interview the remaining 400 sampled households from 4 
comparator PSUs. Having finished interviews in Chittagong and Kushtia by the 31st of 
82 
 
October, they started interviewing 800 sampled households from 5 poor and 3 comparator 
PSUs in Dhaka. Finally, the total survey was finished by the third week of November 
2014. 
3.3.3.12 Difficulties and challenges in the fields 
 It is worth noting here some challenges that I encountered while identifying the 
PSUs for the study. I managed to carry this out in consultation with the local 
people.  
 It was challenging to identify the immediate higher income PSUs, where social 
mobility of the urban poor might have taken place. No statistics are available that 
could represent these groups; no demarcation is available to easily identify them. 
However, using contextual knowledge and in consultation with a number of local 
scholars, it was possible to identify the groups I wanted. 
 The perception of social capital might vary between male and female respondents. 
Again, similar questions might be raised from the differing perspectives of the 
interviewers. 
 Progress was more or less interrupted in all three cities in a number of ways. To 
minimise those challenges, the following alternatives were necessary:  
 Except in Dhaka, the lists of poor households were not available; therefore 
the surveyors had to prepare a list of households living in the PSUs in 
Chittagong and Kushtia before sampling and interviewing could take place. 
However, the unofficial household record from BBS on clusters size helped 
in the sampling of households in Dhaka city 
 Local powerbrokers stopped the interview process in two PSUs in Kushtia.  
The problem was overcome locally, after communicating with the local 
political leaders and city mayor 
 The heads of households who were targeted to take part in the interviews were 
largely absent during the day, so the surveyors had to visit them on the 
previous day to inform them about the next-day interview. In many cases, the 
surveyors had to revisit the household to complete the interview  
 A small number of communities in Kushtia and Dhaka refused to accept 
compensation, because of the suspicion that this might lead to enlistment for 
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eviction. They said that earlier they had received threat of eviction after such 
interviews. So the participants discussed the issue with their community leaders 
who allowed the surveyors to conduct the interview; but the latter were prohibited 
from providing any compensation to the interviewees. 
 
3.3.3.13 Data entry and management  
The answer scripts were largely closed, with several options, and the data were captured 
using Intelligent Character Recognition (ICR) technology. 
3.3.3. 14 Data management and data handling 
The survey data is legally owned and retained by the InM and Heriot Watt University, 
UK. For use of the data by a third party, a record of their location must be filed with the 
both institutions.   
3.3.3.15 Privacy and confidentiality 
Each sampled respondent was provided with a verbal explanation of the objectives, 
general content and time commitment involved in participating in the survey, and was 
given assurances of confidentiality. They were given the opportunity to ask any questions 
during the interview, and provided with the name and telephone number of the local 
contact person (local investigator) who could answer questions before and after the 
interview. The sample respondents were free to decline to participate in the interview 
and/or refuse to answer any specific question. Furthermore, once interviews were 
completed, the responses were verified for completeness and internal consistency, and 
any information linking data to respondent were kept secret.  
3.3.3.16 Sources of funding and budget 
The funding for the survey was secured primarily from InM, Bangladesh. The costs 
associated with the investigator are borne by Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh.  
 
 
84 
 
Table-3.10: The indicative prices direct for the field study (estimated)  
Sl. Item Number of item Per unit costs (Tk) Total 
costs (Tk) 
1 Questionnaire Printing and 
Photocopying (15 pages) 
1900 100 190,000 
2 Training of Interviewers 10 enumerators*3 
days=30 
1,000 30,000 
3 Training & survey kits for 
Interviewers 
10 1,000 10,000 
4 Interviewers salary 10*2 months=20 25,000 500,000 
5 Research Assistant 1*6 months=6 30,000 180,000 
6 Accommodation 10*20 days=200  400 (required for 
Kushtia & Chittagong) 
80,000 
7 Transportation (inter-city 
& local travel) 
10*40 days=400 200 (subject to actual 
travels) 
80,000 
8 Food 10*20 days=200 250 (required for 
Kushtia & Chittagong) 
50,000 
9 Data entry & cleaning 1900 100 190,000 
10 Contingencies    200,000 
 Total  1,510,000* 
* £1=BDT 100 (approx.) 
  
3.3.4 Data analysis 
The literature on social capital implies that there are different dimensions of social capital; 
there are causes, manifestations and consequences. Different kinds of social ‘networks’ 
are viewed as manifestations of social capital that are influenced by the endogenous social 
factors, whereas trust and cooperation are viewed as the consequences of social capital. 
Again, social capital may be generated in macro and micro social (and spatial) contexts 
(see Figure 2.1, Chapter 2) (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Inkeles, 2000). There are issues 
concerning the sources and consequences of social capital, such as whether it is formed 
in an individual context, how it is influenced by physical and human capital, or how 
psychological traits contribute to the generation of social capital. The underlying 
associations among various aspects of social capital are deeply rooted in socioeconomic 
and cultural contexts, so to look only at the direct relationships among variables might 
obscure the implicit or indirect association. In short, there are complex issues surrounding 
the measurement of social capital and the interrelationship of different elements, and these 
need to be considered at the analysis stage. 
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Different technical approaches to analysis are employed for different purposes in 
subsequent chapters. A simple descriptive analytical approach, involving tables and 
graphs, is used to answer Research Question 1: How is the socio-economic condition of 
the urban poor linked to socio-economic vulnerability? (see Chapter 4). The mean 
estimates of the variables on demography (the social and economic characteristics of the 
sample households) provide an overview of the study population. The estimates also 
provide a comparison between the samples of poor and comparator areas, as well as 
comparisons among neighbourhoods and cities.  
A similar descriptive analytical approach is used to address Research Question 2: What 
is the nature and extent of social capital of the urban poor? (see Chapter 5). The 
descriptive statistics provide a comparison of different aspects of social capital. This 
analysis helps to explore the nature and extent of the social capital of the urban poor in 
Bangladesh. 
Chapter 6 analyses Research Question 3 (on trust): How is individual trust affected by 
[social networks and] contextual factors? In the first sections, the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimation is used to analyse the relationships between ‘trust’ in bonding and 
bridging networks and the networks’ size and strength, income, and living period. This 
section informs the later section where we analyse the trust of the poor in particular 
networks, which are important for urban livelihood. In the following section, trust in 
neighbours is analysed using Probit and Logit estimation methods. Necessary discussion 
on these Probit and Logit models is introduced at the start of the section. 
Chapter 7 analyses Research Question 3 (on cooperation): How is individual experience 
of cooperation affected by the context? In the first section, the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimation is used to analyse the relationships between ‘cooperation’ across 
networks and trust, the networks’ size and strength, income, and living period. In the later 
section, the analysis of individual cooperation among neighbours is made based on 
contextual factors. The necessary discussion can be found at the start of the section, but 
here we discuss the contextual effects. 
3.3.4.1 Contextual effects 
A contextual effect is similar to the neighbourhood effect. The idea of context is assumed 
to mean that the effects of socioeconomic factors may cross the boundary of 
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neighbourhood (Blalock, 1984). Such an effect might be seen in a city, assuming that 
socio-economic structure varies significantly across cities and so affects socioeconomic 
characteristics of neighbourhood in a particular city in which the urban poor live. (Buck, 
2001; Overman, 2002; Galster, 2007; Friedrichs et al., 2010; Blalock, 1984; Sampson et 
al., 2002; Manley et al., 2013). Such effects are significantly altered by the social 
processes and influence of the household characteristics, such as income and assets, or 
childhood achievements. It may also influence a neighbourhood’s collective social 
characteristics, such as social norms/behaviour and social exclusion. 
The group level variables influencing individuals, and the observed variables defining an 
individual’s behavioural variation, are necessary elements to an analysis of contextual 
effects on social capital outcome, i.e. cooperation. Group level variables, such as groups’ 
norms of trust and reciprocity, and neighbourhood characteristics, are expected to affect 
the individual’s behaviour. Again, some individual-level characteristics, such as income, 
assets and living period, would also affect the individual behavioural outcome. The 
relationship between group-defining variables and the observed individual characteristic 
might have  implications for the inference of the estimated relationships. This means that 
there is a potential endogeneity issue in the analysis of social capital, which can be 
discussed in the light of Manski (1993). There are three kinds of effects that are observed 
in social interactions: 
 Indirect effects are the effects of endogenous characteristics of individuals that 
influence behaviour; there is a tendency for individuals to behave differently from 
the group in some ways. This means that there are some characteristics at 
individual level which vary among households, and may influence individual 
behaviours. For example, income, assets, education and living period would vary 
among members, and this would lead to differences in individual behaviour 
between two people despite their sharing the norms and values of the 
neighbourhood.  
 Direct effects relate to some variables that affect an individual’s behaviour in the 
group.  For instance, social behaviour (the degree of trust or cooperation) of the 
individual would vary across cities or neighbourhoods. This indicates the 
contextual effects. 
 Correlated effects: there are some variables that might influence an individual to 
behave similarly to the group. For example, the poor (slum dwellers) are likely to 
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behave similarly, and in ways that are somewhat different from other (e.g. 
comparator) groups.  
Different effects of observed endogenous variables, particularly those relevant to social 
capital, have been discussed at length (see Durlauf, 2002; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). 
Such different levels of effects invite a more sophisticated econometric analysis of 
relationships. This study has followed the hypothetical social capital estimation models 
of (Durlauf, 2002), which deal with the major concerns of the exchangeability error and 
identification problems in estimating social capital. These two problems are discussed at 
the beginning of the relevant section in Chapter 7. Individual social cooperation is 
estimated in two situations:  
Model 1: when social capital is predetermined  
Model 2: when social capital is codetermined  
In both situations, structural equation modeling (SEM) is employed to estimate the direct, 
indirect and correlated effects of variables affecting the outcome. Parameters from other 
estimations are also compared. 
3.3.4.2 Structural equation modelling (SEM) 
SEM is a combination of exploratory factor analysis in a multiple regression system 
(Ullman, 2001). SEM is a technique that  extends the possibility of identifying 
relationships among the variables (Schreiber et al., 2006). SEM makes a distinction 
between the exogenous factors (independent variables) and endogenous factors 
(dependent or outcome variables). The exogenous and endogenous variables can be 
observed or unobserved depending on the model being tested. Within the context of 
structural modelling, the exogenous variables represent those constructs that influence 
other constructs but are not themselves influenced by other factors in the model. Those 
constructs identified as endogenous are affected by other endogenous variables in the 
model.  
The measurement model of SEM estimates the pattern of relationships between the 
observed variables and those latent constructs in the hypothesised model. The 
measurement model is used to examine the extent of interrelationships and covariation 
among the latent constructs. The structural model displays the interrelations among latent 
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constructs and observable variables in the proposed model as a succession of structural 
equations. 
The total effect of a variable or construct is the summation of the direct and indirect effects 
of this variable/construct on outcome. Although the focus of structural modelling is on 
estimating relationships among hypothesised constructs, one can use structural modelling 
to test experimental data, where one or more of the variables have been manipulated. In 
sum, SEM allows a researcher to test theoretical propositions  
 
3.4 Ethical considerations 
According to the Framework of Research Ethics of the Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) in the UK, six broader ethical aspects in research should be considered 
while conducting a study (Bryman, 2012b): (i) the study must be well designed to achieve 
high quality; (ii) researchers and subjects must be fully informed about the purpose, 
methods and intended uses of the study; (iii) confidentiality of information must be 
maintained and anonymity of the participants respected; (iv) the involvement of research 
participants must be entirely voluntary; (v) any harm to participants must be avoided; (vi) 
the independence of research must be made clear, and any conflicts of interest and 
partiality must be explicit. These issues were considered with sincerity while conducting 
this research, and efforts were made to avoid the potential transgression of ethical values. 
Two evaluation committees5 have examined the ethical concerns before starting the field 
survey conducted for this research.  
(i) The study has followed a well-structured design to ensure high quality. The 
respondents of this study were not involved fully with the whole research 
process, but they were involved in the process of information collected for this 
study.  
(ii) The researcher was fully informed about the purpose, methods and intended 
uses of the research. The subjects were also informed of the purpose and uses 
of this research; this information was shared during the interviews.  
(iii) Individual information has not been reported anywhere, so there is no 
transgression of research ethics in terms of confidentiality of information.  
                                                 
5Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh, and the Institute for inclusive Finance and Development (InM), 
Bangladesh) 
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(iv) The respondents had the option to skip any questions, and there was no forced 
participation in the interview. Flexibility was allowed in interview time; in 
some cases the interviewers visted more than once to complete the interview. 
(v) Participation in the interview did not pose any threat to the respondents. 
Questions that might affect a respondent’s psychology were excluded. The 
participants were compensated (BDT 100 for 45 minutes) for their time. 
(vi) This research was conducted in collaboration with InM and HWU. There is 
no known affiliation bias, and no potential conflict of interest is observed. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The research process can be summarised as follows: First, a topic area of social capital of 
the urban poor was identified and explored through literature review, followed by the 
formulation of research questions. In the next stage, a theoretical basis related to the topic 
has been investigated to inform the strategy for addressing the research questions, again 
based on literature. The research strategy entailed the selection of a quantitative approach 
and preparation of the structured questionnaire. Then I sought funding and collaboration 
for the field survey data collection. This phase was followed by significant data checking, 
cleaning and (where necessary) imputation. Once the field data was ready, the next stage 
involved identification of the appropriate analytical methods and the step-by-step analysis 
of data. The analysis has gone through several iterations to improve the clarity and 
effectiveness of the methods.  The final stage has been devoted to writing up and 
development of the thesis in consultation with the supervisor and other resources. 
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Chapter 4: Study Area Profile 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 provides an account of the study population, with particular focus on the urban 
poor living in informal housing (slums) in three locations in Bangladesh. The chapter 
focuses on the dynamics of urban poverty, the characteristics of the urban poor and of the 
poor neighbourhoods, and the nature of migration among the poor. These accounts are 
intended primarily to address Research Questions 1: How is the socio-economic condition 
of the urban poor linked to their socio-economic vulnerability? Thus they seek to provide 
context for the study population. Such a socio-economic context is important, particularly 
if it can help to explain the nature and extent of social capital and its implications for 
affordable housing for the urban poor in Bangladesh. 
 
4.2 Dynamics of urban poverty 
Reference to the history of urban poverty in Bangladesh is minimal; this might hint at the 
country’s focus on rural poverty (Bashar and Rashid, 2012; Banks, 2016; CUS, 2006). 
This does not mean that urban poverty did not exist; but since urbanisation itself was 
minor, it is understandable that urban poverty was ignored. This lacuna means there is 
little historical base to lean upon while shaping and developing urban policies for this 
relatively young country. A few studies on the slums and urban poverty in Bangladesh 
have been carried out, but they were mostly in Dhaka. Also such research initiatives were 
not systematically conducted by the government, but rather by individuals or private/non-
governmental organisations (Akther et al., 2006; Amin, 2007; Begum, 2009; Islam, 2001; 
Islam, 1996). The first large-scale survey on ‘slums and floating people’ was conducted 
by the government in 1997, in  six city corporations and some municipal towns across the 
country (BBS, April, 2015). However, in 2014 the government conducted a similar survey 
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which includes all 7 city corporations, 64 district towns and 489 upazila6 towns.7 The 
history of the database on urban poverty is not long, thereby somewhat inhibiting any 
attempts to review the issue of urban poverty in Bangladesh (see Chapter 2 for details).  
Most of the previous studies were independent surveys, and there has been almost no 
attempt to stitch the extant research into a composite whole (Islam, 2002; Hossain, 2008; 
Nabi, 2002; Shakur, 2008).  This chapter has collated information collected for this study 
and tried to connect it with earlier studies. Generally, the poor are largely housed in slums 
or squatter settlements. These neighbourhoods do not contribute to the visual beauty of a 
city, and are discordant with the traditional image of economic progress (Hye, 2014). 
Therefore, slum neighbourhoods are offensive to the state and an eyesore to other city 
dwellers. Urban poverty also arguably ‘hides’ inside the ‘informal housing’8 in other 
formal neighbourhoods which accommodate the middle- or lower-middle-income city 
dwellers. Such informal housing, whether in slums and squatter settlements or in other 
neighbourhoods, gives a particular character to the urban poverty which is an integral part 
of cities in Bangladesh.  
Since independence in 1971, poverty has always been a fundamental concern in the public 
policy of Bangladesh (Hossain, 2011b; Rashid and Bashar, 2010). Public policy has 
stressed education and training for the creation of a skilled labour force and for the 
development of infrastructure. However, these efforts have focused primarily on the issue 
of rural poverty (Banks et al., 2011a). Despite this focus, evidence suggests that urban 
poverty is increasing (WB, 2016b). In 2011, the urban population has increased to 42.7 
million, with an estimated growth of 4.1 % (Islam et al., 2013), while the urban poor 
population increased by eight million between 1992 and 2010 (WB, 2016b). The annual 
growth of the poor population is much higher in urban areas than in rural areas. So rapid 
urbanisation is likely to continue (see Section 3, Chapter 2). 
 
                                                 
6The second-lowest tier of regional administration in Bangladesh. The administrative structure consists of 
division, district, upazila and union. 
7 However, several attempts by the researcher to access this data have failed. 
8Informal housing is located in settlements where groups of housing units have been constructed on public 
land, where the occupants have no legal claim or occupy the land illegally. It might also be defined as 
housing in an unplanned settlement not in compliance with planning and building regulations (OECD. 
(1997) Glossary of Environment Statistics. Studies in Methods. New York: United Nations. 
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4.3 Household characteristics 
This section discusses the social and economic characteristics of the study households. 
Based on the primary data, it analyses a range of socio-economic opportunities for, and 
challenges to, the households structured around the issues of demography, education, 
income and assets and expenditure. Such data could provide an understanding of the 
socio-economic position of the urban poor, thereby providing a context for the analysis 
of social capital.  
4.3.1 Household size 
According to the survey data, the average household size of the urban poor across the 
three sampled cities in Bangladesh is four, which is similar to the national average (BBS, 
2011b). Around 75% of the households are made up of between three and five people. 
However, the household size in Chittagong is higher than in the other two cities. 
Approximately one-third of households there have more than four members, compared 
with 26-29% in Dhaka and Kushtia.  
4.3.2 Age of household head 
The average age of the household heads varies across cities and neighbourhoods. Their 
mean ages are 39, 41 and 42 in Dhaka, Chittagong and Kushtia respectively; these 
differences are statistically significant9. The household heads in Dhaka are younger than 
in Kushtia and Chittagong, perhaps implying that the urban poor in small cities are 
comparatively more stable. Alternatively, it might imply that the big cities are more 
socioeconomically challenging, and only a younger, healthier workforce can survive 
these challenges.  
4.3.3 Household education 
3.3.3.1 Household heads  
Table 4.1 shows the education levels of the poor household heads in Dhaka, Chittagong 
and Kushtia. Also included are four other metropolitan cities: Khulna, Rajshahi, Sylhet 
and Barisal. Two time-point sets of primary data (from 2009 and 2014) on the urban poor 
                                                 
9 In two sample t-tests with unequal variances, the mean age of the study population in Kushtia is 3.71 (t-
value=5) and 2.3 years higher (t-value=2.8) than in Dhaka and Chittagong. The difference between 
Chittagong and Dhaka is not statistically significant. 
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could provide information on any change over the five year period in Dhaka, Chittagong 
and Kushtia. The one point data (from 2009) on Khulna, Rajshahi, Sylhet and Barisal 
provide information on regional variation in education across all seven cities in 
Bangladesh. 
 
Table 4.1: The level of education of household heads in poor neighbourhoods (in %) 
Education  
Dhaka Chittagong Kushtia Khulna Rajshahi Sylhet Barisal 
2009 2014 2009 2014 2009 2014 2009 2009 2009 2009 
Illiterate  38 61 50 54 45 53 43 48 49 49 
Level I-V 19 22 21 21 35 25 25 22 18 14 
Level VI-X 34 12 21 15 17 10 27 26 31 28 
HSC& above 9 5 8 11 3 13 4 5 2 9 
Sources: InM (2009); InM (2014) 
 
Despite the two sets of data being obtained from two different sets of studies of the urban 
poor (which contribute to the differences between years. For example in Dhaka illiteracy 
rose by 23 percentage points; this is a significant difference, and is against expectations 
based on general societal trends in education levels), the information could provide 
perspective on the issue. According to our survey in 2014, half of the poor household 
heads across all three cities were illiterate, which indicates a lower literacy rate among 
the urban poor compared to the district (including urban and rural) average of those 
respective cities, particularly of Dhaka and Chittagong. According to the national 
statistics of 2011, the literacy rates in Dhaka Chittagong and Kushtia were 70.5%, 58.9% 
and 46.3% respectively (BBS, 2011a). However, the remainder had a primary or high 
school education which varied across the cities. A small percentage of household heads 
was found to have higher education such as a higher secondary certificate (HSC) or above. 
These findings indicate a lower level of education of the urban poor compared with the 
national average (see BBS, 2010b). 
The education levels of the heads of households also varied between two study groups in 
poor and comparator areas. The proportion of household heads with different levels of 
education are shown in the bar diagrams10, where the poor appear to be less educated 
                                                 
10 The number along the horizontal lines represents the level of education where 1=illiterate and 5= bachelor 
&above. 
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compared to the comparator households. According to our survey in 2014, approximately 
71% of poor household heads were illiterate, whereas this percentage is lower in 
comparator areas (see Figure 4.1 below). Moreover, this is much higher than the national 
average, which is 33.6 % (BBS, 2011b). 
The horizontal axis of Figure 4.1 represents the levels of education (higher number means 
higher level of education; see footnote). The education level is higher in comparator areas 
in all three study cities.  Approximately 19% of the comparator population heads have 
HSC or higher level education.  Variation between the poor and comparator populations 
is particularly large in Chittagong, yet it is small in Kushtia11. Such variation is also 
evident within the poor areas. The illiteracy rate is 88% in Shantinagar and Chittagong, 
compared to 46 percent in Korail and Dhaka.  
 
Source: InM (2014) 
Figure 4.1: Level of education of the household head 
                                                 
11PSU selection bias may make some contribution to this variation. 
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3.3.3.2 School participation by children 
School participation by children aged between five and fifteen represents the potential 
education attainment of poor households. According to the survey, a quarter of poor 
children remain out of school or drop out during childhood. The proportion of children 
attending school is similar to that in the national survey, but it is significantly less than 
the participation of comparator children, which is 92 % (BBS, 2010a); however, school 
attendance rates vary across cities. Proportions of children attending school are 
approximately three-quarters in Dhaka, two-thirds in Chittagong and 80% in Kushtia. 
Again, participation is higher in comparator areas: 86% in Dhaka, 87% in Chittagong and 
92% in Kushtia. A significant proportion of children over the age of ten were found to be 
engaged in the garment industry and day labour, which gives a clue as to the reasons for  
dropping out of school.   
4.3.4. Household incomes 
Household incomes vary across the study cities and groups. According to the survey data, 
the mean monthly incomes of the poor residents in Dhaka, Chittagong and Kushtia are 
BDT 11,077 (£110), BDT 10,861 (£108) and BDT 9,332 (£93) respectively. The amount 
varies little between Dhaka and Chittagong, but does so moderately between Kushtia and 
the other cities. On the other hand, the mean incomes of the comparator households are 
BDT 16,816 (£168), BDT 15,897 (£158) and BDT 15,119 (£151) respectively, these 
figures are significantly higher than those of the poor residents12.  
According to the BBS’s Household Income and Expenditure Surveys in 2010 and 2005, 
the average monthly income of urban households is BDT 16,476 (£164.5) and BDT 
10,463 (£104.5) respectively. This means the nominal income increased significantly 
over the survey period (see Section 2.3 in Chapter 2). If this trend continues, by year 2015 
the national average (nominal) household income might be double the income of the 
urban poor. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This includes 99 % of each of two groups. Household incomes are up to BDT 31,000 for the 
‘poor’ group and up to 65,000 for the ‘control’ group. 
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Table 4.2: Mean monthly income of study households (in BDT) 
 
City Poor Areas Comparator 
 Mean  Robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean  Robust 
Std. Err. Dhaka 11,076 272.63 16,816 1657.10 
Chittagong 10,861 533.94 15,897 1330.84 
Kushtia 9,331 102.12 15,119 718.43 
Source: InM (2014) 
 
Differences of mean incomes among cities and groups are shown in Table 4.3 below13. 
The differences between poor and comparator groups between Dhaka and Chittagong are 
not statistically significant for either population. However, the difference between 
Kushtia and the other cities is significant, particularly in the case of the poor areas; the 
figure varies by BDT 1,745 (£17) between Dhaka and Kushtia, and by BDT 1,529 (£15) 
between Chittagong and Kushtia, with monthly household income in the poor areas of 
Kushtia lower than in the other two cities. In the case of the comparator groups, 
differences in income between cities are not statistically significant, except those between 
Kushtia and Dhaka. The income of comparator households in Dhaka is BDT 1,697 (£16) 
higher than the income of those in Kushtia. The differences in the cost of living between 
Kushtia and Dhaka may be partly explained by people in Kushtia being closer to their 
rural roots; this will be discussed later. 
 
Table 4.3: Mean monthly income differences between cities (in BDT) 
City pair Poor Comparator 
 Mean Std. 
Err. 
t-value Mean Std. 
Err. 
t-value 
1 Vs 2 -216 354 -0.60 -919 786 -1.17 
1 Vs 3 1,745 306 5.70 1697 775 2.19 
2 Vs 3 1,529 369 4.14 778 792 0.98 
[City: 1=Dhaka; 2=Chittagong and 3= Kushtia ]  
Source: (InM, 2014) 
                                                 
13Two-sample t-tests with unequal variances have been used to test the hypothesis that the mean varies 
significantly. 
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These findings suggest that higher income (by approx. one-fifth) opportunities are one of 
the many reasons for the poor to migrate from the countryside to urban Dhaka and 
Chittagong. This phenomenon concentrates poverty largely in Dhaka and Chittagong. 
According to the World Bank’s global poverty lines (lower headcount poverty line: 
$1.90/day; and upper headcount poverty line: $3.10/day), if a five-member household’s 
income is lower than BDT 22,800 it would fall under the lower poverty line. By this 
measure, both study groups, particularly the ‘poor sample’, are living far below the lower 
poverty line. 
4.3.5 Land property 
More than 90% of the study population has no agricultural land. The remainder own a 
mean amount of 13.2 decimal14 of agricultural land. The mean market value of this land 
is approximately BDT 319,392 (£3,190).  
However, asset values vary significantly among poor and comparator areas, specifically 
in Dhaka and Chittagong.  Land owned by the comparator group is worth BDT 529,149 
(£5,291) in Dhaka and BDT 897,711 (£8,977) in Chittagong; both values are higher than 
those of the poor. However, the variation is insignificant in Kushtia. City-wise mean 
agricultural and homestead land values are presented below in Table 4.4 and 4.5. 
Table 4.4: Mean agriculture land-value (in BDT) 
City Poor Comparator 
 Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Dhaka 44 433,636 75,260 70 962,785 51,079 
Chittagong 51 350,883 72,550 53 1,250,000 756,380 
Kushtia 8 316,125 102,813 23 1,480,000 399,395 
 
Table 4.5: Mean homestead land-value (in BDT) 
city Poor Comparator 
 Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Dhaka 197 365,822 80,268 177 1,600,000 724,983 
Chittagong 191 302,461 28,202 145 1,210,000 294,772 
Kushtia 17 132,059 22,386 127 2,840,000 704,210 
Source: InM (2014) 
                                                 
14A decimal is a unit of area in Bangladesh approximately equal to 1/100 acre (40.46 m²). 
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A large portion of the poor do not have homestead land. Only one third of them own some 
land, but the amount of land that they own is very small. The mean land owned by these 
households is approximately 6.3 decimal, which might be worth approximately BDT 
324,126 (£3,241). Again, homestead-land values vary significantly across cities, but vary 
less between Dhaka and Chittagong. According to the survey data, the mean land values 
in Dhaka and Chittagong are BDT 233,764 (£2337) and BDT 170,402 (£1,704), both of 
which are higher than the land value in Kushtia.  
Mean values of homestead land varies significantly between poor and comparator groups 
across cities. The average value of assets of the comparator groups is BDT 1237,692 
(£12,376), BDT 904,119 (£9,041) and BDT 2703,697 (£27,036) in Dhaka, Chittagong 
and Kushtia respectively; these are much higher than the mean land value of the 
corresponding poor. Both types of land, including the homesteads, are located in distant 
home villages, and not in or near the urban neighbourhood. Thus they cannot be used to 
generate income in kind, for example from food production, although there might be some 
rent. 
4.3.6 Other assets of poor households 
The landless urban poor also own very few other assets. A minimal number own some 
cashable assets like computers, fridge, ornaments and rickshaws. Most of these consist of 
cheap necessary bicycles, sewing or other small machines, furniture, televisions and 
mobile phones. Responses about asset ownership and market values are presented in table 
4.6.  
Table 4.6: Mean asset-values (in BDT) of the poor and comparator households 
Assets Poor Comparator 
 Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Rickshaw 97 23,848 10,554 30 65,083 28,063 
Cycle 115 6,852 1,718 113 22,049 1,875 
Small machinery 383 3,059 438 336 6,556 1,533 
Furniture 979 8,019 1,094 676 36,503 6,578 
TV 614 5,788 270 585 9,400 659 
Computer 9 22,669 4,278 91 25,280 937 
Mobile 918 2,138 142 652 5,727 742 
Ornament  528 9,767 1,891 471 31,453 5,246 
Refrigerator 90 19,159 1,702 303 22,251 1,205 
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Assets Poor Comparator 
 Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Others 572 3,703 847 411 8,344 2,979 
Total Obs. 1,100   700   
 
Source: (InM, 2014) 
 
Of the 1,100 poor area households sampled, the number holding a particular asset is 
shown against the corresponding observation in column 2 (from the left). Column three 
represents the mean market values of the assets, based on the household’s responses. The 
most commonly owned assets of the urban poor are wooden furniture, mobile phones and 
televisions.  
A higher proportion of the comparator households possess many of these assets. For 
instance, 84% of the comparator population own a television set whereas only 56% of 
poor households do. 43% of comparator households have a refrigerator compared to only 
8% of poor households. The mean value of a particular asset is also higher in comparator 
households when compared to the poor households.  
4.3.7 Savings of the poor households 
A significant proportion of the study population was found to have savings; totals ranged 
from a tiny amount of cash in hand to BDT 1,000,000 (£10,000). Half of the savings 
amount to between BDT 500 (£5) and 500,000 (£5,000). Figure 4.4 shows the cumulative 
percentages of total savings in poor and comparator samples.  
 
100 
 
 
Source: (InM, 2014) 
Figure 4.2: Cumulative savings of households 
 
The line showing the poor samples rises sharply on the small amount of savings. This 
means that 90% of the savings are less than BDT 60,000 (£600). On the other hand, the 
comparator households’ line rises comparatively slowly. This means that a higher 
proportion of the comparator group has higher savings: more than 20% of the comparator 
households’ savings are greater than BDT 60,000. The mean household savings of both 
groups are shown in table 4.7 below.  
 
Table 4.7: Total savings of households (in BDT) 
City Poor Comparator 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% conf.  
Interval] 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% conf.  
Interval] 
Dhaka 2,470 263 1954 2985 17,447 3040 11477 23417 
Chittagong 2,719 337 2059 3380 12,149 2708 6832 17467 
Kushtia 7,241 586 6091 8392 34,384 5217 24141 44627 
N 1073 686 
Source: InM (2014) 
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Household savings in poor areas are significantly lower than in the comparator areas. The 
mean savings of the households in poor areas in Kushtia is higher than those in Dhaka 
and Chittagong. This difference is statistically significant15. According to estimates, the 
mean savings of poor households in Dhaka, Chittagong and Kushtia are BDT 2,470 (£24), 
BDT 2,719 (£27) and BDT 7,241 (£72) respectively. Also, the savings of the comparator 
households in Kushtia are significantly higher than in the other two cities. Incomes are 
lower but savings are higher in Kushtia, which implies that large cities offer higher 
income earning opportunities but are more risky or have higher living costs. Table 4.8 
shows the savings of poor households with different entities. 
 
Table 4.8: Mean savings of the poor households (in BDT) 
Entities  Obs. Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
95% Conf. Interval 
MFI 241 4,625 334 4304 4166.84 5083.73 
Cooperative 67 8,269 1086 7880 6346.53 10190.78 
Relative 73 35,288 5925 44657 24868.44 45706.91 
Neighbour 31 7,377 1442 6874 4856.00 9898.84 
Friend 18 12,511 3301 16938 4088.21 20934.01 
Bank 246 59,255 8299 97412 47022.06 71488.71 
Cash 951 1,376 116 1856 1258.18 1494.47 
others 43 22,674 5818 32367 12713.36 32635.48 
Source: InM (2014) 
 
A significant proportion of the poor has been found to have savings with the Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) and the banks. However, the role of MFI’s does not seem to be great. 
Along with the formal and non-formal financial institutions (banks and MFIs), the poor 
are found to save with relatives, neighbours and friends. Beyond the financial institutions, 
the relative is more important than others, with a higher number of the poor reportedly 
saving larger amounts of money with their relatives. Approximately 34% of the 
respondents reportedly saved with the banks or MFIs.  
4.3.8 Household expenditure 
Table 4.9 represents the major expenditures of the households in the study areas. 
According to the estimates, a significant portion of household income is spent on food 
                                                 
15In two-sample t-test with unequal variance 
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and housing. In addition, a considerable amount of incidental expenditure is incurred from 
a number of other sources, such as medical treatment, marriage and other cultural 
obligations. However, food, incidental and other apparently necessary or minimal 
expenditures vary little between poor and comparator. This kind of necessary expenditure 
may squeeze housing and education expenditures. People in poor areas spend about half 
on housing and almost one-third on education compared to comparator households.  It is 
supposed that the poor live in slums and informal housing to save expenditure. 
 
Table 4.9: Monthly expenditure of tenant households (in BDT) 
[£1= BDT 100 (Approx.)] 
 
 Source: InM (2014) 
 
The average monthly food expenditure of the poor and comparators are BDT 5,775 
(approx. £57.50) and BDT 7,547 (£75), while housing-related expenditures are 
approximately BDT 2,300 and BDT 4,500, respectively. The small difference in food 
expenditure but big difference in housing expenditure could suggest that since the poor 
cannot compromise on the necessity for food, they can compromise on housing and 
education. The difference of expenditures on housing and education varies significantly; 
these being BDT 1,836 (£18) and BDT 987 (£10) respectively. 
Field of expenditure Poor Comparator  
Mean  Std. Err. Mean  Std. Err. 
Food 5,775 188 7,547 243 
Rent  2,050 59 3,946 135 
Education  467 38 1,510 105 
Electricity  124 24 244 25 
Water  38 5 66 24 
Gas  71 9 119 25 
Transport  331 20 539 36 
Medical  485 30 689 40 
Mobile  244 10 473 31 
Garment  384 13 628 45 
Incidental (yearly) 5,540 1,179 6,639 1,367 
Total expenditure  16,696 1,230 23,741 1,542 
Obs. 594 411 
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The income levels of the poor suggest that they cannot afford proper housing after they 
have met other needs such as food and healthcare. It may be truer to say that a small 
increment in income is unlikely to change their housing situation. It is conventional in 
economics to assume that the poor maximise utility under income constraints; this means 
that a rise in income may not affect their expenditure on housing and education. In such 
situations, the marginal utility of per unit expenditure on housing or education is less than 
that of other necessary expenditure. 
4.3.9 Households’ debt 
Approximately 59% of the poor households have debt. This can be as small as BDT 150, 
rising to BDT 2,000,000 (£20,000).  The scatter diagrams below represent poor 
households’ debt in three cities. According to the diagram, the lower income households, 
with a monthly household income BDT 20,000 or less, are more likely to have taken a 
higher loan.  
 
 
Source: InM (2014) 
Figure 4.3: Household current debt 
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Table 4.10 represents the estimated mean debt of the poor and comparator households 
across cities. According to estimates, the mean debts of the poor households are 
approximately BDT 26,824 (£268) in Dhaka, BDT 25,883 (£258) in Chittagong and BDT 
29,423 (£294) in Kushtia. The mean debt of comparator households is higher than in the 
poor households, with the exception of Kushtia, where the mean debt of comparators is 
less than that of their poor counterparts. 
 
Table 4.10: Households’ debt in three cities (in BDT) 
City Poor Comparator 
 Mean Robust 
Std. Err. 
Mean Robust 
Std. Err. Dhaka 26,824 5,736 45,539 4,794 
Chittagong 25,883 1,563 33,268 1,513 
Kushtia 29,423 2,351 23,029 6,68 
 
   Source: InM (2014) 
 
In general, higher incomes could support higher debt; however, the poor are more 
vulnerable and have a greater need to resort to debt to get through crises. There is 
generally a relationship between debt, particularly informal and problem debt, and 
poverty. The difference of debt between poor and comparator groups is not significant in 
Dhaka or Kushtia. However, it is significant in Chittagong, where the mean debt of the 
comparator households is approximately BDT 10,495 (£104) greater than that of the poor 
group.  
 
4.4 Neighbourhood characteristics 
This section examines the neighbourhood characteristics in the study areas, such as land 
ownership, tenancy patterns, availability of facilities and the cost of living. These 
variables are important to the poor, because different characteristics offer different social 
opportunities and challenges.  
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4.4.1 Land ownership of neighbourhoods 
Land ownership of the poor neighbourhoods is largely public, but there are cases in which 
settlements are built on both public land and the adjoining private land.16  Moreover, some 
poor neighbourhoods are built on private land. 
4.4.1.1 Dhaka 
Land ownership of neighbourhoods in Dhaka is mixed. This means the neighbourhood of 
a particular type of land is extended to surrounding land of other types. Among four 
categories of land ownership (see the questionnaire in Appendix A), approximately 44% 
is public, 32% private, and 20% ‘khash’.  
Khash land, for example ‘Bawnia’, refers provisional government-allotted land to the 
poor via a rehabilitation project. Over the years, neighbourhoods have extended to 
surrounding private and khash land. So there is no clear demarcation between the 
provisionally allocated land and the extension, but the combined area is known as Bawnia.  
Similar mixed land ownership patterns are found in other neighbourhoods. In Arambagh, 
52% of the land is public, 22% is private and 26% is khash. In Hazaribagh, 80% of the 
land is private, 16% is khash and the remainder is mixed. In Porabari, 18% of the land is 
public, 76% is private and there is some mixed land.  In Korail, the land is primarily 
public, yet 7% is reported to be private. Looking at major shares of land ownership, 
neighbourhoods can be sorted depending on whether land ownership is public, private or 
khash.  
4.4.1.2 Chittagong 
According to survey statistics, land ownership of Jamtoli is public. On the other hand, the 
land ownership of the Shantinagar slums neighbourhood is private. Similarly to earlier 
discussions, although the land ownership of Shantinagar is recorded as private, 
approximately 30% of land is reportedly public or khash.  
                                                 
16Respondents were asked about the land ownership of their houses, and were given four answer options: 
government, private, khash, ‘no idea’. 
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4.4.1.3 Kushtia 
Three-quarters of land ownership in Chror Amlapara is reportedly khash. The 
neighbourhood is primarily built by the banks of the river Gorai, where land title is open; 
the remainder is reportedly private. Land ownership of the ‘Housing Society’ 
neighbourhood, which was developed alongside the national highway, is khash.17 
Conversely, similar proportions of land ownership in Chor Thanapara are reportedly 
private.   
In general, the survey data conveys a more complex picture. Land ownership of poor 
neighbourhoods in cities is primarily public, with the land owned by various government 
bodies, while many residents are paying rent to the illegal occupiers who control those 
lands. However, there is a lot of informal housing scattered over private neighbourhoods. 
This, in turn, has implications for potential housing upgrading, which is discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
4.4.2 The status of tenancy 
The following diagrams are based on responses to the question: How they are living in 
the house? In the case of Dhaka, householders  are largely tenants, whether land 
ownership is public, private or khash. For instance, though the land in Korail is owned by 
a public organisation (T&T, the state-owned telecommunication department), 70% of 
residents are tenants paying  rent. Similarly, 78% of land ownership in Arambagh is either 
public or khash; yet the survey reveals that 95% of its residents are paying rent to primary 
or de facto owners.  
                                                 
17Adjacent to the other side of  the‘Housing Society’ is another neighbourhood, where land is allocated by 
the government specially to house people with lower middle incomes. Spatial boundaries between the two 
neighbourhoods are not distinguishable; however, social boundaries are clearly marked by land ownership 
and housing patterns. 
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Source: InM (2014) 
Figure 4.4: Status of housing occupancy in Dhaka 
 
Also, a large portion of the poor surveyed in Chittagong is paying rent for dwellings 
erected on public land. Land ownership in the Jamtoli slum is largely public; however, 
85% of the residents pay rent. Details of the different types of occupancy in Chittagong 
and Kushtia are shown in figure 4.7 below.  
 
Source: InM (2014) 
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Figure 4.5: Status of housing occupancy in Chittagong and Kushtia 
 
A small percentage of the poor in Kushtia is paying rent in comparison to those in Dhaka 
and Chittagong: 16% in Chor Amlapara and 9% in the Housing Society. This percentage 
is higher in Chor Thanapara, where one-third of the neighbourhood’s residents are paying 
rent even though a large portion of the land is private.  
The interview went on to ask: Who collects the rent? particularly of those living on public 
or khash land. According to the survey data, approximately 83% households in 
Chittagong and 43% of households in Dhaka reported that they pay rent to a third party. 
This third party is allegedly a particular group linked to a political group, which has taken 
control of public land and leases it out for informal housing.  
Corruption in controlling public land is higher in Dhaka and Chittagong than in Kushtia. 
This might imply that controlling public land in big cities provides higher rent because of 
higher demand for informal housing.  
4.4.3 Size of housing units 
The study neighbourhoods are crowded compared to other city neighbourhoods; most of 
the households in Dhaka and Chittagong live in single-room homes. According to the 
survey, 88% of homes in the poor neighbourhoods of Dhaka are single-room dwellings; 
in Chittagong the proportion is 79%. The rest of the households live in either two- or 
three-room housing. Usually a unit is comprised of a room and small courtyard space that 
is almost as useful for cooking, washing, socializing etc. 
In contrast, housing units in Kushtia are large in terms of room size and the number of 
rooms used.  According to the statistics, approximately half of the households live in two- 
or three-room housing, and the average room size is slightly larger than the rooms in 
Dhaka and Chittagong. The diagrams below represent the mean room size of single-room 
housing, two-room housing and three-room housing in the study neighbourhoods. 
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Source: (InM, 2014) 
Figure 4.6: Mean size of housing unit (sq. feet) 
 
Single-room homes can be as small as 85 square feet in Chittagong; this is smaller than 
single-room housing in Dhaka. However, the average room size of two-room housing in 
Dhaka is smaller, at approximately 84 square feet. Compared to room sizes in Dhaka and 
Chittagong, the mean room size of the urban poor neighbourhoods in Kushtia is larger in 
both one-room and two-room homes. Given the average household size of four, living 
conditions among the poor are far below minimum standard levels. 
4.4.4 Costs of living 
4.4.3.1 House rent 
The ratios of rent-paying households in the poor areas of Dhaka and Chittagong are much 
higher than the ratio found in Kushtia. Approximately 75% of Dhaka’s study population 
are tenants; the proportion is even higher, at 86%, in Chittagong. In contrast, only 20% 
of households in Kushtia are reportedly tenants. Moreover, the mean rent in Dhaka and 
Chittagong is much higher than that in Kushtia. Table 4.11 below represents the mean 
rents in Dhaka, Chittagong and Kushtia.  
85
105.891
83.6
126.034
173.475
205.733
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3
Chittagong Dhaka
Kushtia
M
e
a
n
 o
f 
ro
o
m
 s
iz
e
Number of rooms
110 
 
 
Table 4.11: Mean rent in poor neighbourhoods (per month in BDT) 
City Poor Comparator 
 Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Dhaka 2,042 43 1957 2126 3,165 53 3060 3270 
Chittagong 1,972 46 1882 2064 2,726 111 2507 2944 
Kushtia 867 56 757 976 2,009 145 1725 2294 
N 694 364 
Source: InM (2014) 
 
 The mean rent paid by tenants varies across the three study cities. According to the survey 
responses, mean rents in poor areas in Dhaka and Chittagong are BDT 2,042 (£20) and 
BDT 2,017 per month respectively. However, the mean rent in Kushtia is BDT 867 
(£8.50), with rents varying widely between BDT 350 and BDT 2,000. On the other hand, 
mean rents in comparator areas are higher than in the respective poor areas in all of the 
study cities. 
The scatter diagrams below (figure 4.7) show the distribution of rents in the poor areas of 
three cities against the household income. According to the figure 4.7, the proportion of 
tenants in Dhaka and Chittagong are high compared to those in Kushtia. Thus, the 
intensity of distribution is higher in Dhaka and Chittagong than in Kushtia. Though the 
lines of figures display little upward movement in rents with the increase in income, most 
of the rents are limited to within a certain amount. This might mean that the poor may not 
necessarily spend their increased incomes on renting better accommodation. 
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Source: (InM, 2014) 
Figure 4.7: Monthly rent paid by the study household 
 
The difference in mean rents between Chittagong and Dhaka is not statistically 
significant, though those of both cities differ significantly from that of Kushtia. The mean 
rent in Chittagong is BDT 1,225 (£12) higher than in Kushtia, and the mean rent in Dhaka 
is BDT 1,321 (£13) higher. 
4.4.3.2 Expenditure on electricity 
A significant proportion of households – three-quarters in Dhaka and half in Chittagong 
– were found not to report on electricity expenditure. However, the non-response rate in 
Kushtia was only 17%. Mean electricity expenditures by city, according to the survey 
responses, are shown in Table 4.12 below. 
 
Table 4.12: Mean expenditures on electricity (monthly, in BDT) 
City Poor* Comparator* 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% Conf. Interval] Mean Std.  
Err. 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
Dhaka 419 18.08 383.01 624.85 750 44.92 661.62 338.38 
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Chittagong 270 12.61 244.77 294.33 535 30.35 475.38 594.81 
Kushtia 353 10.68 332.02 374.02 667 24.03 609.27 703.84 
N 460 306 
[*The estimates are based on the lower 90% of households who are paying for electricity.] 
Source: InM (2014) 
 
Mean electricity expenditure in Dhaka is the highest of the three study cities, followed by 
Kushtia and Chittagong. According to the survey responses, the means are respectively 
BDT 419 (£4), BDT 353 and BDT 270. It seems a little surprising that the mean 
expenditure in Kushtia is higher than in Chittagong. Such a finding may substantiate the 
literature that many informal housing areas and slums throughout the big cities in 
Bangladesh are unlawfully connected with urban services. However, the mean electricity 
expenditure in comparator areas is higher than the corresponding poor areas, suggesting 
the former are more able and willing to pay for a legal electricity supply than the latter. 
4.4.3.3 Expenditure on water supply 
Though a water supply is an essential service for urban dwellers, most of the urban poor 
remain without it. As such, many of those households have to resort to other means to 
access water. According to the survey responses, approximately 22% of poor households 
in Dhaka and 40% of those in Chittagong pay for water. However, there is no municipal 
water supply connected to the poor neighbourhoods in Kushtia, and households are 
mostly using tube-well water. Table 4.13 represents the comparative mean expenditure 
on water in Dhaka and Chittagong. 
 
Table 4.13: Expenditure on water (monthly, in BDT) 
City  Poor Comparator 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% Conf.  
Interval] 
Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf.  
Interval] 
Dhaka 252 26.22 200.99 304.32 817 204.03 413.42 1219.91 
Chittagong 220 15.29 190.00 250.25 212 17.73 175.96 247.04 
Kushtia Usually use tube-well water 147 15.32 116.39 176.94 
N 231 147 
 Source: InM (2014) 
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Households in poor neighbourhoods of Dhaka and Chittagong mostly use the nearest 
water-point to collect water. They either pay for each full water container, or they pay 
monthly. Some of the poor households reportedly pay for water along with the rent. It 
may be that some of the poor households pay their bills through the informal rents. 
According to our survey, the mean expenditure on water in the poor areas of Dhaka and 
Chittagong is BDT 252 (£2.50) and BDT 220. However, the difference in means between 
these two cities is not statistically significant. 
4.4.3.4 Expenditure on cooking gas 
There are no gas facilities in most of the urban poor neighbourhoods in Dhaka and 
Chittagong. Approximately one-fifth of poor households in each of these cities have been 
found to use gas for cooking. They either buy a gas cylinder or have a connection to a gas 
supply line. The mean expenditure on gas of the study poor in Dhaka and Chittagong is 
shown in table 4.14 below. 
 
 
Table 4.14: Expenditure on gas (monthly, in BDT) 
City  Poor Comparator 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% Conf.  
Interval] 
Mean Std. 
Err. 
[95% Conf.  
Interval] 
Dhaka 714 82.96 549.5 878.3 834 170.05 497.19 1169.9 
Chittagong 509 50.61 407.7 610.2 503 37.08 430.27 576.9 
Kushtia Gas line not available 
N 184 132 
Source: InM (2014) 
      
According to the responses, the mean expenditures on gas in Dhaka and Chittagong are 
approximately BDT 714 and BDT 509 respectively. At a 95% level of confidence, they 
vary between BDT 549 and BDT 878 in Dhaka, and between BDT 408 and BDT 610 in 
Chittagong. Though the mean expenditure of comparator households is higher in Dhaka, 
it does not vary in Chittagong. 
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4.4.3.5 Expenditure on healthcare 
The mean household expenditure on healthcare, at BDT 327, is lowest in Kushtia; the 
mean expenditure in Chittagong is BDT 779, and is BDT 525 in Dhaka. The scatter plots 
below represent the healthcare expenditure of the poor populations in the three study 
cities. 
 
Source: InM (2014) 
Figure 4.8: Healthcare expenditure of the study households 
 
Healthcare expenditure is expected to be very variable according to whether people are 
sick or well. However, a significant difference is evident between cities. According to 
estimates, the expenditure in Chittagong is BDT 452 (£4.50), which is 254 (£2.50) higher 
than in both Kushtia and Dhaka. Healthcare expenditure in Dhaka is approximately BDT 
198 (£2) higher than in Kushtia. This difference is not significant, but it may hint that 
large cities like Chittagong and Dhaka inflict higher healthcare expenditure on their 
residents. Mean healthcare expenditures of comparator households is also highest in 
Chittagong and Dhaka, as shown in Table 4.15 below. 
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Table 4.15: Healthcare Expenditure of the ‘comparator’ households (monthly, in BDT) 
City Mean Std. Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Dhaka 760 48.96 664.26 856.53 
Chittagong 1,023 79.05 867.79 1178.23 
Kushtia 818 136.65 549.48 1086.09 
Source: InM (2014) 
According to the survey statistics, healthcare expenditure is highest among the 
comparators in Chittagong, followed by Kushtia, and the lowest expenditure is in Dhaka.  
4.4.5 Social opportunities 
The survey conducted for this study did not collect data related to social opportunities 
available in the poor areas. However, previous data on poor neighbourhoods might 
provide a glimpse into the available social opportunities (see Table 4.16). Evidence and 
observation suggest that basic social opportunities such as primary schooling, healthcare 
centres, play areas and playing fields, mosques and garbage disposal points are 
completely inadequate in urban poor neighbourhoods.  
 
Table 4.16: Social opportunities in low-income neighbourhoods in Dhaka 
Type of facilities 
Availability (%) 
1983  1988  
Primary school 5.8 5.7 
Healthcare center 0.8 3.4 
Open Space for children  13.6 10.2 
Mosque  13.9 10.3 
Garbage disposal facility - 8.6 
     Source: CUS (1983); CUS (1988) 
  
 
According to the 1988 study, only 5.7% and 3.4% of the poor in Dhaka had access to 
primary schooling and primary healthcare respectively. These social opportunities have 
improved little over the years. Access to primary healthcare improved from 0.8% to 3.4%, 
presumably because of the active presence of NGOs in the country. A number of NGOs 
and voluntary organisations are working in the poor neighbourhoods to provide primary 
education and healthcare facilities, but those efforts are inadequate. The availability of 
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other facilities, such as open spaces, decreased between 1983 and 1988. This probably 
implies that the poor neighbourhoods are gradually expanding to fill such spaces.  
Urban poor neighbourhoods largely lack necessary access roads. According to the 
statistics of 1988, more than half of these neighbourhoods had no access road, while 31% 
had only narrow earthen walkways. Only 17% had moderate levels of access roads to their 
houses.  
 
Table 4.17: Road and drainage facilities in Dhaka 
Road availability % 
No roads  51.3 
Earthen narrow lanes 31.3 
Herring road (made of 
brick layer) (<4ft) 
7.5 
Herring road (>4ft) 1.8 
Paved road 8.1 
Drainage Condition Percentage 
Good 34.8 
Exist but poor in 
condition 
43.1 
Does not exist 
22.1 
  Source: CUS (1988) 
  
 
As with access roads, the overall drainage conditions in poor neighbourhoods are poor or 
very poor. Only one-third of neighbourhoods were found to be properly connected to the 
city’s drainage. The remainder are either connected poorly or not at all. 
 
4.5 Migration of the urban poor 
The respondents living in the poor areas are mostly rural migrants who have moved to 
cities at some point. Very few of them have lived for generation after generation in these 
urban locations. This section discusses four aspects of migration of the urban poor: origin 
of migration, frequency of migration, reasons for migration and costs of migration.  
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4.5.1 Origin of migration 
Dhaka alone accommodates 55% of the total urban poor of Bangladesh; therefore, much 
of the study was conducted there (CUS, 2006). According to CUS and InM data, the major 
districts of origin of the migrant poor to Dhaka have been as presented in table 4.18. 
Those studies collected the origin of migration of the urban poor living in informal 
settlements across Dhaka in different years. According the data, five districts out of 64 
districts in the country contribute much to Dhaka’s poor population.  
 
Table 4.18: Percentage of Dhaka’s poor by major districts of origin 
District of Origin Dhaka (in %) 
1974  1979 1988 1996 2009 
Dhaka 27 20 16 8 24 
Faridpur 31 21 21 18 6 
Comilla 17 15 15 10 5 
Barisal 11 19 23 23 9 
Mymensingh 7 7 5 6 5 
Noakhali 4 3 7 3 1 
Others All  3 15 14 32 51 
Sources: CUS (1974),CUS (1979),CUS (1988), CUS (1996);(InM, 2009) 
 
According to the statistics, intra-urban migration in Dhaka gradually decreased until 
1996. However, according to the survey in 2009, the intra-city migration in fifteen poor 
neighbourhoods was still found to be high.  Approximately a quarter of poor households 
are found to be moving around within the city.  
The poor primarily originated from Faridpur, Comilla and Barisal. The percentage share 
of immigrants from these districts is always higher than from any other districts of the 
country. Comilla is very closer to Dhaka and is an economically advanced district, but 
other two districts are not economically advanced and affected to a greater or lesser 
degree by floods or cyclones. Together these three contributed between 50% and 60% of 
the migrants, followed by Mymensingh and Noakhali (close to Dhaka and economically 
poor), which have also contributed a significant portion of Dhaka’s poor migrants. Since 
communication between Dhaka and other districts has improved over the time, the 
migration rates (as a percentage of total migrants) from other districts have gradually 
increased.  
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4.5.2 Frequency of migration 
According to the survey, a significant proportion of the study poor stay in a 
neighbourhood for longer periods of time. However, the proportion that stays varies 
across the three cities: 45% in Dhaka have stayed more than 20 years, 31% in Chittagong, 
and 38% in Kushtia; these people have not migrated or moved out in the last twenty years. 
The remainder were found to have migrated between one and three times during this 
period. The following diagrams show the cumulative frequency distributions of numbers 
of migrations in the three study cities. 
 
 
Source: InM (2014) 
Figure 4.9: Cumulative distribution of household by the number of migrations 
 
Approximately 61% of the poor migrated just once, and a further 20% and 10% 
respectively migrated twice or three times during this period. The remaining 9% were 
found to migrate more than three times. The frequency of migration in Dhaka is higher 
than either of Chittagong and Kushtia. Approximately 80% of households in poor areas 
are found to migrate up to three times within the twenty-year period. This percentage is 
lower in Chittagong and Kushtia.  
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Table 4.19: The mean stay period (in years) of households in poor areas 
 
City Obs. Mean Std.Err. [95% Conf. Interval] 
All 1796 14.3 0.290 13.7347 14.8722 
Dhaka 797 12.6 0.396 11.8381 13.3940 
Chittagong 499 12.8 0.544 11.7634 13.8999 
Kushtia 499 18.5 0.587 17.3390 19.6471 
  
Source: InM (2014) 
 
The data reveal that the mean stay period of households in poor areas is 14.3 years, which 
is not significantly different from the mean stay period of the poor households in 
Chittagong. However, both significantly differ from Kushtia.  The stay period in previous 
neighbourhoods are shown in the histograms below.  
 
 
Source: (InM, 2014) 
Figure 4.10: Stay period of the study households in previous neighbourhoods 
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The histograms represent the distribution of the stay period in previous neighbourhoods18. 
The frequencies for Kushtia are more skewed right than for either Dhaka or Chittagong. 
This means that a large proportion of the households in the poor areas of Chittagong 
stayed in previous neighbourhoods for only a very short time. Again, frequency of stay 
period in Dhaka is skewed slightly more to the right than in Kushtia, indicating the poor 
are less transient in a small town.  
4.5.3 Reasons for migration 
There are two main types of migration happening in cities: (i) intra-city migration; and 
(ii) inter-district migration. The latter type is when migrants move to a city from other 
districts, maybe from a rural area or smaller city. Most inter-district migration takes place 
into large cities, notably Dhaka and Chittagong. 
The reasons for migration vary across the study population. According to the 2009 InM 
survey, approximately half of poor households reportedly moved to Dhaka for better 
income opportunities. Similar evidence is found in the case of Kushtia. Other reasons 
causing migrants to move away from their original locations in Bangladesh are higher 
rents, river erosion and eviction from the land. Approximately 14% of poor households 
in Dhaka reportedly lost their land, and another 3% were evicted from their previous 
living place. 
According to this survey, income opportunity still remains the main reason of migration, 
particularly for the poor in Dhaka and Chittagong. Other reasons given are bad 
neighbours, unavailability of urban services (e.g. water and electricity), and lack of school 
facilities. The percentage shares of various factors contributing to migration in the three 
study cities are shown in the diagram below.  
 
                                                 
18 99% of the stay periods, ranging from  1 to 55 years of stay at the previous location, have been taken into 
consideration. The remaining 1% have been treated as outliers.  
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Source: (InM, 2014) 
Figure 4.11: Key reasons for the migration of the urban poor 
 
The question: Why did they migrate from their previous living place? is accompanied by 
12 answer options (see Appendix A), and the respondents were allowed to choose more 
than one answer.  According to the data, the percentages of respondents who migrated for 
economic reasons are approximately 56% in Dhaka and 71% in Chittagong; these are 
much higher than in Kushtia, at 37%. Next in order of importance comes ‘high rent’, 
followed by ‘eviction’ and ‘river erosion’. Higher rent in a respondent’s previous place 
was particularly common among the poor in Kushtia, where half of the respondents cited 
this, followed by approximately 39% in Dhaka and 20% in Chittagong. Eviction is 
another significant reason for migration to Dhaka, where approximately 12% of the poor 
respondents were reportedly evicted from their pervious living places.  
4.5.4 Costs of migration 
In addition to economic loss, frequent migration often involves social losses for the 
victims. Such migration may result in looser social connections, a condition which creates 
a sense of social insecurity. Social elements like networks, trust and cooperation, which 
are developed through enormous social exchanges over time, are often absent in a new 
place.  Perhaps social connectedness is critical for the urban livelihoods of the poor; this 
is analysed in Chapters 6 and 7. Figure 4.14 shows the households’ responses to losses 
resulting from migration. 
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Source: (InM, 2014) 
Figure 4.12: Damage inflicted on the poor from forced migration 
 
Multiple possible responses were allowed to the question, Which social and economic 
losses were caused by migration? A significant proportion of the poor cited the loss of 
social network, trust and cooperation. The percentages of respondents in Dhaka who 
reported those losses are approximately 29%, 32% and 21% respectively; they are 
approximately 32%, 21% and 19% respectively in Chittagong; and 44%, 39% and 46%, 
respectively in Kushtia. In contrast, the proportion of respondents who reported any 
economic losses, such as loss of land or other property, was much smaller.19 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
Low income and limited assets, as well as limited socio-economic opportunities, deprive 
the urban poor of access to minimum livelihoods opportunities and deny them anything 
other than a sub-standard living. Higher livelihood expenses in cities require the poor to 
spend a significant portion of their income on food and daily necessities, leaving them 
less to spend on housing. Consequently, informal housing becomes the last resort of the 
                                                 
19However, a lesser proportion of the comparator households reported such losses from migration; 
approximately 25% and 32% of households in Dhaka and Chittagong reported that they lost nothing. Yet 
the social cost of migration of poor households seems higher than economic loss, which hits the transient 
poor hardest.  
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urban poor. These informal settlements provide neither security of tenure nor adequate 
social opportunities, consequently binding the poor to a state of sustained vulnerability. 
To cope with the situation, some of the poor themselves move from one place to another, 
incurring social costs by destroying their social capital. This situation varies across cities, 
but the lives of the poor in larger cities seem to be fraught with many challenges. Despite 
the comparator poor in better-off neighborhoods enjoying greater socioeconomic 
opportunities, the urban lives of the poor are challenged by higher expense and socio-
economic vulnerability. 
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Chapter 5: The Nature and Extent of Social Capital 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The urban poor in Bangladesh clearly lack income and wealth, as confirmed by the 
evidence presented in Chapter 4. Their persistent deficiency in physical (material) assets 
is also associated with a low achievement of human capital, which ultimately generates a 
vicious cycle of poverty (Haddad et al., 1999; Banks, 2016; Bashar, 2012). Moreover, 
such poverty persists over generations of the poor, in a situation with minimal 
socioeconomic opportunities (see chapter 4). Thus the poor cannot easily overcome 
poverty by selling unskilled labour in formal or semiformal labour markets. Also, new 
unskilled young workers  are moving to cities to work in the clothing industry and in other 
low-paid work (see Chapter 4).  In addition, the persistent threat of eviction from their 
homes, and discriminatory social attitudes towards the urban poor, create a state of social 
vulnerability that often pushes them even deeper into poverty (Chen and Ravallion, 2010; 
Ravallion and Sen, 1996; Hossain, 2011b; Mahmud, 2008). Nonetheless, there is little 
encouragement or incentive for the public and private sectors to invest in the urban poor. 
Equally, the Bangladeshi government’s interventions are scant and often fraught with 
distributional problems (Nawaz, 2004). Although the prevalence of the non-government 
organisations (NGOs) help the poor and make them more visible through small-scale 
investment (primarily, microcredit), primary education and social services, nevertheless, 
such interventions hardly change their poverty in any sustainable way (Rahman, 1999). 
Neither the conventional market economy nor forceful displacement by state agencies 
help to solve poverty. Rather, both push the poor further into poverty and social 
vulnerability by destroying the little socioeconomic progress that they make through 
various national and international efforts. In fact, such displacement arguably damages 
their social capital; an asset upon which it is believed the urban poor greatly rely 
(Woolcock, 1998b). 
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The literature on social capital, as reviewed in Chapter 2, is mostly placed in the context 
of developed countries, or within a macro-framework of developing countries. This 
chapter intends to investigate the nature and extent of different aspects of social capital of the 
urban poor in Bangladesh, and thereby to help fill an empirical gap in knowledge about social 
capital in this context. A number of tables present data on different social networks, trust and 
cooperation of the urban poor, with comparative statistics from the comparator groups. From 
the literature review, taken in conjunction with the socio-economic and demographic profile 
of the relevant populations, we may derive certain expectations or hypotheses concerning the 
extent and patterns of social capital likely to be found in these areas. For example, we would 
expect higher levels of certain types of social capital where people are better off, or where 
communities are more stable and less transient, or composed mainly of people from similar 
backgrounds.. Conversely, however, shared adversity may bring people together as a day-to-
day coping mechanism.  
The descriptive analysis of responses obtained from the field survey suggests that, despite 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities, trust and cooperation exist in poor neighbourhoods to a greater 
extent than in the comparator neighbourhoods. These outcomes of social capital are a 
significant new finding, which  may have implications for housing the urban poor in 
Bangladesh. 
 
5.2 The variables and measures 
Theoretical debate on social capital has stimulated academic efforts towards the 
development of its measurement  (Adlar and Kwon, 2002). The debate has focused 
attention on the interlinkage of the causes (e.g. socio-economic factors), manifestation 
(e.g. network, frequency of meeting) and consequences (e.g. trust, cooperation) of social 
capital. These are the potential measures of social capital that are commonly found in the 
literature (Woolcock, 1998b; Furstenberg and Hughes, 1995; Narayan and Pritchett, 
1999; Knack and Keefer, 1997a; Casey, 2004), which this research has sought also to 
measure through its household survey, as described in Chapter 3. 
Depending on the social classes involved, individuals’ social networks may be formed at 
different levels. The networks formed within the same social group (class) are known as 
bonding networks (Ferlander, 2007; Adler and Kwon, 2002).  They are formed and 
reinforced by frequent contact, and assist the process of ‘getting by’ on a daily basis 
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(Stone et al., 2003). Bonding networks are generated in a closer group and so denser ties 
and higher levels of trust and reciprocity exist, but bonding may also lead to exclusionary 
practices (Freeman, 1978). As a bridging social network is formed between more 
heterogeneous groups of people, the connection is more fragile and loose. However, 
network members may gain from the connection (Achuller et al., 2000).  Linking 
networks are created through connection with those in authority; it is these connections 
between individuals and institutions which reach beyond community boundaries (see 
Section 2.2). 
Putnam’s quantitative measurement index to quantify social capital has been largely 
followed in the literature. It uses six measures: marital status, social actions (working 
together), sociability (frequency of meeting), trust and solidarity, safety and civic 
engagement (government or national level affairs) (Ramlagan et al., 2013; WB, 2001; 
Putnam, 1993). Community-level social capital studies view such capital as 
multidimensional and collectively owned (Bourdieu, 1986), or as a community-level 
resource (Putnam, 1993) that is embedded in the networks of mutual interactions and 
social virtues. Common measures of community level social capital include variables 
representing bonding networks (number of network, frequency of meeting), membership 
of associations, community engagement, trust and social support (Putnam, 2001; 
Scheffler et al., 2007; Ziersch et al., 2005b; Grootaert and Narayan, 2004; Wilson, 2006; 
Glaeser et al., 2000). 
In this chapter, social interaction is considered the principal manifestation of social 
capital, which is more or less facilitated by the socio-economic status of the people. The 
contribution of  social class to the generation of social networks, and the associated social 
outcomes, have been brought explicitly into  the major theories of social capital 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001; Coleman, 1990). Therefore, it is expected that certain 
socioeconomic variables would influence social networks and social behaviours. More 
precisely, social class would be expected to frame the spectrum of social interactions and 
relations which people are able to engage in and influence the attributes of the particlar 
networks (manifestation of social capital), thereby affecting the key outcomes, e.g. nature 
of trust (immediate) and cooperation (ultimate), of social capital. The social networks, in 
the forms of numbers of networks (volume) and frequency of contact (strength) have been 
used in the literature for measuring social capital, and can also manifest the structure of 
social capital (Putnam, 2001; WB, 2001; Onyx and Bullen, 2000). Trust and cooperation 
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have been used in the literature as  measures of latent or expressed behavioural outcomes 
of social capital (Harpham et al., 2002; Putnam, 2001; Fukuyama, 1996).  
The formulation of social capital is based on social relations; the precise notion of it is 
based on differing but influential theories within the social science literature. Here, the 
underlying nature and extent of social capital is linked to deeply-rooted social and cultural 
variations across populations, and is manifested by different aspects of social class, social 
networks, trust and cooperation. 
For some authors, the conception of social class seems to be that the processes that form 
social capital are the same as the processes that form social class (Bourdieu, 1986). This 
seems to make class inseparable from social capital. Another argument is that social 
capital is stronger and more effective for some classes (higher vs lower classes). It may 
also imply that bonding capital is generally formed within a class, whereas bridging, 
which is generally weaker, crosses class lines (see Section 2.2 for details).  
The socioeconomic risks and potentials underlying socioeconomic vulnerabilities and 
linked to economic thresholds (income, assets, education and occupation) that are 
considered to be the key factors constraining people within the social class (see Appendix 
B). Variables for the social network, including the bonding and bridging/linking 
networks, are developed based on the measures of number and frequency of contact, each 
of the networks having been taken into consideration. In addition, some measures 
regarding the scope for socialisation (for example whether social gatherings take place in 
the community) have been taken as indicators of social relationships which might 
facilitate networks. Variables for the trust measure relate to how far people could rely on 
different networks. This includes, for example, measures of comparative trust in financial 
matters (e.g. lending money) and non-financial matters (e.g. looking after the house in 
the residents’ absence) among the networks. These subjective/hypothetical measures have 
been collected on a Likert scale (see chapter 3). The cooperation measure also includes 
both financial (e.g. borrowing money) and non-financial (e.g. help in daily life) 
cooperation that the respondents actually received from the networks during the last year. 
These behavioural data are also measured as the degree of cooperation on Likert scales. 
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5.3 Results and discussion 
This section discusses the descriptive estimates of the data obtained from the field survey. 
The estimates are based on the mean of the observed variables relevant to social capital. 
Some results are estimated on the t-tests to investigate group means.  
5.3.1 Social opportunities and challenges 
The measures of perception of social opportunities and challenges of the urban poor and 
comparator groups in Bangladesh are presented in Table 5.1. The mean and standard 
deviations of each of the responses have been shown for a general perception on each of 
the thirteen variables on socioeconomic risks and potential which may be considered as 
outcomes or indicators of socioeconomic situation or class. These socioeconomic 
variables may be taken as indicative of the  social vulnerability of the groups concerned 
(Cutter et al., 2003). How closely correlated they are with objective data on economic 
positions, i.e. income, assets, etc., is shown in Appendix B. Social vulnerability refers to 
the inability of the urban poor to withstand adverse socioeconomic uncertainties, risks 
and threats. 
According to the estimates, a moderate level of income uncertainty existed among the 
poor households compared to a very low level among the comparator households. 
However, both groups experienced some degree of income uncertainty due to the nature 
of their work /jobs. Relative income uncertainty is shown in table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1: Comparative risks and potential of the sample households living in poor areas 
and comparator areas 
 
Risks and potentials 
Mean Mean Difference* 
 Poor Comp. (Poor-
Comp.) 
t-value Obs. 
1. Risk of income loss 3.67 
(.05) 
2.74 
(.06) 
-.93 
(.08) 
-11.84 1677 
2. Risk of being evicted 4.06 
(.06) 
1.89 
(.05) 
-2.17 
(.07) 
-29.16 1681 
3. Risk of flooding 3.03 
(.05) 
1.84 
(.04 
-.18 
(.07) 
-17.66 1684 
4. Risk of fire hazard  3.70 
(.05) 
2.24 
(.04) 
-1.47 
(.07) 
-21.62 1684 
5. Risk of house damage 3.29 
(.05) 
2.07 
(.04) 
-1.22 
(.07) 
-18.10 1675 
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Risks and potentials 
Mean Mean Difference* 
 Poor Comp. (Poor-
Comp.) 
t-value Obs. 
6. Risk of being discriminated to avail 
public facilities  
2.83 
(.05) 
2.28 
(.05) 
-.55 
(.07) 
-8.14 1671 
7. Risk of being accused of crime 2.48 
(.05) 
2.01 
(.05) 
-.48 
(.07) 
-7.01 1679 
8. Risk of being harassed by the police or 
influential others 
2.45 
(.04) 
2.19 
(.05) 
-.26 
(.07) 
-3.86 1676 
9. Risk of health hazard in daily work 3.80 
(.05) 
2.91 
(.05) 
-.89 
(.07) 
-12.52 1668 
10. Risk of health hazard for living 
environment 
4.28 
(.04) 
2.99 
(.05) 
 
-1.29 
(.06) 
-19.65 1663 
11. Potential of their children to be 
educated  
3.80 
(.04) 
2.39 
(.04) 
-1.41 
(.06) 
-22.58 1676 
12. Potential of economic development 3.91 
(.04) 
2.54 
(.04) 
-1.37 
(.06) 
-22.68 1680 
13. Potential of social development 4.02 
(.05) 
2.40 
(.04) 
-1.62 
(.06) 
-25.51 1673 
Source: InM (2014) 
[Scale: 1=no possibility;…; 6=highest possibility. Higher risk represents higher social 
vulnerability and higher potential may represent the higher scope to overcome the existing 
situation. Figures within the parenthesis represent the std. error.* All mean differences are 
significant and based on the two-sample t-test with unequal variances.] 
 
The greatest threats of all are the risk of being evicted from the poor areas and the 
potential health hazards inflicted by the living environment; these two issues highlight 
particular social vulnerabilities of the urban households living in poor/informal housing 
areas. On a six-point Likert scale in which 1 represents ‘no possibility’ and 6 represents 
‘highest possibility’, respondents were asked to answer the questions related to eviction 
and health hazards: “what is the possibility of eviction from the land?”, and “what is the 
possibility of health hazards from the surrounding living conditions?” Based on these 
survey records, health hazards from the living environment and insecurity of tenure from 
the threat of eviction represent what may be defined as a ‘moderate level of vulnerability’, 
based on scores higher than 4.0. However, these threats are much lower among the 
population living in the comparator areas (who are also relatively poor), where the level 
of vulnerability from the risk of eviction and potential health hazards are reported as 2.0 
and 3.0 respectively; these two issues represent a very low to low level of vulnerability 
in comparator areas. 
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Both groups are typically exposed to very low to low levels of social vulnerability arising 
from harassment from police/local powerbrokers/influential others or from accusations 
of criminal activities, and have a low to very low likelihood of being unable to avail 
themselves of public opportunities (job, education, healthcare, public buses etc.) through 
discrimination. The urban poor are harassed by the police, exploited by the local 
powerbrokers, denied social services or  accused categorically of being responsible for 
criminal activities in the cities slightly more often than the comparators (Banks et al., 
2011a). The results support the contentions in the literature to some extent, but they also 
suggest that problems of this kind are not as serious as the basic problems of housing 
insecurity. Also, this evidence hints that local powerbrokers may be seen by residents as 
not necessarily a problem, but sometimes as a solution. However, the differences are still 
statistically significant, as shown in the fourth column (from the left) of Table 5.1. Social 
inequality and lack of good governance are allegedly accountable for these discrepancies 
(Sobhan, 2010). With respect to the three risks/threats highlighted, households living in 
the poor areas are socially more vulnerable, than the relatively poor living in the 
comparator areas. Social vulnerabilities inflicted from other challenges can be analysed 
in a similar fashion. 
In general, the estimates reveal a moderate to low level of socioeconomic vulnerability 
associated with households in poor areas compared to those in comparator areas. 
Moreover, both groups have the potential for socio-economic development; however, the 
potential of the poor area residents seems to be greater than that of the comparator area 
residents (see points 12 & 13 of Table 5.1). This finding may conflict with the general 
perception that the poorer group has lower potential than the comparator group, which 
has better access to social opportunities. Social opportunities, such as education, 
healthcare, communication, living environment and better income opportunities are 
greater in comparator areas; factors that might provide higher socioeconomic potential to 
the comparator poor. However, an alternative argument can be made that the fewer 
socioeconomic opportunities in the poor areas may mean greater scope for development. 
The poor living in a comparator area may be trapped in a situation of higher house-rent 
and limited occupational choices. Once social status increases, households look down on 
some occupations such as day-labouring, rickshaw-pulling and garment work, and treats 
those doing such jobs as inferior regardless of how hard they actually work. Also the 
comparator group’s higher expenses on utilities may squeeze their development potential. 
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5.3.2 Social networks 
The social network is assumed to be the primary manifestation of social capital. It is 
regarded as a medium for social capital outcomes at both individual and collective levels. 
The volume and intensity of different types of social networks, such as bonding or 
bridging/linking, have largely been used in the literature to understand and measure the 
quality and extent of social capital. Also, this study conceives the scope and culture of 
social interactions that could facilitate social networks as the potential means for building 
a social network. Therefore, the following subsections discuss the scope for the 
socialisation of the study population, the formation of bonding and bridging/linking 
networks and the culture of social interactions. 
5.3.2.1 Scope for socialisation 
Family is perhaps the first place where individuals learn to socialise with others. A family 
helps its members to form social relationships with others. The socio-economic 
background of the family provides a particular context to the individual members 
regarding the scope and orientation of socialisation (Parke and Buriel, 2007). This 
socioeconomic status is linked to the social class that defines social networks. For 
example, individuals from a particular socio-economic background are likely to attend 
the same school (e.g. the children of poor households are likely to attend the public 
school) or to live in the same neighbourhood (e.g. the poor households are likely to live 
in a slum neighbourhood). These social institutions might be formal or informal; schools 
and religious institutions may be more formal settings for socialisation than the playing 
fields, the culture of volunteering or the culture of social gathering. These social 
institutions provide a specific pattern of social relations and social norms of trust and 
reciprocity to a particular group, and this is important to the understanding of social 
capital. 
Respondents in the study areas were asked about those social institutions, and their 
involvement in them, that are assumed to facilitate social interactions and social relations 
of the urban poor. According to the responses (shown in Table 5.2), approximately one-
fifth of households in both groups lives in a joint family structure, which may be 
comprised of close and/or distant relatives. These proportions seem significant. In 
addition, a few households are found to live together with non-relative households. 
Nonetheless, many of the sample households are reportedly living adjacent to their 
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relatives or with relatives in the vicinity of the same neighbourhood. Such relatives can 
be quite numerous – there can be up to forty households. This type of extended family 
living potentially facilitates a higher bonding social network for the poor. 
A large majority (90%) of the households of both groups celebrate Eid/Puja (the biggest 
festivals of the country) with their neighbours in their communities. Only a quarter (22% 
poor and 30% comparator) of the remainder celebrated Eid/Puja in their villages. 
Presumably, their village is the place where they originate from. This small percentage 
may imply that many of the very poor households have lost touch with their origins. 
Living in the poor/slum neighbourhoods all year round might imply that the social 
network of the poor is primarily urban based. 
Regarding visiting certain places, people and family in the previous year (which might be 
a platform for social interactions and relationships), household members of both groups 
are found to visit the mosque monthly, spending on average half an hour there. Although 
they don’t follow the five-time prayer in a day injunction, the poor typically attended 
monthly prayers at the mosque. However, the frequency mosque attendance is higher in 
the poor areas than in the comparator neighbourhoods.  The respondents also visited three 
to four neighbours and co-workers daily. The households living in poor areas usually 
visited more neighbours and spent a significant time in interactions compared to the time 
spent with their co-workers, which may suggest a stronger network of poor households 
and their neighbours. 
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Table 5.2: Culture and scope for socialisation and social interaction 
 Percentage of HH 
 
 
Mean (number of 
household, HH 
member or networks) 
Mean Frequency of 
gathering** 
 
Mean time spent 
in a single meeting 
(minutes)  
 Poor Comp. Poor Comp. Poor  Comp. Poor Comp. 
1. Living in a joint family 18 
[N=990] 
18 
[N=693] 
      
2. Living with a non-relative family 2 1       
3. Relatives living in the same neighbourhood   3.5 
[N=739] 
3.7 
[N=485] 
    
3. Invited to a neighbourhood event 97 
[N=998] 
98 
[N=696] 
      
4. Celebrated vacation (e.g. Eid, Puja) in the 
current neighbourhood 
90 90       
5. Celebrated vacation in village  22 30       
6. Household member attended mosque   1.2 1.5 4.2 3.6 32 32 
7. Household member visited neighbour   4.0 3.3 6.0 6.0 13 14 
8. Respondent visited co-worker    5.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 3 2 
9. Freq. of community gathering      3.0 2.6 20 14 
10. Freq. of participation  in community 
gathering  
    2.5 2.3 10 6 
11. Freq. of friends gathering outside 
neighbourhood 
    2.4 2.6 101 102 
12. Freq. of participation in the group meeting     1.1 1.0   
Source: InM (2014) 
[**Scale: Frequency of gathering/attending code: 6=daily; 5=weekly; 4=monthly; 3=yearly; 2=biennial 1=never] 
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5.3.2.2 Bonding network 
The bonding network is assumed to be the major form of social network. Frequent 
interactions form a close tie with relatives, friends and neighbours, or with other persons 
of similar socioeconomic conditions, backgrounds and interests. Such ties are the basis 
for social trust and cooperation (Fukuyama, 1996; WB, 2001).  In our study population, 
relatives and neighbours are the most important networks among six bonding networks 
of interest (Table 5.3). Almost every household in both groups reportedly maintains 
regular contact with their relatives and neighbours. Households in poor areas are found 
to have ten such relatives on average, compared to twelve in the comparator areas. Many 
of these relatives live in the same neighbourhood, with only a few outside; the proportion 
of relatives living in the same neighbourhood is higher in the poor areas. Moreover, both 
the groups maintain a weekly contact with five neighbours on average. However, the poor 
maintain a marginally larger network with the neighbours than do the comparators. 
Details on six bonding networks, whether member live in the same neighbourhood, or 
outside, and the frequency of contacts, are shown in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3: Bonding networks of the urban poor 
Network  Proportion of 
households 
maintains network  
 
Mean number of network 
 
Mean frequency 
of contact** 
 
 
Within 
community 
Outside 
community 
Poor Comp. Poor Comp. Poor  Comp.  Poor  Comp.  
Relatives 97% 
[N=986] 
97% 
(N=694) 
3.57 
(6.2)* 
3.51 
(5.7) 
6.65 
(8.8) 
8.31 
(8.3) 
4.89 
(0.9) 
4.93 
(0.9) 
Friend 44% 
[N=982] 
61% 
(N=688) 
1.32 
(3.7) 
2.25 
(4.4) 
1.17 
(5.3) 
1.90 
(6.6) 
5.29 
(0.9) 
5.39 
(0.8) 
Neighbour 97% 
[N=991] 
99% 
(N=691) 
5.33 
(5.0) 
4.96 
(4.0) 
  5.85 
(0.5) 
5.81 
(0.7) 
Coworker  29% 
[N=988] 
38% 
(N=690) 
.60 
(5.5) 
.55 
(2.2) 
.78 
(2.1) 
1.47 
(5.1) 
5.56 
(1.0) 
5.66 
(0.8) 
Parent of 
child’s 
friend 
6% 
[N=984] 
11% 
(N=691) 
.11 
(0.8) 
.24 
(1.2) 
.05 
(0.5) 
.16 
(1.1) 
4.58 
(1.3) 
4.73 
(1.3) 
Community 
leader 
12% 
[N=989] 
8% 
[N=689] 
.14 
(0.6) 
 
.08 
(0.4) 
  4.61 
(1.0) 
4.03 
(1.4) 
Source: InM (2014) 
[**Scale: Frequency of contact code: 6=daily; 5=weekly; 4=monthly; 3=yearly; 2=biennial 
1=never. * The figure in the parenthesis represents the std. dev.] 
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Friends of the poor also form an important network, exceeded only by relatives and 
neighbours. A significant proportion of comparator households reportedly maintains 
contact with friends. As recorded, 44% of poor households and 61% of comparator 
households, respectively, maintain 2.5 and 4.15 friends on average. This means the 
comparator households maintain a higher network with friends than do the poor.This may 
be related to their somewhat higher standard of living, enabling more choice in 
socialisation, whereas the poor are struggling and mainly depend on people they can call 
on immediately.  The ability to participate in social activities is positively associated with 
income/economic resources (Bailey et al., 2015). However, both groups are found to 
maintain daily or weekly contact with their friends.  
Respondents are also found to maintain networks with their co-workers. Though this an 
almost inevitable corollary of working, 29% of the poor households and 38% of the 
comparator households have been found to be in regular contact with a small number of 
co-workers. Other networks seem insignificant with respect to the proportion of 
households maintaining such networks; for example, parents of children’s friends and 
community leaders. In general, the poor living in a comparator area have greater 
networks, particularly with friends and co-workers, than those living in a poor area; 
however, the differences are not that great. 
5.3.2.3 Bridging or linking network 
A bridging or linking network enables connection between someone of a lower socio-
economic class and persons or organisations with a higher level of resources. These 
networks may yield higher economic outcomes to the person with lower socio-economic 
status, through facilitating access to information and socio-economic opportunities. This 
study has considered nine persons and organisations as measures of bridging networks 
that may facilitate economic opportunities. However, it is not totally surprising to find 
that the bridging network of the poor is minimal; with very few having such a network 
(Table 5.4). Moreover, the bridging network is even more diminished in poor areas; 
presumably, only NGO connections initiate socioeconomic opportunities for the poor.  
One-fifth of the poor households are reportedly connected with NGOs, compared to only 
8% of the comparator households. A very small percentage of the poor have some other 
bridging networks. Approximately 6% of households in poor areas reported that their 
relatives have a political connection, compared to only 3% in comparator areas. However, 
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the comparator households have better-developed bridging/linking networks with others. 
Details on different networks, volume and frequency of contact are shown in Table 5.4. 
As recorded, 17% of poor households and 23% of comparator households are found to 
have connections with professionals who are working formally in established 
organisations and who have a regular income. On the other hand, 29% of poor households 
and 35% of comparator households have a connection with businessmen. However, the 
high percentages of households with business connections may be because there are many 
small businesses and businessmen in the neighbourhoods, operating marginal enterprises. 
Many of those professionals or businessmen are found to live in the same communities. 
Therefore, the findings show that only a minority have connections, e.g. with business 
men; the number of such connections is not very large, and that the frequency of contact 
with them is low.  
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Table 5.4: Bridging networks of the urban poor in Bangladesh 
Source: InM (2014) 
[**Scale: Frequency of contact: 6=daily; 5=weekly; 4=monthly; 3=yearly; 2=biennial 1=never].* The figure in the parenthesis represents the Std. Dev. 
Network  Proportion of households 
maintains network  
Size of network Frequency of contact** 
 Within community Outside community 
Poor Comp. Poor Comp. Poor  Comp.  Poor  Comp.  
1. Involvement of HH member with the 
political party 
2.2% 
[N=995] 
3.2% 
(N=694) 
2.0 
(1.24)* 
1.7 
(1.1) 
2.6 
(1.8) 
2.5 
(2.7) 
3.2 
(1.2) 
2.6 
(1.4) 
2. Involvement of relatives with the 
political party 
6.3% 
[N=994] 
3.5% 
(N=693) 
1.8 
(0.5) 
2.6 
(2.5) 
2.5 
(1.5) 
1.9 
(1.2) 
3.4 
(1.1) 
2.9 
(1.3) 
3. Involvement of HH member with a 
professional(formal job) 
 16.8% 
[N=995] 
22.5% 
(N=693) 
2.1 
(1.9) 
2.0 
(1.6) 
2.7 
(3.2) 
2.8 
(2.8) 
3.2 
(1.7) 
3.2 
(1.1) 
4. Involvement of HH member with a 
businessman 
29.4% 
[N=993] 
34.8% 
(N=690) 
1.6 
(0.9) 
1.9 
(1.2) 
2.1 
(1.5) 
2.6 
(2.2) 
2.6 
(0.9) 
2.7 
(0.9) 
5. Involvement of HH member with the 
govt. service providing org. 
7.8% 
[N=991] 
15.3% 
(N=691) 
1.0 
(.) 
1.7 
(0.8) 
1.2 
(0.4) 
1.4 
(0.7) 
2.6 
(0.9) 
2.7 
(0.9) 
6. Involvement of HH member with the 
volunteer org. 
7.2% 
[N=992] 
11.5% 
[N=689] 
1.0 
(.) 
2.8 
(2.1) 
1.6 
(0.9) 
1.8 
(1.6) 
3.8 
(1.0) 
3.7 
(.9) 
7. Involvement of HH member with the 
NGOs 
18.3% 
[N=981] 
8.3% 
(N=686) 
1.5 
(3.4)* 
1.5 
(0.7) 
1.5 
(1.1) 
1.4 
(0.6) 
3.8 
(1.1) 
3.7 
(1.0) 
8. Involvement of HH member with the 
local govt. official 
9.5% 
[N=962] 
8.2% 
(N=681) 
1.9 
(0.9) 
1.1 
(0.4) 
1.2 
(0.7) 
1.4 
(.9) 
3.1 
(0.8) 
3.4 
(1.1) 
9. Involvement of HH member with the 
police/justice depart. 
 2.0% 
[N=834] 
4.0% 
(N=545) 
2.5 
(2.1) 
- 
 
1.4 
(0.7) 
2.5 
(2.0) 
4.2 
(1.1) 
3.8 
(1.1) 
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The number of contacts with political parties, professionals or businessmen, through the 
involvement of household members or relatives, varies between three and five among the 
comparator households, whereas it is between two and four among the poor households. 
Nonetheless, the frequency of contact with the networks is sporadic. 
5.3.2.4 Cultural capital 
Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Lin’s social capital theories all note the role of culture of social 
interactions when building social networks. They suggest that regular social gatherings, such 
as religious congregations, political demonstrations, voluntary activities, social club 
activities and national rallies, facilitate social interactions. Thus, such gatherings presumably 
help build social networks. A portion of the sample households attended a ‘religious 
congregation’ and ‘national rallies’ – two out of five social gatherings listed in the 
questionnaire. According to estimates, three-fifths of both groups had attended a religious 
congregation in the last year. Also, one-fifth of the poor sample and a quarter ofthe 
comparator sample attended national rallies. However, a small proportion of households 
reportedly attended other social gatherings. Detailed information on the participation of 
social gathering is shown in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Culture of social gathering among the urban poor 
(Members who attended social gatherings in the last year) 
Network  Proportion of households 
 
Mean frequency of 
attending gathering 
Poor Comp. Poor Comp.  
1. HH member attended the religious 
congregation 
59.0% 
[N=997] 
60.0% 
[N=692] 
3.3 
(0.7)* 
3.3 
(0.6) 
2. HH member attended the political 
demonstration 
13.0% 
[N=994] 
4.0% 
[N=693] 
3.1 
(0.9) 
3.1 
(0.8) 
3. HH member attended the voluntary 
works 
 5.0% 
[N=990] 
4.0% 
[N=693] 
3.4 
(1.0) 
3.5 
(1.0) 
4. HH member attended the social club 
(formal meeting) 
1.0% 
[N=994] 
1.4% 
[N=693] 
3.3 
(1.6) 
3.8 
(1.6) 
5. HH member attended the rally (to 
celebrate national days) 
18.1% 
[N=994] 
25.2% 
[N=691] 
3.1 
(0.5) 
3.1 
(0.5) 
Source: InM (2014) 
 [Scale: Frequency of contact code: 6=daily; 5=weekly; 4=monthly; 3=yearly; 2=biennial 1=never. 
N=total observation; *the figure in the parenthesis (.) represents the Std. Dev.] 
139 
 
Nonetheless, the frequency of participation in those social gatherings is not high. As 
recorded, both groups participated in either a religious congregation or national rally 
approximately once a year. While some of the literature argues that the culture of attending 
social gatherings should help the urban poor to some extent, in building a social network, 
this evidence suggests that such behaviour may not be very beneficial in this case.  
5.3.3 Trust  
5.3.3.1 Trust in bonding and bridging networks 
Trust, as well as cooperation, is assumed to be an outcome of social transactions, and is thus 
believed to have a relationship with social networks (Fukuyama, 1996). Respondents were 
asked to reflect on their perceived level of trust in nine networks in respect of the following 
three issues: (i) lending money; (ii) taking care of the house in the family’s absence; and (iii) 
receiving help/support in an emergency.According to the survey results, relatives are the 
most trusted network. Neighbours and friends are also trusted, compared to the community 
leader, political leader, NGO officials and religious leaders. Table 5.6 shows comparative 
levels of trust between the poor areas sample households and comparator households. 
 
Table 5.6: The (mean) degree of household trust in networks 
 
Network 
Lending money 
 
Taking care of house 
in absence 
Reliable in 
emergency 
Poor Com. Poor Com. Poor Com. 
1.Relative 9.7 
(1081) 
9.7 
(679) 
8.8 (851) 8.6 
(512) 
9.6 
(1059) 
9.6 
(667) 
2.Friend 8.0  
(781) 
8.1 
(529) 
8.0 
(652) 
8.3 
(423) 
7.9 
(748) 
8.1 
(524) 
3.Neighbour 8.9 
(1028) 
8.9 
(657) 
9.8 
(1048) 
9.8 
(680) 
9.0 
(1044) 
9.0 
(678) 
4.Co-worker  7.0  
(732) 
7.2 
(460) 
6.9 
(653) 
7.1 
(402) 
6.9 
(728) 
7.1 
(462) 
5.Group-member 5.5 
(520) 
5.7 
(318) 
5.5 
(515) 
5.8 
(320) 
5.5 
(522) 
5.5 
(315) 
6.Community 
leader  
4.8 
(592) 
4.9 
(394) 
5.0 
(592) 
4.9 
(393) 
4.8 
(596) 
4.9 
(393) 
7.Political leader 4.0 
(592) 
4.0 
(395) 
4.0 (583) 4.2 (390) 4.1 
(591) 
4.1 
(395) 
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Network 
Lending money 
 
Taking care of house 
in absence 
Reliable in 
emergency 
Poor Com. Poor Com. Poor Com. 
8.NGO official 3.4 
(522) 
3.2 
(321) 
  4.0 
(545) 
3.8 
(319) 
9.Religious leader 3.6 
(595) 
3.3 
(395) 
3.3 
(584) 
3.1 
(389) 
3.4 
(583) 
3.5 
(385) 
Source: InM (2014) 
[Higher point indicates the higher degree of trust in networks; scale: 10 = highest degree of trust and 
1= lowest degree of trust]. Figures within the parenthesis indicate the number of responses 
 
Respondents scaled their trust across the networks to identify who they trusted for lending 
money, taking care of the house in the family’s absence and relying on help/support in an 
emergency. According to the survey, relatives are the most trusted network for lending 
money and relying on in an emergency, for both the poor households and comparator 
households. The scores for both cases are close to the highest levels of trust. However, both 
groups trusted the neighbours most for taking care of the house in the family’s absence. This 
is not surprising, as the trusted relatives may not be available to care for the house, so that 
particular situation would require reliance on neighbours who may not be relatives. 
However,  neighbours are not only trusted in caring house in the family’s absence, but also 
are the second most trusted network for lending money or relying on in an emergency. 
Moreover, the poor area households have higher trust in neighbours compared to the 
comparators. Friends and co-workers are trusted; however, only after relatives and 
neighbours. Trust in other networks is even lower. Details of the levels of trust in different 
networks are presented in Table 5.6.   
5.3.3.2 Trust in civic institutions 
This study went further into establishing the general perception of trust in the civic 
institutions involved in community affairs.  Respondents were asked whether they agree or 
disagree with statements that civic institutions (such as local government, police, judiciary, 
services authority and national and international development organisations) delivered 
expected services to the urban poor households. According to the responses, households are 
largly inclined to ‘disagree’ with the statements. However, they tend to neither agree nor 
disagree over the statements about the local government authority and police. Generally, the 
findings would establish that the urban poor trust public institutions more than NGOs. This 
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would apear to conflict with a general expectation that NGOs are more trusted by their 
beneficiaries (Dowla, 2006b), as they are expected to work for the betterment of the marginal 
groups in society through various efforts towards urban poverty reduction. However, there 
are small differences in the degree of agreement with the statements on civic organisations 
between the poor and comparator households. The comparative levels of agreements and 
disagreements are presented in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7: Degree of trust in the institutions 
 
Statements made 
Degree of trust 
Mean Mean Difference** 
Poor  Comp. Poor-
Comp. 
t-
value 
Tot. 
obs. 
1. Received services(any) from the local 
government  
3.2 
(.04)* 
2.9 
(.05) 
.22 
(.06) 
3.6 1549 
2.Received services from the law enforcement 
agency  
2.8 
(.04) 
2.7 
(.04) 
.16 
(.06) 
2.8 1646 
3. Judiciary is neutral  2.7 
(.04) 
2.7 
(.04) 
.06 
(.06) 
1.1 1582 
4. Received water supply  2.7 
(.04) 
2.4 
(.04) 
.33 
(.06) 
6.0 1518 
5. Received electricity supply 2.4 
(.03) 
2.0 
(0.3) 
.40 
(.05) 
8.7 1686 
6. Political parties work for the public welfare 2.5 
(.04) 
2.4 
(.05) 
.06 
(.06) 
.9 1531 
7. Local NGOs work for the public welfare 2.2 
(.03) 
2.4 
(.04) 
-.16 
(.05) 
3.0 1620 
8. International NGOs work for the public welfare 2.2 
(.04) 
2.4 
(.05) 
-.17 
(.06) 
2.8 1437 
Source: InM (2014) 
 [Scale: 5= strongly agree; 4= agree; 3= neither agree nor disagree; 2=disagree and 1= strongly 
disagree] * Figures in the parenthesis represent std. err. ** Two-sample t-test with unequal variances 
 
Poor households are more likely than the comparator households to agree that the public 
institutions provide expected services to them. This may suggest that the expectation of 
public services is lower among the poor living in a poor area (Ruel et al., 1999). The mean 
differences of agreement with the statements between the two study groups are mostly 
statistically significant (see the t-value in column 2 from the right), particularly the statement 
about the service authorities. In the case of electricity and water supply authorities, poor 
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households’ agreement is likely to be 0.4 and 0.3 points higher than with comparator 
households. This may hint that these service facilities are not much better in comparator 
houses. Mean differences of agreement with other institution are not large. The differences 
between the two study groups are not significant in the scores for judiciary and political 
parties. Though generally, trust in the judiciary is higher than trust in political parties, this 
attitude may contradict the overall public trust in the judiciary, as alleged political and 
administrative interferences in the judiciary often cause public distrust (Mollah, 2008). 
Surprisingly, poor households are more likely to distrust the national and international 
NGOs. Is it perhaps because the NGOs in Bangladesh have not really effectively helped the 
urban poor in informal housing areas, which may undermine their credibility among the 
extreme poor (Banks et al., 2011a). 
5.3.4 Cooperation  
Cooperation can also be a consequence of social relationships, and thus may be considered 
as a form of social capital, or as a practical benefit derived from it. To gain a general 
perception about cooperation among the urban poor, respondents were asked about the 
cooperation received from their networks. This question relates to both financial and non-
financial cooperation.  
5.3.4.1 Financial cooperation 
Again, relatives are important as a source of financial cooperation for the urban poor  (as in 
the UK – see (Fitzpatrick et al., 2016); this is similar to the case of trust. A significant 
proportion of poor and comparator households – 30% and 27% respectively – reportedly 
received financial cooperation from their relatives. According to the responses, the average 
amount of financial cooperation received by the poor households is BDT 5,170 (approx. 
£51) which is about a half of their monthly income. The mean cooperation received by the 
comparator households from relatives is substantially higher at BDT 17,456 (approx. £171), 
which is equal to the average monthly income of the comparator group. 
Neighbours are equally important to the poor households when it comes to receiving 
financial cooperation. One-third of the poor reportedly received approximately equal 
financial cooperation from their neighbours as from their relatives. The comparators 
received substantially less financial cooperation from their neighbours even though, as we 
have seen, a significant proportion of them received cooperation from relatives. This finding 
may corroborate the particular importance of neighbours to the urban poor, and may have 
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implications for the outcomes of their social capital. Which is more important, the high level 
of cooperation or the higher proportion of recipients? Though cooperation the comparator 
group received from their friends is higher than that from their neighbours, the proportion of 
households which actually received that cooperation is smaller. Moreover, financial 
cooperation is rare with group members, coworkers and community leaders, and not very 
widespread even among friends. 
 
Table 5.8: Financial cooperation received by the households from the bonding networks 
Network  Poor Comparator 
 Amount 
(£)  
Level of 
coop. 
Amount  
(£) 
Level 
of coop. 
Relative 51 5.92 
(331)* 
171 
 
6.42 
(189) 
Friend 3.4 5.47 
(69) 
16 5.75 
(62) 
Neighbour 47 5.56 
(332) 
6.7 6.02 
(181) 
Group member .17 5.28 
(7) 
3.5 6.28 
(7) 
Coworker  .96 5.28 
(52) 
8.8 5.96 
(54) 
Community 
leader 
.04 5.00 
(7) 
.02 5.50 
(2) 
N 999 
- 
696 
- Source: InM (2014) 
[Scale of cooperation: 7 = very good cooperation…1 = non-cooperation] * The figure in the 
parenthesis ( ) represents the number ofobservations. 
 
The respondents were asked further about their expectations of financial cooperation from 
their networks; responses are shown in Table 5.9. This shows the amount of cooperation 
respondents expected to receive, and the perception of the level of cooperation.  Both groups 
largely expected more cooperation from their networks than they actually received. The 
expected cooperation might also be an important indicator of future cooperation among the 
urban poor, as discussed below. 
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Table 5.9: Expected level of financial cooperation from the bonding networks 
Network  Poor Comparator 
 Amount 
 (£) 
Level of 
coop. 
Amount  
 (£) 
Level of 
coop. 
Relative 76 
(999)* 
6.05 
(728) 
255 
(696) 
6.37 
(526) 
Friend 125 
(999) 
5.37 
(168) 
31 
(696) 
6.16 
(117) 
Neighbour 161 
(999) 
5.57 
(543) 
104 
(696) 
6.06 
(298) 
Group member .69 
(999) 
4.90 
(43) 
1.20 
(696) 
6.4 
(5) 
Coworker  23 
(999) 
5.05 
(85) 
28 
(696) 
6.08 
(76) 
Parent of child’s friend 20 
(999) 
5 
(10) 
  
Community leader .23 
(999) 
5.03 
(26) 
  
 Source: InM (2014)  
[Scale of the level of cooperation: 7 = very good cooperation …1 = non-cooperation] *Figures in the 
parenthesis ( ) indicate the number of observations 
 
It is not surprising that the poor households would expect cooperation from their relatives, 
friends and neighbours. But what is noticeable is that the households expect to receive higher 
cooperation from their neighbours and friends than from their relatives. What could be the 
possible explanation for this perception? Relatives of the urban poor may also be poor, so 
may not be able to offer or provide financial cooperation. Relatives of a large majority of the 
poor households are living in the same neighbourhood, which may hint at their poor 
economic circumstances. According to the survey, the poor households believed they could 
receive BDT 7,711 (approx. £68) cooperation from their relatives, if asked.  This expectation 
is 50% higher than the average cooperation they actually received. Nonetheless, their 
expectations of friends and neighbours are also greater than the actual cooperation received: 
BDT 12,758 (approx. £113) and 16,410 (approx. £145), respectively. These findings could 
further support the highly interdependent nature of the urban livelihoods of the poor. 
In contrast, comparator households expected to receive higher cooperation from the relatives 
than from friends or neighbours. Moreover, the expected amount of cooperation from the 
relatives – BDT 26,041 (approx. £231) – is much higher than expected from their neighbours 
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and friends, which totalled BDT 10,409 (approx. £92) and BDT 3,145 (approx. £28) 
respectively. Unlike poor households, very few comparator households expected financial 
cooperation from other networks.  
5.3.4.2 Non-financial cooperation 
Non-financial cooperation is common among the urban poor. Table 5.10 details the non-
financial cooperation received by the study population from four major networks. 
Cooperation includes borrowing household items, and receiving help in repairing a house. 
Relatives, friends and neighbours again seem important providers of non-financial 
cooperation. A small proportion of households are found to receive cooperation from other 
networks, and these have not been reported. 
The highest proportion of both groups reportedly borrowed household items mostly from 
their relatives and neighbours, with cooperation from the neighbours exceeding that from 
the relatives. Compared to 10% and 14% of poor and comparator households respectively 
who received cooperation from their relatives, the proportion that received cooperation from 
neighbours is 1% and 16% respectively. This means that the cooperation from the 
neighbours is seven percentage points higher in the poor areas, and it underlines the poor’s 
dependency on their neighbours. A similar finding also reveals in the poor’s expectations of 
non-financial cooperation from neighbours and relatives. Approximately one-fifth of each 
group believes that they would receive cooperation from their relatives. The expectation  of 
borrowing household items from neighbours is even higher. 
Other forms of non-financial cooperation, for example in gaining work or protecting children 
from potential danger, are received from relatives and neighbours. However, the higher 
dependency on neighbours than on relatives is again reflected among the poor households. 
Cooperation from the other two networks is received by only a small proportion of 
households, as seen in Table 5.10.  
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Table 5.10: Non-financial cooperation from the networks—relatives, friends, neighbours, and group members 
  
Cooperation received   
From relatives From friends 
Poor households (%) Comp. households (%) Poor households (%) Comp. households (%) 
Occurred  Expected  Occurred Expected  Occurred  Expected  Occurred Expected  
Borrowing HH items  10.0 21.0 14.0 19.8 1.2 1.9 0.4 1.9 
Gaining work 6.9 11.6 5.0 9.5 2.0 5.9 1.3 6.6 
Protecting children from danger  3.0 8.5 5.0 8.9 2.6 2.9 2.4 2.7 
Gaining information  2.5       6.8  2.3 9.0 1.3 3.0 0.6 2.8 
Taking HH member to hospital 2.2 5.1 4.0 5.0 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.9 
Resolving family dispute 2.8 3.1 2.3 2.6 0.7 1.5 0.1 1.2 
Building/repairing house 1.3 3.4 .57 1.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 
Cooperation received   From neighbours From group-members 
Borrowing HH items  17.3 29.2 16.2 27.2 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.4 
Gaining work 10.1 12.0 14.4 15.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.7 
Protecting children from danger  7.1 9.9 9.6 10.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.4 
Gaining information  1.7 4.7 3.6 4.9 0.4 1.7 0.4 0.7 
Taking HH member to hospital 2.4 4.3 4.5 4.6 0.7 1.3 0.1 0 
Resolving family dispute 2.1 2.7 2.0 2.7 0.7 0.7 0.1 0 
Building/repairing house 0.7 2.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.0 0 
N 999 698 999 698 
Source: InM (2014)  
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The study further investigated the level of cooperation received; this data is not shown in 
the table. Perception of cooperation was sought on a 7-point Likert scale, where 7 
represents the ‘highest cooperation’ and 1 represents ‘non-cooperation’. A considerable 
proportion (18%) of poor households reportedly received a degree of cooperation, largely 
from their relatives and neighbours. Perceptions range from very good to moderate; of 
these, approximately 15% are good or very good. Only a small proportion (0.3 %) 
reported non-cooperation from their networks. Similarly, approximately 19% of 
comparator households reportedly received very good to moderate cooperation. However, 
none reported non-cooperation from the neighbours. This analysis substantiates the 
previous finding that relatives and neighbours are important to the urban poor for both 
financial and non-financial cooperation in their daily lives. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The urban poor in Bangladesh have limited access to socioeconomic opportunities. A low 
to moderate level of social vulnerability affects the urban poor living in informal 
settlements, compared to a low level of vulnerability of the moderately poor living in 
comparator neighbourhoods. Various sources of vulnerability, particularly the risk of 
eviction from the land and of potential health hazards, largely create higher levels of 
vulnerability. This may have serious repercussions for the social capital of the urban 
poor. Displacement can disrupt the social relationships that the urban poor build over the 
years through numerous social transactions. The field evidence highlights the 
interdependent way of life of the urban poor. Additionally, the lack of security of tenure 
that hinders the sense of neighbourhood belonging potentially reduces the elements of 
trust and cooperation. The potential effects of health hazards are twofold: they incur 
additional healthcare expenses for the already financially burdened urban poor; and health 
problems reduce their lifetime working hours. Thus a minimum standard of living 
environment with necessary security of tenure may have potential implications in 
reducing social vulnerabilities of the urban poor, and in improving their lives. Improved 
living conditions, informed by the issues examined above, may also help build a strong 
sense of belonging and social capital; these possible changes therefore have potential 
policy implications for sustainable poverty reduction. 
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Socioeconomic vulnerabilities of the urban poor have limited the scope for socialisation 
and social interactions which restrict their social networks, particularly with friends and 
with wider ‘bridging networks’, and thus their social capital. However, their neighbours 
are an important social network (a manifestation of social capital), which potentially 
generates other forms of social capital such as trust and cooperation in the neighbourhood. 
Such social networks among neighbours offers cooperation which is of practical value. 
More social interactions with the neighbours thus potentially yield more trust and 
cooperation in poor neighbourhoods. Such trusted and collaborative community 
relationships may have potential implications in the livelihood developement of the urban 
poor. These descriptive findings provide a context for a further investigation into the 
outcome of social capital, in relation to social networks and other soci-economic 
variables, while providing pointers to some important relationships which may emerge. 
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Chapter 6: The Intermediate Outcome of Social 
Capital: Trust 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The preliminary findings suggest that the urban poor neighbourhoods have a low to 
moderate level of social vulnerability compared to a low level in comparator 
neighbourhoods (see Chapter 5 for details). This vulnerability particularly comes from 
the risks of eviction and potential health hazards in the informal housing environment 
(refer to Appendix B). This vulnerability risks the social capital of the poor in a number 
of ways. Short ‘living periods’ in a place may disrupt or limit the social relations that are 
built through the numerous social exchanges for living together in a neighbourhood. Thus, 
displacement caused by settlement could weaken social networks, trust and cooperation 
(Woolcock, 1998a). Also, poor health as a result of informal living involves additional 
expense and affects income both in the short and long terms. 
It is argued that the strategic (or longer-term) goals of social capital have an impact on 
issues such as health status, participation rates in education, employment rates, household 
income and business confidence (Stone, 2001: 5, reporting Spellerberg 1997, pp. 43-45; 
Poortinga, 2012). These outcomes could be empirically related to measures of social 
capital and the immediate social outcomes (see Section 2.2). Stone has shown that social 
capital is an important driver of social inclusion, and that social inclusion leads to 
improvements in personal wellbeing as well as an increase in income (Stanley et al., 
2012). 
Mohan and Mohan (2002) point out that levels of trust are the best indicators of 
measurement for social capital. Trust is the expectation that arises, within a community, 
of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, of other 
members of that community (Fukuyama, 1996: , pp.26 in Stone, 2001 pp.25; Bakshi et 
al., 2015). Thus, trust and reciprocity are closely related. The means of measuring norms 
of trust and reciprocity are less well developed than are the measures of the network 
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structure. Three broad types of trust are identified in the literature: (1) trust of familiars 
or particularised trust, which exists in established relationships and social networks; (2) 
generalised trust, extended to strangers on the basis of expectations of behaviour or a 
sense of shared norms; and (3) civic or institutional trust, which refers to basic trust in 
institutions of governance or civil society, including fairness of rules, official procedures 
etc. These forms of trust can be equated with bonding social capital (between family and 
close friends), bridging social capital (where the networks extend to more removed 
associations, such as work and school associations), and linking social capital (where trust 
is extended to more official relationships, such as government and other agencies) (Stone 
et al., 2003). 
As with networks, Stone gives a range of questions which have been used in studies to 
measure ‘trust’. She notes the ad hoc approach to trust measurement, where measures of 
norms, attitudes and the outcomes of norms are not clearly delineated. In addition, the 
measurement of generalised trust often fails to specify a spatial boundary, such as 
community or nation (Halpern, 1999; Stone, 2001). This supports Stone et al. (2003) in 
noting that often trust measurements are unclear and too broad, of the form ‘most people 
can be trusted’. Indeed, most trust measures are national, few being state-based measures. 
This also raises the issue as to whether social capital is variable between locations. 
Therefore, one uniform measure of trust may not be valid for use across locations (Mohan 
and Mohan, 2002; Onyx and Bullen, 2000). 
Johnson et al. (2003) have established what they call principles of measurement of trust 
(see chapter 2). They specify the arena of activity to which measures apply: political 
organisations, economic and occupational organisations and voluntary and social 
organisations. Poor people have fewer bridging/linking networks; this may be a result of 
less access to or trust in people from higher classes or public and private organisations. 
Again, this trust is circular – if poor people have fewer bridging/linking networks, a 
component of social capital, then they will have less trust. However, trust in civic 
organisations may have policy implications in generating and managing resources, or 
energising federation, particularly in urban poor neighbourhoods where institutional 
involvement is less (Ng et al., 2016; Robbins, 2016). Trust in organisations may be useful 
for mobilising local resources as well as mediating/outsourcing investment (Ostrom, 
2014; Pretty, 2003). It also enhances community governance by establishing implicit 
norms (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). 
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This chapter discusses trust in bonding and bridging/linking networks.  Trust in networks 
is predicted in relation to network structure (volume and strength), household income and 
living period. The results are expected to give an indication on trust in networks that might 
help with strategies to mobilise resources required for neighbourhood development.  
Theoretically, a positive relationship is expected between the network structure and the 
intermediate outcome of social capital, trust. This means that the higher volume of 
network and interpersonal interactions are expected to positively affect the trust of the 
study population in networks. Additionally, the interrelated socio-economic factors such 
as income and living period, which could be markers of social class, are also expected to 
influence trust among individuals. Woolcook’s empirical evidence and Fukuyama’s 
theoretical proposition underpin the assumption that higher income and longer living 
period are associated with an increase in trust. Thus, theoretically, higher income and 
longer living period in a place would help increase social capital. Moreover, our primary 
findings indicate that the poor trust their neighbours more than other bonding networks.  
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 formulates the linear relationship 
between trust and explanatory variables linked to the theoretical proposition discussed. 
The section also presents the results of the estimation for each of the networks, grouped 
into two sub-headings: (1) trust in bonding networks and (2) trust in civic organisations. 
The section is followed by a general discussion in 6.3. Section 6.4, in which the analysis 
is based on Logit and Probit estimations, is dedicated to an exploration of trust in 
neighbours. The final section draws a general conclusion on the analysis and indicates a 
further line of investigation. 
 
6.2 Trust in bonding and bridging networks 
To measure the perceived degree of trust in bonding networks, respondents were asked 
to rank their trust in each of  ten possible networks. They ranked their relative trust 
between 1 and 10 against each network. For example, the respondents ticked 1 for 
relatives, if they trusted their relatives most. But we recoded the ranks of trust in the later 
stage so that a higher value represents a higher trust in the network. Also, respondents 
were asked to rank their trust  in networks separately in three sets of circumstances: (i) 
lending money; (ii) looking after their house in their absence; and (iii) emergency help. 
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In addition, the respondents were asked to reflect on eight statements about the services 
of the eight civic organisations. These are: local municipality, police, law court/justice, 
water supply authorities, electricity supply authorities, political parties, local NGOs and 
international NGOs. Responses to the statements were obtained on a 6-point Likert-scale 
where a higher value represents higher agreement, assuming that agreement with the 
statements reflects trust in the organisations.  
Suppose that 𝑖 is a member of a community, 𝜔𝑖 is any outcome for an observation 𝑖 which 
is linearly dependent on 𝐗𝑖: network structures, income and living period. If explanatory 
variables 𝐗𝑖 have a linear relationship with the degree of trust, 𝜔𝑖, the function can be 
written as follows: 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝐜𝐗𝑖 + 𝐽 𝑆𝑁𝑔(𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖              (6.1) 
 
Where 𝐜 are the parameters explaining the linear relationships between individual trust 
and household characteristics, and 𝐽 explains the relationship between the trust and 
network structure. 
The linear relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables can be tested 
using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. The estimates are in standardised Beta 
values20 and presented in Table C.1, Table C.2, Table C.3 and Table C.4 in Appendix C. 
6.2.1 Results: trust in bonding networks 
6.2.1.1 ‘Lending money’ 
According to the regression estimates, the effect of having a larger network on trust 
regarding lending money is largely insignificant. Having more relatives, neighbours and 
friends does not help increase trust in those networks.  However, a higher frequency of 
interactions (strength) with relatives and neighbours influences trust in them. This means 
that more interactions help increase trust, though these increases vary widely across 
networks. The effect is particularly significant in the case of trust in neighbours. Trust 
increases by .18 standard deviation for one standard deviation increase of interaction with 
                                                 
20 Beta values are key indicators of relationships, resulting from the regressions that are standardised, the 
variances of dependent and independent variables in the regressions are 1.  
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neighbours, keeping all other factors constant (ceteris paribus). The estimates are similar 
in both poor and comparator areas. Details of the estimates can be found in Table C.1. 
The overall relationship between trust and social class markers (income and ‘living 
period’) seems significant and positive. The relationship between trust and income is very 
strong compared to the relationship with living period. Trust in relatives increases by .97 
standard deviation for one standard deviation increase of income, whereas it increases 
only .16 standard deviation for one standard deviation increase of ‘living period’, ceteris 
paribus. However, the effect is less in cases of trust in neighbours, particularly in poor 
areas. The ‘living period’ in a neighbourhood affects trust in relatives equally in areas; 
the effect in the case of neighbours is insignificant in poor areas. 
6.2.1.2 ‘Looking after the house in absence’ 
Neighbours are generally trusted to take care of homes in the household’s absence. Trust 
in relatives may be irrelevant to this situation as there may be no relative living nearby. 
According to the estimates, the effect of the size of network on trust is insignificant across 
networks. However interaction affects individual trust to some extent, particularly with 
neighbours. Trust in neighbours increases by .15 and .14 standard deviation in poor and 
comparator areas respectively if interactions increase by one standard deviation ceteris 
paribus. (However, the corresponding trust in friends decreases by .21 and .30 standard 
deviation, which may imply a general distrust in friends). Details on the estimates are 
presented in Table C.2 in Appendix C. 
As expected, household income significantly increases trust in networks. According to 
the estimates, trust in neighbours increases by .78 standard deviation in poor areas for one 
standard deviation increase of income; this change is even higher in comparator areas 
ceteris paribus. The overall effect of income is generally lower in poor areas, where trust 
related to non-financial circumstance is less dependent on household income. On the other 
hand, the ‘living period’ has no significant influence on trust in networks, except in the 
case of neighbours. Even the parameter estimated for neighbours is not so significant in 
poor areas. Trust in neighbours increases by only .07 in poor areas, compared to .24 in 
comparator areas, if living period increases by one standard deviation.  
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6.2.3.1 Emergency help 
The estimates for the volume of network are not statistically significant, but they are 
positive and statistically significant for interactions. Notably, interactions affect trust 
among neighbours; the estimate is even higher than for relatives. Details of the estimates 
are presented in Table C.2 in Appendix C. Trust increases by .15 standard deviation in 
neighbours, compared to .08 in relatives, for one standard deviation increase of 
interactions ceteris paribus. These estimates vary slightly from the findings revealed for 
the case of taking care of house in absence. The higher rate interactions influence the 
individual trust in neighbours less in poor areas than in comparator areas. (However, 
interaction significantly affects trust in relatives in poor areas.)  
Household income has a positive and significant effect on individual trust across 
networks, but the effect is generally lower in poor areas. The effects on trust tend to be 
higher in the case of relatives and lower in the case of friends. Higher household income 
influences trust in relatives more strongly than it does with neighbours, particularly in 
poor areas. On the other hand, the ‘living period’ of household influences trust less – the 
effect is generally positive and statistically significant, particularly in the case of trust in 
relatives and neighbours. The beta-coefficients are .11 and .10 respectively; these imply 
a relatively weak relationship. However, the effect among neighbours is insignificant in 
poor areas.   
6.2.3 Results: trust in civic organisations 
According to OLS estimates, the linear relationship between trust in civic organisations 
and the number of organisations in contact is mixed. The parameters revealed are negative 
in the case of public service authorities such as the water supply and electricity supply 
authorities. However, a positive relationship is evident in the case of international NGOs. 
Again, the overall (combined) relationship between trust and connection differs. Hence, 
trust in the local municipality, police department, law court/justice department and 
international NGOs is highly significant in poor areas and increases with the number of 
connections (with  persons linked with those organisations), though the overall 
relationship is insignificant. This means that households connected with those 
organisations trust the organisation more. For instance, trust in local government and 
international NGOs increases by .18 and .19 standard deviation, respectively, for one 
standard deviation increase of connections ceteris paribus.  
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The relationship between trust and interaction with civic organisations is also mixed. 
Higher interaction increases trust in the police, law court/justice department and local 
NGOs; conversely, it decreases trust in local government, the electricity supply authority, 
political parties and international NGOs. Both positive and negative relationships are 
statistically significant but small in magnitude, particularly in poor areas. Trust in local 
government decreases by 0.08 standard deviation for one standard deviation increase of 
interaction with it. However, the effect is largely insignificant in comparators areas, 
except in the case of trust in police and law court/justice departments. 
In general, the relationship between trust in civic organisations and household income is 
positive, but the size of beta is much smaller (varying between .12 and .24 standard 
deviation) compared to that of a bonding network. This means that trust in civic 
organisations such as the police or law court/justice department is less affected by 
household income. However, trust in the electricity supply authority is substantially 
correlated with the household income. The relationship between trust in civic 
organisations and household income is small in magnitude in poor areas, compared to that 
of comparator areas (the highest difference in beta is observed in the case of the electricity 
supply authority). Trust increases by .19 and .30 standard deviation, respectively, for one 
standard deviation increase of income in poor and comparator areas ceteris paribus.  
The linear relationship between trust in civil organisations and the ‘living period’ of 
households is largely insignificant. However, a negative relationship is evident in the case 
of local government and international NGOs; a longer period of living in the 
neighbourhood led to less trust in the organisations. The overall trust in local government 
and international NGOs decreases by .10 and .09, respectively for one standard deviation 
increase of living period. The estimates are particularly significant in the poor areas, 
which may suggest the growing distrust of poor households in those organisations. 
Nonetheless, a positive relationship is evident in the case of the water supply authority, 
where trust increases by .10 standard deviation in poor areas for one standard deviation 
increase of living period. 
 
6.3 Discussion 
The relationships between bonding network structure and trust under three situations may 
partly demonstrate theoretically expected manifestation of social capital. The size of 
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network does little to help in trust, but interaction helps regardless of the situation; it is 
particularly appropriate to the case of trust in neighbours. Moreover, interaction is more 
useful in the case of trust in financial transactions among the urban poor.  However, the 
lower beta values for trust in neighbours in poor areas may imply that social trust and 
reciprocity are generally high in deprived urban neighbourhoods. A possible 
interpretation might be that, in poor areas, everybody knows their neighbours’ business – 
there is complete transparency. The poor do not have to ‘interact’ to know what is going 
on with their neighbours. Also, the poor livelihood (in poor areas) might inflict an implicit 
trust among neighbours which forces general norms of social behaviour. However, the 
volume of network has little to do with building trust in neighbours (or other networks) 
regardless of the situation (financial, non-financial or emergency).  
Secondly, the strong relationship between income and trust across networks, situations 
and study groups is theoretically expected as higher social class would facilitate social 
capital. Such a relationship is expected to be even stronger in financial transactions among 
the urban poor. However, the effect of income on trust in neighbours is less in poor areas. 
The insignificant relationship between living period and trust invites an argument of 
measurement. It may be that the effect is nonlinear, with first an increasing effect and 
then, for a very long period of residence, a decreasing effect. Long-standing residents 
may be the unsuccessful, failing poor. The findings in the context of study population 
may contradict the theoretical relationship between social class and social capital. 
Trust in civic organisations generally increases with higher bridging networks in poor 
areas. The connection perhaps provides access to information about those organisations 
that is useful in receiving services. Since the poor are largely uneducated or little 
educated, connection with bridging networks presumably means to services which 
increase trust (Cameron, 2010; Braun and Aßheuer, 2011).  However, higher interaction 
may not be necessary to gain access to services, but may imply the weak ties of bridging 
and linking networks (Hauser et al., 2007). The findings entail that more bridging and 
linking contacts might lead to economic gains. 
The relationship between trust in civic organisations such as police and law 
court/judiciary departments and household income may contradict the theoretical 
proposition of social capital because the relationship is weaker in poor areas. This means 
that household income (which is related to individual’s social class) becomes less relevant 
in bridging networks. Despite the fact that services from public organisations are 
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delivered to all citizens equally regardless of economic condition, the finding underlines 
differential trust levels in relation to household income between the two study groups.  
It is not clear whether household trust in civic organisations increases with a longer living 
period. Yet a longer period of living in a neighbourhood may be significant in that it may 
facilitate urban livelihood (e.g. providing options for accessing water, electricity, etc.). 
Nevertheless, the negative relationship in the cases of local government and international 
NGOs may imply that new migrants in urban low income neighbourhoods still rely on 
those organisations.  
In conclusion, understanding of social trust relies much on the broader societal context. 
It implies that there are issues of units (spatial boundaries) for measuring trust. Also, 
individual trust in a network is subject to nonlinear relationships with the social and 
economic factors of individual households as well as of the group. This means that the 
measure of individual trust is influenced by households and neighbourhoods. Nonlinear 
relationships among variables can be investigated by structural analysis. A structural 
analytic approach is offered in chapter 7, but first we analyse the particular trust in 
neighbours using few additional variables including city type, community category, MFI 
membership and risk associated with housing tenure. Since the dependent variable, the 
degree of trust, is ordinal, we use ordered Logit and Probit estimations to give a more 
reliable prediction of the relationship. The estimates of two models are expected to 
provide similar results on relationship between dependent and explanatory variables. 
 
6.4 Trust in neighbours 
As in the earlier estimation, the perceived level of trust (lowest to highest) in neighbours 
among the poor is only known when it crosses the thresholds. This means there are 10 
ranks and 9 thresholds in the order of trust in neighbours (see the previous section on 
analytical framework).  If 𝜔𝑖
∗ is the single latent variable (which is unobserved), the Logit 
or Probit model can be expressed as below: 
𝜔𝑖
∗ = 𝐗𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖             (6.2)    
That means, 𝜔𝑖
∗is continuous between any number among lowest and highest thresholds 
of trust. If the probability that observation 𝑖 will select 𝑗 alternative, the function can be 
written as below: 
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𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝(𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗) = 𝑝 (𝛼𝑗−1 < 𝜔𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑗) = 𝐹 (𝛼𝑗 − 𝐗𝑖
′𝛽) − 𝐹(𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝐗𝑖
′𝛽)  
 
Given that 𝜔𝑖 = 𝑗  and 𝛼𝑗−1 < 𝜔𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛼𝑗, where 𝛼 is said to be cut-off values between 
two ranks (level of trust). Here a slight difference between Logit and Probit models is 
noted. If  𝐹 is logistic cumulative density function (cdf), F(z)=
𝑒𝑧
(1+𝑒𝑧)
 in logit model, 
which is normal cdf in Probit model. 
Each of the models with 𝑗 alternatives will have one set of coefficients with (𝑗 − 1) 
intercepts and 𝑗 marginal coefficients. The marginal effect of an increase in a regressor 
𝑥𝑟 on the probability of 𝑖 selecting 𝑗 is 
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑟𝑖
= {𝐹′(𝛼𝑗−1 − 𝐗𝑖
′𝛽) − (𝛼𝑗 − 𝐗𝑖
′𝛽)}𝛽𝑟    (6.3) 
 
Therefore, the sign of parameter 𝛽 in equation 6.2 indicates the probability of increasing 
or decreasing the level of trust for an increase of  𝐗𝑖
′.  On the other hand, 
𝜕𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑟𝑖
 explains the 
likelihood of increasing or decreasing the probability that 𝑖 will choose an alternative 𝑗 in 
respect to 𝑥𝑟.    
In this probability model, explanatory variables are: number of neighbours; frequency of 
contact with the neighbour; household income; assets; living period; risk of eviction; MFI 
membership (yes=1; no=0); community type (poor = 1; comparator= 0) and category of 
city (Dhaka = 1; Chittagong = 2; Kushtia = 3). Dependent variable has 10 categories— 
lowest 1 to highest 10. However, some of the categories may not be included in the 
estimation if responses to a category are not adequate. Using equation 6.2 and equation 
6.3, the probability of increasing or decreasing the level of trust in neighbours is estimated 
in three cases: (1) lending money to neighbours; (2) looking after the house in absence; 
and (3) for emergency help. We can estimate the probability of increasing or decreasing 
trust in neighbours using Equation 6.2 and 6.3. The Logit and Probit estimates are 
presented in Table 6.1 and Tables C.5—C.7 in Appendix C. Details on the Logit and 
Probit estimates of coefficients and marginal effects can be found in the appendices C.6.1, 
C.6.2 and C.6.3. 
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6.4.1 Results 
The coefficients of the Probit and Logit model are presented in Table 6.1. The intercepts 
(or thresholds) parameters and other details can also be seen in Appendix C. The 
coefficients differ by the scale factor, and therefore we cannot interpret the magnitude of 
the coefficient. We can only interpret the sign of coefficients, but can look at marginal 
effects for representative cases. According to the estimates, the coefficients of both 
models indicate the same direction, to the conclusion that it is likely that the level of trust 
in neighbours among the urban poor increases with higher frequency of contact, 
particularly in the cases of lending money and emergency help, with the risk of eviction 
(regardless of the three cases) and MFI membership (in the case of lending money). 
Conversely, it is likely that trust decreases with higher assets of poor households, 
particularly in the cases of lending money and emergency help. Moreover, it is likely that 
the level of trust is higher in the case of lending money if the city is smaller. However 
such a finding is contrary to the finding in the case of looking after the house, where level 
of trust is likely to be higher in a big city. Moreover, it is highly likely that the probability 
of trust in neighbours increases if the poor live in comparator areas. There is not a 
significant relationship between the probability of increasing or decreasing of trust in 
neighbours and the number of neighbours, income or living period. 
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Table 6.1: Probability of ‘trust’ in neighbours    
(Dependent variable= Degree of trust) 
Variables Logit Model Coefficients 
(Equation 6.2) 
Probit Model Coefficients 
(Equation 6.2)  
Lending 
money 
looking 
after 
house 
Emergenc
y help 
Lending 
money 
Lookin
g after 
house 
Emergenc
y help 
Number of neighbours -.01 -.01 -.02* -.01 -.01 -.01 
Freq. of contact .27*** -.03 .21*** .15*** -.01 .12** 
(Log) income -.04 -.17 -.08 -.02 -.10 -.06 
(Log) asset -.14*** .01 -.08** -.08*** .00 -.04*** 
Living period -.02 .03 -.04 -.01 .00 -.02 
Risk of eviction .07** .25*** .10*** .04** .14*** .06*** 
Microfinance 
membership 
(yes=1; no=0) 
.27** -.21 .08 .16** -.12 .05 
Community type 
(poor=1; comparator=0) 
-.50*** -
1.03*** 
-.47*** -.28*** -
.54*** 
-.27*** 
Category of city 
(Dhaka-1; Chittagong=2; 
Kushtia=3) 
.16** -.23*** -.03 .09** -.11** -.02 
N 1545 1571 1572 1545 1571 1572 
Pseudo R2 .02 .03 .01 .02 .03 .01 
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6.4.2 Marginal effects 
6.4.2.1 Trust in lending money21 
According to the estimates revealed by Equation 6.3, one unit increase in frequency of 
contact with neigbours is associated with being 1% more likely that the household will 
choose trust level 9; 4% more likely of choosing level 10, and 4% less likely of choosing 
trust level 8 (Table C.5, Appendix C). Again, one unit increase of ‘risk of eviction’ of 
housholds is associated with being approximately 1% more likely of choosing trust level 
9 or 10. MFI membership is associated with being 4% more likely of choosing trust level 
10, and 4% less likely of choosing trust level 8. Again, poor neighbourhoods are 
associated with being 6-7% more likely of choosing trust level 8, and 7% less likely of 
level 10 (details of the estimates can be found in Appendix C).  
The marginal effects of the number of neighbours, income and living period on trust are 
zero. This means there is no association between those variables and likelihood of 
increase or decrease of trust in neighbours. 
6.4.2.2 Trust in looking after the house22 
According to estimates (refer to Table C.6), one unit increase of ‘risk of eviction’ is 
associated with being 3% more likely of choosing trust level 10 and 2% less likely of 
choosing trust level 9. Poor neighbourhoods are associated with being 3% more likely of 
choosing trust level 8, 9% more likely of choosing level 9 and 13% less likely of choosing 
level 10. Living in a small city is associated with being 1% more likely of choosing trust 
level 8, 2% more likely of choosing level 9, and 3% less likely of choosing level 10. The 
marginal effects of number of neighbours, frequency of contact with neighbours, MFI 
membership and other variables on trust are zero, as estimates revealed.  
6.4.2.3 Trust in emergency help  
One unit increase in frequency of contact is associated with being 4% more likely that a 
household will choose trust level 10, 1% less likely of choosing trust level 7 or 9, and 3% 
less likely of choosing level 8 (see Table C.7). Again, one unit increase of risk of eviction 
                                                 
21 Probabilities of choosing trust thresholds 7, 8, 9 and 10 are respectively .02,  .19, 61 and 18 
22 Probabilities of the poor’s trust level 9 and 10 in neighbours is .84 and .11 in the case of looking after 
house. 
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is associated with being approximately 2% more likely of choosing trust level 10 and 1% 
less likely  of choosing level 8. The poor neighbourhood is associated with being 2-6% 
more likely that the household will choose trust level 8 and 9, and 9% less likely of 
choosing trust level 10. All other marginal coefficients are insignificant. 
6.4.3 Discussion 
The above findings would imply that trust in neighbours relies largely on social factors 
such as frequency of contact, risks of eviction and group (MFI) membership, rather than 
economic factors such as income and assets. The findings might also imply that the urban 
poor in small cities are more likely to trust their neighbours, particularly for financial 
transactions (e.g. lending money and emergency help). However, higher trust in 
neighbours in big cities regarding ‘looking after the house’ may rather indicate higher 
dependency of the poor for nonfinancial cooperation on neighbours. The relationship 
between trust and insecurity of tenure (risk of eviction, which is higher in poor areas) may 
mean that trust is higher among neighbours in poor neighbourhoods. In addition, higher 
trust in comparator neighbourhoods would imply the importance of security of tenure for 
building neighbourhood trust. Effects of socioeconomic factors on trust in neighbours are 
to some extent similar in financial cases (the cases of lending money and emergency help) 
which vary with effects in non-financial cases. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Frequent social exchange is crucial for building particularised trust, especially among 
neighbours in poor communities. This trust relies on a number of social and economic 
factors. Factors exhibiting household characteristics as well as reflecting on established 
social norms and culture influence individual trust levels. This implies that the poor are 
more likely to trust their neighbours. Such trust is an outcome of social transactions. Trust 
in civic organisations relies more on macro social structure (e.g. state institutions, rules 
of law), and forms of governance within a broader social context rather than in a micro 
social institution (e.g. a neighbourhood). It may imply that higher civic trust is expected 
in a society where rules of law are established, and institutional governance is well 
functioning. Particularised and civic trust are less influenced by individual household 
characteristics across networks of the poor. However, a longer period of living could 
perhaps facilitate strong social relations and thereby increase trust. This could suggest 
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that insecurity of tenure potentially disrupts trust, as such social capital in poor 
neighbourhoods.  
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Chapter 7: The Behavioural Outcome of Social 
Capital: Cooperation 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The definition of social capital assumes cooperation as the tangible form of outcome, with 
the potential to mobilise economic resources for an individual or group in a society. As 
defined, social capital is ‘network structure’, with shared norms and values which 
potentially yield social virtues such as trust and cooperation  (ABS, 2006). Such social 
virtues could have potential implications in areas such as health, education, employment 
and family wellbeing, thus fostering community strengthening (see Section 2.2, Chapter 
2). Financial exchanges can be a form of cooperation, and such exchanges, or lending 
cooperation, have been measured in several empirical studies on cooperation (DeSteno et 
al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2012; Bouma et al., 2008). Non-financial transactions might also 
represent a way of understanding cooperation.  
In this chapter, we analyse the relationships between cooperation and major variables 
linked to different aspects of social capital based on data obtained from the study 
population. The organisation of the chapter is as follows: Section 7.2 explores the (linear) 
relationships between cooperation measures and other variables (trust and some 
socioeconomic characteristics of households) across networks. Such relationships might 
indicate the dependency of cooperation on different aspects of social capital. Section 7.3 
explores the structural relationships between individual cooperation (among neighbours 
in particular) and the broader socio-economic context. This exploration of non-linear 
relationships may provide a better understanding of social cooperation. 
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7.2 Cooperation across networks 
7.2.1 Analytical framework 
The dependent variable, ‘degree of cooperation’, varies across households, depending on 
socioeconomic circumstances and the need for cooperation. An equal amount of financial 
cooperation may provide varied degrees of cooperation across households. Such grounds 
may provide a rationale for considering the amount of money borrowed in the past as an 
explanatory variable for measuring cooperation. Further, let us assume that the level of 
trust (perceived over the past action, e.g. borrowing money) is an explanatory variable 
factor in the current perceived degree of cooperation. Equally, the amount of financial 
cooperation received from a network is assumed to be an indicator of the extent of the 
household’s trust. The act of borrowing money happened in the past, and is viewed as a 
lagged measure of trust. 
Financial cooperation may require a certain level of trust among networks (Putnam, 1995; 
Fukuyama, 1996) The requirement of trust is perhaps lower in non-financial cooperation. 
However, such trust is based on past experiences of reciprocal financial and non-financial 
transactions and other socioeconomic factors. Thus social transactions and building trust 
are influenced by short living period, which is also linked to poor socioeconomic 
conditions.  
Moreover, poor income may also restrict financial transactions. However, this may create 
the conditions for non-financial transactions, which are necessary for vulnerable and 
interdependent livelihoods of the urban poor (see Chapter 4). It may also involve the 
effects of class on social capital; more on this argument can be found in Chapters 2 4 and 
5, and in Appendix B on understanding socioeconomic vulnerability. Nonetheless, there 
is an assumption that a higher social network structure yields higher cooperation23 (see 
Chapter 2 for details). 
A positive relationship is expected between individual cooperation and social network, 
amount of financial cooperation, degree of trust, income and living period. Again, in the 
case of bridging/linking networks, a higher network is expected to provide access to 
higher economic resources, though higher interactions may not facilitate yields (see 
Chapter 2). Moreover, the relationship between cooperation and income is expected to be 
                                                 
23 Interactions with bonding networks (particularly with neighbours) positively affect trust (see Chapter 6). 
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insignificant. However, a significant relationship between cooperation and living period 
in a place is expected. 
The respondents were asked to state whether they had borrowed money from any 
networks during the past year.24 The follow-up question was, What was the degree of 
cooperation perceived from the amount borrowed? The responses were recorded on a 7-
point Likert-scale; a higher score represents a higher level of cooperation (see Chapter 3 
for details). 
A similar logic is applied to predict the perceived degree of nonfinancial cooperation from 
the networks. However, this differs in that the dependent variable ‘degree of cooperation’ 
is replaced by the ‘number of non-financial cooperations’ received over the past year, 
assuming that higher incidence of cooperation is  a reflection of higher magnitude of 
cooperation. The respondents were given a list of common cooperations presumed to be 
happening in urban poor neighbourhoods.25 One point is assigned on receiving each 
incidence of cooperation. 
Assume that 𝑖 is a member of a neighbourhood 𝑔(𝑖). 𝜔𝑖 is any financial or non-financial 
cooperation perceived by observation 𝑖 from 𝑗 network which is linearly dependent on 
some socioeconomic variables 𝐗𝑖 and network structure𝑆𝑁𝑖, the function can be written 
as below: 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝐜𝐗𝑖 + 𝐽 𝑆𝑁𝑔(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖            (7.1) 
 
The linear relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables can be tested 
using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. The estimates are in standardised Beta 
values and presented in Table D.1, Table D.2 and Table D.3 in Appendix D. 
 
 
                                                 
24 This is particularly asked to understand the extent of financial cooperation happening with the bonding 
networks in poorer neighbourhoods. 
25 Getting by in the neighbourhood, solving social problems, negotiating utilities, receiving legal support, 
getting a job, receiving health care, getting into the neighbourhood, receiving public services/social 
security, and in other ways. 
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7.2.2 Cooperation from the bonding networks 
7.2.2.1 Financial cooperation   
The overall relationship between financial cooperation and trust across networks is 
positive, specifically in the case of cooperation among relatives. However, these types of 
relationships are weaker in poor areas compared to comparator ones. According to OLS 
estimates, cooperation from relatives increases by .18 standard deviation in comparator 
areas compared to a .08 standard deviation increase in poorer areas given one standard 
deviation increases of trust ceteris paribus. Moreover, this relationship is not positive 
across networks in poor areas. Details of the estimates can be found in Table D.1.   
The relationship between cooperation and the amount of money received in the past is 
positive but small in extent. The relationship is highly significant only in the case of 
friends in poor areas, where the perception of cooperation increases by .30 for one 
standard deviation increase of amount of money. However, this relationship is 
insignificant in the case of neighbours in poor areas.  
The nature of relationships between cooperation and the size and strength of networks are 
dissimilar. A significant relationship between network size and cooperation is evident in 
the case of neighbours; cooperation increases by .26 standard deviation if the number of 
neighbours increases one standard deviation. However, this relationship is particularly 
insignificant in the cases of relatives and friends. On the other hand, the relationship 
between frequency of contact and cooperation is generally positive, except in the case of 
neighbours in comparator areas. In poorer areas, one standard deviation higher interaction 
increases the financial cooperation by .28 and .15 standard deviation in the cases of 
relatives and neighbours respectively.  
A consistent positive relationship between household income and cooperation is evident 
across networks. It may imply that an increased income of the poor rises in line with the 
perception of cooperation. This relationship is consistent with the case of cooperation 
from relatives and neighbours; one standard deviation change in household income 
increases cooperation by .22 standard deviation in cases of relatives and neighbours. 
However, such a relationship is weaker in both cases in poorer areas than in comparator 
areas.  
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The relationship between period of living and cooperation is positive, particularly in the 
case of relatives and neighbours. Cooperation among relatives and neighbours increases 
by .15 and .08 standard deviation respectively for one standard deviation increase of 
living period. Such a relationship is particularly significant in poorer areas, where one 
standard deviation increase of living period raises cooperation among relatives and 
neighbours by .14 and .13 standard deviation respectively. 
Discussion 
The estimates suggest that higher trust could facilitate financial cooperation among the 
poor (although this is not the case between friends). It could substantiate the previous 
finding that financial cooperation between  relatives and neighbours is more substantial 
in terms of amounts of money and incidences than other bonding networks (see Table 
D.1), which might indicate the interdependent livelihood of the urban poor.  
Although a certain level of trust is called for in the case of cooperation among relatives, 
this is not as high as with neighbours. A close and transparent relationship with 
neighbours may engender a level of implicit trust. Alternatively, it might imply that 
relatives of the poor are unable to cooperate on financial matters. Consequently, the poor 
tend to rely largely on their neighbours for this type of cooperation.  Such reliance is 
perhaps necessary for the poor.  Mutual interdependence and frequent exchanges may 
imply that there is implicit trust among the poor which may have implications for 
collective efforts in livelihood development. 
There is little evidence that the amount of money from relatives and neighbours affects 
cooperation. Such a finding would perhaps be consistent with the previous paragraph, 
which underlines that trust is less important in cooperation, particularly in poorer areas. 
This analysis backs up preliminary findings that relatives and neighbours are important 
in poorer areas (see Chapter 5).  
Generally, the size of a network has few implications for financial cooperation, though a 
greater number of neighbours is more meaningful. However, interactions with relatives 
and neighbours seem particularly important in poorer areas. The findings are similar to 
evidence revealed in Chapter 6, in which interaction significantly affects trust. 
Paradoxically, the variable of household income always seems to have a positive 
correlation with financial cooperation. That means that the higher-income poor 
experience more cooperation. However, this relationship is generally weaker in poor areas 
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than in comparator ones, which may suggest that the poor in slums have a cooperative 
social value orientation regardless of socioeconomic challenges.  
Generally, longer periods of living in a place pay off, with a higher degree of cooperation 
from either relatives or neighbours, since there will have been more social exchanges, 
particularly with neighbours, and these are important in financial cooperation. 
7.2.2.2. Non-financial cooperation  
The overall relationship between trust and non-financial cooperation is insignificant 
across different networks. However, a statistically significant but weaker relationship is 
evident in the cases of relatives and neighbours in poorer areas. This   relationship is 
insignificant in the case of friends in either sample.  
The relationship between the amount of money and non-financial cooperation is 
insignificant in the cases of relatives and neighbours particularly in poorer areas. 
However, significant positive relationships are evident in the case of friends and 
neighbours in the comparator areas sample. Cooperation increases by only .09 and .15 
standard deviation respectively for one standard deviation increase in amount of money 
in the cases of friends and relatives in comparator areas.  
Negative and significant relationships are evident between sizes of network (relatives or 
neighbours) and non-financial cooperation. However, a positive and statistically 
significant relationship is evident in in comparator areas, where cooperation increases by 
.24 and .08 standard deviation respectively for one standard deviation increase in size. 
However, such relationships are statistically insignificant in poorer areas. The 
relationships between interaction and cooperation are negative and significant in the cases 
of relatives and friends. It may be that non-financial cooperation requires less trust 
requiring interactions. However, a small but statistically significant relationship is evident 
in poorer areas, where cooperation increases by .05 for one standard deviation increase in 
interaction with neighbours. 
Again, a consistent and significant positive relationship between household income and 
non-financial cooperation is evident across different networks. However, the magnitude 
of the relationship can be reduced in non-financial cooperation compared with financial 
cooperation. For one standard deviation increase in income, non-financial cooperation 
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rises by .04 in neighbours and .06 in relatives. However, these relationships are 
insignificant in poorer areas. 
The relationship between living period (length of time in a place) and non-financial 
cooperation is insignificant in the cases of relatives or friends. However, a significant 
relationship is evident in the case of neighbours. One standard deviation increase in living 
period increases overall cooperation by .11 standard deviation. However, this type of 
relationship is weaker in poorer areas than in comparator ones. Lengthier periods of living 
in a place seem useful for higher cooperation among the poor. 
Discussion 
Trust seems important to non-financial cooperation in the case of neighbours, but less so 
in the case of relatives. These findings might substantiate the theoretical proposition that 
trust is crucial for social transactions. Yet it contrasts with the previous findings that trust 
has little effect on financial cooperation. However, the findings might imply that non-
financial cooperation is more common in poorer neighbourhoods.  
The insignificant relationship between money and non-financial cooperation underlines 
the non-monetary nature of transactions in poor neighbourhoods. This finding might 
establish the social value orientation of the urban poor. Economic hardship may restrict 
financial cooperation among the poor; however, non-financial cooperation is always 
welcomed.  
Network size has no significant effect on non-financial cooperation in poorer 
neighbourhoods, and this is consistent with previous findings on financial cooperation. 
However, these findings may to some extent contradict the proposition of social network 
theories that assume that higher networks lead to greater economic gain (Ziersch et al., 
2005a; Knack and Keefer, 1997b). But such a proposition is held to an extent (and also 
substantiates the preliminary findings of Chapter 5), since interactions with neighbours 
facilitate non-financial cooperation.  
The reduced impact of income on non-financial cooperation among the poor may imply 
that the poor are cooperative regardless of their socioeconomic challenges. Much of the 
cooperation common among the poor requires no financial guarantee, but is important to 
their livelihoods.  
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The significant effect of living period on non-financial cooperation among neighbours 
only underlines the importance of security of tenure in developing the livelihoods of the 
urban poor. This could facilitate both financial and non-financial cooperation among 
poorer neighbours (as well as relatives). 
7.2.3 Cooporation from bridging/linking networks  
The bridging and linking networks provide access to information or opportunities to the 
lower end of the network, and so the question is of how useful they are (Levin and Cross, 
2004; Molm et al., 2000). For instance, we may not particularly trust politicians, but we 
realise that they can be useful. So the assumption is that the relationship between 
individual cooperation and trust in a particular bridging/linking network is weak. Thus, 
the variables of trust and amount of money are absent from Equation 7.1. The number of 
non-financial cooperations received from bridging and linking networks is regressed on 
the network structure, income and living period. The OLS estimation results are presented 
in Table D.3 in Appendix D. 
Cooperation is expected to increase with networks’ structure. Bridging and linking 
networks connect people from different socioeconomic backgrounds. The effect of 
income (one marker of social class) may be strong as well, since those with a higher 
income (social class) are better able to exploit networks. This is also evidence from our 
preliminary analysis that the poor have limited access to bridging networks (see Chapter 
5). Moreover, a longer period of living in the same place is expected to affect cooperation 
from bridging networks, since it helps strengthen ties to particular areas.  
According to the estimate,  the overall relationship between network size and cooperation 
is insignificant across different networks. Stronger ties with political involvement, 
businessmen, public institutions or NGOs do little to increase cooperation. However, a 
higher-level network with professional and voluntary organisations increases cooperation 
by .13 and .22 standard deviation respectively, particularly in comparator areas. 
Interaction significantly increases cooperation, especially if it is with political parties, 
relatives who are involved in politics, professionals and public and voluntary 
organisations. The effects are generally greater in poor areas than in comparator areas. 
Cooperation from professional and voluntary organisations increases by .21 and .37 
standard deviation in poor areas, compared with .13 and .30 in the comparator sample, 
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for one standard deviation increase of interactions. However, the effect is less apparent 
when it comes to political parties. 
The relationship between income and cooperation was found to be largely insignificant 
among the study population. However,weak but significant relationships are evident in 
the cases of cooperation from businessmen, voluntary organisations and NGOs where 
household income is positively correlated to cooperation; the parameters vary between 
.04 and .08 standard deviation for one standard deviation increase in income.  
The relationship between period of living and cooperation is largely insignificant across 
the networks. That neither of these estimates is statistically significant may imply that it 
does not affect cooperation much.   
Discussion 
The insignificant relationship between cooperation and size of network might imply that 
gaining access to, or exploiting, an effective network is not easy for the poor members of 
the study group. However, greater interaction suggests meaningful cooperation. This 
could partly substantiate the theoretical proposition that suggests greater interaction 
means stronger networks that can help to realise economic gains.  
The insignificant relationship between cooperation and income is perhaps in line with 
general expectations; however, it contrasts with the previous findings that the effect of 
income on cooperation is consistent across the bonding networks. Nevertheless, higher 
income facilitates cooperation from local businessmen, NGOs and local government 
officials. Finally, such a finding is not completely unexpected; the gain from a bridging 
network is largely one-directional, since this type of network helps divert resources from 
someone of a higher social class to someone from a lower class. However, the person of 
higher class might also benefit from social recognition which helps to control the 
distribution of income and wealth. This means that the individuals at the bottom benefit, 
while the giver maintains their social status by way of their generosity. This kind of social 
relationship does not necessarily require trust or reciprocation. 
7.2.4 Interim conclusions on cooperation across networks 
The relationship between cooperation (either financial or non-financial) and trust varies 
widely across bonding networks. However, the extent of cooperation among neighbours 
in poor areas is rather different from that of other networks. The interdependent 
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livelihoods of the poor plausibly incur some implicit (or explicit) trust that helps facilitate 
cooperation. Such a distinctive form of social virtue could substantiate the theoretical 
proposition that socioeconomic and cultural homogeneity (or shared adversity when 
living in close quarters) of a group yields higher cooperation. This social virture might 
have implications for strengthening community as well as for fostering social wellbeing.  
Cooperation among neighbours in poor areas relies on mutual relationships and previous 
exchanges. It means that a secure neighbourhood is crucial for interpersonal ties and 
cooperation. Such social ties are important for generating social capital.  
The strong relationship between cooperation and income lies in line with the effect of 
social class on social capital. However, less variance in income, and a weak relationship 
in the case of poor neighbourhoods, particularly with cooperation among neighbours, 
might imply the effectiveness of collective efforts among the urban poor. It is plausible 
that this effectiveness is realised over a long period, since it implies that income and 
tenure securities are crucial to social cooperation in poor neighbourhoods. 
Theoretically, cooperation is a form of social capital. However, individual cooperation 
depends on various social and economic factors, which means that the relationships 
between cooperation and socioeconomic factors are more complex and depend on a 
broader social context. The ways in which factors affect each other is thus a general 
concern in understanding social cooperation. They might be influenced by individual 
goals as well as by expectations of others. This means that some factors may directly 
affect individual cooperation, whereas other factors may  affect cooperation in indirect 
ways. Such structural issues are addressed in detail in the following section. 
 
7.3 Cooperation among the neighbours: a structural analytic approach 
This section aims to explore non-linear relationships among different aspects of social 
capital. More precisely, it looks at how individual cooperation (the outcome of social 
capital) is influenced by household and neighbourhood characteristics. Because of the 
abstract construct of social capital, a structural analytic approach is employed in data to 
explore the relationships between socioeconomic variables associated with social capital. 
This approach is expected to illustrate more clearly how different aspects of social capital 
may influence each other.  
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The relationships between individuals’ perceived degree of cooperation from a neighbour 
and social capital measures such as network structure and socioeconomic factors26 are 
investigated within the theoretical context of social capital. However, the initial 
theoretical models are modified on the basis of test results to imply a best plausible 
relationship among different aspects of social capital in the context of Bangladesh’s urban 
poor. 
The theoretical proposition of social capital is contingent on social class (Bourdieu, 1986; 
Lin, 2001). It could imply that several socioeconomic factors of a household underlie the 
formation of social capital, because those factors indicate social class, which is 
responsible for cultural distances between groups. Such differences in class and culture 
affect decision-making and behaviours at group as well as individual level (Akerlof, 
1997), so are important to an understanding of individual cooperation. The 
socioeconomic opportunities and challenges that define a group (e.g. social class), in 
which individual cooperation is reflected, provide a basis for the understanding of the 
formation of social capital (Guiso et al., 2006). Social capital is associated with the social 
position and power endowed with economic capital (Fine, 2001). Thus, socioeconomic 
factors provide a meaningful context in which to understand  individual cooperation. 
In line with the previous argument, the development of social capital takes time and 
resources; those with higher quantities of economic capital are in a better position to 
generate higher social capital, except that those in higher socioeconomic positions tend 
to be busier with work and other commitments and have less time to interact with their 
neighbours. This means that the network structure (the volume and frequency of contact 
with a neighbour) depends on social and economic factors since these factors characterise 
the household and group. Bourdieu (1986) describes social capital as the “circumstances 
in which individuals can use membership in groups and networks to secure benefits” 
(reported in  Johnson et al., 2003: 34). Important to Bourdieu’s understanding of social 
capital is that the size of social capital generated depends on features of the social network 
and the volume of social capital which already exist in it.  
                                                 
26 The investigation is made in the case of cooperation among neighbours since the urban poor are found 
to maintain networks which are useful for their daily livelihood largely with neighbours (see Sections 5.1 
and 5.3 for details). Though relatives represent another useful bonding network for the urban poor, this 
cooperation does little to follow the proposition of social capital theories, e.g. greater cooperation does not 
require greater interaction. 
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Direct associations between behavioural outcomes (trust and cooperation) and 
socioeconomic factors are evident (see Chapter 6). However, some factors are not directly 
responsible but indirectly influence individual behaviour and so are significant in 
understanding the social capital (Ziersch et al., 2005a; Van Deth, 2003). In this section, 
both direct and indirect factors linked to cooperation are explored and discussed; it 
investigates the close as well as the distant relationships affecting individual behaviour.  
Consideration of individual cooperation as a function of only exogenous factors (while 
analysing individuals as members of a group) might  limit the perspective in 
understanding the relationship between individual behaviour and associated factors 
(Manski, 1993; Manski, 2000; Sampson et al., 2002). Thus, individual cooperation is 
assumed to depend on a group’s shared norms and values (defined by the endogenous 
socioeconomic factors of individuals). 
The influence of ‘endogeneous’ group factors (e.g. the group’s social vulnerability, norms 
of trust and cooperation) which are constructed and reconstructed by backward and 
forward feedbacks between individual and group characterstistics, is important to the 
analysis of individual cooperation. The previous section has discussed details of 
socioeconomic opportunities and challenges attributed to socioeconomic potential and the 
vulnerability of the study population. The uncertainty of income and limited assets 
contribute to the ‘poor’ group’s higher social vulnerability compared with that of the 
‘comparator’ group (see Table 5.1.1  columns 5 and 7). These endogeneous factors are 
discussed in the literature using terms like ‘social norms’, ‘peer influence’ and 
‘neighbourhood effects’(Cialdini and Trost, 1998; Reno et al., 1993; Hollander, 1964; 
Maxwell, 2002; Bauder, 2002; Goux and Maurin, 2007). So the effects of a group’s 
shared norms and values are important to revealing a critical perspectiveof the analysis 
of individual cooperation. 
Section 7.3.2 sets out a framework for analysis that could explore the direct and indirect 
relationships between individual cooperation and the aspects of social capital. Section 
7.3.3 presents the results obtained from the two models. In section 7.3.4 we analyse the 
relationships among variables that best fit with the data and inform the initial theoretical 
models for potential modification. Finally, we draw a conclusion based on our findings. 
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7.3.1 Analytical framework  
Three kinds of effects are discussed in the literature of social interaction and social capital 
(Manski 1993; Durlauf (2002); Glaeser et al., 2002). First, there are some effects caused 
by endogenous factors of individuals which differentiate individual and group behaviour. 
Secondly, there are also some effects caused by exogenous factors of groups which 
influence the individual behaviour. This effect is known as contextual (neighbourhood) 
effect and has been discussed in detail in Chapter 3. So the exogenous characteristics of 
a group are supposed to directly affect individual behaviour, whereas the endogenous 
(group defining characteristics) factors affect it indirectly. Moreover, there are other 
effects called correlated effects. Individuals in a group tend to behave similarly because 
they share some similar observed (and unobserved) characteristics. Therefore, the 
individual’s orientation to social cooperation is not straightforward, calling for a 
structural solution to the problem.  
7.3.1.1 Exchangeability errors and identification of the models 
Though Manski’s concept is used to understand the three effects, the analytical 
framework follows Durlauf (2002) article, On the empirics of social capital, which 
addresses the concerns of contextual effects specifically in the measurement of social 
capital. According to Durlauf, there are two fundamental concerns associated with 
measuring social capital: exchangeability and identification. A contextual effect is similar 
to the neighbourhood effect. The idea of ‘context’ is assumed to mean the social boundary 
that may cross the physical boundary of neighbourhood (Blalock, 1984).  A contextual 
effect may be defined at city level, assuming that socioeconomic variations across cities 
are significant and influence the poor in the selection of both the city and the 
neighbourhood. These choices are significantly affected by socioeconomic processes and 
are influenced by income and assets, childhood achievements, social norms and social 
exclusion (Buck, 2001; Overman, 2002; Galster, 2007; Friedrichs et al., 2010; Blalock, 
1984; Sampson et al., 2002; Manley et al., 2013). The causes, manifestations and 
outcomes of social capital are so interrelated that the relationships among them are often 
misleading. Such interrelationships often lead to exchangeability and identification 
problems. Details of the sources of these problems can be found in Durlauf’s article. 
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Exchangeability 
The structural model presupposes that the variables under study possess ‘conditionally 
exchangeable errors’. This kind of exchangeability error arises from the indistinguishable 
error structure (where the error cannot be distinguished in the model) or if there is no 
clear way of separating variables because of more than one dependent variable. In this 
context, the partial exchangeability of errors of one equation affects the vector of 
parameters in another equation. Suppose that 𝐹𝑖 information is available on each of the 
𝑖 study households and that each of the observations follows a linear structural form: 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝐙𝑖𝛾 + 𝜂𝑖               (7.2) 
 
Where 𝜔𝑖 is any behavioural outcome of 𝑖th observation, 𝐙 is the vector of variables 
and 𝛾 is a parameter. Error 𝜂𝑖are said to be 𝐹𝑖-conditionally exchangeable given that 
Pr(𝜂1 = 𝑎1, … , 𝜂𝑘 = 𝑎𝑘|𝐹1…𝐹𝐼) = Pr(𝜂𝜌(1) = 𝑎1, … , 𝜂𝜌(𝑘) = 𝑎𝑘|𝐹1…𝐹𝐼) 
 
𝜌(. ) is any operator which permutes the K indices. If 𝐙𝑖 = 𝐙𝑗∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜔’s are assumed to be 
partially exchangeable. This exchangeability violation leads to an inconsistency in the 
results, and there is limited scope to deal with this error unless the omitted variables can 
be identified or selection bias is eliminated (Durlauf, 2002).   
Therefore, the exchangeability condition is perhaps necessary given the vagueness of the 
notion of social capital. This implies that the clear instruments that might account for the 
‘endogeneity’ issues in the analysis of social capital are not guaranteed, nor can the 
unobserved heterogeneity be identified with confidence (Durlauf, 2002; Manski, 2000). 
These conditions do not meet the standards typically considered necessary for causal 
inference. The exchangeability error does cause a problem in interpreting parameters 
estimated, and provides no guarantee of causality in the regression analysis. However, it 
does provide a standard in the evaluation of comparable parameters in the model 
specified. 
Identification of the Model 
The identification of the model is another issue of concern when estimating the 
relationships among different aspects of social capital. The concern of identifying 
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endogenous and contextual factors which affect behaviour outcomes separately have been 
discussed in a number of articles (Durlauf, 2002; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Manski, 1993; 
Andersson, 2001). The contextual effect on behavioural outcomes of social capital, in 
particular, has been discussed at length, notably by Durlauf (2002). 
Suppose that 𝑖 is a member of a neighbourhood,  𝑔(𝑖), and the individual behavioural 
outcome (cooperation) for an observation 𝑖 is linearly dependent on some variables. 
Suppose that 𝐗𝑖 is 𝑟 –dimensional matrix [of variables x1, x2, etc.] of observed variables 
that have direct effects on individual behavioural outcome 𝜔𝑖. 𝐘𝑔(𝑖) is 𝑠-dimension matrix 
of  exogenous group-level observed variables, which are known to be the contextual 
factors, indirectly affecting the individual behavioural outcomes (cooperation and 
trust), 𝜔𝑖 .E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) is the individual expectation of average choice of others (group-
level average), is common across the individuals within a group, conditional to a set of 
information, 𝐹𝑔(𝑖). If the measure of social capital is 𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖), the function can be written as 
below: 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝑘 + 𝐜𝐗𝑖 + 𝐝𝐘𝑔(𝑖) + 𝐽1E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽2𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖    (7.3) 
 
Estimation of parameters of behavioural equations (𝑘, 𝐜, 𝐝, 𝐽1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐽2) is now a concern. 
According to Durlauf, identification of the model can be achieved in situations: (i) when 
social capital is assumed to be pre-determined and (ii) when it is assumed to be co-
determined. The identification in both situations largely depends on the dimensions of 
𝐗𝑖 (observed individual-level variable) and 𝐘𝑔(𝑖)(observed group-level variables). The 
specifications of the models in two situations are discussed below under separate 
headings. 
 
Model 1: Social capital is pre-determined 
The predetermined social capital model supposes that social capital is determined by a set 
of observed variables. Exogenous factors are assumed to affect the outcome of social 
capital either directly or indirectly.  In such a condition the error term 𝜀𝑖 in equation (7.4) 
is not correlated with the social capital [cov (𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖),  𝜀𝑖)=0]. In addition, there is no linear 
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dependency among observed variables, 𝐗𝑖 and 𝐘𝑔(𝑖).
27 Under such conditions the 
behavioural outcome of social capital can be determined by the following equation: 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝑘 + 𝐜𝐗𝑖 + 𝐝𝐘𝑔(𝑖) + 𝐽1E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽2E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽3E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝜀𝑖 
                         (7.4) 
 
Although the group level endogenous factors [E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) and 
E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖))] are in a single equation (7.4), the identification of the model is non-
trivial; however, it can be achieved under certain assumptions. It assumes that there is at 
least an element in the equation in which the group characteristic does not affect the 
individual characteristics. Then the model is identified by the reduced form (3SLS 
estimation), assuming that the individual characteristics are moderated by the 
instrumentals for the group average expectation which indirectly affects the individual 
social capital outcome (Bramoullé et al., 2009).28 Identification is achieved under the 
strong assumption that the observed variables, 𝐗𝑖, 𝐘𝑔(𝑖), are not linearly dependent. The 
necessary condition is that there is at least one element of each of 
E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) and E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖) whose group characteristic does not 
affect the individual behavioural outcome, 𝜔𝑖. Alternatively, the model is identified if at 
least 𝑟 + 𝑠 + 3 observed variables are available in the systems of equation, in which at 
least one variable in each equation is different from the main behavioural equation (see 
the discussion of (Durlauf, 2002)). 
According to Equation 7.4, the individual behaviour depends on the observed 
characteristic 𝐗𝑖 (household level variables) and 𝐘𝑔(𝑖) (that affect the group), and the 
expected shared vulnerability E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), cooperation E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) and trust 
E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)). Household characteristic ( 𝐗𝑖) includes ‘income’ of the household head, 
‘education’ of the head, ‘volume’ of networks and ‘frequency’ of contact. (Please see 
Chapters 5 for how these variables could distinguish the two study groups and affect the 
                                                 
27 This is a strong assumption indeed; variables can be predetermined but this does not necessarily mean 
that they are uncorrelated. 
28The limitation of OLS is its downward bias in estimating the effects of endogenous explanatory variables, 
even when the households are randomly assigned (Caeyers B. (2014) Peer effects in development 
programme awareness of vulnerable groups in rural Tanzania. Centre for the Study of African Economics: 
Department of Economics, University of Oxford. 
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manifestation and outcome of social capital.  These variables distinguish individual 
behaviour from average expectation of group behaviour). These variables are supposed 
to directly affect individual cooperation. Again, the group level observed characteristics 
𝐘𝑔(𝑖) may include household assets, type of neighbourhood (poor = 1 or comparator = 0), 
membership of the microfinance institution (MFI) (member = 1, non-member = 0) 
category of city (Dhaka = 1, Chittagong = 2, Kushtia = 3), land ownership of the house 
(public = 1, private = 2) and neighbourhood expenditure (e.g. rent, utility bills). The way 
𝐘𝑔(𝑖) distinguishes the groups at different levels has been discussed in detail in Chapter 
4. These variables are assumed to directly affect the general expectation of group 
cooperation and trust. Note that trust varies with household income, and neighbourhood 
expenditure is not considered to be instrumental in the case of group trust (see Chapter 
6). Group level expectations (on cooperation and trust) are assumed to directly (group 
cooperation) and indirectly (through group trust) affect individual cooperation. So, these 
are contextual effects, expected to vary on 𝐘𝑔(𝑖). 
Some variables may have no direct relationship with the general expectation of group 
cooperation, with trust or with individual cooperation; rather, they are correlated with  𝐘𝑖. 
Such variables are assumed to predict the group characteristic E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), and 
indirectly affect group cooperation and trust. The risks of irregular income and eviction 
from the land, and the living period of households, are assumed to define social 
vulnerability of a group and are correlated to household assets (see Appendix B on social 
class markers). These variables account for group vulnerability and are assumed to partly 
account for the groups’ behavioural variations. In the earlier chapter, correlations between 
income and assets, frequency of contact and group trust, and volume of network and 
group cooperation have been found to be significant, so are also assumed to be significant 
in the SEM model (Figure 7.1). 
Therefore, the parameter c explains the variations of individual behaviour, directly 
influenced by observed characteristics, 𝐗𝑖. Parameter d explains the contextual variations 
of individual behaviour influenced by observed group characteristics; 𝐘𝑖. J1 [parameter 
accompanying group cooperation E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖))] and J2 [parameter accompanying group 
trust E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖))] can explain the variations of individual cooperation influenced by 
expected shared norms of trust and cooperation of a group. Moreover, the parameter J3 
explains the variations of individual behaviour correlated to the group’s social 
vulnerability E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)).  
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Model 2: Social capital is co-determined  
Suppose individual cooperation is co-determined with trust in neighbours. This means the 
individual behavioural choice, 𝜔𝑖 , and trust in neighbours, 𝑆𝐶𝑖 , are in a system of 
simultaneous functions determining the group’s expected norms of 
cooperation E (𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), trust E  (𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) and social vulnerability E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)). 
The assumptions assume that individual behavioural choice is codetermined by the 
factors of trust in others in the group (Glaeser et al., 2002; Durlauf, 2002; Manski, 1993). 
Any effort an individual makes towards cooperation depends on various socioeconomic 
factors which directly and indirectly influence their behavioural choices. If an individual 
chooses some characteristics of social behaviours 𝜔𝑖 and 𝑆𝐶𝑖, given the social 
vulnerability E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), expected group trust E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖))and group 
cooperation (𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), the nonlinear model of simultaneous equations can be 
expressed by the following two functions: 
𝜔𝑖 = 𝑘 + 𝐜𝐗𝑖 + 𝐝𝐘𝑔(𝑖) + 𝐽1E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽2E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽3E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝜀𝑖 
       
𝑆𝐶𝑖 = ?̅? + ?̅?𝐗𝑖 + 𝐝𝐘𝑔(𝑖) + 𝐽1̅E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽2̅E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝐽3̅E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) + 𝜂𝑖
                        (7.5) 
If E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) and E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) are linear functions of E(𝐗𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) 
and E(𝐘𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), then identification can be achieved through second and third stage 
regression. This means that identification can be achieved in a similar way as discussed 
in model-I (pre-determined social capital). It means that at least three elements of 𝐗𝑖 are 
not elements of 𝐘𝑔(𝑖) that provides an instrument for estimating E(𝜔𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)), 
E(𝑆𝐶𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)) and E(𝑦𝑔(𝑖)|𝐹𝑔(𝑖)). Identification is achieved by excluding group level 
analogues from individual characteristics. 
In Equation 7.4, the hypothesis is that income, education of the household head, number 
of neighbours in contact, frequency of contact with neighbours and group cooperation 
directly affect individual cooperation. In addition, Equation 7.5 further hypothesises that 
individual cooperation is codetermined with the individual’s degree of trust in 
neighbours. The trust that directly affects individual cooperation is also the result of a 
number of socioeconomic factors. This argument provides the basis to hypothesise that 
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group cooperation is affected by group trust, household assets, neighbourhood type, MFI 
membership, city category (based on economic primacy), land ownership of 
neighbourhood, neighbourhood expenses and the number of neighbours in contact with 
each other. 
Another hypothesis, similar to model-I, is that group trust is related to the frequency of 
contact with neighbours, household assets, neighbourhood type, MFI membership, city 
category and land ownership. A further hypothesis is that household assets are linked to 
household income, and that they determine factors such as living period of household and 
risks of irregular income and eviction. The path diagram of the model is shown in Figure 
7.2.  
7.3.2 The results 
Our estimations are based on the rationale specified in two models and the household-
level data on financial cooperation among neighbours in the study population. The 
estimations explore the relationships between individuals’ ‘degree of cooperation’ and 
the characteristics of the households and groups they belong to. The parameters explore 
three effects in the models: direct, indirect and correlated effects. The OLS, 3SLS and 
maximum-likelihood estimation methods have been applied to each of the models to 
predict linear and nonlinear relationships. The hypothetical relationships between 
different variables have been shown with the parameters in two schematic diagrams. 
Figure 7.1 presents the case of predetermined social capital, while Figure 7.2 presents the 
case of codetermined social capital. In the following section, three effects are discussed 
under separate headings based on the parameters estimated in two hypothetical models. 
In later stages, the hypothetical models are modified to estimate the robust relationships 
between variables. The estimates of the new models are presented in Table 7.2 and Table 
7.3, and are analysed in the following discussion section. All estimates are in standardised 
beta-coefficient, and details of estimations can be seen in Appendix D.7.1. 
7.3.2.1 Direct effects 
According to the estimates of the models in Equation 7.4 and Equation 7.5 (shown in 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2), the direct relationships between individual cooperation and the 
number of neighbours in contact with each other, the household income and the formal 
education of the household head are statistically significant. In the case of predetermined 
social capital (Equation 7.4 and Figure 7.1), one standard deviation increase in number 
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of neighbours, income, and education increases cooperation by .33, .17 and .12 standard 
deviation respectively, ceteris paribus. Again, in the case of codetermined social capital 
(Equation 7.5 and Figure 7.1), the corresponding estimates are .31, .17 and .09 (the 
estimate of education is not statistically significant). The extent of the effects are more or 
less similar in both models. The other estimates, including those for group cooperation 
which is expected to directly affect individual cooperation, are not statistically significant 
in either case. Moreover, the magnitude of the parameter of ‘individual trust’ is 
statistically insignificant in the case of codetermined social capital. Details of the 
estimates of two models can be found in Appendices D.7.1 (A) and D.7.1 (B). 
7.3.2.2 Indirect effects 
There are some effects that are expected to be moderated by group cooperation, group 
trust and assets. Variables including neighbourhood type, MFI membership, 
neighbourhood expenses (e.g. rents and utility expenditures) and the number of 
neighbours in contact with each other; these are expected to indirectly affect individual 
cooperation through a group’s general norms of trust and cooperation. However, neither 
estimate for group cooperation or trust is statistically significant. Each of the parameters 
affecting group cooperation is equally significant in both models (Equation 7.4 and 
Equation 7.5). However, the parameters of group trust and volume of neighbours are quite 
large at .33 and .71 respectively. Parameters influencing group trust can be seen in Figures 
7.1 and 7.2.  
The group’s norms of trust are expected to indirectly affect individual behaviour 
(individual cooperation in the case of Equation 7.4 and individual cooperation and trust 
in the case of Equation 7.5). The parameters of frequency of contact, household assets, 
MFI membership and city category affecting group trust are statistically significant in 
both models. In fact, each of the three parameters is equally significant; however, the 
parameter of frequency of contact is highly significant, and varies between .69 and .96 in 
two models. This implies the necessary social interactions. The other estimates are 
insignificant in both models. 
7.3.2.3 Correlated effects 
Three variables that are expected to be linked with the behavioural outcomes of 
individuals are living period of household, risk of irregular income and risk of eviction 
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attributed to household assets; these are statistically significant in both models (Figures 
7.1 and 7.2). The parameters (.39) are the same in both models, revealing that household 
assets are significantly related to living period. Additionally, the parameters suggest that 
having more assets decreases the risks of irregular income and eviction by .33 and .22 
standard deviation. Nonetheless, the relationship between household income and assets 
is significantly correlated. 
 
 
 185 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Model 1 Social capital is predetermined (the case of neighbours in financial 
cooperation) 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Model 2 Social capital is co-determined (the case of neighbours in financial 
cooperation) 
Note: Variable names (used in Figure 7.1 and 7.2) and their descriptions are presented 
below: 
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Figure 5.5.1: Social capital is predetermined--equation (5.1)
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Figure 5.5.2: Social capital is codetermined--equation (5.5)
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Table 7.1: Variable names and their descriptions 
Variable  names 
(normalised) 
 Description of the variables 
zlogincom: : Household’s log-income 
zfreq_nei : Frequency of contact with the neighbour 
zformal_edu1 : Formal education of the household head 
zlev_coop_neigh : Level of cooperation received from the neighbour 
znneigh : Number of neighbours in networks 
zcoop : Mean group level cooperation 
ztrust : Mean group level trust 
Zftrust_nei  Individual level trust in neighbour 
zliv_period : Duration of living period in the neighbourhood 
zr_eviction : Risk of eviction from the land/house 
zr_incomloss : Risk of income loss 
zlogasset : Household’s total assets value (in log) 
zctype : Type of neighbourhood 
zmfi_mem : Whether the respondent is member of MFI 
zcity_cat : City category  
zlandown : Land ownership of the household in the neighbourhood 
zlognbexp : Neighbourhood (e.g. rent and utilities) expense (in log) 
zage : Age of household head 
 
7.3.3 Discussion 
Individual cooperation was assumed to be directly influenced by the number of 
neighbours, the frequency of contact with them, household income, the level of education 
of the household head, and group cooperation. However, their estimated size and low 
significance suggest that the effects of those variables on individual cooperation might 
not be underlying as was hypothesised in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. Rather, true relationships 
may be less direct and may lie in different pathways. This gives grounds for an alternative 
hypothesis of relationships that might better explain the relationships between individual 
behavioural outcomes and socioeconomic variables in the models. With this assumption, 
the new models would assume that (individual) household characteristics are largely 
defined by group characteristics. So those household level variables may affect individual 
behaviour indirectly, moderated by group characterstics (rather than as was assumed in 
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Figure 7.1 and 7.2). The new models assume that several household-level variables affect 
individual cooperation through predicted group characteristics.  
In the new models (which differ from the models described above and presented in 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2), three household-level characteristics – education of household-head, 
living period of household and type of neighbourhood – are assumed to affect individual 
cooperation directly. In addition, individual cooperation is assumed to be directly 
influenced by group cooperation (and individual trust, endogeneously determined by 
group trust, household assets and education of household head, see Equation 7.5). The 
expectation of group cooperation is an endogenous factor in terms of expected group trust, 
household income, age of the household head, MFI membership and land ownership. 
Again, group trust is also determined by exogenous observed factors such as household 
income, household assets, household size, age of household head, MFI membership and 
category of city of residence. The nature and extent of relationships between individual 
cooperation and variables considered in the new models (Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4) are 
discussed in the following three sub-sections. 
  
 
Figure 7.3: Social capital is predetermined (new model-1 for Equation 7.4)  
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Figure 7.4: Social capital is co-determined (new model-2 for Equation 7.5) 
 
The estimates (beta-coefficients) of the new models are presented in Table 7.2 (regarding 
financial cooperation) and Table 7.3 (regarding nonfinancial cooperation). A three 
estimations procedure (using OLS, 3SLS and Max.-likelihood) is carried out for each of 
the predetermined and codetermined social capital models. The OLS estimation explores 
the direct relationship between individual cooperation and the predicted group 
characteristics (not influenced by the individual characteristics assumed to have an 
indirect affect), along with other individual characteristics, whereas the other two 
estimations explore both linear and non-linear relationships. The three estimations 
provide the comparative relationships among estimates within a model and between two 
models. Details of the estimates can be found in Appendix D.7.1 and D.7.2. 
7.3.3.1 Direct effects 
As expected, group cooperation, education of the household head, living period and 
neighbourhood type are found to directly affect individual cooperation.   
(a) Expected group cooperation 
The results indicate a positive relationship between individual cooperation and expected 
group cooperation. The parameters estimated in three estimations (in both models) show 
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that individual cooperation increases as expected group cooperation does, and that the 
effects vary between .12 (in OLS) and .51 (in 3SLS) standard deviation in the case of 
predetermined social capital that are slightly smaller than the parameters estimated in the 
case of co-determined social capital (Table 7.2 on financial cooperation). However, this 
strong relationship is not evident in the case of non-financial cooperation (compare Tables 
7.5 and 7.6). 
(b) Education 
A positive relationship between individual (financial) cooperation and education level of 
the household head is evident in both models (Table 7.2). The parameters indicate that 
individual financial cooperation increases significantly as the level of education of the 
household head increases. The parameters estimated in 3SLS and maximum likelihood 
estimations vary between .24 and .19 respectively. These parameters differ slightly 
between two models, but are lower than the parameters calculated in the OLS estimation 
in both models. However, such a significant relationship between individual cooperation 
and education really does not exist in case of non-financial cooperation (see Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.2: Dependent variable: Individual’s perceived ‘degree of cooperation’ for monetary 
helps from the neighbours 
[Parameters are eta-coefficients] 
 
Variable 
Equation (7.4) 
Equation-(5.4) 
 Equation (7.5) 
 OLS  3SLS  Max. 
Likelihood 
 OSL  3SLS  Max. 
Likelihood  
Group cooperation .12*** .51*** .28***  .14*** .61*** .29*** 
 Group trust  .10** .30***   .11 .30*** 
  Income   .15** .14***   .15** .14*** 
  Assets  .16** .13***   .17** .13*** 
  Household size  -.08 .07***   -.13** .07*** 
  Age of the head  .14** .18***   .19*** .18*** 
  MFI member  .37*** .24***   .39*** .24*** 
  Category of city  .01 .13***   .02 .13*** 
 Income  .31*** .24***   .31*** .24*** 
 Neighbs. in contact  .77*** .68***   .77*** .68*** 
 Age of the head  .13*** .10***   .13*** .10*** 
 Neighb. exp.  .06* .07***   .06* .07*** 
 MFI membership  .09** .04***   .10*** .04*** 
 Land ownership   -.03 -.03**   -.02 -.03* 
Individual trust     -.01 -.92*** -.02 
 Group trust       .41*** .09*** 
 Assets       -.20*** -.10*** 
 Education of head      .06 .08*** 
Education of head .29*** .21*** .22***  .26*** .24*** .19*** 
Living period .13*** -.01 .07  .14*** -.09 .07 
Type of community -.23*** -.24*** -.22***  -.20*** -.19*** -.21*** 
Constant .04 -.19*** -.19***  -.00 .01 -.02*** 
N 515 263 1784  471 250 1784 
R2 .12 .09 -  .11 -.56 - 
Adj- R2 .11 - -  .10 - - 
F 17.69 - -  11.62 - - 
𝜒2 - 53.97 -  - 79.89 - 
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Table 7.3: Dependent variable: Individual’s perceived ‘degree of cooperation’ for 
nonfinancial helps from the neighbours 
[Parameters are in Beta-estimates] 
 
Variable 
Equation-(7.4) 
Equation-(5.4) 
 Equation-(7.5) 
OLS  3SLS  Max. 
Likelihood 
 OSL  3SLS  Max. 
Likelihood  
Group cooperation -.07*** .07** -.02  .04 .08* -.04 
 Group trust  .17* .30***   .15 .30*** 
  Income   .15*** .14***   .15*** .14*** 
  Assets  .17*** .13***   .18*** .13*** 
  Household size  .02 .07***   -.02 .07*** 
  Age of the head  .14*** .18***   .14*** .18*** 
  MFI member  .31*** .24***   .31*** .24*** 
  Category of city  .03 .13***   .09** .13*** 
 Income  .26*** .24***   .26*** .24*** 
 Neighbs. in contact  .68*** .68***   .67*** .68*** 
 Age of the head  .12*** .10***   .12*** .10*** 
 Neighborhood exp.  .08*** .07***   .09*** .07*** 
 MFI membership  .06** .04***   .06*** .04*** 
 Land ownership   -.03* -.03**   -.03 -.03** 
Individual trust     -
.09*** 
-.08 -.03 
 Group trust       .69*** .09*** 
 Assets       -.27** -.10*** 
 Education of head      .01 .08*** 
Education of head .01 .04 .05  .01 .05 .05 
Living period .08*
** 
-.00 .05  .08*** -.01 .05 
Type of community -
.05* 
-.00 -.01  -.03 -.01 -.01 
Constant . 1 .00 .02  .02 .02 .03 
N 176
1 
800 1786  1654 768 1784 
R2 .01 -.01 -  .01 -.03 - 
Adj- R2 .01 - -  .01 - - 
F 4.60 - -  4.42 - - 
𝜒2 - 6.71 -  - 6.63 - 
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(c) Living period 
The relationship between cooperation and living period is direct (as well as correlated - 
see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). Although the parameters estimated in new models are 
insignificant in 3SLS and Max.-likelihood estimations, they are statistically significant in 
OLS estimations. One standard deviation longer living period potentially increases 
individual cooperation by .13 and .14 standard deviation respectively in the two models 
(see Table 7.2). A similar relationship is also evident in the case of non-financial 
cooperation from neighbours (see Table 7.3).  
(d) Type of neighbourhood 
A negative and statistically significant relationship between financial cooperation and 
neighbourhood type is evident across three estimations of two models. It means that the 
degree of financial cooperation is higher in comparator areas than in poorer ones. 
Individual cooperation decreases between .22 and .24 standard deviation in the case of 
predetermined social capital for living in poor neighbourhoods that are slightly higher 
than the corresponding parameters in the case of co-determined social capital. However, 
no such relationship is apparent in the case of non-financial cooperation in either model. 
This might imply that the financial incapability of those living in poor neighbourhoods 
may limit financial cooperation. 
(e) Individual trust (Equation 7.5) 
According to estimates, the relationship between individual financial cooperation and the 
individual trait of trust is not statistically significant. This might imply that cooperation 
is not codetermined by one’s trust in neighbours (Equation 7.5 and Table 7.2). The 
evidence is also true for the case of non-financial cooperation (Table 7.3).  
7.3.4.2 Indirect effects 
The general assumption in the new models is that individual cooperation is moderated by 
average expectation of group behaviours. Socioeconomic factors that form norms of 
social behaviours may have no direct relationship with individual behaviour; however, 
they may have an indirect effect.  
(a) Effects through group cooperation 
Individual cooperation is positively correlated with group cooperation. Group 
cooperation depends on group trust, household income, number of neighbours in contact, 
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age of household head, neighbourhood expenditure, MFI membership and land ownership 
of the house. This means that the factors affecting group cooperation indirectly influence 
individual cooperation. According to the estimation, the factors (particularly the number 
of neighbours in contact with each other) have been found to affect group cooperation 
significantly. In both models, group cooperation increases by between .68 and .77 for one 
standard deviation higher number of neighbours in contact (Table 7.2). However, group 
cooperation is less among households living on public land. This relationship is even 
higher in the case of non-financial cooperation, and the difference is very small (Table 
7.3). 
(b) The effects through group trust 
Despite the lack of a direct relationship between group trust and individual cooperation, 
the former is significantly correlated with individual trust (Equation 7.5). The parameters 
estimated in 3SLS and maximum-likelihood estimations imply that individual trust 
increases by .41 and .09 standard deviation respectively for one standard deviation 
increase in group trust. Moreover, individual trust is negatively correlated to household 
assets; both 3SLS and maximum-likelihood estimates indicate that having more assets 
would potentially decrease individual trust in either type of cooperation (financial or non-
financial). Equally, the level of education of the household head increases individual trust. 
Although the estimate in 3SLS estimation is statistically insignificant, it is statistically 
significant in the maximum-likelihood estimation of either cooperation. 
(c) Effects of group trust 
More distant relationships between group trust and factors such as income, assets, age of 
household head, MFI membership and category of city are evident. Most of these factors 
positively influence group trust with varying degrees of significance. However, the 
relationship between group trust and household size is negative in two estimations of each 
model regardless of the type of cooperation. 
MFI membership significantly increases group trust compared to any other factors in the 
models. The parameters vary between .24 and .39 in the case of financial cooperation and 
between .24 and. 31 in the case of non-financial cooperation. Other factors have less effect 
on group trust (see Tables 7.5 and 7.6).  
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7.3.4.3 Correlated effects 
There are correlated effects linked to some socioeconomic variables. The risks of irregular 
income and eviction, which lead to social vulnerability, are significantly related to 
household assets. According to estimates, having fewer assets also suggests a low income 
and potentially increases social vulnerability (Appendices 7.1 and 7.2). The risks of 
having an irregular income increase by between .22 and .31 as household assets decrease 
by one standard deviation. The risk of eviction from the land is even higher, and varies 
between .31 and .54 in two models. These effects could imply that potentially, social 
vulnerability has some related effects on individual cooperation. 
7.3.4 Conclusion 
The insignificant differences between estimates in two models (Equation 7.4 and 7.5) 
imply that whether social capital is predetermined or codetermined matters less in 
understanding cooperation. However, it is critical to understand ways in which some 
contexual factors affect the social norms of cooperation as well as of trust. Measuring 
cooperation is not straightforward, as the factors are interlinked, so, understandably, the 
effects of one factor on another fluctuate. Yet an inference on the relationships between 
cooperation and contextual factors could be drawn from the estimation results such that 
individual cooperation is largely determined by group norms. Factors such as norms of 
trust, income levels, networks among neighbours, age of the household head, 
neighbourhood characteristics and MFI membership, which distinguish between groups, 
are linked to individual cooperation. Higher education potentially facilitates cooperation 
among neighbours. Financial cooperation is potentially higher among the poor in 
wealthier neighbourhoods (e.g. the comparator poor). However, nonfinancial cooperation 
does not necessarily differ among poorer neighbours regardless of where they live. 
In conclusion, the effects of social networks and socioeconomic factors on cooperation 
are complex; this could suggest that individual cooperation is potentially high in 
neighbourhoods where people are more in contact with each other. The effectiveness of 
social capital thus relies on norms of social behaviours rather than on definitions of 
individual characteristics. Therefore, an understanding of context is more important to an 
analysis of cooperation and its implications for neighbourhood development; the 
characteristics of the neighbourhood significantly influence the outcome/opportunities for 
people in terms of ability to gain access to social capital and therefore social inclusion 
and wellbeing (see van Ham and Manley, 2015; Bailey et al., 2015). Such an implication 
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offers scope for thinking in town planning about how the structure and form of a 
neighbourhood influences opportunities for people.  Thus this work offers some evidence 
of the importance of the neighbourhood structure. It could also be related to the literature 
on ‘mixed neighbourhoods’, where people experiencing disadvantage are not clustered in 
one area.   
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Chapter 8: The Implications of Social Capital for 
Affordable Housing 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
While in principle pro-market housing policies could be viewed as the main way to 
provide housing, those policies have achieved little in practice to deliver affordable 
housing to the urban poor of Bangladesh. As a result, more than half of the total urban 
population still lives in informal housing (WB, 2016a; NHA, 2012; GoB, 2015). The 
situation in Bangladesh is typical of the developing world in this respect. This situation 
is the result of income inequality (see Section 2.3.2), and there is an argument for  
redistribution of income and wealth through income or housing subsidies; such provisions 
do, however, have their own limitations (Prest and Barr, 1979; Musgrave and Musgrave, 
1989; Bramley et al., 2005). To varying degrees, all developed countries have such a 
system, in the forms of social housing or housing allowances, in recognition of the reality 
that the poorest households cannot afford minimally decent housing without assistance.  
The lower-income households cannot afford minimally adequate standards of housing, as 
the housing produced in the market is expensive (see Section 2.3.3). Such a consequence 
implies that pro-market housing policies have failed to deliver affordable housing to the 
urban poor, so that their housing needs remain unmet (Rahman, 2010; Rahman, 2012). 
As in many developing countries, the poor house themselves in informal settlements with 
limited resources and limited access to land; they are only able to do so in very poor 
conditions (Bredenoord and van Lindert, 2010; Monkkonen, 2011) 
Though the Bangladesh government made some non-market interventions to provide 
minimum-standard housing to the poor, these measures failed, allegedly due partly to the 
relocating of the poor to the city’s periphery, and partly to corruption in housing allocation 
(Khan, 2012c; Khan, 2012a). The affordable housing demands (and needs) of the urban 
poor have received less attention in policy (NHA, 2012). This policy document highlights 
some of the issues relevant to informal housing upgradation in cities in half a page which 
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includes: (i) restriction on informal housing on private land; (ii) rehabilitation of the urban 
poor before eviction; (iii) involvement of slum residents in slum upgrading; (iv) 
installation of necessary infrastructures and services; (v) incremental construction and 
gradual upgrading of slum housing; (v) cross subsidy; and (vi) social housing. However, 
the ill-developed market infrastructures, lack of housing finance, lack of provision for 
public/subsidised housing, and non-involvement of the poor in planning and development 
remain the major challenges to affordable housing policies (see Section 2.3.3 for details).  
The extent of housing research in Bangladesh is limited, and most studies have viewed 
the housing of the poor from the perspective of the ‘public good’ (Begum, 2007a; Rashid, 
2009c; Islam, 1996; Nawaz, 2004; Khan, 2012c; Hossain, 2011b); this emphasises the 
need for free housing/land to the poor and largely undermines the market forces. Given 
the existing demands (needs) for low-cost housing and scarcity of city land, such an 
approach is understandably impractical (see Section 2.3.3 for details). But affordable 
housing for the poor could be argued for from the perspective of ‘merit good’29. However, 
this perspective has little been appreciated in national housing policies in Bangladesh. 
Affordable housing for the poor may be argued as part of the wider welfare economic 
perspective of human welfare and as part of societal development goals, emphasising 
links to education, health and workforce development.30 
A small section of the literature discusses housing market weaknesses and constraints, 
which disfavor the functioning of housing market in Bangladesh. Barriers to an affordable 
housing supply include a large stock of housing held  by a small group, a small housing 
finance market, the absence of a secondary housing market, easy regulations and market 
information, higher interest rates and short maturity period for mortgage finance, and 
absence of proper land titles (see Section 2.3.3 for details). Though the growth of housing 
                                                 
29 The merit good is essentially that if (poor) people are able to consume a minimum quantity/quality of 
certain specific goods/services, this generates significant wider collective benefits to society, and provides 
merits specific to subsidy/regulation/provision. The argument is most often used in respect of education, 
health and housing. It can be rationalised as a type of informational externality, sometimes called ‘altruism’; 
I get some benefit from knowing that however poor some people are they do not have to sleep on the streets, 
and I am willing to pay something to ensure that this does not happen. Musgrave RA and Musgrave PB. 
(1989) Public Finance in Theory and Practice, US: McGraw-Hill Inc, LeGrand J. (1991) Quasi-Markets 
and Social Policy. The Economic Journal 101: 1256-1267, Bramley G. (1993) Quasi-Markets and Social 
Housing. In: Grand JL and Bartlett W (eds) Quasi-Markets and Social Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
UK, 154-182.. 
30 The benefits of conditional altruism might not be obvious; however, actions would have long-term 
implications in reducing social costs by addressing public health concerns and the negative effects of slum 
characteristics on surrounding neighbourhoods. In the case of providing higher standards of living 
conditions to the poor, social benefits may come  through efficient labour forces or reductions in public 
health expenditures Roback J. (1982) Wages, rents and the quality of life. Journal of Political Economy 90: 
1257-1278. 
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finance is significant (see Section 2.3.3), access to that finance is limited to the richer 
section of society. However, the finance market would not flourish if there were risks 
involved in housing finance. Those risks come from various sources, including from the 
lack of proper land title and regulations (Abdulai et al., 2011; Huang and Clark, 2002; 
Gurran and Bramley, 2016). 
Much of the potential demand for housing in Bangladesh is ineffective. Poor households’ 
spending goes largely on daily necessities as incomes increases. But housing is more than 
just a basic essential, and there are dimensions of luxury, conspicuous consumption and 
investment motives, which lead to an increase in demand for housing as incomes rise. 
The formal housing units (produced by real-estate developers) is significantly large, 
making housing unaffordable to middle- and lower-income households (see Section 
2.3.3). 
Nonetheless, the supply of affordable housing to the urban poor is not guaranteed by the 
country’s existing market policies. Ideally, housing would be supplied by a market in 
which market efficiency is ensured along with a certain level of equity. With such an 
aspiration, the quasi-market31 approach may be relevant here.32 In this process, social 
capital around cooperation may have implications for overcoming the public 
good/collective action problems and achieving the general good.  A possible link might 
be to the notion of cooperative-based housing agencies (like community-based housing 
associations). Such models typically require a certain amount of public subsidy (Malpass, 
1999). This chapter argues that even after the public subsidy, the affordable housing 
would require to follow the market process in which social capital might be mobilized 
for:  
(i) the financial viability of housing investment; and  
(ii) a non-market mechanism in land pooling and distribution of affordable housing 
to the urban poor. 
Section 8.2 analyses the policy challenges associated with the housing market. Section 
8.3 points to externalities. Section 8.4 discusses generalised solutions to specific market 
                                                 
31A quasi-market is a public sector institutional structure that is designed to reap the benefits of efficiency 
of the free market without losing the equity. LeGrand J. (1991) Quasi-Markets and Social Policy. The 
Economic Journal 101: 1256-1267. 
32 Quasi-market ideas arose in the advanced welfare state countries, where public provision of welfare 
through bureaucracies is established but is yet to achieve more flexibility and efficiency. However, such 
market-like policies may have implications for affordable housing supply to the poor in Bangladesh. 
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failures. Section 8.5 discusses the implications of social capital to address the market and 
non-market issues in affordable housing for the urban poor. Section 8.6 derives an 
economic model for affordable housing for the urban poor. The final section draws 
conclusions from the preceding analysis. 
 
8.2 Market shortcomings and constraints 
Along with the market shortcomings (see Section 2.3.3), the housing market is 
constrained by a number of factors such as scarcity of serviced land, the fixed locations 
of housing, and inefficient transportation systems; these act against the responsive supply 
of housing. These constraints are discussed in more detail in this section. 
8.2.1 Housing is an expensive good 
At current prices, a condominium apartment in a least-preferred neighbourhood like 
Mirpur in Dhaka is estimated as at least 56 times the annual income of the urban poor 
(see Section 2.3.3). The average monthly income of poor households is approximately 
BDT 13,000 (see Section 4.3). This figure approximates to the national income (BBS, 
2010b). The average formal housing unit, at 1300 square feet, is far beyond the price 
range of large middle-income households (see Section 2.3). This contrasts with  house 
price in countries like the UK or the USA, whose homes cost three to four times the annual 
average income (LeGrand et al., 2008; Bramley et al., 2005; Barr, 2012).  
8.2.2 Shortage of developable land  
Bangladesh is one of the most populous countries in the world, with as many as 1,200 
people per sq. km (see Section 2.3). Therefore, there are concerns over loss of agricultural 
land, filling out depressed land, and provision of infrastructure and services. Planning 
regulations are applied to deliver land for housing in order to ensure the optimum use of 
scarce land. Vacant land may not be granted, or land development for housing may 
require infrastructures and services requiring considerable investment and time. 
Therefore, the immediate supply of land is constrained by various factors including social, 
economic, biophysical, neighbourhood and institutional ones (Ahmed et al., 2014). 
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8.2.3 Transportation problems 
Since the mobility of people and goods is a major concern of city dwellers, the housing 
market is constrained by the transportation system. Good transportation is linked to 
housing solutions (WB, 2016a); However, in cities in Bangladesh, transportation 
networks have poor infrastructure and are highly inefficient, and trips within big cities 
like Dhaka and Chittagong are typically long. Transport systems incur financial costs and 
loss of working hours. Thus, transport networks (with offices, schools, hospitals etc.) 
influence households’ preferences of housing location. The standard daily commute is 
expected be limited to an hour (Bertaud, 2014); therefore, housing policies are linked to 
and constrained by transport policies. 
8.2.4 Fixed location 
Unlike other goods, housing is not moveable from one location or city to another. 
Although housing land in Dhaka is expensive, it is cheap in other cities. Fixed location is 
therefore a major housing market constraint contributing to unaffordability. Housing may 
be affected by a range of costs associated with the households, such as changing of jobs, 
longer commutes, changing of schools and loss of social goods (e.g. social capital) that 
are spatially embedded. However, unless a move to another location will bring significant 
gains, households are unlikely to relocate. Subsidised housing in a particular region 
(especially on the outskirts of a city) may not be an appropriate strategy of ‘affordable 
housing’. 
 
8.3 Market externalities 
Benefits of an efficient housing market could be offset by a number of external factors if 
the market fails to consider the social costs. In such a situation, marginal social cost 
exceeds marginal social benefits (LeGrand et al., 2008; Bramley and Leishman, 2005). 
For instance, a slum with an unhygienic living environment is likely to spread disease 
that would incur public health costs. Similarly, costs may be incurred from congested 
neighbourhoods lacking sunlight, or narrow streets, or social crime that would reduce the 
optimum benefits of living in the neighbourhood concerned. Narrowly defined efficient 
markets have little power to overcome these factors. 
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8.4 Policy responses to the housing challenges 
Investment in housing is associated with large amounts of money, so there are risks 
associated with non-recovery. Such market behaviour is not unexpected per se, because 
of the illiquid nature of the land and housing assets that financial institutions hold against 
the liquid nature of liabilities (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). This kind of market 
behaviour would set out stringent regulations to discourage the sanctioning of finance to 
low-income groups (LeGrand et al., 2008; Barr, 2012). 
There are significant market failures in housing, which can be analysed diagnostically 
towards various possible solutions involving government subsidy, regulation and direct 
public provision.  
 
Table 8.1: Major housing market challenges and expected policy responses 
Market challenges  Policy responses 
1. Imperfect Competition: 
-Monopoly in land holding 
-Capital market gap 
-Absence of market information  
 
 
-Deregulation (e.g. mortgages), stock 
transfer 
-Mobilisation of local and external fund  
-Introduction of estate agencies 
 
2. Unequal distribution: 
-Wide housing inequality  
-Unequal access to capital market 
 
 
-Income or housing subsidy 
-Tenure neutral policies for housing 
construction and mortgage finance 
-Introduction of non-profit intermediaries  
 
3. Externalities: 
-Public health hazards of slum housing 
-Lack of neighbourhood amenities in run-
down or congested areas 
 
 
-Regulations for minimum housing 
standards 
-Subsidies (renovation grants)  
-Area renewal schemes 
 
4. Non-excludable, non-rival—public 
good properties: 
Public spaces in housing areas 
Crime  
 
 
-Design guides; laws of tenement, 
-Localised housing management 
5. Heterogeneous product: 
All housing distinct, spatially fixed 
Wide price/rent variations 
Inelastic supply, price booms/slumps 
 
-Planning policies for new housing 
incorporating overall numbers, location, 
type and size 
-Tax and interest rate policy 
-Public/subsidised provision 
Source: Adapted from Gurran and Bramley (2016) 
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Another issue is the measurement of housing supply and the different ways it can be 
adjusted. The housing literature talks about housing services, which is a composite of 
physical housing space (sq. m.), privacy, quality of building, quality of included 
fixtures/equipment, quality of immediate environment, and management of common 
elements of the housing block. Again, a lower price is presumably not expected within 
high market demand and low supply constraints. A particular package of recommended 
solutions targeting the poor on the interface between economic and social policy, where 
there is some hybrid or contrived structure, may call for a ‘quasi market’; this aims at a 
solution to market failure problems, including unacceptable distributional outcomes. Two 
particular ways of facilitating affordable housing supply are discussed, where social 
capital would have implications for housing the urban poor. 
(a) By developing small-parcel land holding by the poor land owners in cities, requiring 
land pooling and construction finance. This kind of development targets the 
‘comparators areas’ where poor land owners provide informal housing to the 
landless poor in cities. 
(b) By redevelopment of the existing slums on public land, which would require the 
provision of necessary infrastructures and the physical construction of housing. 
Such a redevelopment is largely linked to political will to release land controlled 
by the local powerbrokers. 
 
8.5 Implications of social capital for affordable housing challenges 
Current market response to housing need is limited, offering no choice to the urban poor, 
and the existing housing policies provide little direction in delivering affordable housing 
to the poor in Bangladesh. The situation demands government intervention to deliver 
affordable housing that might focus more on equity. Interventions would need to address 
the economic strength of the country, the proportion of urban poor in cities, deliverable 
land, and the finance options which pose challenges to affordable housing. There is also 
a challenge in terms of institutions, with the need for a new institutional form to promote 
and organise housing upgrades for the urban poor. 
One can in theory envisage policies to narrow income inequality, although these are not 
high on the agenda in Bangladesh. However, one aspect worth mentioning is the issue of 
housing allowances. This is obviously a direct solution to inequality in housing for the 
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poor. The problems are that any reasonable scheme would be unaffordable for the 
government, and that if not linked to reformed supply side measures, it would tend to 
inflate rents and prices further, making it self-defeating. Unless income inequality is 
significantly reduced, there appears to be little option left but to intervene in the demand-
side factors to accommodate the urban poor. Any change which could facilitate affordable 
housing is largely attributed to intervention in supply-side instruments. 
8.5.1 Small-parcel land development 
Many small parcels of serviced lands owned by the poor households in cities are left 
undeveloped in poor neighbourhoods. Those lands are providing a sub-standard housing 
to the urban poor. Redevelopment to higher density could raise both the quantity and the 
quality of supply. So, there is a scope for development of such land for affordable housing 
to the urban poor.  
Issues for such developments include: (a) the tiny plot size and loss of economy of scale 
(after adhering to planning regulations and building codes, such plots produce costly 
housing); (b) the physical constraints inflicting problems of financial feasibility; and (c) 
poor land owners have limited or no access to construction finance, so are unable to take 
part in private initiatives.  
The level of trust and cooperation among poor neighbours (see Section 7.3), including in 
the comparator areas, may potentially be mobilized to merge the small-parcel land for 
viable housing development, raise local finance for construction, gain access to formal 
finance and maintain the post-construction housing stock. This implies that there are 
potential opportunities for social capital to be drawn on to facilitate the necessary actions 
to house for the poor. Exactly how this might work will be discussed below, where of 
trust and cooperation among neighbours are seen to be of value in tackling some of the 
market and non-market challenges.  
8.5.1.1 Available land for affordable housing 
Merging small-parcel land might provide efficiency in structure and construction, and 
this would potentially bring financial viability to the housing development. Small-parcel 
lands in already-developed areas might be a substantial source of land readily available 
for the construction of affordable housing, and multi-storey development on such land 
could supply substantial quantities of housing units. However, land pooling and collective 
 204 
 
construction efforts would require the effective mobilisation of the social capital of poor 
landowners (see Section 6.4 and 7.3). This collective approach potentially provides some 
economies of scale of affordable housing construction that could also attract formal loan 
finance for the poor landowners.  
The greater challenge lies in the relationship of trust among the participating poor 
landowners, who would need to interact and motivate themselves to work collectively in 
the construction of housing. Trust among members of a group is higher than that among 
non-members (Section 6.2). Particular attention may need to be paid to the formation of 
a group so that the regular discussion could take place. These interactions are expected to 
increase trust and cooperation among group members. This would imply that a 
homogeneous group with similar goals might build strong ties based trust, leading to 
higher levels of cooperation. This could have potential implications for small-scale land 
merging. 
8.5.1.2 Finance  
Housing development involves large-scale investment for longer terms, so there is much 
concern over financial risks. Conventional housing finance sees poor landowners as less 
attractive; the risk of recovery is always a major concern for the financial institutions. 
Any loan provider would want to avoid such risk, suggests that finance for housing 
construction is competitive. Other financial sources, such as the secondary money market, 
might offer an alternative source, however, this requires a solid institutional framework, 
specific mechanisms and institutions to generate capital. The government’s intervention 
in managing financial risk is also important when it comes to channeling finance from the 
market. Moreover, there may be a need for mechanisms to reduce front loading to adjust 
high interest rates, for example, with index-linked mortgages. These concerned with 
reducing the risks of housing finance. Incentives for private sector investment in this 
particular housing sub-market seem critical for making finance available to the poor land 
owners (LeGrand, 1991; Bramley, 1993).  
Questions of housing finance for poor landowners may introduce the concept of 
microfinance and how it operates, and may mobilise collective funding for construction. 
This approach could increase the supply of housing finance and reduce the risks of 
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investment.33 In the case of microfinance, the risks of non-payment could be shared by 
group members. This would mean that the members taking collective responsibility for 
repayment, with trust and cooperation playing a crucial role. However, a high level of 
trust and cooperation are involved in generating the large amounts required for housing 
finance. The findings of Chapters 6 and 7 might suggest a certain level of trust and 
cooperation that could be used to gain higher levels of housing finance. Once the group 
can identify the benefits of collective housing development, the risk of default repayment 
reduces. Given that the urban poor in Bangladesh have somewhat insecure incomes, 
provision needs to be made to bridge gaps in payment. 
8.5.1.3 Intermediaries 
The two points above on land pooling and capital finance would suggest the necessity of 
a third party in market and non-market interventions. The roles of such an intermediary 
may not be limited to mobilising social capital to generate financial capital from 
secondary bond/security markets, but may be extended to negotiations for other sources 
of finance (via budgetary allocation or foreign investment), and to providing technical 
support in negotiating finance, construction, planning, transfer, repayment and 
maintenance.34 For an instance, an intermediary could invite developers to tender for 
building, securing the supply of standard housing at a comparative price. This model 
could also help poor landowners wanting to build in an incremental way, by adding extra 
floors to a building as and when they can afford to. These interventions may also reflect 
responsiveness to the housing market demands of the urban poor.35 
Both interventions (of merging land and construction finance) would require a high level 
of trust and cooperation among poor landowners, and the intermediary’s role would be 
considerable. Once a certain level of trust and cooperation exists among the poor (see 
Section 6.4 and Section 7.3), then certain market and non-market challenges (such as 
pooling land, mobilising local fund, sharing risks of recovery of investment and 
                                                 
33 The sums involved and the required durations of loans would surely be beyond normal microfinance 
limits. However, existing microfinance cooperators might use that as a basis to seek larger-scale funding 
from a scheme which, perhaps with government backing/guarantees, could obtain larger /longer loans or 
bond finance. 
34 For example, in the UK there is something called The Housing Finance Corporation which syndicates 
bond issues on behalf of smaller housing associations, and there are also Secondary Housing 
Associations/Cooperations which provide services (finance- or development-related) to small community-
based housing associations and cooperatives (notably in Glasgow). 
35 There might be another model, more suitable for small cities like Kushtia, where the demand for housing 
is moderate and residents are encouraged to build better housing, perhaps 2-3 storeys high, on their existing 
plots. 
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maintenance of common space) could potentially be resolved.  Such an institutional 
mechanism could facilitate regular meeting (interactions) to build the strong ties 
necessary for collective effort in housing construction that could facilitate access to 
finance and extend to actual contribution of labour time, as well as enhancing decisions 
and shortening decision-making time. All would potentially reduce the costs of delivering 
housing to the urban poor (Walker, 1993). 
Yet once the development has become viable, the housing price may reach the general 
level of the market. Thus, certain measures, such as keeping housing units small or having 
shared spaces (for kitchens and toilets), need to be in place to keep prices/rents low. 
Housing needs to be affordable to the poorer section of the urban community; this may 
include some upwardly-mobile, formerly poor people, however, it is unlikely to be 
affordable to the poorest from the informal slum areas without an allowance. 
8.5.2 Slum redevelopment [or upgrading] 
Affordable housing policies for the landless urban poor might offer slum residents a 
choice between existing and peripheral settlements; however, it is reasonable to predict 
that few would choose the latter. The poor might not move out to a newly planned suburb 
in the context of a city with poor transport facilities where informal income activities are 
concentrated in the city centre. Therefore, in-situ slum redevelopment (or the upgrading 
of slums) could potentially offer an option to the landless poor. The most common and 
most recommended policy approach in many other developing countries is upgrading, 
where public intervention is mainly focused on putting in proper infrastructure (which 
may require moving some people and demolishing some houses) and assisting poor 
residents in their own efforts to improve their homes incrementally. However, in the 
context of Bangladesh, particularly in large cities like Dhaka and Chittagong, upgrading 
alone may be downplayed by non-targeted beneficiaries (e.g. local powerbrokers) and 
sub-standard housing. Such an approach would be inefficient in Dhaka and Chittagong 
too, where the population densities of slums are 220,246 and 255,100 per square 
kilometre respectively (see Table 2.2 for slum density). However, the redevelopment of 
slums raises a number of political and market concerns, including: releasing land from 
the powerbrokers; provision of infrastructures; channeling finance; delivering technical 
support in construction; distribution of housing to the target poor; intervening in long-
term recovery plans; and maintaining the financial viability of the programme. In the 
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following sub-sections, we discuss the four issues concerning slum redevelopment in 
which social capital may have potential implications.  
8.5.2.1 Subsidised land to house slum dwellers  
The big slums in cities in Bangladesh have been developed largely on land held by the 
public institutions. This land is left vacant for future use despite the urgent need for a 
minimum standard of housing for the urban poor. Arguably, social disorder helps 
powerful groups to exploit the poor via rents on informal housing with minimal or no 
investment (Hossain, 2011a). Also, the supply of unauthorised utility service connections 
to the slums, arranged through informal negotiation with service providers, incurs losses 
in public revenue. This context provides support for the argument that existing slums on 
public land could be used for affordable housing with necessary tenure security for the 
existing slum dwellers.  
Substantial amounts of private land are deliberately left vacant for economic rent. The 
gains from vacant private land are two-fold: revenue from rent of substandard housing, 
and revenue from increasing land values. However, these gains have little social benefit. 
The land is readily available with the necessary infrastructure and services for 
construction, and the locations are well connected with formal and informal labour 
markets. In some cases, land may need to be connected with service lines of surrounding 
neighbourhoods, but this would take little effort. Given the scarcity of serviced land in 
cities, the existing private vacant land might also be used for mixed development, part of 
which can house the existing and displaced slum dwellers and part being used for private 
market housing, and possibly some can be used for businesses. 
Generally speaking, land is very limited in Bangladesh, particularly in cities like Dhaka 
and Chittagong, being largely owned by private individuals and public institutions. So 
relying on the public alone would not release enough land to build affordable housing for 
slum dwellers. Also, delivering land for such a purpose would involve the political 
economy. However, it could be argued that land can be directed to a purpose for overall 
social benefits. Even private slum land may be acquired for a legitimate public purpose 
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under planning and/or housing policies, subject to due process and to some form of 
compensation code.36 
8.5.2.2 Sources of finance 
Once the major question about land for affordable housing is solved, if ever, then finance 
is another critical factor in slum redevelopment. This issue may be solved in the market 
process; however, non-market aspects may be critical for the financial viability of the 
market process and substantial supply of affordable housing for the landless poor. 
Government budgetary allocation may be an initial source of finance for the construction 
of buildings. Other sources, as discussed above, such as a secondary money market and 
the mobilisation of local resources, may be considered along with this one to address the 
issue of small-parcel land development.37 Other sources may include international donor 
agencies such as the WB, DfID and ADB, who work in livelihood development of the 
marginal poor in Bangladesh and elsewhere.  Loans from those bodies may be enabled 
by low interest rates and longer recovery periods.  
8.5.2.3 Requirement of intermediary 
This kind of redevelopment might require a particular kind of intermediary who could 
negotiate with different stakeholders to release land, channel finance, recover costs and 
maintain housing stock. There are a number of viability issues including efficient 
(compact) use of land, production of low-cost housing, maintenance, an easy and long-
term repayment plan and distribution of housing among the targeted poor. Such services 
would require a trusted body which can mediate and facilitate redevelopment. 
Any past intervention in the allocation of public land and housing has been fraught with 
political and administrative interference which have largely been counterproductive. The 
target poor have rarely, if ever, been the ultimate beneficiaries. It could be argued that in 
the absence of involvement of the poor themselves, the distribution process may be 
                                                 
36 The ‘slums’ should not be eligible for market value compensation when compulsorily purchased, whereas 
more generally government land acquisition needs to be at market value. The ‘inclusionary housing through 
planning’ approach relies on trying to prevent or divert the land value uplift which occurs when planning 
permission (or up-zoning) is granted, so as to use it to offset the cost of affordable housing, and effectively 
to subsidise it. This capturing of development gain is also important in helping to pay for infrastructure 
improvement Gurran N and Bramley G. (2016) Urban Planning and the Housing Market: International 
Perspectives for Policy and Practice: Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
37The UK’s concept of housing associations, which are non-profit and subject to regulation, may be an 
option.They can operate and obtain long-term loan finance, and sometimes bond finance, at rates not much 
above those of government securities. 
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fraught with corruption. That implies that the allocation of subsidised housing would 
require the involvement of an intermediary, and residents should be involved in the 
decision-making process, drawing on the social capital in which the role of an 
intermediary is crucial. 
Moreover, in the absence of an intermediary, even fair allocation of land to the slum 
dwellers may not supply the desired decent housing to the market. Any arrangement to 
lease subsidised land to the poor (e.g. in Bawnia or Dhaka), combined with a lack of 
access to finance, may discourage the efficient use of land. The allocation of ownership 
may help a few to achieve security of tenure, but would have little impact compared to 
the scale of need.  
The roles of the intermediary are crucial in generating finance, recovering costs, 
providing expert services in construction and maintaining a large housing stock. A long-
term repayment plan for finance and maintenance of stock would rely on the social capital 
of the slum dwellers. All of the arguments presented lead to the conclusion that there is a 
need to establish a non-profit intermediary who can be both effective and trusted to 
manage land allocation, finance, construction, and maintenance of affordable housing for 
the marginal poor in cities. 
8.5.2.4 Forms of tenure 
The form of tenure may be another issue in the provision of affordable housing for slum 
dwellers. Individual ownership may not be feasible; however, collective ownership might 
be economically viable, though subject to detailed conditions. Rental provision with 
necessary security of tenure may be more appropriate on the grounds that the ownership 
may not be financially viable and may raise hopes of someday becoming homeowners. 
Many of the poor cannot even pay for a minimally decent unit with shared toilets, showers 
and kitchens; subsidised rent may have to be considered in any financial recovery plan 
for slum redevelopment. In this process, the dwellers’ social capital might be useful when 
allocating rent subsidy, as the group can decide who should be eligible for rent subsidy 
(as often happens when disbursing microfinance, with members deciding whose need is 
most urgent). 
The provision of a housing allowance might be considered; this would have a significant 
impact in the redevelopment of slums in cities. Affordable housing policies entail the 
redevelopment of slums to ensure a continuous supply of housing to the urban poor.  A 
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not-for-profit intermediary, like the housing associations in the UK, based in the 
community and drawing on social capital, seems both appropriate and necessary to this 
process. Such a non-profit (but legally controlled) intermediary might be useful in 
managing rents and repayments, similarly to the way in which microfinance institutions 
work in Bangladesh. 
8.6 Theoretical derivation of affordable housing 
The conventional housing market, primarily comprised of housing units produced by 
developers, is largely concentrated at optimum prices to maximise profit. In the context 
of a developing country like Bangladesh, these prices interplay between market actors 
(developers) and the higher end of society, and are facilitated by efficient market 
behaviours. This forces housing prices well above the budgets of middle- and low-income 
groups.38 This market behaviour requires most urban residents to rent their homes; yet the 
urban poor may not be able to afford formal housing rents. In the absence of income or 
housing subsidies, the poor are likely to move to informal housing. Another issue worth 
noting is that the deficit in formal housing is excessively high, so the demand for 
affordable housing is also high. In this context, the housing market might be divided into 
two broad sub-markets on the basis of ownership and rental provision: the ownership 
market (denoted by D1 and S1, Figure 8.1(a)) and the rental market (denoted by D2, and 
S2S3, Figure 8.1(a)). Obviously, the rental market is much larger than the ownership 
market. Demand in the rental market is expected to be varied and to depend on various 
levels of affordability, and this would determine the quality of housing in the market (e.g. 
S2, S3, and so on). 
  
                                                 
38 (If the poor packed more than one household into a housing unit, they might be able to afford it, but this 
might infringe the regulations applied within the formal market, which are clearly not applied in slums.) 
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(a) Sub-market demands and supplies   (b) Limited-responsive supplies  
Figure 8.1: Housing markets and supply elasticity to demand 
 
Given housing market policy and infrastructures, demand for ownership D1 is expected 
to meet by the supply schedule S1 [figure 8.1(a)]. This ownership market may be elastic 
but constrained by market forces such as finance, serviced land, geographic location, etc. 
Therefore, only OQ1 quantity (quality) of housing units would determine the efficient 
market price at p1. This means that OQ1 quantity of housing units is produced against the 
total ownership demand of OQ1+OQ2+OQ3. With such a gap between demand and market 
supply, price p1 is likely to be speculative, which would have multiple effects on land 
values and interest rates. This means that if elasticity of supply is unresponsive to demand, 
competition among buyers would increase and prices would be pushed up. This would be 
followed by increases in land values (see Section 2.3.3) and interest rates on housing 
finance (both construction finance and mortgages). However, in the end, the market may 
be as efficient as predicted by economic theories.  
Since p1 is set at high prices, demand OQ2+OQ3 is ultimately ineffective in the home 
ownership market and shifting in the rental market. The concern is that if p1 is speculative, 
this would influence the rental market too, though not on the same scale. The rental 
submarkets are separated by various institutional constraints etc., so that units of housing 
are priced differently on either side of the submarket boundary. Suppose the rental 
housing supply OQ2 (in comparator and other areas) and OQ3 (in slum areas after 
redevelopment) are available at p2 and p3. The mainstream private (rental) demand (OQ2) 
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may achieve efficiency in the sense that there are many landlords and high demand. 
However, market weakness, involving inadequate finance and poor regulation leading to 
variations in quality etc., may undermine efficiency. Also, much of the demand may be 
ineffective, so shifting to the demand for OQ3. This rental demand is significantly large 
and ineffective; this can be resolved through the interventions discussed in the two cases 
above. The supply schedule S3 is largely low quality housing (identified by small units, 
shared facilities and/or by some other means), with demanding government interventions. 
OQ3 supply is made on nonprofit market ventures and assumed to be economically viable 
given the overall social benefits.  There is a finite amount of land and structures devoted 
to housing that are close to employment opportunities; this may continuously push prices 
up. 
In addition, population growth generates more demand, and the slow process of supply 
of housing lags behind. q1 (Figure 8.2(b)). Although market actors (suppliers) are 
supposed to predict the process of urban and economic growth and form expectations, the 
demand for housing is increasing in the absence of adequate land and capital. 
In principle, one way to control house prices increase (either of ownership or rental 
properties) is to increase supply. Such a market response is expected to satisfy demand in 
the market; however, it requires adequate supplies of land and capital. Service land 
occupied by informal housing in comparator and slum areas can partially meet the 
demand for land, while local (cooperative) and external funds (e.g. the secondary money 
market and international development agencies) can fill the gap in the capital. 
Market behaviour may be depicted by Figure 8.2(a), in which the horizontal axis 
represents the quantity of demand and the vertical axis represents the market price. D1 
and S1 represent initial demand and supply schedules in the market. Given the demand 
D1 and the supply S1, the initial market clearing price, p
*, is determined by Q*. However, 
once demand starts increasing, the price goes up to p1 in response to demand D2, until a 
new supply schedule is available in the market. This situation would arise from poor 
migrants in cities or simply because of the upward mobility of income and overall 
economic growth of the country. The latter reasons increase demand mainly for 
ownership and quality rental housing (q1 and q2, Figure 8.1(b)), whereas the former may 
increase demand largely for low quality rental housing for the poor. A short run 
adjustment would be to raise the supply schedule S1, which is inelastic and so rises 
steeply. A longer run adjustment is represented by S2, this is a shallower line joining p*q*   
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with p2 and a value of Q between Q* and Q**. Some economists claim that some US 
cities and regions offer infinitely elastic supply in the long run. However, a more realistic 
general case is that even long run elasticity is finite and not that high, particularly for 
housing with reasonable access to major urban amenities and employment (Malpezzi and 
Maclennan, 2001; Barker, March 2004; Bank, 1993). However, cyclical disturbances, 
some affecting price, some affecting supply and some affecting both, are expected. 
Expectations may not be in line with reality, and there is a risk of shock in the capital 
market (e.g. the 2008 banking crisis). Therefore a dynamic flow of equilibrium is 
associated with a growth trajectory, with cyclical disturbances around that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Long-term dynamic market equilibria 
 
The line S in figure 8.2(b) represents new housing added to existing stock, which is a 
function of price. This supply is highly inelastic in the short term and the price of a new 
lot is dependent on the supply of land and construction finance. It would also fail to 
estimate the current additional demand caused by the rebuilding of old stock. The 
additional supplies to the market meet less demand than estimated, so the market may not 
achieve equilibrium at p2. 
Suppose that p* is the market clearing price for the supply Q*, which is also the price for 
new supply q* to offset increased demand. This additional amount of housing stock offsets 
the depreciation of old housing units, as well as new demand added to the market (some 
types of housing depreciate faster than others). If demand shifted outward (in the absence 
of necessary supply), as shown by D2, this would destabilise the market price, and push 
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the price up (to p1). If the suppliers (e.g. non-profit intermediaries) moved forward to 
construct new housing and added to q2 quantity (which is greater than q
* to the market 
after a period), the new price would settle at p2 (with the supply schedule S2). This is 
higher than the initial price, p*, however it is still less than p1 that increased for shifting 
demand from D1 to D2.  
In the same way, house prices would continue to decrease until they reach efficient price 
p2 at quantity Q. The market always tries to hold the efficiency by varying supplies (Q
*, 
Q, and Q**) to offset additional demand. However, market actors (developers) try to 
achieve profits and avoid disaster (e.g. unsold stock in a slump). Whether the outcome is 
‘efficient’ is questionable. Here a distinction between rents and prices seems obvious. 
Generally prices are more volatile than rents, because they are asset prices which attract 
investors with prospects of future capital gains (or losses), as well as a steady income 
from rents (Bramley et al., 2005). This implies that the profit motives of suppliers would 
potentially undermine the low-quality housing demand of the rental market and move on 
to the buying and high-quality rental markets.  
 
8.7 Conclusion 
Given the growing trend of the urban poor and the scarcity of urban land, affordable 
housing policies would perhaps involve vertically extended buildings to maximise use of 
land. Condominium flats, with shared facilities such as kitchens, toilets and common 
spaces, may solve the problem of affordability. However, this would require releasing 
serviced land and available finance to initiate construction. Moreover, generating local 
resources, facilitating technical support for construction, and distribution and 
maintenance of housing would require nonprofit intermediaries. Such intermediaries 
could mobilise the social capital of trust and cooperation, which may establish financial 
viability and contribute to the success of the venture.  
Interventions in either small-scale land development or slum redevelopment may be 
enforced by zoning to include a proportion of affordable housing, as is the case in the UK 
under section 106 and with the USA’s inclusionary zoning. In addition, intervention 
would require planning regulations for the compulsory purchase of land which private 
owners are not developing, with compensation making due allowance for all obligations 
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and public infrastructure costs. Provision of peripheral land to house the poor might also 
be a part of a long-term strategy to secure affordable housing for the poor. 
The effectiveness of quasi-market interventions lie largely in the mobilisation of social 
capital to achieve efficiency as well as equity.  Non-market measures, such as collective 
efforts in affordable housing development, are crucial for small-parcel land pooling, 
allowing the generation of a collective local fund, the sharing of risks related to default 
repayment, the allocation of housing to the target poor and subsidies for those with the 
greatest need. All of these would require a depth of trust and cooperation within a group. 
The effort could extend to actual contribution of labour, as well as to deliberative and 
decision-making time. Thus, the concept of a housing association may be enable the 
mobilising of social capital and provide the expertise required by these approaches. Thus 
social capital might be an important instrument in the quasi-market process of creating a 
supply of affordable housing for the poor.  
In conclusion, the plight of the urban poor can be viewed as the consequence of market 
policy which has forced them to live in sub-standard housing conditions. Public 
interventions to create affordable housing might be part of correcting this, with 
consequences of greater social benefits reflecting the social aims of efficiency and equity.  
Efficiency is important to maintain quality of service at the lowest possible cost, and 
equity ensures optimal social benefits for those involved. Free (or subsidised) housing 
may involve some externalities that are seen in most cases of public good (Musgrave and 
Musgrave, 1989). Also, government financial constraints are a major concern. Overall 
social benefits are critical in maintaining social sustainability and economic prosperity. 
Therefore, conditional altruism and/or concern about social externalities are quite 
common, and underpin quite a lot of social policy. Specific merit good or conditional 
altruism arguments lead to specific subsidies for housing. An effective housing policy is 
one which can give more certainty to key actors in the market, for example through the 
use of guarantees, where the government may step in as a kind of insurer if things go 
wrong, but also by maintaining prudent stable monetary policies. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This study has tried to address the housing problem of the urban poor in Bangladesh, 
which is linked to low income and limited assets. It sees social capital, in the form of trust 
and cooperation among residents, as a key element in developing solutions to this and 
other problems facing the urban poor, and this has been the primary focus of the study. 
To better understand this, the study has analysed primary data collected from 1,800 
households across three cities in Bangladesh to explore the socioeconomic condition and 
social capital of the study population. A structural analysis of social capital suggests that 
the potential for cooperation with neighbours is particularly high among the urban poor, 
and hence some of the market and non-market housing problems constraining the 
affordable housing supply to the urban poor can potentially be reduced. The findings 
contribute to urban policy, partly by providing information related to this urban poverty 
to livelihood development. This chapter first highlights the major findings and their 
potential implications for the development of policy, with a particular focus on the 
implications for affordable housing for the urban poor in Bangladesh. The follow-up 
sections outline some of the study’s contributions to academic scholarship, while noting 
some of its limitations and suggesting avenues for future research. 
 
9.2 Major findings 
The study has tried to address the four research questions. The following findings 
contribute to the answers to those questions: 
9.2.1 Urban poverty inflicts social vulnerability on the urban poor in Bangladesh;  
9.2.2 A lack of social opportunities is challenging to the urban poor’s socioeconomic 
potential in a way that may affect their social capital;  
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9.2.3 Neighbours are the urban poor’s primary networks in their interdependent way of 
life;  
9.2.4 Trust varies across urban neighbourhoods;  
9.2.5 Individuals’ perception of cooperation depends on the broader social context; 
9.2.6 Some of the market and non-market problems in affordable housing supply could 
be mitigated by mobilising the social capital of the urban poor. 
9.2.1 Urban poverty inflicts social vulnerability (Chapter 4) 
The urban poor in Bangladesh have limited access to socioeconomic opportunities, and 
this inflicts persistent poverty and substandard living conditions on them. Such poverty 
concentrates the poor in informal housing settlements, largely in slums. Livelihood in 
informal settlements is accompanied by a certain level of social vulnerability, inflicted 
primarily by insecurity of tenure, substandard living conditions and disrespectful social 
attitudes; this vulnerability is higher in large cities, particularly in Dhaka, compared with 
the other cities of Bangladesh. These findings help to answer Research Question 1: How 
are Bangladesh’s urban poor placed within the socio-economic structure of cities?  
9.2.2. A lack of social opportunities challenges the urban poor’s socioeconomic 
potential (Appendix B) 
The available social opportunities and challenges may define the urban poor’s 
socioeconomic status. The findings imply that income threshold measures (income, 
education and employment) are weaker markers of social status compared to measures of 
the urban poor’s socioeconomic potential attributed to access to social opportunities. Thus 
income threshold measures may narrow down the implications for an understanding of 
social class and its relation to social capital. Together with income threshold measures, 
thee socioeconomic potential of given social opportunities and challenges could provide 
a better understanding of social class and social capital. These findings could answer part 
of Research Question 1: How is the socioeconomic condition of the urban poor linked to 
socioeconomic vulnerability? 
9.2.3 Neighbours are the urban poor’s primary social networks (Chapter 5) 
In the absence of social opportunities, poverty has restricted the scope for socialisation 
and social exchanges of the urban poor, leading to a potential negative impact on the 
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formation of social capital. Moreover, the urban poor’s social capital is disrupted by social 
vulnerability attributed to income and risks of eviction. Such disruption destroys the 
interdependent livelihoods of the urban poor and delays socioeconomic progress. 
Under socioeconomic constraints, neighbours represent the most common bonding 
networks of the urban poor in Bangladesh. Though networks of relatives are important, 
neighbours are the primary source of daily cooperation in most urban poor areas. 
Networks of neighbours are facilitated by frequent social interactions over the period of 
the life course, yielding trust and cooperation, so frequent interactions are important in 
generating social capital. However, a high volume of networks does not necessarily mean 
access to economic resources. A strong tie among neighbours can potentially offer both 
financial and non-financial cooperation; both are essential in urban informal livelihood. 
However, the urban poor in Bangladesh have limited access to bridging networks, and 
this limits their ability to access wider resources or exert influence. These findings help 
to answer Research Question 2: What is the nature and extent of social capital of the 
urban poor in Bangladesh? 
9.2.4 Trust varies across urban neighbourhoods (Chapter 6) 
Frequent interactions are important to building trust among bonding networks, 
particularly among neighbours. Individual trust also depends on the established social 
norms of the neighbourhood; levels of social trust vary across social boundaries. Within 
the established social norms, individual trust depends less on a household’s 
socioeconomic situation, but short lengths of residency in a neighbourhood potentially 
undermines trust among neighbours. Such transitory living limits social exchanges, 
creating looser social ties among neighbours. Individual trust is thus subject to a number 
of social factors, and its measurement requires consideration of the context in which an 
individual belongs. The findings partly answer research questions 2 and 3: How is 
individual trust contextualised within collective social norms? 
9.2.5 Individuals’ cooperation is formed within the broader social context of trust and 
socioeconomic factors (Chapter 7) 
The relationship between trust and cooperation varies widely across networks. However, 
these relationships among neighbours differ from other bonding networks. A level of 
implicit or explicit trust exists among the poor, suggesting an interdependent social 
culture which facilitates a higher level of actual or potential cooperation.. 
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Some of the socioeconomic characteristics of poor households are not directly linked 
either to individual trust or cooperation; rather, they are associated with group trust and 
cooperation which indirectly affect individual cooperation. Thus, the measurement of 
individuals cooperation is contingent on a broader social context, influenced by individual 
goals as well as the expectations of others. These findings help answer Research Question 
3: How is the individual outcome of social capital contextualised with collective 
socioeconomic attributes? 
9.2.6 Some of the market and non-market problems in affordable housing supply could 
be mitigated by mobilising social capital of the urban poor (Chapter 8) 
Affordable housing supply for the poor largely depends on access to cheap land and long-
term finance. An affordable housing supply potentially lies in a quasi-market context, in 
which some of the housing market and non-market challenges might be addressed by 
mobilising social capital. Housing market challenges such as access to construction and 
market interest rates, and risks of repayment, might be overcome by setting up specialised 
institutional structures to generate finance and long-term recovery. Cooperative efforts of 
the beneficiaries could make such programmes financially viable.  Non-market 
challenges, such as small-parcel land pooling, the allocation of housing to the targeted 
poor, and making the housing market responsive to a particular need, could be addressed 
by the involvement of the beneficiaries. However, the effectiveness of the institutional 
structure relies partly on the mobilisation of social capital, which suggests the need for a 
non-profit intermediary. Such an intermediary could provide support in dealing with these 
challenges.  
Interventions (e.g. vertically extended buildings) for the efficient use of scarce land 
require large-scale investment, in which an intermediary might be useful in negotiating 
finance from formal financial institutions or in generating capital from the secondary 
money market. The role of the intermediary is also critical to release small-parcel serviced 
land and to mobilise local savings for the construction of housing.  
Long-term strategies for a continuous supply of affordable housing to the poor may 
include providing the poor with peripheral land. Moreover, interventions could be 
enforced along with planning regulations for the compulsory purchase of undeveloped 
private land.  These findings could answer Research Question 4: How could social capital 
address some of the market and non-market barriers to ‘affordable housing’ supply to 
the urban poor?  
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9.3 Implications for urban policy 
Urban policy has always focused on financial or human capital as a strategy for reducing 
poverty, but perhaps this has under-emphasised the potential of the urban poor’s social 
capital. This study has considered whether this may be useful as a strategic instrument for 
sustainable urban poverty policies in Bangladesh.  
Socioeconomic homogeneity and close physical proximity among the urban poor 
facilitates social norms and a culture of livelihood dependency, which can reduce social 
vulnerabilities. Such homogeneity and dependency may suggest that the implications of 
social capital may require higher recognition in the design of interventions to improve the 
living conditions of this group.  However, such homogeneity has also somewhat excluded 
the urban poor in cities by restricting their bridging/linking networks. 
Living in a poor neighbourhood limits access to social opportunities and hold back 
socioeconomic prosperity. A sustainable poverty policy may address housing as a strategy 
to ensure social opportunities and reduce social vulnerabilities. 
Interventions to increase income are arguably less effective for sustainable poverty 
policies than those for neighbourhood development, since, as we have seen, individual 
outcomes are context-specific. This suggests intervention for a specific context as a 
potential approach to sustainable poverty reduction, for which social capital may have 
implications. 
Security of tenure might be one such contextual intervention to improve conditions for 
the urban poor, with potential to enhance social status and reduce social vulnerabilities. 
This could be meaningful for sustainable urban poverty reduction; it could protect the 
poor from unpredictable eviction, potentially facilitating higher social capital and greater 
access to economic resources. This could potentially reduce social costs and facilitate an 
efficient labour force to support the urban labour market. Contexual intervention could 
have implications for community strenthening as well as for social wellbeing, and so 
could provide an important direction for policy. 
 
9.4 Implications for the international development agencies 
The implications of social capital as a strategy for improving housing offer opportunities 
for large-scale investment in Bangladesh and elsewhere. The international development 
agencies working on behalf of the urban poor in developing countries, such as the World 
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Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the DFID, may therefore find this study 
interesting. 
 
9.5 Contribution to literature 
9.5.1 Contribution to development literature 
These findings might contribute to the existing literature on poverty, providing detailed 
practical information on the socioeconomic conditions and social vulnerability of the 
urban poor in Bangladesh. They may also contribute to the sociology literature on the 
implications of income threshold measures and socioeconomic potentials for the notion 
of social class. 
9.5.2 Contribution to social capital literature 
Findings from this study could contribute to the literature on social capital, as outlined 
below. 
It has explored the particular nature and extent of social capital of the urban poor within 
the specific context of Bangladesh. Increased interactions within social networks do 
facilitate a greater degree of trust. The positive relationships found between interactions 
and cooperation are grounded in theory, and thus these findings could help substantiate 
the theoretical propositions on social capital. However, the weak relationship between 
network size and the outcomes of social capital might narrow down the context of 
theoretical proposition concerning social capital. 
The socioeconomic and cultural homogeneity of a group could lead to social cooperation 
and social capital. A positive relationship between household incomes and cooperation 
also  underscores the link between social class and social capital that features in some of 
the literature. 
Social insecurity resulting from insecurity of tenure anda transient lifestyle could disrupt 
the formation of social capital. However, the formation of social capital is complex due 
to the interactive relationships among a number of socioeconomic factors. The economic 
outcomes of social capital are very contextualised, implying that various social factors 
are interrelated. Such structural relationships mean that a broader social context is 
required to analyse the different aspects of social capital. 
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9.5.3 Contribution to housing literature 
This study could contribute to the literature on housing, particularly within the context of 
countries similar to Bangladesh, in the following ways: 
Firstly, the quasi-market approach to housing problems is new in Bangladesh to some 
extent, but it could prove economically feasible in dealing with the urban poor’s housing 
problems. Secondly, the implications of social capital in addressing some of the market 
and non-market challenges in the housing sector in Bangladesh, and potentially in other 
developing countries, might contribute to the housing literature by linking together the 
pure-market and non-market approaches to affordable housing supply.  
 
9.6 Contribution to methodology 
The methodological approach used in this study to explore findings might contribute in 
at least two ways:  
Firstly, the study has developed a measurement survey for social capital within the 
context of a developing country’s urban poor. A comprehensive list of variables was 
adopted in this study based on theoretical propositions that could reflect different aspects 
of social capital within the context of the urban poor in developing countries.  
Secondly, the study has tested some approaches to modelling relationships in quite a 
challenging context. It has tested both linear and non-linear relationships across different 
aspects of social capital. The structural models which have been developed to test the 
theoretical propositions of social capital may contribute to the structural measurement of 
social capital. 
 
9.7 Contribution to a primary (household level) data set 
The study conducted face-to-face interviews with 1,800 households in 18 PSUs across 
three cities in Bangladesh. Information on the socioeconomic characteristics and different 
aspects of social capital of the study population has contributed to the analysis of real-
world experience. The data set offers baseline information for future studies of the social 
capital of the urban poor in Bangladesh. This primary data set could also be useful for the 
future study of urban poverty in Bangladesh. 
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9.8 Benefits to the study population  
This study does not present any direct benefits to the participants themselves. However, 
the information they provided has helped inform policy for urban poverty reduction, 
security of tenure and livelihood improvement that might ultimately benefit this group.  
 
9.9 Benefits to the research team 
The researchers have generated a nationally representative data set that helps to make 
reliable findings. Therefore this study offers more value than studies that lack primary-
level information. It is hoped that a PhD degree will be attained based on this study, and 
this is of value to the research team, particularly to the PhD student, whose academic 
career will be enhanced.  
 
9.10 Benefits to the Institute for Inclusive Finance and Development (InM) and 
Heriot-Watt University (HWU) 
Ownership of the data set collected by this study is retained by the InM and HWU.  InM 
is acknowledged as the funding authority for the data. This is a unique opportunity for the 
organisation to become known in the international academic arena for its diversified 
research interests. Research articles from this study are expected to mention HWU as the 
authors’ affiliated institution. Therefore, this study provides good value for money, for 
the InM’s investment in the field survey, and for HWU in exploring real-world problems. 
9.11 Limitations of this research 
The dimensions of social capital are wide. This study has a specific focus on the micro-
level cognitive dimensions of social capital within the particular context of the urban poor 
in Bangladesh. It investigates the nature and extent of social capital with a focus on this 
particular group. However, the group is situated within a broader social structure. Thus, 
some of the findings resulting from the investigation of social capital may lack a 
necessary analogy with the overall social structure.  
Answers to questions about perceptions of the degree of trust and cooperation are 
obtained in an ordered scale. Social and individual psychological perspectives on a scale 
may vary across respondents, interviewers, neighbourhoods and cities. These problems 
may be reduced to some extent by increasing the sample size of the study population. 
This study is based on cross-sectional data obtained from 1,800 households. A larger 
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sample size might provide more stability of the parameters estimated, and could in turn 
provide higher reliability. 
The study does not investigate the causal relationship in theoretical propositions in a 
definitive way. More precisely, it cannot be used to analyse behaviour changes in 
response to changes in exogenous or intervening factors over a period of time, which 
would be the ideal context for causal modelling. Therefore, while the findings are 
indicative, they do not provide a basis for strong inferences about causality 
Because of the recursive nature of relationships across different aspects of social capital, 
identifying relationships between endogenous social capital outcomes and endogenous 
mediators affecting the outcomes is complex. This may potentially weaken the 
explanatory power of the parameters revealed in the estimations of models. However, the 
post-estimation analysis of the tests could increase the models’ suitability and 
justification. 
The study acknowledges multiple complex barriers to affordable housing for the urban 
poor in Bangladesh. However, it has addressed some of those in which social capital 
might have implications. Affordable housing policy requires an analysis of all aspects. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that although the survey has generated a rich dataset, many 
variables (that are directly or indirectly related to this study) collected from the study 
population have been left unanalysed because of time constraints and the need to focus 
on the core research questions. 
 
9.12 Directions for future research 
There is a substantial theoretical basis to argue for a causal relationship between social 
class and other aspects of social capital (social network, trust and cooperation). This study 
has attempted to explore some of those relationships, considering some socioeconomic 
variables that might indicate social class. However, a broader understanding of this 
particular group’s social class, with the social structure and its relationship with the 
manifestation and outcomes of social class, might provide a greater understanding of this 
relationship. Although there has already been a lot of social capital research in social 
science disciplines, this relationship is important, and a deeper understanding of social 
capital is warranted. Further studies may be conducted to explore the reliable variables 
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that might define social class and its causal effects on the manifestation and outcomes of 
social capital.  
A further survey on the same study population might help explore the causal relationship 
with various aspects of social capital. A structural approach to the analysis used to explore 
the contextual effects would require further development of the analytical framework to 
capture causality, leaving scope to develop the models further. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 
 
Institute of Microfinance (InM)    
E-4/B, Agargaon Administrative Area  
Sher-e- Bangla Nagar, Dhaka-1207, Bangladesh 
PABX: +88-02-8181066, Fax: +88-02-8152796  
www.inm.org.bd  
 
Potential of Social Capital of Urban Poor 
 
Dear Householder 
Researchers at Heriot Watt University, UK are carrying out this research in collaboration 
with Institute of Microfinance, Dhaka. This research is funded by both the institutions, and 
aims to find out the level and nature of social capital which might help improve housing of 
the urban poor. 
The questionnaire is prepared for interviewing the selected households living in urban poor 
clusters in Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna in Bangladesh. One representative (preferably 
household head) from each sample household would be taken for interview. 
Your house is located within a carefully selected sample cluster and your responses to the 
questions will be highly valued and are vitally important for this project. We would appreciate 
your time and effort to answering this questionnaire. 
We would like to ask you questions be relevant to this research. Your answers will be kept 
strictly confidential, private and anonymous. If you are unhappy answering any questions, 
please leave them blank.  
Thank you in advance for your help.  
 
 
JUNE-AUGUST, 2014 
    
 
 
 
 
Heriot Watt University 
Edinburgh EH14 4AS, UK 
Email: tb112@hw.ac.uk  
Contact: 01712 131 960 
www.hw.ac.uk 
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Respondent’ name:  Date:  
Community Name: District: 
Household Address: 
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Section 1: Socio-economic information  
[In the first section, I am now going to ask you a number of questions regarding your socio-economic condition. For each of the household members I will ask you 
questions on their gender, age, education and occupation.] 
 
A. Socio-demographic information 
 
Sl. 
No. 
Name of the household member Sex 
 
Age 
(years) 
 
Relationship 
with HHH 
Marital 
status  
Level of 
education 
Type of 
school 
(student) 
Primary 
occupation 
 
Nature of 
job 
Distance 
travelled 
for job 
Monthly 
Income(Tk.) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
1            
2            
3            
4            
5            
6            
           
Code 
Sex code: 1=Female, 2=Male, 3=Other 
Relationship code: 1=Household head (HHH), 2=Spouse of HHH, 3=Son, 4=Daughter, 5=Father, 6=Mother, 7=Others (please specify) 
Marital status: 1=Married, 2=Unmarried, 3=Widow, 4=Others (please specify) 
Education code: 1=No education, 2= primary (completed), 3=Secondary(completed), 4=Higher secondary(completed), 5= Bachelor or above(completed) 
School type: 1=Government, 2=NGO(National), 3=NGO(international), 4=Community school (manages and run by the community), 5=Others (please specify) 
Occupation code: 1=Jobless, 2 = House maid, 3= Rickshaw puller, 3 =Day labourer, 4 = Hawker, 5= Transport worker, 6= RMG worker, 7=professional, 8= Student, 9 = Small 
businessman (up to Tk. 100,000), 10 = Businessman, 11=Others (please specify) 
Job nature: 1=Full-time and permanent, 2= Full-time but temporary, 3= part-time, 4=Daily business, 5=Not applicable (for student) 
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B: Social identity  
[Here I will ask you certain question regarding your communal identity and housing condition.] 
 
1. How long are you living in this community (years)?  
2. Have you born in this community? 
Yes    No 
3. Do you feel that you are a member of this community?  
Yes    No   
4. What is the type of land on which you are living?    
     Public              Private 
5. What is your tenancy status in this house? [use Code]  
6. If tenant, how much is the house rent (BDT)? 
7. If tenant, whom do you pay rent? [use Code] 
8. How many rooms do you have in your house? 
9. How is the average size of room (sq. m)? 
10. If migrated, how long did you live in your previous community (year)? 
11. How many times have you migrated in last 20 years? 
12. What is your reason for migration (answer can be more than one? [use Code] 
13. What have you lost for being migrated? (Answer can be more than one) 
 Nothing=1  Social networks=2  Cooperation=3  Trust=4  Land=5   
 Property=6   Others (specify)=7       
 
14. Do you have National Identity card?   
Yes     No 
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Tenancy code: Rent collector code: 
1= Living free 1= None 
2= Living on own land 2= House owner 
3= Living on de-facto ownership agreement  
[i.e. public land leased from third party who has no legal 
ownership] 
4= living on agreement with government for a certain 
period 
3= Third party 
4= Other (please specify) 
5= Tenant (paying rent to owner)  
6= Other (please specify)  
Reasons for moving from previous place: 
1= Without (or unknown) reason  8= For water problem 
3= Evicted  9= For electricity problem 
4= Losing land by river erosion 10= Less income opportunity   
5= Higher rent 11= limited school facilities for the children 
6= Unfriendly neighbor 12= Encouraged by relatives and friend 
7= For gas problem 13= others (please specify) 
 
 
C. Household assets  
[Now, please provide in details of your total assets as listed below.] 
Sl. 
No. 
List of assets Amount 
/number 
Market value 
(Tk.) 
1 2 3 4 
1 Agricultural Land (decimal)   
2 Homestead Land (decimal)   
3 Rickshaw/Van   
4 Bicycle   
5 Machineries (Sewing/candle making/ plastic machine etc.)   
6 Furniture (Bed, Table, Chair, Almira, others)    
7 Television   
8 Computer   
9 Cell phone    
10 Jewelry    
11 Refrigerator   
12 Others (please specify)   
 
 
D. Monthly Expenditure of the Household 
[Now, please provide in details of your monthly expenditure as listed below.] 
Sl. 
no. 
Item Average  monthly 
expenditure (Tk.) 
1 2 3 
1 How much money do you spend on food?  
2 How much money do you spend for the house rent?  
3 How much money do you spend on your children’s education?  
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Sl. 
no. 
Item Average  monthly 
expenditure (Tk.) 
4 How much money do you spend for the electricity bill?  
5 How much money do you spend for the water bill?  
6 How much money do you spend for the gas bill?  
7 How much money do you spend for the transportation?  
8 How much money do you spend for the healthcare?  
9 How much money do you spend for mobile /communication?  
10 How much money do you spend for clothing?  
11 How much money do you spend for repaying loan?  
12 How much money do you spend for insurance?  
13 How much money do you spend for the incidental expenditure in last 
one year? 
 
14 Other expenditure (please specify)  
 
 
E. Financial debts and savings  
[Now, I am going to ask you questions regarding your financial debt and saving and insurance. 
Please provide in details as listed below.’ If you don’t have any debt, saving and insurance, you 
can leave it blank.] 
 
1. How much (total) loan do you owe?  
(i) Moneylender  
(ii) NGO/MFI (current)  
(iii) Relatives   
(iv) Bank  
(v) Total 
 
2. How much saving do you have?  
1. Cash  
2. NGO/MFI   
3. Bank  
4. Someety  
5. Investment (in business) 
6. Lent amount  
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Section 2: Social vulnerability 
A. Vulnerability in respect to income, healthcare, accommodation and social justice 
[Now I am going to ask you few questions regarding vulnerability in respect to income, 
healthcare, accommodation, and social justice. Please use the weight code at the bottom for 
each of the following question.] 
Possibility of sudden loss of income  
Possibility of eviction 
Possibility of flooding 
Possibility of fire hazard 
Possibility of house collapse for using weak building materials 
Possibility of being discriminated in social services (job, education, healthcare, court, public 
transport)  
Possibility of being accused for any blame for other’s misdeed  
Possibility of being harassed by others (police, community leader, political leader)  
Possibility of health damage because of job nature (physical labour, Non-physical labour, or 
both physical and non-physical labour)  
Potential health hazard from living environmental  
 
Weight: 
5 = Very high possibility 2= low possibility 
4 = High possibility 1= Very low possibility 
3= Moderate 0= Don’t know 
 
 
B. Vulnerability to use of or experience with certain local public services 
[I am now going to ask you about you or your family’s use of or experience with certain local 
public services over the last year.] 
Description Yes=1 
No=0 
 [Yes=1 No=0] 
If ‘yes’ did you get the 
service? 
 
If ‘no’, what 
was the 
reason?   
1 2 3 4 
1. Has any of your family members sought service from 
police in last one year? 
   
2. Has any of your family members sought service from 
health care center/hospital? 
   
3. Has any of your family members sought service from 
Court/justice? 
   
4. Has any of your family members sought any help from 
any other govt. service provider? 
   
 
Reason code:   
0= Don’t know 2= Did not listen to you 4= Others, (please specify) 
1= Asked for bribe 3= Middle man asked for money  
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C. Vulnerability to development participation 
Do you agree or disagree that people of your community or around have received or observed any 
improvement of the social services below in last 5 years? 
Healthcare 
Education/school 
Road 
Sanitation 
Electricity 
Gas 
Family planning 
Social safety allowance/cash benefit 
Legal support 
Awareness of civil right 
 
5 = Strongly agree 2= Disagree 
4 = Agree 1= Strongly disagree 
3= neither agree nor disagree 0= Don’t know 
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Section 3: Access to finance 
[Now I am going to ask you some questions regarding your access to finance in MFI and formal bank. If you have had any experience, you can leave it blank.] 
 
1. Are you a member of microfinance group?       Yes        No 
 (if answer is “No”, then switch to Section 4) 
2. How often (in a month) does the MFI official visit the borrowers?     
3. If you are a microcredit borrower, please answer how long you are involved with, the name of MFI, loan size and how often do the members meet together: 
Member 
ID  
Joining year in the 
first MFI  
No. of current 
involved MFI 
Current MFI 
Loan 1  Loan 2  
Name Guaranteed Loan 
amount  
Frequency of 
meeting [code] 
Name Guaranteed Loan 
amount 
Frequency of 
meeting[code] 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1         
2         
3         
4         
Frequency of meeting code: 
1=Daily 2=Weekly 3=Fortnightly 4=Monthly 5=Biannual 6=Annual 7=More than a year 
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4. Have you ever sought loan from bank? 
   Yes    No  
5. If ‘yes’, did you get loan? 
   Yes    No 
6. If you never approached, do you believe that bank would give you loan?   
Yes    No 
7. What are the constraints of getting bank loan you think?  
1= Mortgage required     2= Lack of relevant knowledge 
3= Lack of information      4= Lack of trust in Bank 
5= Complicated procedure    6= Others (please specify) 
 
Section 4: Social Capital  
A. Scope for socialisation and social interactions 
Scope for socialisation  
[I am going to ask you a few questions about local community life here in this neighbourhood 
[name of neighbourhood] 
1. How long (in years) have you been living in this community?  
2. Are you living in an extended joint family? (If HH are living with parents and brothers or relatives) 
     Yes    No 
3. Are you sharing the house with non-kin? 
     Yes    No 
4. How many families are sharing your house?  
5. How many people are living in this house?  
6. How many of your relatives (HHs) live in this community?   
 7. Do your neighbours invite you at special occasion (i.e. at marriage ceremony, Eid/Puja festival)? 
    Yes    No 
8. Where did you celebrate your Eid/Puja (festivities) in the last five years? 
Festival code: 0=nowhere, 1=within existing community, 2= with my parents’/relatives in village or 
other place, 3=go to relative’s place, 4= other (please specify) 
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Social interactions  
[I am now going to ask you about a number of social activities which you might do – in each case I will 
ask about how many different people or groups you see, how often and for how long.] 
Description Number  Frequency  Hour/s 
spent on 
each visit 
1 2 3 4 
1. How many of your family members visit 
mosque/mondir? 
   
2. How many neighbours’ houses do you visit?    
3. How many people do you interact with for your 
works? 
   
4. How frequent does social-gathering take place within 
the community? 
   
5. How frequent do you attend the social-gathering?    
6. How frequent do you attend the friends’ gathering?    
7. How frequent do you attend the group meeting?    
    
Frequency code: 0=none, 1=daily, 2=weekly, 3=monthly, 4=yearly, 5=biennial 
 
B. Social networks  
Bonding networks  
[I am now going to ask you about contacts you have with relatives, friends, neighbours and others 
[in this neighbourhood, City, Anywhere?]. Again we are interested in how many contacts you 
have, who often you are in contact with them, and whether they have helped you in any way.]  
Description Number of persons Frequency of 
contact in 
last one year 
Favour received 
in last one years 
Within  
community 
Outside 
1 2  3 4 
1. Do you keep contact with relatives?     
2. Do you keep contact with friends?     
3. Do you have contact with neighbours?     
4. Do you have contact with 
workmates/colleagues? 
    
5. Do you have contact with parents of kid’s 
friend? 
    
6. Do you have contact with community 
leaders? 
    
7. Do you have contact with others (please 
specify)? 
    
Help/Favour code: 
1= Helped financially 6= Helped healthcare support 
2= Helped settle dispute and live in this 
community 
7= Helped in negotiation for housing arrangement 
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3= Helped in trouble made by others 8= Helped in getting state services e.g. social safety 
support, police support  
4= Helped in negotiation for utility connection 9= Helped in other means (please specify) 
5= Helped get legal support  
Contact code:  
1=Daily, 2= Weekly, 3=Monthly, 4=Biannual, 5= Annual, 6=more than a year 
 
 
Bridging and linking networks 
[I am now going to ask you about contacts you or your family have with people involved in 
government, politics, business, or other organizations. Again we are interested in how many 
contacts you have, how often you are in contact with them, and whether they have helped you in 
any way.] 
Description Number 
of persons 
Frequency of 
contact in last 
one year 
Favour 
received in last 
one years  
1 2 3 4 
1. Do any of your family members have contact with any 
political parties? 
   
2. Do you have any relative having contact with local 
leader? 
   
3. Do any of your family members have contact with any 
professional people? 
   
4. Does any of your family members have contact with any 
people owning businesses? 
   
5. Does any of your family members has contact with utility 
service agency? 
   
6. Does any of your family members has contact with non-
govt. voluntary support agency? (legal, health, etc. support) 
   
7. Does any of your family members has contact with 
NGO/MFI? 
   
8. Does any of your family members has contact with city 
council? 
   
9. Does any of your family members have any contact with 
government agencies (police, court, railway, hospital, etc.)? 
   
 
C: Cultural capital  
Culture of participation in religion, politics, voluntary works and social club  
[I want to ask you now about whether you or your family members participate in the activities of 
any groups or institutions, for example religious, political, voluntary or social groups. Again, I am 
interested in how often you/they take part and any favours or benefits received in consequence.] 
Description Yes=1 
No=0 
Frequency 
[Code] 
1 2 3 
1. Did any of your family members attend any religious group meeting in last 
one year? 
  
2. Did any of your family members attend political demonstration in last one 
year? 
  
3. Did any member of your family members participate in voluntary works in last 
one year? 
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Description Yes=1 
No=0 
Frequency 
[Code] 
1 2 3 
4. Did any of your family members attend any social club meeting in last one 
year?? 
  
5. Did any of your family members attend any social rally (celebration of 
environment day, Independence day etc.)? 
  
Frequency code:  
1=Daily 2= Weekly 3=Monthly 
4=Biannual 5= Annual 6=more than a year 
 
D. Trust in people and organisations 
[I want to ask you few questions relevant to trust in person as well as organisation.] 
Trust in person 
1. Whom would you lend money if asked by the following person (of course, if you have money)? (Please 
rank according to priority)   
Relative Community leader  
Friend  Political leader  
Neighbor  NGO Official 
Colleague Religious leader 
Group member  Stranger  
 
2. Whom would you ask to keep an eye on your house while you are going away? (Please rank according 
to priority) 
Relative Community leader  
Friend  Political leader  
Neighbor  NGO Official 
Colleague Religious leader 
Group member  
 
 Stranger 
 
  
3. Whom could you ask for the help if in trouble? (Please rank according to priority) 
Relative Community leader  
Friend  Political leader  
Neighbor  NGO Official 
Colleague Religious leader 
Group member   Stranger 
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Trust in organisation  
[Please mark whether you agree or disagree with the following statement about the agencies.] 
4. Local government (e.g. ward council/city corporation, paurashava) provides services to the community 
as required.  
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
5. Law enforcing agency (police) provides necessary services when someone requires. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
6. Judiciary is fair to all people. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
7. Water supply authority would help get water connection or other services if someone asks for.  
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
8. Electricity supply authority would help get electricity connection or other services if someone asks for. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
9. Political parties are working for favouring the poor. 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
10. Local NGOs/MFIs working in the community are favoring the poor for their economic development   
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
11. International NGOs/MFIs working in the community are favoring the poor for their economic 
development.   
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
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E. Cooperation 
[I am going to ask you now some questions regarding financial and non-financial cooperation 
within your network.] 
 
Financial cooperation  
1. Did any collective financial cooperation take place in the community in last one year? 
     Yes    No    Don’t know 
2. If ‘yes’, please mention the purpose of this cooperation. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
3. If ‘yes’, did you take part in that collective cooperation? 
     Yes     No 
4. Did you receive any cooperation from anyone/group in borrowing money in last one year? 
     Yes    No 
5. Did you cooperate (lending money without interest) anyone in last one year? 
     Yes    No 
 
[If you have received or hoping to receive any financial cooperation from people around you in 
last one year, please tell me the amount of money you received and your feeling about the level 
of cooperation.] 
Description 
 
 
Answer 
Person Amount 
(Tk.) 
Level of 
cooperation 
1 2 3 4 
6. If you received any 
cooperation, who did cooperate? 
(i) Friend   
(ii) Relative   
(iii)  Neighbours   
(iv) Group member   
(v) Colleagues   
(vi) Parent of kid’s friend   
(vii) Community leader   
(viii) Others (please specify)   
7. Whom would you believe 
may cooperate at financial 
emergencies in future? 
(i) Friend   
(ii) Relative   
(iii) Neighbour   
(iv) Group member   
(v) Colleague   
(vi) Parent of kid’s friend   
(vii) Community leader   
(viii) Others (please specify)   
    
Cooperation level:  5=Very strong, 4=strong, 3=Moderate, 2=Weak, 1=Very weak, 0=non-cooperation 
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Non-financial cooperation 
‘Now I am going to ask you about non-financial cooperation within your networks.’ 
8. Did any collective non-financial cooperation take place in the community in last one year?   
   Yes    No 
    
9. If ‘yes’, please mention the purpose of this cooperation. 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
10. If ‘yes’, did you take part in that collective cooperation? 
   Yes    No 
11. What are the good things happened in this community in last one year? 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
11. Have you received any non-financial cooperation from anyone in last one year? 
     Yes    No 
12. Did you offer any non-financial cooperation to anyone in last one year? 
     Yes    No 
 
Description 
 
 
Answer 
Person Type of 
cooperation 
Level of 
cooperation 
1 2 3 4 
 
14. If you received any non-
financial cooperation in last one 
year, who did cooperate? 
(i) Friend   
(ii) Relative   
(iii) Neighbour   
(iv) Group member   
(v) Colleague   
(vi) Parent of kid’s friend   
(vii) Community leader   
(viii) Others (please specify)   
 
15. Whom would you believe 
may cooperate in future? 
(i) Friend     
(ii) Relative   
(iii) Neighbour   
(iv) Group member   
(v)  Colleague   
(vi) Parent of kid’s friend   
(vii) Community leader   
(viii) Others (please specify)   
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Cooperation type code: 
1= Borrowing household stuff 6= Support for filing a police case 
2= Introducing new work 7= Mediating dispute 
3= Saving children from potential harm 8= Housing upgrading/repair/building 
4= Providing information about support services 
(govt. social support program, legal support program, 
educational support program) 
9= Others (please specify) 
 
5= Taking someone in hospital  
Cooperation level:   
5=Very strong, 4=strong, 3=Moderate, 2=Weak, 1=Very weak, 0=non-cooperation 
 
 
Section 5: Scope for housing improvement/upgrading 
[This is the last question. Here, I would ask you few questions regarding housing problems you 
are experiencing, and whether there is any scope for improvement of housing as well as the 
living environment.] 
1. What are the problems you are experiencing living in this community? 
The house is not strong enough   Sharing of toilet 
Higher theft possibility Muddy living environment in the rainy season 
No formal electricity connection Lack of access road to house 
No formal water line connection Unhygienic latrine around 
No formal gas line connection Local mastan often creates problem 
No sewer connection Very noisy community 
Kitchen facility is not good Not feeling safe for uncertain accommodation 
No garbage disposal place Bad smell around 
Sharing of kitchen Others (please specify) 
 
2. Do you want to live in an improved housing like a flat with necessary housing facilities in a 
multistoried building?          
Yes    No 
3. For how long (years) do you like this flat to live? 
0=dint know 1=<20  2=21-40 3=41-60 4=61-80 5=81-100 6=>100 
 
4. Do you agree or disagree to live in a flat having common kitchen (say, for four families? 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
 
5. Do you agree or disagree to live in a flat having common toilet (say, for four families? 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
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6. Do you agree or disagree that sharing families should take care for these common facilities’ 
maintenances? 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree  
Have no 
idea about 
the agency 
7. Would you please say your preference of location for such flat?  
Existing community City’s periphery 
Around the existing community   Anywhere having job 
 
8. How much can you deposit to a reliable agency at the beginning for availing such a flat (Tk.)? 
 
 
 
9. Are you able to repay the rest of the cost for flat over a long period (for instance, 30 years)?  
     Yes    No 
10. Do you want to pay monthly installment for such flat more than what you are paying for your 
accommodation right now?    
     Yes    No 
11. Whom do you trust most as an intermediary organisation for undertaking the housing 
improvement project?   
Central government  agency    Local government   
Local NGO/MFIs       International NGOs  
Housing developer       Others (please specify) 
 
 
 
Signature of the interviewer:  
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Surrounding community facilities 
1. How many primary schools are in this community?  
Government  
Private 
2. How many high schools are in this community?       
Government  
Private 
3. How many playgrounds/open-spaces are within this community?  
4. How many mosques/mondirs are around this community?  
5. How far (m) is the nearest rail station? 
6. How far (m) is the nearest bus stoppage?  
7. How far (m) is the city center (CBD)? 
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Appendix B: Understanding socioeconomic vulnerabilities of the urban poor: A 
confirmatory factor analysis 
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Abstract  
This article explores the socio-economic opportunities and challenges of a group 
that might indicate the notion of social class. The Confirmatory Factor Analysis is 
employed in the primary data collected from 1,800 urban poor households across 
three cities in Bangladesh to explore whether those markers indicate the latent 
social class in the same way. The analysis reveals that income threshold measures 
(income, education, and employment) are weaker markers of social class than the 
measures of socio-economic potential facilitated by various social opportunities 
and challenges. Such finding could imply that only income threshold measures 
may narrow down the notion of social class. Thus, along with income threshold 
measures, social opportunities, and challenges might be considered as the rational 
markers of social class. However, such perspective may vary in a greater flexibility 
between groups. 
Keywords: Social class; households’ characteristics; social opportunities and 
challenges; urban poor; Bangladesh; developing countries 
 
1. Introduction 
Shared socio-economic potentials and vulnerabilities defining norms of social behaviour 
are considered in line with the understanding of the concept of ‘social class’. When it is 
discussed with the example of the black American working class or white middleclass, it 
means that social class is rooted in ethnicity and a particular economic threshold 
(DiMaggio, 1997; Bourdieu, 1986; Bernstein, 2002; Gates, 1981). It implies social and 
economic thresholds that dictate socio-behavioural differences are the way social class is 
understood (Hall, 2008; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Fiske and Markus, 2012). Thus, the 
socio-economic context is important for understanding social outcomes - social relations, 
trust and co-operation (López-Calva and Ortiz-Juarez, 2014). This article discusses social 
and economic opportunities and constraints that may constitute social class, to understand 
differential social outcomes. 
The concept of ‘social class’ has been largely considered to be a basis for analysing social 
capital (Granovetter, 2005; Bourdieu, 1986). It comes in such a way that social capital 
depends on the extensity of social relations that are built on social relation within the 
social boundary. Such boundary define social ties (often referred to as social networks) 
within a group to facilitate access to and mobilisation of economic resources that enhance  
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social status (Lin, 1999; Granovetter, 2005). It assumes that social interactions largely 
take place within the same social boundaries hence, the networks developed are specific 
to a particular social group (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 2001). The underlying association 
between the extent of social networks and social class is therefore significant in 
understanding social behaviours. 
Theories on social class propose several elements to socio-economic position 
including income, education and employment (Lin, 1999; Bradley and Corwyn, 2002; 
Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004; Barber, 1968; Haug and Sussman, 1971). Economic 
thresholds may explicitly indicate the notion of a particular social class. However, those 
factors are influenced by many social variables that are deeply rooted in society’s social 
and cultural norms (Granovetter, 1985).  
Social class is variously defined as a difference in preferred lifestyle, social class as a 
‘life condition’ (based on wealth) and ‘social status’ (based on control over wealth) 
(Sorenson, 2000; Hollingshead, Fall 2011). The former seems simpler to analyse 
empirically, however, it rather narrows the notion of social class (Hollingshead, Fall 
2011). The latter is complex and requires composite criteria to contexualise the former. 
Economic factors might largely contribute to the observed construct of social class; 
however, the associated factors of ‘social status’ arguably facilitate ‘life condition’. Those 
underlying factors of ‘exploitation’ that generate social ‘opportunities’ and ‘constraints’ 
thus perhaps give a broader perspective on the notion of social class. This is because a 
specific set of social opportunities (e.g. low educational opportunities) and challenges 
(e.g. risk of eviction from one’s land) can be available to an identical social group, and 
varies across social class (Lareau, 1987). Thus, a composite of several indicators (life 
condition and social status) might be advantageous in giving more information and 
greater flexibility (Liberatos et al., 1988; Campbell and Parker, 1983) although, such an 
initiative might obscure an important difference in the relationship between social class 
and its indicators (Ostfeld and Eaker, 1985). 
Though exact delineation between two (immediate) social classes may not be observed, 
however, different access to desired goods and services depends on social opportunities 
and challenges. Poor access to income or education of the poor are just two of many such 
contextual factors that might help to differentiate between groups. It could be argued that 
income, assets, employment and education are the resources that provide ‘life condition’ 
and so largely provide a basis for understanding social class; however, a  
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composite (set of) factors of ‘life condition’ and ‘social status’ (social opportunities 
and challenges) might provide a comprehensive expression of the construct of social 
class.  
In this paper, the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)1 is employed to validate the 
indicators used to construct ‘latent’ variable, social class. The empirical test within the 
context of the urban poor in Bangladesh may add insight to the existing scholarship on 
understanding social class. The organisation of the paper is as follows:  
 Section 2 briefly discusses the context of the urban poor.  
 Section 3 discusses details of the empirical test procedure.  
 Section 4 discusses the results followed by a discussion of the implications in 
Section 5.  
 Finally, a conclusion draws on the analysis.  
2. The context  
Social structure as imagined by the sociologists resembles the pyramidal shape as shown 
by the bold lines (see Lin, 2001; Murdock, 1949). According to this construct, a few 
people are at the top while a large mass of the population is at the bottom. Such a social 
structure perhaps resembles western societies, but hardly represents the societies in 
Bangladesh accurately, particularly in urban areas (BBS, 2010c). A shadow pyramid 
perhaps exists, in which the population declines as social classes move downward. It 
means a portion of the urban population lives at the bottom, numerically similar to the 
highest class in the social structure (Bashar and Rashid, 2012).  
Upper class  
 
 
                      Lowest class 
 
                                                 
1 CFA is a kind of principal factor analysis (PFA), but it generates factor score rather than mean score. Each 
indicator simultaneously determines the ‘latent factor’ with a comparative factor loading. The relationship 
which is not accounted in the model is identified as an error.  
B1 
B2 
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Figure-5.2.1: Presumptive social hierarchy 
 
Urban populations are largely middle class, however, socio-economic change which 
facilitates social mobility reshapes social structure over time (Goldthorpe, 1985).  
Since the data was collected primarily from poor urban households, the context of the 
analysis perhaps represents mainly the lowest tiers in the composite structure of 
Bangladeshi urban social classes. Compared to other groups, these study groups have 
lower levels of education, occupation and income. According to the survey conducted for 
this study in 2014, approximately 70% of the heads of household of the urban poor sample 
had no education and, further, 20% were only educated to primary level. While the level 
of education in the ‘comparator’ sample is higher, only up to 15% (depending on the 
economic prominence of each city) of the household heads in the group had  a university 
education. Consequently, the nature of occupations is mainly manual—rickshaw pulling, 
day labouring or garment work, for example - jobs which are considered to be low social 
status. Moreover, the average incomes (monthly) of the households of both groups are 
low and vary between BDT 9,332 (=£ 92) — 11,077 (=£ 108) and 15,119 (=£ 148) — 
16816 (=£ 165), respectively. Some 40% of household income at national (urban) level 
(according to the National Income and Expenditure Survey 2010) is below the average of 
the study population (BBS, 2010a), however the statistics are not exactly comparable 
since: (i) the survey year of the study is different from that of the national survey, and (ii) 
the survey for this study was conducted only in major towns (two metropolitan and one 
major town), where the household income is presumably much higher than in most of the 
other towns.  
Social opportunities between groups presumably differ in the ways in which social life 
facilitates social interactions and networks, and in the underlying factors behind economic 
outcomes. The social infrastructures for spontaneous socialisation and social exchanges 
that facilitate different access to information and mobilisation of social resources,  
contribute to differences in social norms and culture (Fukuyama, 1996; Elster, 2000). 
Such infrastructures provide shared perspectives and views (through frequent interactions 
that build social relations) within a class boundary and yield a similar pattern of social 
achievement. Different access to social opportunities leads to inequality in terms of social 
opportunities (Drèze and Sen, 1999). Such inequalities contribute extensively to divisions 
between social classes, and are seen in different socio-economic outcomes: in income,  
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assets, vulnerability, and potential. Those outcomes influence social behaviours—trust 
and co-operation—that are specific to a particular social group. Having the least access 
to social opportunities thus leads the urban poor to acquiring a minimal income and 
education that in turn lead to greater social vulnerabilities (Sobhan, 2010).  
3. Analytical framework 
We explore each of the above factors’ contribution to latent1 social class concept. A latent 
variable is a non-deterministic function of observed variables (Bollen, 2002). If a factor 
retains reasonable explanatory power, it is considered to be a marker2 of social class, 
otherwise, is dropped from the latent ‘social class’ model. (However, the factor might still 
be a valid independent variable for the overall model, or part of another latent concept 
that is not the same as social class). It is worth noting again here that it is desirable that 
the factors defining the latent concept are expected to be uni-dimensional that the 
indicators attributed to the latent are expected to have a minimum level of correlation that 
explains a reasonable relationship between the indicators and latent. We employ 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to test this system of equations. 
CFA is a type of principal factor analysis which generates factor score rather than mean 
score of the indicators.  Factor loadings of indicators are at the same time determined by 
their relative significance to the latent variable. CFA does more than Principal 
Component Factor Analysis. It allows each item to have its own unique variance. That 
means each indicator variable has a corresponding error term, ε. The error terms enable 
the variances in responses that are unique to the item and do not reflect the shared 
variance. The latent variable is shared by the indicators, and the ε’s make each item 
unique. The necessary assumption is that ε’s are normally distributed and uncorrelated. 
Based on this assumption, the construct of social class is shown below: 
                                                 
1 Bentler PM. (1982) Linear systems with multiple levels and types of latent variables In: KG J¨oreskog 
and Wold H (eds) Systems Under Indirect Observation. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 101–130. defines a 
latent variable as follows: “A variable in a linear structural equation system is a latent variable if the 
equations cannot be manipulated so as to express the variable as a function of manifest variables only.” 
2 This is a kind of implied causality running from variables to latent function. However conceptually, it 
may be the other way round, the latent function (Class) is the true cause and the associated variable is more, 
or as much, a consequence as cause; that is why we suggest the term ‘marker’. 
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The latent variable social class encompasses nine indicators shown in the schematic 
diagram. The direction of arrows implies how social class yields observed indicators. That 
is to say that the way households responded to each of nine indicators depended on their 
social class. Alternatively, all indicators imply the one-dimensional social class.    
The covariances of indicators are summarised by the latent variable and the unique 
variance of indicators. By isolating shared variances of indicators from their unique 
variance, we obtained better estimates for social class. Using these assumptions, we ran 
maximum log-likelihood estimations in Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). The 
estimation software STATA has performed the maximum log-likelihood estimation on a 
total of 1724 observations. The number of missing observations is 76. The estimation 
uses list-wise deletion of any observations if none of the responses was recorded. We 
hypothesise on the construct of social class that income threshold measures (income, 
assets and education of the head) are better indicators of social class than the proxies for 
social opportunities (potential and risks). Before beginning the statistical exploration, we 
presented a brief discussion on the social structure of cities in Bangladesh, to help 
understand the degree of appropriateness of the findings.  
 
4. Exploring socioeconomic thresholds and social vulnerabilities 
Sclass
r_victim
1
p_socdev
2
sort_assets
3
sort_income
4
formal_edu1
5
r_incomeloss
6
r_eviction
7
p_edu
8
p_ecodev
9
Figure 5.2: Hypothetical construct of Social Class of the urban poor
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As explained above, a set of socio-economic opportunities and vulnerabilities are being 
used as the markers of social class1. The following table lists the summary descriptives 
(including variable name, number of observations, unique, minimum and maximum 
value, and label) of nine indicators. The indicators are assumed to have underlying 
association with the latent (social class) factor. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
Variable      Obs   Unique    Mean  Min  Max  Label 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
sort_assets   1778      6     3.17    1    6  sorted hh assets 
sort_income   1797      6     3.55    1    6  sorted income 
formal_edu1   1790      5     4.22    1    5  formal education of the household head 
r_incomeloss  1779      6     3.28    1    6  risks of sudden income loss 
r_eviction    1783      6     3.14    1    6  risks of being evicted from land 
r_victim      1773      6     2.64    1    6  risks of victim in public place 
p_edu         1777      6     3.19    1    6  potential of edu attainment by the children 
p_ecodev      1782      6     3.32    1    6  potential of economic development 
p_socdev      1775      6     3.32    1    6  potential of social development 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
The responses are on a 6-point Likert scale. [The responses on education of the 
household-head are on a 5-point scale.] The higher value represents the lower level of 
socioeconomic vulnerabilities or, in other words, a higher social class. Before estimating 
the relationship between indicators and latent variable, we run factorisation that gives a 
comparative factor values (Eigen value). It helps understand the possible ways of 
associating indicators with its latent.   
 
Factor analysis/correlation                    Number of obs    =     1705 
    Method: principal-component factors            Retained factors =        2 
    Rotation: (unrotated)                          Number of params =       17 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |   Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      4.12535      2.92089            0.4584       0.4584 
        Factor2  |      1.20445      0.38545            0.1338       0.5922 
        Factor3  |      0.81900      0.04888            0.0910       0.6832 
        Factor4  |      0.77012      0.13266            0.0856       0.7688 
        Factor5  |      0.63747      0.05501            0.0708       0.8396 
        Factor6  |      0.58246      0.06721            0.0647       0.9043 
        Factor7  |      0.51525      0.29767            0.0573       0.9616 
        Factor8  |      0.21758      0.08927            0.0242       0.9857 
        Factor9  |      0.12831            .            0.0143       1.0000 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(36) = 6957.78 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
                                                 
1 There is an issue here that bundling variables together in a scale is implying that class is just 
something more or less of the variables, whereas the concept of class may be interpreted in terms 
of discrete groups, which are different, but not necessarily ‘more’ or less than each other, or not 
by a known quantum (e.g. occupations, or caste). 
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Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+--------------------+-------------- 
     sort_assets |   0.5830    0.5532 |      0.3541   
     sort_income |   0.4759    0.4002 |      0.6133   
     formal_edu1 |   0.4960    0.5136 |      0.4902   
    r_incomeloss |   0.6215   -0.3344 |      0.5019   
      r_eviction |   0.6625   -0.1123 |      0.5485   
        r_victim |   0.4375   -0.5672 |      0.4868   
           p_edu |   0.8443   -0.0395 |      0.2855   
        p_ecodev |   0.8814   -0.0984 |      0.2135   
        p_socdev |   0.8980   -0.1305 |      0.1765   
    ------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
The results from factorisation indicate that the first factor yields better explanatory power 
than the second factor, with an Eigen value of 4.13. That implies 41% of total variances 
over all nine indicators is explained by the first factor. Generally, an Eigen value of 1.0 
or greater is recommended (Acock, 2013). The Eigen value of the second factor is just 
above the cut-off line 1.0. Under such ground, the indicators in Factor1 explains the model 
better than Factor 2.  
The loadings of the indicators explain how social class accounts for the responses to each 
of the nine indicators. According to the estimates, nine indicators in Factor 1 have 
loadings between .44 and .90 that are higher than the recommended cut-off value off .40, 
while a cut-off value .30 is also recommended (Costello and Osborne, 2005). The loading 
on ‘risks of harassment’ has the lowest value, however, this value is still higher than the 
recommended value. That means a significant association of that variable is accounted 
for by social class. All other indicators have higher values than ‘risk of harassment’ and 
can be explained similarly. Therefore, a higher Eigen value of Factor 1 and high factor 
loadings allow us to consider all indicators in the system. Moreover, dropping an indicator 
from the system provides little difference to the estimates, rather it restricts flexibility by 
way of limiting the association of each indicator with its latent.  
The ‘uniqueness’ in last column represents the error variance of each indicator. For 
instance, 61% of the variances of ‘household income’ are not accounted for by the 
solution of Factor 1, suggesting that there is a substantial variance in income which is 
random/contingent and not so clearly indicative of social class as other factors. Similarly, 
17% of the variances of ‘social development’ indicator are not accounted for by the 
solution.  
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Principal Component Factor analysis assumes that these values of uniqueness are close 
to 0. However, the alternative method for performing exploratory factor analysis, such as 
the  default principal factor method, does have flexibility in such assumption, yet 
produces similar results. The uniqueness score on ‘income’ is high, even when 
factorisation is run separately in ‘poor areas’ and ‘comparator areas’ samples. It might 
suggest that there is a case for including both class and income in the structural model, or 
class and the part of income which is not correlated. Nonetheless, the loadings on income, 
assets and education in Factor 2 are associated with the latent in a way which contrasts 
with the way other indicators do. It suggests that the way in which economic thresholds 
(life condition) account for social class might be different from the social opportunities 
(exploitation).    
4.1 Alpha reliability test 
The Alpha reliability test gives a score using the unstandardised variance and covariance. 
We estimate unstandardised results using unstandardised variables. The following table 
lists the various estimates that the test has produced.  
                          item-test  item-rest  interitem 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Item         |  Obs  Sign   corr.     corr.      cov.  alpha   Label 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
sort_assets  | 1778    +    0.598     0.462    .878   0.830   sorted hh assets 
sort_income  | 1797    +    0.519     0.386    .927   0.837   sorted income 
formal_edu1  | 1790    +    0.498     0.398    .964   0.834   forml education of hhh 
r_incomeloss | 1779    +    0.642     0.511    .848   0.824   risk of income loss 
r_eviction   | 1783    +    0.692     0.553    .797   0.821   risk of eviction  
r_victim     | 1773    +    0.480     0.344     .94   0.840   risk of being victim of 
harass. 
p_edu        | 1777    +    0.800     0.727    .790   0.800   potential of edu attain. 
p_ecodev     | 1782    +    0.840     0.783    .778   0.795   potential of econ. dev. 
p_socdev     | 1775    +    0.864     0.808    .745   0.789   potential of social dev.  
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Test scale   |                                 .852   0.8372   mean(unstandardized) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
The Alpha value is .84, which is quite satisfactory and substantially higher that the 
standard minimum value .70. That means the indicators pass the Alpha reliability test. 
Moreover, Alpha values are reduced substantially each time if any of the indicators is 
dropped from the model. It implies there is a rationale for thinking that each of the 
indicators accounts for social class. The summary of the model is presented below, based 
on nine indicators which account for social class: 
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------------------------------------------------------------- 
Class 
-------------------------------------------------------------  
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%     1.333333              1 
 5%     1.666667              1 
10%            2              1       Obs                1797 
25%     2.555556       1.111111       Sum of Wgt.        1797 
 
50%     3.222222                      Mean           3.319355 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      1.010462 
75%     4.111111       5.666667 
90%     4.777778       5.666667       Variance       1.021034 
95%            5       5.666667       Skewness       .1335625 
99%     5.444445       5.888889       Kurtosis       2.311987 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Based on 1797 observations, the results provide some critical values of standard deviation 
1.01 from the mean value, Skewness 0.13 and Kurtosis 2.31. The variance is presented 
graphically in the histogram diagram below.  
 
 
 
4.2. Generating factor scores  
We generated the social class scale based simply on the mean score of indicators. It  gives 
equal significance to all indicators. However, the items are not τ (“tau”) equivalent, 
because the indicators are different in importance. The indicators accounting for higher 
importance would have higher weight at time in generating the score. Thus factor score 
gives a better score since it is weighted on the salience of indicators. Factor scores are 
standardised, with 0.0 mean and 1.0 variance, and are presented in the table below. 
Figure-5.1: Normal fequency score for Factor1
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Scoring coefficients (method = regression) 
 
    ---------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2  
    -------------+-------------------- 
     sort_assets |  0.14133   0.45928  
     sort_income |  0.11536   0.33228  
     formal_edu1 |  0.12024   0.42641  
    r_incomeloss |  0.15066  -0.27766  
      r_eviction |  0.16060  -0.09321  
        r_victim |  0.10606  -0.47095  
           p_edu |  0.20467  -0.03281  
        p_ecodev |  0.21365  -0.08171  
        p_socdev |  0.21769  -0.10838  
    ---------------------------------- 
 
A total of 1705 observations in our study populations responded to all nine indicators in 
the model. The estimates show the factor coefficients which are similar to standardised β-
weights. The ‘potential for social development’ has a β-weight of 0.22, and ‘income’ has a β-
weight of 0.12. That means that ‘potential for social development’ accounts for approximately 
double loading compared to that of ‘income’. It makes sense because in unstandardised 
estimations, the loading on social development (0.90) is double that of income (0.48). That is 
why the factor score is more reliable than mean score.   
 
5. Results 
Taking only five iterations, STATA maximum likelihood estimators have maximised the 
functions. The estimation has reported three sections, labelled measurement, variance and 
covariance. The measurement provides estimates of the factor loadings and their standard 
errors and z-test for each estimate, along with the 95% confidence interval. The variance shows 
the margin of error for each of the indicators that has not been captured in the model. Equally, 
the covariance shows how one indicator is correlated with another. In unstandardised solutions, 
the reference indicator (‘potential of social development’) gets the model implied loading (1.0) 
to solve the log-likelihood estimation. In standardised solutions, the model generates separate 
loading for each of the indicators in the simultaneous function.1 A standardised composite 
solution for the total sample (‘poor areas’ and ‘comparators areas’ samples) ha been shown in 
the figures below on the model specified before. The standardised and unstandardised solutions 
                                                 
1 The standardised loadings are computed by multiplying the unstandardised coefficients by the model implied 
standard deviation of the markers divided by the standard deviation of social class. 
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According to the estimates, the standardised coefficient for social class->‘potential for 
social development’ is 0.93 (standard 𝛽-coefficient) and its standard error (𝜀𝑖) is 0.13, 
keeping all other indicators constant (ceteris paribus). This means that it is likely that the 
‘potential for social development’ is 0.93 standard deviation, higher if the latent predictor 
increases by one standard deviation. The estimates are significant at p<0.00 with a z-
statistic 239.19 for the solution. That means that the chances of obtaining the estimates 
are 95 out of 100, if sampling is drawn from the same study population. However, 
estimates vary little between the ‘poor areas’ and ‘comparator areas’ samples -.91 and 
.89, respectively. Similar loading can also be seen in social class->‘potential for economic 
development’— 𝛽-value is .93—however, unlike the ‘potential for social development’, 
the value is a little higher in the ‘comparator areas’ sample. Moreover, the estimate for 
the ‘potential for children’s education’ is also high, at .87, particularly in the ‘poor areas’ 
sample. 
𝛽-values for income, assets and ‘education of head of households’ is less than a half of 
socio-economic potential indicators. Income, assets and education of household head are 
likely to be .35, .45 and .36 standard deviations higher, for one standard deviation increase 
of latent predictor, ceteris paribus. However, the value for ‘household assets’ in the 
‘comparator areas’ is only one third of the value in ‘poor areas’, though it is the same for  
Sclass
1
r_victim
1.8
1 .87
p_socdev
2.1
2 .13
sort_assets
2
3 .8
sort_income
2.4
4 .88
formal_edu1
3.9
5 .87
r_incomeloss
2
6 .73
r_eviction
1.7
7 .69
p_edu
2.2
8 .27
p_ecodev
2.3
9 .14
.36
.23
.93 .45 .35
.19
.36
.3
.52 .56
.85 .93
Figure 5.3: Assumed construct of Social Class based on nine observed soci-economic variables
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 ‘income’ in both areas. Moreover, the estimate for the ‘education of household head’ is 
also less, particularly in the ‘comparator areas’. 
𝛽-values for three risk indicators in the model varies between .36 and .56, values for 
‘income loss’ and ‘eviction’ are substantially higher than that for ‘harassment’. However, 
large variation in values is evident between ‘poor areas’ and ‘comparator areas’. The 
values are less in the ‘poor areas’ sample, particularly for ‘eviction’ and ‘harassment’—
.37 and .24, respectively in ‘poor areas’ compared with .51 and .47 in ‘comparator areas’. 
Discussion on the goodness of fit has been presented in Appendix. 
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Table 1: Final results for CFA on social class (All loadings and covariances are significant at p< 0.001) 
  All  Sample Comparison 
 Unstand. Stand.  Unstand. Stand.  Unstand. Stand.  
Loading       
 p_socdev:   1.00 (fixed) 0.93 1.00(fixed) 0.91 1.00(fixed) 0.89 
sort_assets:  0.50 0.45 0.37 0.34 0.15 0.12 
sort_income:   0.35 0.35 0.21 0.22 0.32 0.23 
formal_edu1:   0.27 0.36 0.14 0.24 0.25 0.20 
r_incomeloss:   0.60 0.52 0.54 0.45 0.75 0.49 
r_eviction:   0.74 0.56 0.49 0.37 0.64 0.51 
r_victim:   0.36 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.63 0.47 
p_edu:   0.87 0.85 0.89 0.85 0.82 0.72 
p_ecodev:   0.91 0.93 0.93 0.91 1.03 0.92 
Variances       
error.  p_socdev 0.31 0.13 0.40 0.17 0.24 0.20 
error. sort_assets 2.06 0.80 2.07 0.88 1.50 0.98 
error. sort_income 1.88 0.88 1.74 0.95 1.90 0.95 
error. formal_edu1 1.01 0.87 0.57 0.94 1.52 0.96 
error. r_incomeloss 2.05 0.73 2.23 0.79 1.76 0.76 
error. r_eviction 2.51 0.69 2.85 0.86 1.18 0.74 
error. r_victim 1.82 0.87 2.05 0.94 1.35 0.77 
error. p_edu 0.59 0.27 0.59 0.28 0.59 0.47 
error. p_ecodev 0.29 0.14 0.31 0.15 0.18 0.14 
Social class 2.11 1.00 (fixed) 1.93 1.00(fixed) 0.98 1.00(fixed) 
Covariances        
e.sort_assets*e.sort_income 0.36 0.19 0.31 0.16 0.25 0.15 
e.sort_assets*e.formal_edu1 0.43 0.30 0.22 0.20  0.56 0.37 
e.r_incomeloss*e.r_victim 0.44 0.23 0.49 0.22 0.33 0.22 
N          1705         1053           649 
Model vs. saturated: Chi2(24)       239.19      183.71     174.98 
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5.1. Covariance of residuals 
The post-estimation suggests three covariances of the variances. These are covariances 
of variances between assets and income, assets and education, and the risks of income 
loss and harassment. Each of these covariances gives the model a better fit when it was 
taken individually. The covariance of the residuals of nine indicators also provides a 
notion of model structure, and is presented below. Covariances between two residuals are 
both positive and negative.  
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5.2 Goodness of fit 
We ran the post-estimation command that provides extended statistical information 
regarding the model’s exactness of fit. In the first section of the results, we have a 
𝝌 𝟐(chi − squared) of 239 with 24 degrees of freedom (at p=0.00). The 𝝌 𝟐 value 
compares the estimated model to a saturated model that has no degree of freedom. Log-
likelihood estimation produces the covariance matrix of nine indicators and picks the 
combination of parameter estimates that does the best job of reproducing the covariance 
matrix. There are 45 elements in the covariance matrix. For the unstandardised solution, 
the estimation requires eight factor loadings plus nine error variances plus three 
covariances, plus one variance of social class. A standardised solution requires nine factor 
loadings plus nine error variances and three covariances. Thus we have (45-21) =24 
degrees of freedom. In our chi-squared test, 𝝌 𝟐(24) = 239.19 at p = 0.00. 
The widely used measure of Comparative Fit Index (CFI) indicates whether the model 
perfectly reproduces the entire 45 pieces of information in the covariance matrix. In our 
model, CFI reports that the model performed an accuracy level 97% which is better than 
the baseline model that assumes no relationship among observed indicators. This  
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percentage exceeds the recommended cut-off value of 0.95. Therefore, the model has 
perfectly reproduced the entire covariance matrix.   
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) of approximation is also a measure of model fitness. 
It measures how much has error occurred for each degree of freedom. Our model reports 
the RMSE is 0.073 and at the 90% confidence interval ranges from 0.064 to 0.081, 
indicating that the model is a reasonable fit. For a good fit, the model would require an 
RMSE value equal or less than 0.05 at p < 0.001.  
Another index for measuring model fitness is the Standard Root Mean Squared Residual 
(SRMR). It measures how close the model comes, on average, to reproducing each 
correlation. Our estimation-produced SRMR is 0.034. It means that, on average, the 
estimation comes within 0.034 of reproducing each correlation among the nine indicators, 
whereas the recommended SRMR is 0.08. Given the average correlation, SRMR confirms 
an excellent fit. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
High values of coefficients are supposed to reflect the strong relationship between ‘social 
class’ and the ‘indicator’. In that sense, the relationship between socio-economic potential 
and social class is stronger than the measures of income threshold or risks. That means 
social class of the study population might be reflected in the social, economic and 
educational potential of the urban poor. The relationship between social class and the 
perception of socio-economic development potential, particularly in the fields of 
healthcare, living environment and education, is important. Such an explanation might be 
particularly appropriate when analysing social class among the urban poor in a context 
such as Bangladesh. 
The relationship between social class and income threshold measures is weaker in the 
study population, compared to measures of socio-economic potential. That means only 
income, assets, employment, or education might not indicate a complete notion of social 
class. Moreover, there are variations in the way measures of income threshold are 
reflected in social class in different contexts. However, the reflection of social class in 
household’s assets might differ across contexts, and might be a better indicator within the 
context of the urban poor, which might not be a better indicator in other contexts. Thus,  
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income might represent an important indicator for social class, but assets might also offer 
a notion of social class. Similarly, the nature of the household head’s employment and 
education could also have bearing on the notion of social class. 
The relationship between the measures of social risks (constraints) and social class seems 
significant. It is stronger than income threshold indicators. However, the proxies have 
weaker loading than those of socio-economic potential proxies, although the strong 
relationship might imply a rationale for considering such measures in order to understand 
social class. Such measures of risk are presumably linked with income threshold 
measures. A lack of social opportunities inflicting socio-economic risks and 
vulnerabilities is related to poor income, risk of eviction, discrimination and social 
harassment. Perhaps, linking these risks and vulnerabilities with social class is more or 
less explicit.   
In conclusion, it is tempting to state that, along with income threshold measures, social 
opportunities (facilitated by various socio-economic potentials and vulnerabilities) might 
be the rational indicators for analysing social class. This perhaps provides a broader 
perspective and greater flexibility in understanding a particular group’s social class 
structure. Social opportunities vary across social contexts and constraints that come from 
various sources, and potentially have implications for the notion of social class. 
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Appendix C: Chapter 6 
Table C.1: Trust in bonding networks regarding ‘lending money’  
Dependent variable: Degree of trust in financial lending (OLS estimation) 
Network Standardised Beta-coefficient  
Obs.^ 
 
Adj- R2 
 
RMSE 
Number 
of 
networks 
Freq. of 
contact 
Log- 
income 
Living 
period 
Relative All .02                                                                                        .11*** .97*** .16*** 1680 0.99 0.84 
Poor .01 .10*** .94*** .14*** 1021 0.99 0.76 
Comparator .06 .08 .88*** .15*** 655 0.99 0.90 
Friend  All -.04 -.22*** .55*** .08** 842 0.98 1.05 
Poor -.07 -.22*** .45*** .05 445 0.98 1.07 
Comparator .01 -.29*** .60*** .12** 394 0.98 0.96 
Neighbour All .01 .18*** .73*** .10*** 1592 0.99 0.91 
Poor .03 .18*** .65*** .03 957 0.99 0.91 
Comparator -.12** .20*** .76*** .16*** 631 0.99 0.87 
Co-worker .01 -.07 .44*** .08 486 0.98 1.05 
Community leader -.04 -.16 .37*** .29*** 98 0.96 0.99 
***99%levelof confidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence 
^ Number of responses on a particular network varies across the households. 
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Table C.2: Trust in bonding networks regarding ‘looking after house’ in absence  
Dependent variable: Degree of trust (OLS estimation)  
 
Network 
Standardised Beta-coefficient  
Obs. 
 
Adj- R2 
 
RMSE 
Number 
of 
network
s 
Freq. 
of 
contac
t 
Log- 
income 
Living 
period 
Relative All sample -.06* .01 .53*** -.01 1295 0.98 1.15 
Poor -.03 .01 .47*** -.01 799 0.98 1.14 
Comparator -.08 -.04 .55*** -.03 493 0.98 1.11 
Friend  All  -.04 -
.23*** 
.48*** .06 669 0.98 1.20 
Poor -.10* -
.21*** 
.38*** .05 367 0.98 1.31 
Comparator .05 -
.30*** 
.56*** .08 299 0.99 1.03 
Neighbour All sample .03 .11*** .9*** .16*** 1605 0.99 0.80 
Poor -.00 .11*** .78*** .07* 955 0.99 0.73 
Comparator -.00 .13** 1.0*** .24*** 646 0.99 0.75 
Co-worker                 -.06 -
.23*** 
.42*** .07 379 .98 1.10 
Community leader     .05 -.01 .24*** .23** 98^ .92 1.45 
***99%levelof confidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence 
 
  
                                                                          
 
Trust -267 
 
Table C.3: Trust in bonding network ‘in emergency helps’  
Dependent variable: Degree of trust (OLS estimation) 
 
Network 
Standardised Beta-coefficient  
Obs. 
 
Adj- 
R2 
 
RMS
E 
Num. 
of 
networ
ks 
Freq. 
of 
conta
ct 
Log- 
inco
me 
Livin
g 
period 
Relative All .03 .08** .80*** .11*** 1648 0.99 0.92 
Poor -.03 .10*** .78*** .12*** 1002 0.99 0.84 
Compara
tor 
.06 .00 .74*** .07 642 0.99 0.98 
Friend  All .00 -.25*** .56*** .03 826 0.99 0.99 
Poor -.04 -.34*** .47*** -.03 437 0.98 1.02 
Compara
tor 
.06 -.17*** .62*** .08 386 0.99 0.91 
Neighbour All .01 .15*** .61*** .10*** 1619 0.99 1.02 
Poor .03 .14*** .56*** .06 965 0.99 1.02 
Compara
tor 
-.10** .18*** .61*** .12** 650 0.99 0.99 
Co-worker  .03 -.10** .38*** .07 486 0.97 1.18 
Community 
leader 
 .15 -.03 .29*** .29*** 100 0.95 1.19 
***99%levelof confidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence 
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Table C.4: Trust in civic organisations 
Dependent variable: Degree of trust (OLS estimation, equation 6.1)  
 
Trust in 
Standardised Beta-coefficient  
Obs. 
 
Adj- R2 
 
RMSE Number 
of 
networks 
Freq. 
of 
conta
ct 
Log- 
incom
e 
Living 
period 
1.Local 
government 
All .00 -
.06** 
.19*** -
.10*** 
948 0.86 1.14 
Poor .18*** -
.08** 
.17*** -.08** 557 0.86 1.40 
Comparat
or 
-.06 -.01 .17*** -.07 387 0.87 1.47 
2.Police All -.04 .16**
* 
.12*** .05 949 0.88 1.46 
Poor .09** .15**
* 
.09*** .06 558 0.85 1.56 
Comparat
or 
-.12** .22**
* 
.13*** .08 387 0.92 1.27 
3.Law-
court/justice 
All -.03 .11**
* 
.12*** .00 949 0.85 1.57 
Poor .12*** .09** .10*** -.01 558 0.82 1.65 
Comparat
or 
-.11** .21**
* 
.12*** .09* 387 0.90 1.37 
4.Water supply 
authorities 
All -.06* -.02 .15*** .06* 950 0.84 1.64 
Poor -.01 -01 .11*** .10** 558 0.81 1.67 
Comparat
or 
-.11* .03 .16*** .05 388 0.89 1.52 
5.Electricity 
supply 
authorities 
All -.12*** -
.10**
* 
.24*** .04 950 0,92 1.34 
Poor -.14*** -
.10** 
.19*** .04 558 0.89 1.48 
Comparat
or 
-.19*** -.04 .30*** .06 388 0.96 1.04 
6. Political 
parties 
All -.02 -
.13**
* 
.19*** .01 950 0.85 1.36 
Poor .08* -
.15**
* 
.18*** .00 558 0.84 1.38 
Comparat
or 
-.05 -
.10** 
.17*** .04 388 0.86 1.31 
7.Local NGOs All .01 .08
* 
.18*** -.01 949 0.90 1.44 
Poor .06 .07* .18*** -.05 558 0.92 1.38 
Comparat
or 
.00 .07 .16*** .01 387 0.89 1.47 
8.International 
NGOs 
All .06* -
.06** 
.18*** -
.09*** 
949 0.84 1.74 
Poor .15*** -.07* .17*** -
.13*** 
558 0.86 1.69 
Comparat
or 
.05 -.09* .16*** -.06 387 0.83 1.72 
***99%levelof confidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence 
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Table C.5: Marginal coefficients (Trust in lending money) 
Variable Logit model marginal coefficient 
(dy/dx) (Equation 6.3) 
Probit model marginal coefficient 
(dy/dx) (Equation 6.3) 
level7 level8 level9 level1
0 
level7 level8 level9 level10 
Number of neighbours .00 .00 -.00 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 -.00 
Freq. of contact -
.00*** 
-
.04*** 
.01** .04*** -.01** -
.04*** 
.00** .04*** 
(Log) income .00 .01 -.00 -.01 .00 .01 -.00 -.01 
(Log) asset .00*** .02*** -.00** -
.02*** 
.00*** .02*** -.00** -
.02*** 
Living period .00 .00 -.00 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 -.00 
Risk of eviction -.00** -.01** .00* .01** -.00** -.01** .00 .01** 
Microfinance membership 
(yes=1; no=0) 
-.01** -.04** .00 .04** -.01** -.04** .00 .04** 
Community type 
(poor=1; comparator=0) 
.01*** .07*** -.01 -
.07*** 
.01*** .06*** -.01 -
.07*** 
Category of city 
(Dhaka-1; Chittagong=2; 
Kushtia=3) 
-.00** -.02** .00* .02** -.00** -.02** .00 .02** 
Probability .02 .19 .61 .18 .02 .19 .61 .18 
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Table C.6: Marginal coefficients (Trust in look after house) 
Variable Logit model marginal 
coefficient (dy/dx) (Equation 
6.3) 
Probit model marginal 
coefficient (dy/dx) (Equation 
6.2) 
level8 level9 level10 level8 level9 level10 
Number of neighbours .00 .00 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 
Freq. of contact .00 .00 -.00 .00 .00 -.00 
(Log) income .01 .02 -.00 .01 .02 -.03 
(Log) asset -.00 -.00 .00 -.00 -.00 .00 
Living period -.00 -.00 .00 -.00 -.00 .00 
Risk of eviction -.01*** -.02*** .03*** -.01*** -.02*** .03 
Microfinance membership 
(yes=1; no=0) 
.01 .02 -.02 .01 .02 -.03 
Community type 
(poor=1; comparator=0) 
.03*** .09*** -.13*** .04*** .08*** -.12*** 
Category of city 
(Dhaka-1; Chittagong=2; 
Kushtia=3) 
.01** .02** -.03** .01** .02** -.03** 
Probability .03 .11 .84 .03 .11 .84 
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Table C.7: Marginal coefficients (Trust for emergency help) 
Variable Logit model marginal coefficient 
(dy/dx) 
(Equation 6.3) 
Probit model marginal 
coefficient (dy/dx) 
(Equation 6.3) 
level7 level8 level9 level10 level7 level8 level9 level10 
Number of neighbours .00* .00* .00 -.00* .00 .00 .00 -.00 
Freq. of contact -.01** -.03** -.01* .04** -.01** -.02** -.00* .04 
(Log) income .00 .01 .00 -.02 .00 .01 .00 -.02 
(Log) asset .00** .01** .00** -.01** .00** .01** .00** -.01 
Living period .00 .01 .00 -.01 .00 .00 .00 -.01 
Risk of eviction -.00*** -
.01*** 
-
.00** 
.02*** -
.00*** 
-
.01*** 
-
.00** 
.02 
Microfinance membership 
(yes=1; no=0) 
-.00 -.01 -.00 .02 -.00 -.01 -.00 .02 
Community type 
(poor=1; comparator=0) 
.02*** .06*** .02** -
.09*** 
-
.02*** 
.05*** .01** -.09 
Category of city 
(Dhaka-1; Chittagong=2; 
Kushtia=3) 
.00 .00 .00 -.01 .00 .00 .00 -.00 
Probability .03 .17 .53 .26 .04 .17 .53 .26 
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Trust in Neighbours 
***Ordered Logit and Probit estimation 
. ** Dependent variable has 10 categories denoted 1---10(least trusted to highest trusted, 
however some of the categories are not responded) 
 
D.6.1. **trust in neighbours 'lending money', (s4_2) 
. *dependent variable 
. global ylist ftrust_nei 
. *explanatory variables 
. global xlist nneigh freq_nei logincom logasset liv_period r_eviction mfi_mem ctype city_cat 
 
. *Ordered logit model coefficients 
. ologit $ylist $xlist 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1608.4324   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1573.2414   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -1572.8927   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -1572.8925   
 
Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs   =       1545 
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      71.08 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -1572.8925                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0221 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  ftrust_nei |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      nneigh |  -.0107305   .0112602    -0.95   0.341    -.0328001    .0113392 
    freq_nei |   .2667786   .0867238     3.08   0.002     .0968032    .4367541 
    logincom |  -.0378565   .0985332    -0.38   0.701    -.2309781    .1552651 
    logasset |  -.1357723   .0283042    -4.80   0.000    -.1912475   -.0802971 
  liv_period |  -.0232196   .0360138    -0.64   0.519    -.0938054    .0473662 
  r_eviction |   .0693734   .0327765     2.12   0.034     .0051326    .1336142 
     mfi_mem |   .2689147   .1196136     2.25   0.025     .0344763     .503353 
       ctype |  -.4986058   .1367866    -3.65   0.000    -.7667027    -.230509 
    city_cat |   .1625309   .0664853     2.44   0.015     .0322221    .2928397 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -8.170108   1.190542                     -10.50353   -5.836689 
       /cut2 |  -5.094623   .9699272                     -6.995646   -3.193601 
       /cut3 |  -2.734795   .9576384                     -4.611732   -.8578585 
       /cut4 |   .1240558   .9545164                     -1.746762    1.994874 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Ordered logit marginal effects 
. mfx, predict (outcome (6)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==6) (predict, outcome (6)) 
         =  .00118867 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0000127      .00002    0.79   0.429  -.000019  .000044   5.82006 
freq_nei |  -.0003167      .00025   -1.29   0.197  -.000798  .000165   1.16764 
logincom |   .0000449      .00012    0.37   0.711  -.000193  .000282   9.34467 
logasset |   .0001612      .00012    1.36   0.173   -.00007  .000393   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |   .0000276      .00005    0.59   0.557  -.000064   .00012   3.50291 
r_evic~n |  -.0000824      .00007   -1.18   0.238  -.000219  .000054   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|   -.000305      .00025   -1.22   0.224  -.000796  .000187   .317799 
   ctype*|     .00057      .00043    1.33   0.183   -.00027   .00141   .596764 
city_cat |   -.000193      .00016   -1.23   0.219  -.000501  .000115   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==7) (predict, outcome (7)) 
         =  .02394123 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0002501      .00026    0.94   0.345  -.000269  .000769   5.82006 
freq_nei |  -.0062189      .00222   -2.81   0.005  -.010562 -.001876   1.16764 
logincom |   .0008825       .0023    0.38   0.701  -.003627  .005392   9.34467 
logasset |    .003165       .0008    3.98   0.000   .001606  .004724   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |   .0005413      .00084    0.64   0.521  -.001111  .002193   3.50291 
r_evic~n |  -.0016172       .0008   -2.03   0.043  -.003181 -.000053   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0059994       .0027   -2.22   0.026  -.011289  -.00071   .317799 
   ctype*|   .0112013      .00337    3.32   0.001   .004595  .017807   .596764 
city_cat |  -.0037888      .00164   -2.31   0.021  -.007008 -.000569   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (8)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==8) (predict, outcome (8)) 
         =  .18930151 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0015447      .00162    0.95   0.341  -.001633  .004722   5.82006 
freq_nei |  -.0384034      .01254   -3.06   0.002   -.06298 -.013827   1.16764 
logincom |   .0054495      .01419    0.38   0.701  -.022353  .033252   9.34467 
logasset |   .0195447      .00412    4.75   0.000   .011478  .027612   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |   .0033425      .00519    0.64   0.519  -.006822  .013507   3.50291 
r_evic~n |  -.0099865      .00473   -2.11   0.035  -.019261 -.000712   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|   -.037729      .01637   -2.30   0.021  -.069818  -.00564   .317799 
   ctype*|   .0699173      .01879    3.72   0.000   .033088  .106746   .596764 
city_cat |  -.0233967       .0096   -2.44   0.015  -.042213 -.004581   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (9)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==9) (predict, outcome (9)) 
         =   .6119841 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0002682       .0003   -0.90   0.370  -.000855  .000318   5.82006 
freq_nei |   .0066688      .00337    1.98   0.048   .000058   .01328   1.16764 
logincom |  -.0009463      .00249   -0.38   0.704  -.005829  .003936   9.34467 
logasset |   -.003394      .00149   -2.28   0.022  -.006305 -.000483   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |  -.0005804      .00093   -0.62   0.532  -.002401   .00124   3.50291 
r_evic~n |   .0017342      .00107    1.63   0.104  -.000357  .003826   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|   .0042035      .00269    1.56   0.118  -.001071  .009478   .317799 
   ctype*|  -.0078146      .00485   -1.61   0.107  -.017315  .001686   .596764 
city_cat |   .0040629       .0023    1.77   0.077  -.000443  .008569   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (10)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==10) (predict, outcome (10)) 
         =  .17358448 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0015393      .00162   -0.95   0.341  -.004706  .001628   5.82006 
freq_nei |   .0382702      .01246    3.07   0.002   .013857  .062683   1.16764 
logincom |  -.0054306      .01414   -0.38   0.701  -.033135  .022274   9.34467 
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r_evic~n |   .0099518       .0047    2.12   0.034   .000746  .019158   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|   .0398299      .01829    2.18   0.029   .003977  .075683   .317799 
   ctype*|   -.073874      .02095   -3.53   0.000  -.114927 -.032821   .596764 
city_cat |   .0233155      .00953    2.45   0.014   .004636  .041995   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
. *Ordered probit model coefficient 
. oprobit $ylist $xlist 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1608.4324   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1572.5962   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -1572.551   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -1572.551   
 
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       1545 
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      71.76 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood =  -1572.551                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0223 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  ftrust_nei |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      nneigh |  -.0061207   .0063472    -0.96   0.335     -.018561    .0063196 
    freq_nei |   .1525021   .0506756     3.01   0.003     .0531797    .2518244 
    logincom |  -.0232844    .055345    -0.42   0.674    -.1317586    .0851897 
    logasset |  -.0792771   .0158735    -4.99   0.000    -.1103886   -.0481657 
  liv_period |  -.0106006   .0201906    -0.53   0.600    -.0501733    .0289722 
  r_eviction |   .0392027   .0183691     2.13   0.033        .0032    .0752054 
     mfi_mem |    .162682   .0670507     2.43   0.015      .031265    .2940989 
       ctype |  -.2759599   .0763304    -3.62   0.000    -.4255647    -.126355 
    city_cat |   .0899355   .0379834     2.37   0.018     .0154895    .1643815 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -3.940366   .5849356                     -5.086819   -2.793913 
       /cut2 |  -2.828782   .5443251                     -3.895639   -1.761924 
       /cut3 |  -1.635619   .5402051                     -2.694402   -.5768365 
       /cut4 |   .0852477    .539084                     -.9713375    1.141833 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. *Ordered probit model marginal effects 
. mfx, predict (outcome (6)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==6) (predict, outcome (6)) 
         =  .00098157 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0000203      .00003    0.81   0.421  -.000029   .00007   5.82006 
freq_nei |  -.0005048      .00038   -1.33   0.184  -.001249   .00024   1.16764 
logincom |   .0000771      .00019    0.41   0.685  -.000296   .00045   9.34467 
logasset |   .0002624      .00018    1.44   0.151  -.000096  .000621   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |   .0000351      .00007    0.49   0.621  -.000104  .000174   3.50291 
r_evic~n |  -.0001298      .00011   -1.22   0.222  -.000338  .000079   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0004958      .00038   -1.29   0.198   -.00125  .000259   .317799 
   ctype*|   .0008641      .00062    1.39   0.165  -.000356  .002084   .596764 
city_cat |  -.0002977      .00024   -1.26   0.208  -.000761  .000166   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (7)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==7) (predict, outcome (7)) 
         =  .02263698 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
 
                                                                          
 
Trust -275 
 
freq_nei |  -.0079928      .00285   -2.80   0.005  -.013579 -.002406   1.16764 
logincom |   .0012204      .00291    0.42   0.674  -.004474  .006914   9.34467 
logasset |    .004155      .00098    4.22   0.000   .002227  .006083   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |   .0005556      .00106    0.52   0.600  -.001522  .002633   3.50291 
r_evic~n |  -.0020546        .001   -2.06   0.039  -.004005 -.000104   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0080762      .00332   -2.43   0.015  -.014591 -.001561   .317799 
   ctype*|   .0138545      .00409    3.38   0.001    .00583  .021879   .596764 
city_cat |  -.0047136      .00208   -2.27   0.023  -.008788 -.000639   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (8)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==8) (predict, outcome (8)) 
         =   .1908518 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0014448       .0015    0.96   0.335  -.001493  .004383   5.82006 
freq_nei |  -.0359982      .01203   -2.99   0.003  -.059582 -.012415   1.16764 
logincom |   .0054963      .01307    0.42   0.674  -.020112  .031104   9.34467 
logasset |   .0187134      .00383    4.89   0.000   .011205  .026222   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |   .0025023      .00477    0.52   0.600  -.006842  .011846   3.50291 
r_evic~n |  -.0092538      .00435   -2.13   0.034  -.017786 -.000722   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0377569      .01535   -2.46   0.014  -.067843 -.007671   .317799 
   ctype*|   .0640047      .01755    3.65   0.000   .029617  .098393   .596764 
city_cat |  -.0212293        .009   -2.36   0.018  -.038875 -.003583   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (9)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==9) (predict, outcome (9)) 
         =  .60930814 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0002011      .00022   -0.90   0.371  -.000641  .000239   5.82006 
freq_nei |   .0050109      .00266    1.88   0.060  -.000209   .01023   1.16764 
logincom |  -.0007651      .00185   -0.41   0.679  -.004383  .002853   9.34467 
logasset |  -.0026049      .00121   -2.16   0.031  -.004968 -.000242   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |  -.0003483      .00068   -0.51   0.608  -.001679  .000982   3.50291 
r_evic~n |   .0012881      .00081    1.60   0.111  -.000294   .00287   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|   .0030594      .00225    1.36   0.173  -.001343  .007462   .317799 
   ctype*|  -.0055464       .0038   -1.46   0.144  -.012985  .001893   .596764 
city_cat |   .0029551      .00175    1.69   0.092  -.000477  .006387   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (10)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(ftrust_nei==10) (predict, outcome (10)) 
         =  .17622151 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0015847      .00164   -0.96   0.335  -.004806  .001637   5.82006 
freq_nei |   .0394849      .01315    3.00   0.003   .013713  .065257   1.16764 
logincom |  -.0060287      .01433   -0.42   0.674  -.034114  .022057   9.34467 
logasset |   -.020526      .00413   -4.97   0.000  -.028619 -.012433   11.4149 
liv_pe~d |  -.0027446      .00523   -0.52   0.600  -.012991  .007502   3.50291 
r_evic~n |   .0101501      .00476    2.13   0.033   .000822  .019479   3.06926 
 mfi_mem*|   .0432696      .01832    2.36   0.018   .007369   .07917   .317799 
   ctype*|   -.073177      .02075   -3.53   0.000  -.113838 -.032516   .596764 
city_cat |   .0232856      .00984    2.37   0.018    .00399  .042581   1.83754 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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D.6.2. **trust in neighbours 'loking after house', (s4_2) 
.  
. *dependent variable 
. global ylist htrust_nei 
  
. *explanatory variables 
. global xlist nneigh freq_nei logincom logasset liv_period r_eviction mfi_mem ctype city_cat 
 
. *Ordered logit model coefficient 
. ologit $ylist $xlist 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -889.42202   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -863.79442   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -862.96393   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -862.96275   
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -862.96275   
 
Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs   =       1571 
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      52.92 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -862.96275                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0297 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  htrust_nei |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      nneigh |  -.0106387   .0148244    -0.72   0.473     -.039694    .0184165 
    freq_nei |  -.0350202   .1093992    -0.32   0.749    -.2494387    .1793984 
    logincom |  -.1703653   .1388275    -1.23   0.220    -.4424623    .1017316 
    logasset |   .0118146    .037344     0.32   0.752    -.0613784    .0850076 
  liv_period |   .0259855   .0489825     0.53   0.596    -.0700185    .1219895 
  r_eviction |   .2460949   .0438775     5.61   0.000     .1600965    .3320933 
     mfi_mem |   -.212933   .1563432    -1.36   0.173      -.51936     .093494 
       ctype |  -1.032994   .1921953    -5.37   0.000     -1.40969   -.6562977 
    city_cat |  -.2269679   .0923288    -2.46   0.014    -.4079291   -.0460067 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -9.286085   1.681628                     -12.58201   -5.990155 
       /cut2 |  -6.975383   1.388346                      -9.69649   -4.254276 
       /cut3 |  -4.962117   1.356464                     -7.620738   -2.303497 
       /cut4 |    -3.4966   1.351789                     -6.146057   -.8471426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *Ordered logit marginal effects 
. mfx, predict (outcome (6)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==6) (predict, outcome (6)) 
         =  .00055903 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   5.94e-06      .00001    0.58   0.559  -.000014  .000026    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0000196      .00006    0.30   0.760  -.000106  .000145   1.16168 
logincom |   .0000952      .00012    0.78   0.437  -.000145  .000335   9.35034 
logasset |  -6.60e-06      .00002   -0.30   0.763  -.000049  .000036   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -.0000145      .00003   -0.47   0.639  -.000075  .000046   3.53724 
r_evic~n |  -.0001375      .00014   -0.99   0.323   -.00041  .000135   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0001242      .00016    0.80   0.426  -.000182   .00043   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0005492      .00056    0.99   0.323   -.00054  .001639   .590707 
city_cat |   .0001268      .00014    0.93   0.352   -.00014  .000394   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (7)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
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 y  = Pr(htrust_nei==7) (predict, outcome (7)) 
         =  .00504834 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0000534      .00008    0.70   0.484  -.000096  .000203    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0001757      .00055    0.32   0.750  -.000906  .001257   1.16168 
logincom |   .0008548      .00075    1.14   0.253  -.000612  .002322   9.35034 
logasset |  -.0000593      .00019   -0.31   0.753  -.000428   .00031   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -.0001304      .00025   -0.52   0.601  -.000619  .000358   3.53724 
r_evic~n |  -.0012347      .00045   -2.73   0.006   -.00212 -.000349   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0011145      .00093    1.20   0.229    -.0007  .002928   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0049297      .00182    2.71   0.007   .001369  .008491   .590707 
city_cat |   .0011387      .00059    1.94   0.053  -.000014  .002292   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (8)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==8) (predict, outcome (8)) 
         =  .03490527 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0003542      .00049    0.72   0.474  -.000615  .001324    5.7352 
freq_nei |    .001166      .00364    0.32   0.749  -.005976  .008308   1.16168 
logincom |   .0056724      .00465    1.22   0.223  -.003447  .014792   9.35034 
logasset |  -.0003934      .00124   -0.32   0.752  -.002831  .002045   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -.0008652      .00163   -0.53   0.596  -.004063  .002333   3.53724 
r_evic~n |  -.0081938      .00165   -4.96   0.000  -.011429 -.004959   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0073679      .00567    1.30   0.194  -.003744   .01848   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0326386      .00665    4.90   0.000   .019596  .045681   .590707 
city_cat |    .007557      .00314    2.41   0.016    .00141  .013704   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (9)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==9) (predict, outcome (9)) 
         =   .1140483 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0009766      .00136    0.72   0.473  -.001692  .003645    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0032149      .01004    0.32   0.749  -.016469  .022899   1.16168 
logincom |   .0156396      .01275    1.23   0.220  -.009354  .040633   9.35034 
logasset |  -.0010846      .00343   -0.32   0.752  -.007804  .005635   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -.0023855      .00449   -0.53   0.596  -.011195  .006424   3.53724 
r_evic~n |  -.0225916       .0041   -5.51   0.000  -.030623  -.01456   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0200213      .01507    1.33   0.184  -.009508  .049551   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0896919      .01597    5.62   0.000   .058391  .120993   .590707 
city_cat |   .0208358      .00846    2.46   0.014   .004261  .037411   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (10)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==10) (predict, outcome (10)) 
         =  .84543907 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0013902      .00194   -0.72   0.473  -.005186  .002406    5.7352 
freq_nei |  -.0045761      .01429   -0.32   0.749  -.032591  .023439   1.16168 
logincom |   -.022262      .01812   -1.23   0.219  -.057768  .013244   9.35034 
logasset |   .0015438      .00488    0.32   0.752   -.00802  .011107   11.4067  
mfi_mem*|  -.0286279       .0216   -1.33   0.185  -.070962  .013706   .307447 
   ctype*|  -.1278095      .02206   -5.79   0.000  -.171048 -.084571   .590707 
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city_cat |  -.0296583      .01194   -2.48   0.013  -.053062 -.006254   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. *Ordered probit model coefficient 
. oprobit $ylist $xlist 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -889.42202   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -863.08001   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -862.9133   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -862.91328   
 
Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       1571 
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      53.02 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -862.91328                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0298 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  htrust_nei |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      nneigh |  -.0062914   .0082818    -0.76   0.447    -.0225234    .0099406 
    freq_nei |  -.0092442   .0624623    -0.15   0.882    -.1316679    .1131796 
    logincom |  -.1049221   .0753152    -1.39   0.164    -.2525373     .042693 
    logasset |   .0041281    .020477     0.20   0.840    -.0360061    .0442624 
  liv_period |   .0046183   .0265926     0.17   0.862    -.0475022    .0567389 
  r_eviction |   .1374083   .0234897     5.85   0.000     .0913694    .1834472 
     mfi_mem |  -.1225255   .0854533    -1.43   0.152    -.2900109    .0449598 
       ctype |  -.5438952   .1013695    -5.37   0.000    -.7425758   -.3452147 
    city_cat |  -.1098653   .0506931    -2.17   0.030    -.2092219   -.0105088 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -4.446628   .7915014                     -5.997942   -2.895314 
       /cut2 |  -3.680493   .7407749                     -5.132385   -2.228601 
       /cut3 |  -2.855611   .7322668                     -4.290827   -1.420394 
       /cut4 |  -2.106365   .7303554                     -3.537835   -.6748947 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
. *Ordered probit model marginal effects 
. mfx, predict (outcome (6)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==6) (predict, outcome (6)) 
         =  .00040854 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   9.27e-06      .00002    0.61   0.543  -.000021  .000039    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0000136      .00009    0.15   0.884  -.000169  .000196   1.16168 
logincom |   .0001546      .00019    0.81   0.419   -.00022  .000529   9.35034 
logasset |  -6.08e-06      .00003   -0.20   0.844  -.000067  .000054   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -6.81e-06      .00004   -0.17   0.864  -.000085  .000071   3.53724 
r_evic~n |  -.0002025      .00021   -0.98   0.325  -.000606  .000201   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0001966      .00025    0.80   0.425  -.000286  .000679   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0007689      .00078    0.99   0.324  -.000759  .002297   .590707 
city_cat |   .0001619      .00018    0.90   0.366  -.000189  .000513   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (7)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==7) (predict, outcome (7)) 
         =   .0045199 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0000805      .00011    0.74   0.459  -.000133  .000294    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0001183       .0008    0.15   0.882  -.001451  .001687   1.16168 
logincom |   .0013432      .00104    1.29   0.198    -.0007  .003386   9.35034 
logasset |  -.0000528      .00026   -0.20   0.841  -.000568  .000462   11.4067     
mfi_mem*|   .0016682      .00133    1.25   0.210  -.000939  .004275   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0065596      .00233    2.82   0.005   .001998  .011121   .590707 
                                                                          
 
Trust -279 
 
city_cat |   .0014064      .00078    1.80   0.072  -.000125  .002937   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (8)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==8) (predict, outcome (8)) 
         =  .03462193 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0004474      .00059    0.76   0.449  -.000711  .001605    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0006574      .00444    0.15   0.882  -.008049  .009364   1.16168 
logincom |    .007461       .0054    1.38   0.167  -.003122  .018044   9.35034 
logasset |  -.0002936      .00146   -0.20   0.840  -.003148   .00256   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -.0003284      .00189   -0.17   0.862  -.004034  .003377   3.53724 
r_evic~n |  -.0097711       .0019   -5.13   0.000  -.013503 -.006039   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0090502      .00661    1.37   0.171  -.003911  .022011   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0363795      .00731    4.97   0.000   .022047  .050712   .590707 
city_cat |   .0078125      .00366    2.13   0.033   .000633  .014992   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (9)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==9) (predict, outcome (9)) 
         =  .11749343 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |    .000975      .00128    0.76   0.448  -.001543  .003493    5.7352 
freq_nei |   .0014326      .00968    0.15   0.882  -.017539  .020404   1.16168 
logincom |   .0162596      .01171    1.39   0.165  -.006683  .039202   9.35034 
logasset |  -.0006397      .00317   -0.20   0.840  -.006859   .00558   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |  -.0007157      .00412   -0.17   0.862  -.008792   .00736   3.53724 
r_evic~n |   -.021294      .00385   -5.53   0.000  -.028845 -.013743   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|   .0192333      .01362    1.41   0.158  -.007459  .045926   .307447 
   ctype*|   .0806968      .01485    5.43   0.000   .051594    .1098   .590707 
city_cat |   .0170257      .00789    2.16   0.031    .00156  .032491   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (10)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(htrust_nei==10) (predict, outcome (10)) 
         =  .84295621 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0015122      .00199   -0.76   0.447  -.005414   .00239    5.7352 
freq_nei |  -.0022219      .01501   -0.15   0.882  -.031647  .027203   1.16168 
logincom |  -.0252184      .01809   -1.39   0.163  -.060669  .010232   9.35034 
logasset |   .0009922      .00492    0.20   0.840  -.008654  .010638   11.4067 
liv_pe~d |     .00111      .00639    0.17   0.862  -.011416  .013636   3.53724 
r_evic~n |   .0330266      .00561    5.88   0.000   .022022  .044031   3.06747 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0301483      .02151   -1.40   0.161  -.072301  .012005   .307447 
   ctype*|  -.1244048      .02186   -5.69   0.000  -.167253 -.081557   .590707 
city_cat |  -.0264066      .01214   -2.18   0.030    -.0502 -.002613   1.80013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
 
. global ylist emtrust_nei 
 
. *explanatory variables 
. global xlist nneigh freq_nei logincom logasset liv_period r_eviction mfi_mem ctype 
city_cat 
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. *Ordered logit model 
. ologit $ylist $xlist 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1811.4795   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -1794.3563   
Iteration 2:   log likelihood =  -1794.302   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -1794.302   
 
Ordered logistic regression                       Number of obs   =       1572 
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      34.35 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001 
Log likelihood =  -1794.302                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0095 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 emtrust_nei |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      nneigh |  -.0179208    .010603    -1.69   0.091    -.0387023    .0028607 
    freq_nei |   .2089185   .0848759     2.46   0.014     .0425648    .3752723 
    logincom |   -.078817   .0950057    -0.83   0.407    -.2650247    .1073907 
    logasset |  -.0751264   .0271546    -2.77   0.006    -.1283485   -.0219044 
  liv_period |  -.0403558   .0346936    -1.16   0.245     -.108354    .0276425 
  r_eviction |   .1007264   .0318521     3.16   0.002     .0382974    .1631554 
     mfi_mem |   .0803452   .1131404     0.71   0.478     -.141406    .3020963 
       ctype |  -.4749812   .1320144    -3.60   0.000    -.7337247   -.2162377 
    city_cat |  -.0313177   .0621971    -0.50   0.615    -.1532217    .0905863 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -8.998622   1.362124                     -11.66834   -6.328908 
       /cut2 |  -7.898566   1.090239                     -10.03539   -5.761737 
       /cut3 |  -7.610043   1.051306                     -9.670566    -5.54952 
       /cut4 |  -7.386104   1.027236                     -9.399451   -5.372758 
       /cut5 |  -6.689724   .9773251                     -8.605246   -4.774202 
       /cut6 |  -4.714693   .9320075                     -6.541394   -2.887992 
       /cut7 |  -2.924342   .9242046                      -4.73575   -1.112934 
       /cut8 |  -.5324001   .9209592                     -2.337447    1.272647 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. *Ordered logit marginal effects 
. mfx, predict (outcome (6)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==6) (predict, outcome (6)) 
         =  .00305337 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0000542      .00004    1.35   0.175  -.000024  .000133   5.76781 
freq_nei |  -.0006321      .00038   -1.66   0.096  -.001376  .000112   1.16858 
logincom |   .0002385      .00031    0.78   0.436  -.000362  .000838   9.34728 
logasset |   .0002273      .00013    1.75   0.080  -.000027  .000481   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |   .0001221      .00012    1.04   0.301  -.000109  .000353    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0003047      .00017   -1.84   0.065  -.000629  .000019   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0002396      .00035   -0.69   0.493  -.000924  .000445   .316794 
   ctype*|   .0013892      .00072    1.93   0.053   -.00002  .002799   .591603 
city_cat |   .0000947      .00019    0.49   0.623  -.000283  .000473    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (7)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==7) (predict, outcome (7)) 
         =  .03629055 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0006188      .00037    1.66   0.096   -.00011  .001348   5.76781 
freq_nei |   -.007214      .00304   -2.37   0.018  -.013179 -.001249   1.16858 
logincom |   .0027216       .0033    0.83   0.409  -.003737   .00918   9.34728 
r_evic~n |  -.0034781      .00116   -2.99   0.003  -.005761 -.001195   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0027382      .00382   -0.72   0.473  -.010223  .004747   .316794 
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   ctype*|   .0158767      .00465    3.42   0.001   .006767  .024986   .591603 
city_cat |   .0010814      .00215    0.50   0.615  -.003134  .005297    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
  
. mfx, predict (outcome (8)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==8) (predict, outcome (8)) 
         =  .16725603 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0022419      .00133    1.69   0.091  -.000359  .004842   5.76781 
freq_nei |  -.0261356      .01066   -2.45   0.014  -.047023 -.005248   1.16858 
logincom |     .00986      .01189    0.83   0.407  -.013451  .033171   9.34728 
logasset |   .0093983      .00343    2.74   0.006   .002683  .016113   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |   .0050485      .00435    1.16   0.246  -.003474  .013571    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0126008      .00402   -3.13   0.002  -.020488 -.004714   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0099804      .01396   -0.72   0.475  -.037335  .017374   .316794 
   ctype*|    .058074      .01595    3.64   0.000   .026813  .089335   .591603 
city_cat |   .0039178      .00778    0.50   0.615  -.011331  .019167    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (9)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==9) (predict, outcome (9)) 
         =   .5339772 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0004471      .00032    1.41   0.158  -.000173  .001067   5.76781 
freq_nei |  -.0052118      .00288   -1.81   0.070   -.01085  .000426   1.16858 
logincom |   .0019662      .00248    0.79   0.427  -.002885  .006818   9.34728 
logasset |   .0018741      .00096    1.96   0.050  -2.3e-06  .003751   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |   .0010067      .00094    1.08   0.282  -.000827  .002841    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0025128      .00121   -2.07   0.038   -.00489 -.000135   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|   -.002227      .00353   -0.63   0.528  -.009147  .004692   .316794 
   ctype*|   .0155757       .0068    2.29   0.022   .002251    .0289   .591603 
city_cat |   .0007813      .00158    0.49   0.622  -.002321  .003884    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (10)) 
 
Marginal effects after ologit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==10) (predict, outcome (10)) 
         =   .2563705 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0034165      .00202   -1.69   0.091  -.007383   .00055   5.76781 
freq_nei |   .0398292       .0162    2.46   0.014   .008086  .071572   1.16858 
logincom |   -.015026      .01811   -0.83   0.407  -.050524  .020471   9.34728 
logasset |  -.0143225      .00517   -2.77   0.006  -.024455  -.00419   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |  -.0076936      .00661   -1.16   0.244   -.02065  .005263    3.5229 
r_evic~n |   .0192029      .00607    3.17   0.002   .007316   .03109   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|   .0154264      .02188    0.71   0.481  -.027452  .058305   .316794 
   ctype*|  -.0923126      .02607   -3.54   0.000  -.143405  -.04122   .591603 
city_cat |  -.0059705      .01186   -0.50   0.615  -.029215  .017274    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. *Ordered probit model coefficient 
. oprobit $ylist $xlist 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -1811.4795   
Iteration 3:   log likelihood =  -1794.177   
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Ordered probit regression                         Number of obs   =       1572 
                                                  LR chi2(9)      =      34.61 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0001 
Log likelihood =  -1794.177                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0096 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 emtrust_nei |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      nneigh |  -.0090493   .0061945    -1.46   0.144    -.0211903    .0030917 
    freq_nei |    .122006   .0497299     2.45   0.014     .0245372    .2194748 
    logincom |  -.0564431   .0548179    -1.03   0.303    -.1638842    .0509981 
    logasset |  -.0432045   .0154179    -2.80   0.005     -.073423    -.012986 
  liv_period |  -.0192661   .0197404    -0.98   0.329    -.0579566    .0194245 
  r_eviction |   .0561432   .0178146     3.15   0.002     .0212273    .0910591 
     mfi_mem |   .0539908   .0649834     0.83   0.406    -.0733743     .181356 
       ctype |  -.2725281   .0738574    -3.69   0.000     -.417286   -.1277702 
    city_cat |  -.0153889   .0366124    -0.42   0.674    -.0871478    .0563701 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       /cut1 |  -4.256216   .6090038                     -5.449842   -3.062591 
       /cut2 |  -3.927406   .5655245                     -5.035814   -2.818999 
       /cut3 |  -3.833857   .5587927                     -4.929071   -2.738643 
       /cut4 |  -3.759684    .554576                     -4.846632   -2.672735 
       /cut5 |  -3.523155   .5460035                     -4.593302   -2.453008 
       /cut6 |   -2.73173   .5360291                     -3.782328   -1.681132 
       /cut7 |  -1.805072   .5328913                      -2.84952   -.7606244 
       /cut8 |  -.3472949   .5317234                     -1.389454    .6948639 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
. *Ordered probit model marginal effects 
. mfx, predict (outcome (6)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==6) (predict, outcome (6)) 
         =  .00290005 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0000691      .00006    1.23   0.219  -.000041  .000179   5.76781 
freq_nei |  -.0009313      .00055   -1.69   0.092  -.002014  .000152   1.16858 
logincom |   .0004308      .00046    0.94   0.346  -.000465  .001327   9.34728 
logasset |   .0003298      .00018    1.81   0.071  -.000028  .000688   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |   .0001471      .00016    0.90   0.367  -.000173  .000467    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0004286      .00023   -1.88   0.061  -.000876  .000019   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0004032       .0005   -0.80   0.425  -.001393  .000586   .316794 
   ctype*|   .0019905        .001    2.00   0.046   .000037  .003944   .591603 
city_cat |   .0001175      .00028    0.41   0.679   -.00044  .000675    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (7)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==7) (predict, outcome (7)) 
         =  .03563355 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0006533      .00045    1.44   0.149  -.000234  .001541   5.76781 
freq_nei |  -.0088086      .00371   -2.37   0.018  -.016082 -.001535   1.16858 
logincom |   .0040751      .00398    1.02   0.306   -.00373   .01188   9.34728 
logasset |   .0031193      .00115    2.70   0.007   .000858  .005381   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |    .001391      .00143    0.97   0.331  -.001413  .004195    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0040535      .00135   -3.00   0.003  -.006698 -.001409   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0038389      .00457   -0.84   0.401  -.012793  .005115   .316794 
   ctype*|   .0189981      .00535    3.55   0.000   .008514  .029482   .591603 
city_cat |   .0011111      .00265    0.42   0.675  -.004076  .006299    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==8) (predict, outcome (8)) 
         =  .16814437 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0018028      .00123    1.46   0.144  -.000618  .004223   5.76781 
freq_nei |   -.024306      .00996   -2.44   0.015  -.043835 -.004777   1.16858 
logincom |   .0112446      .01094    1.03   0.304  -.010193  .032682   9.34728 
logasset |   .0086072      .00311    2.77   0.006   .002513  .014702   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |   .0038382      .00394    0.97   0.330  -.003882  .011558    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0111848       .0036   -3.11   0.002  -.018239  -.00413   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0107114      .01284   -0.83   0.404  -.035887  .014464   .316794 
   ctype*|   .0535106      .01452    3.68   0.000   .025047  .081975   .591603 
city_cat |   .0030658      .00729    0.42   0.674   -.01123  .017361    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (9)) 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==9) (predict, outcome (9)) 
         =  .53253663 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |   .0003184      .00025    1.29   0.197  -.000165  .000802   5.76781 
freq_nei |  -.0042928      .00234   -1.84   0.066  -.008871  .000286   1.16858 
logincom |    .001986      .00205    0.97   0.334   -.00204  .006012   9.34728 
logasset |   .0015202      .00077    1.98   0.048   .000017  .003024   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |   .0006779      .00074    0.92   0.357  -.000764   .00212    3.5229 
r_evic~n |  -.0019754      .00094   -2.09   0.036  -.003825 -.000126   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|  -.0021351      .00293   -0.73   0.467  -.007882  .003612   .316794 
   ctype*|   .0124956      .00535    2.34   0.019   .002014  .022977   .591603 
city_cat |   .0005415       .0013    0.42   0.678  -.002013  .003096    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
 
. mfx, predict (outcome (10)) 
 
Marginal effects after oprobit 
      y  = Pr(emtrust_nei==10) (predict, outcome (10)) 
         =  .25791835 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  nneigh |  -.0029231        .002   -1.46   0.144  -.006845  .000999   5.76781 
freq_nei |   .0394103      .01607    2.45   0.014   .007904  .070916   1.16858 
logincom |  -.0182322      .01771   -1.03   0.303   -.05294  .016476   9.34728 
logasset |  -.0139559      .00498   -2.80   0.005  -.023721 -.004191   11.4055 
liv_pe~d |  -.0062233      .00638   -0.98   0.329  -.018721  .006274    3.5229 
r_evic~n |   .0181353      .00576    3.15   0.002   .006851  .029419   3.08142 
 mfi_mem*|   .0175504      .02125    0.83   0.409  -.024108  .059209   .316794 
   ctype*|  -.0892751      .02449   -3.64   0.000  -.137284 -.041266   .591603 
city_cat |  -.0049709      .01183   -0.42   0.674  -.028151  .018209    1.8257 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Appendix D: Chapter 7 
Table D.1: Degree of financial cooperation received from the bonding networks  
Dependent variable: ‘Degree’ of financial cooperation [OLS estimation] 
 
Network 
Standardised Beta-coefficient Obs.^ Adj-R2 RMSE 
Degree of 
trust 
Fin. Coop. 
received 
Number of 
networks 
Freq. of 
contact 
Log-  
income 
Living 
period 
Relative All 08** .04 .01                                                                                        .19*** .22*** .15*** 523 0.97 1.15 
Poor  .08** .05 .02 .28*** .14*** .14*** 339 0.96 1.24 
Comparator .18*** .05 -.08 .00 .28*** .13 184 0.98 0.87 
Friend  All .01 .10 -.06 .16* .28*** -.21** 106 0.97 1.04 
Poor -.30*** .30*** .00 .01 .38*** -.12 52 0.97 1.07 
Comparator .31*** .10 -.08 .19 .14*** -.37*** 53 0.98 0.88 
Neighbour All .03 .06 .26*** -.02 .22*** .08* 458 0.96 1.20 
Poor .03 .08 .28*** .15*** .15*** .13** 294 0.95 1.27 
Comparator .11* .14* .24*** -.37*** .29*** -.04 162 0.98 0.91 
Co-worker(all) .06 .02 .17 .05 .30*** -.07 56 0.97 1.07 
***99%levelofconfidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence. ^ Responses for each explanatory variable are not equal. $Trust in 
financial lending.  
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Table D.2: Non-financial cooperation from the bonding networks 
Dependent variable: Number of non-financial cooperation received in (past one year) [OLS estimation] 
Network Standardised Beta-coefficient ^Obs
. 
Adj-R2 RMSE 
Degree of 
trust# 
Fin. Coop. 
received 
Number of 
networks 
Freq. of 
contact 
Log-  
income 
Living 
period 
Relative All .01 -.03 -.11***                                                                                        -.17*** .06*** .04 1680 0.40 0.82 
 Poor .07*** -.05 -.12*** -.20*** .00 -.00 1021 0.40 0.79 
 Comparator -.03 -.04 -.10*** -.12*** .08*** .10*** 655 0.42 0.86 
Friend All .04 .06* .12*** -.08** .06*** -.01 842 0.63 0.59 
 Poor .02 .03 -.01 -.06 .06*** -.03 445 0.59 0.61 
 Comparator .04 .09* .24*** -.12** .06** .02 394 0.67 0.55 
Neighbour  All .01 -.03 -.05** .01 .04*** .11*** 1592 0.55 0.74 
 Poor .05* -.05 -.11*** .05* .02 .09*** 957 0.54 0.72 
 Comparator -.02 .15*** .08* -.04 .06*** .14*** 631 0.58 0.73 
Co-worker                  All .05 .12*** .07* -.14*** .02 .14*** 486 0.55 0.76 
Poor -.06 .07 -.06 -.16*** .08*** .12* 257 0.57 0.71 
Comparator .17*** .13** .21*** -.15** -.05* .19*** 228 .56 0.77 
***99%levelofconfidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence. ^ Responses for each explanatory variable are not equal. 
#Trust in financial lending. Figure in the parenthesis (.) shows the ‘standard coefficient’ as the regression failed to estimate the standardisedβ . 
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Table D.3: Expected cooperation in relation to the bridging/linking networks  
Dependent variable: Number of non-financial cooperation received [in past one year] 
(OLS estimation) 
 Standardised Beta-coefficient Obs.^ Adj- 
R2 
RMSE 
Number 
of 
networks 
Freq. 
of 
contact 
Log- 
income 
Living 
period 
   
1.HH member in politics(all 
sample) 
-.01 .34*** .02 -.12 73 .47 .70 
Poor  .14 .28* .02 -.15 49 .49 .71 
Comparator -.33 .43** .03 -.08 24 .44 .68 
2.Relatives in politics(all 
sample) 
-.02 .23** .02 -.00 97 .48 .69 
Poor  -.02 .18 .01 .07 67 .42 .76 
Comparator .04 .38** .05 -.20 30 .62 .51 
3.Professional(all sample) .03 .15*** .00 .04 351 .35 .60 
Poor  -.06 .21*** -.00 .00 191 .33 .54 
Comparator .13* .13* -.00 .09 158 .37 .65 
4.Businessman(all sample) .04 -.01 .04*** .06 549 .41 .61 
Poor  -.02 .01 .04** .05 311 .40 .60 
Comparator .10 -.02 .04** .08 236 .43 .62 
5.Govt. organisation(all 
sample) 
.11 .26*** .01 -.00 199 .69 .48 
Poor  .13  .44*** -.01 -.08 89 .74 .43 
Comparator .10 .10 .05 .05 110 .66 .511 
6.Voluntary organisation .17** .30*** -.00 -.02 161 .63 .53 
Poor  -.01 .37*** .01 -.02 79 .72 .44 
Comparator .22** .30*** -.01 -.03 81 .56 .61 
7.NGO -.04 -.09 .06*** -.10 244 .15 .39 
Poor  -.04 -.08 .04** -.05 182 .10 .35 
Comparator .06 -.05 .06* -.15 62 .20 .48 
8.Local government -.05 .05 .08*** .01 156 .61 .49 
Poor  -08 .06 .05** .03 98 .57 .50 
Comparator .01 .06 .08 .03 57 .65 .48 
***99%levelof confidence; **95% level of confidence and; * 90% level of confidence. ^ 
Responses for each explanatory variable are not equal. 
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D7.1.A Social capital is pre-determined [the case of financial cooperation from neighbours] 
(figure 7.1) 
. gsem (zlogasset -> zr_incomeloss, ) (zlogasset -> zr_eviction, ) (zlogasset -> zcoop, ) 
(zlogasset -> ztrust, ) (zlogasset -> zliv_period, ) (zcoop -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zformal_edu1 
-> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zlogincom -> zlogasset, ) (zlogincom -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (znneigh -
> zcoop, ) (znneigh -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zctype -> zcoop, ) (zctype -> ztrust, ) (zcity_cat 
-> zcoop, ) (zcity_cat -> ztrust, ) (zlandown -> zcoop, ) (zlandown -> ztrust, ) (ztrust -> 
zcoop, ) (zfreq_nei -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zfreq_nei -> ztrust, ) (zlognbexp -> zcoop, ) 
(zmfi_mem -> zcoop, ) (zmfi_mem -> ztrust, ), nocapslatent 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -12020.199   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -12020.199   
 
Generalized structural equation model             Number of obs   =       1760 
Log likelihood = -12020.199 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_incomeloss <-       | 
             zlogasset |  -.2221436    .023576    -9.42   0.000    -.2683518   -.1759354 
                 _cons |   .0047243   .0232617     0.20   0.839    -.0408678    .0503164 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_eviction <-         | 
             zlogasset |  -.3321818   .0270131   -12.30   0.000    -.3851265   -.2792371 
                 _cons |   .0003053   .0226016     0.01   0.989     -.043993    .0446035 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zcoop <-               | 
                ztrust |   .3329731   .0160391    20.76   0.000      .301537    .3644092 
             zlogasset |   .0528268   .0378571     1.40   0.163    -.0213717    .1270253 
               znneigh |   .7076501   .0177481    39.87   0.000     .6728645    .7424358 
                zctype |    -.06621    .028396    -2.33   0.020     -.121865   -.0105549 
             zcity_cat |   .0065787   .0233864     0.28   0.778    -.0392578    .0524151 
              zlandown |  -.0304557    .020711    -1.47   0.141    -.0710485     .010137 
             zlognbexp |   .1534281   .0263245     5.83   0.000     .1018331    .2050232 
              zmfi_mem |   .0648948   .0187158     3.47   0.001     .0282126     .101577 
                 _cons |   .0634991    .021535     2.95   0.003     .0212914    .1057069 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ztrust <-              | 
             zlogasset |   .1422072   .0292937     4.85   0.000     .0847925    .1996218 
                zctype |   -.012241    .023382    -0.52   0.601    -.0580688    .0335869 
             zcity_cat |   .0817926   .0186308     4.39   0.000     .0452769    .1183083 
              zlandown |  -.0257298   .0188178    -1.37   0.172    -.0626121    .0111524 
             zfreq_nei |   .6914849   .0166166    41.61   0.000     .6589169    .7240528 
              zmfi_mem |   .0874361   .0183547     4.76   0.000     .0514616    .1234107 
                 _cons |  -.0158566   .0169893    -0.93   0.351     -.049155    .0174418 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zliv_period <-         | 
             zlogasset |   .3861347   .0231612    16.67   0.000     .3407396    .4315299 
                 _cons |   .0034378   .0218518     0.16   0.875     -.039391    .0462667 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop_neihg <-    | 
                 zcoop |   .0508739   .1061569     0.48   0.632    -.1571898    .2589376 
          zformal_edu1 |   .1152493   .0637868     1.81   0.071    -.0097706    .2402692 
             zlogincom |   .1708321     .07294     2.34   0.019     .0278724    .3137919 
               znneigh |   .3279143   .1181458     2.78   0.006     .0963527    .5594758 
             zfreq_nei |  -.0215087   .0451242    -0.48   0.634    -.1099505    .0669331 
                 _cons |  -.1764166    .065105    -2.71   0.007    -.3040201    -.048813 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlogasset <-           | 
             zlogincom |    .390177   .0220824    17.67   0.000     .3468964    .4334577 
                 _cons |  -.0009447   .0219661    -0.04   0.966    -.0439974    .0421081 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   var(e.zr_incomeloss)|   .9436712   .0322275                      .8825741    1.008998 
     var(e.zr_eviction)|   .8924167   .0306472                      .8343262    .9545518 
           var(e.zcoop)|   .2458477   .0121876                      .2230841     .270934 
          var(e.ztrust)|   .4446301   .0161981                      .4139893    .4775386 
     var(e.zliv_period)|   .8404056   .0292657                      .7849596     .899768 
var(e.zlev_fcoop_neihg)|   .9048403   .0781663                      .7639049    1.071777 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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D7.1. B Social capital is co-determined [the case of fianancial cooperation from the 
neighbours] (figure 7.1) 
  
. gsem (zlogasset -> zr_incomeloss, ) (zlogasset -> zr_eviction, ) (zlogasset -> zcoop, ) 
(zlogasset -> ztrust, ) (zlogasset -> zftrust_nei, ) (zlogasset -> zliv_period, ) (zcoop -> 
zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zformal_edu1 -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zformal_edu1 -> zftrust_nei, ) 
(zlogincom -> zlogasset, ) (zlogincom -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (znneigh -> zcoop, ) (znneigh -> 
zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zctype -> zcoop, ) (zctype -> ztrust, ) (zcity_cat -> zcoop, ) (zcity_cat 
-> ztrust, ) (zlandown -> zcoop, ) (zlandown -> ztrust, ) (ztrust -> zcoop, ) (ztrust -> 
zftrust_nei, ) (zftrust_nei -> zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zage -> zftrust_nei, ) (zfreq_nei -> 
zlev_fcoop_neihg, ) (zfreq_nei -> ztrust, ) (zfreq_nei -> zftrust_nei, ) (zlognbexp -> zcoop, 
) (zmfi_mem -> zcoop, ) (zmfi_mem -> ztrust, ), nocapslatent 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -14008.381   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -14008.381   
 
Generalized structural equation model             Number of obs   =       1760 
Log likelihood = -14008.381 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_incomeloss <-       | 
             zlogasset |  -.2221436   .0235763    -9.42   0.000    -.2683523   -.1759348 
                 _cons |   .0047243   .0232617     0.20   0.839    -.0408678    .0503164 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_eviction <-         | 
             zlogasset |  -.3321818   .0270777   -12.27   0.000    -.3852532   -.2791104 
                 _cons |   .0003053   .0226016     0.01   0.989     -.043993    .0446035 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zcoop <-               | 
                ztrust |   .3329731   .0160426    20.76   0.000     .3015301    .3644161 
             zlogasset |   .0528268   .0380883     1.39   0.165    -.0218249    .1274784 
               znneigh |   .7076501   .0177491    39.87   0.000     .6728625    .7424378 
                zctype |    -.06621   .0284669    -2.33   0.020    -.1220041   -.0104158 
             zcity_cat |   .0065787   .0233864     0.28   0.778    -.0392578    .0524152 
              zlandown |  -.0304557   .0207188    -1.47   0.142    -.0710639    .0101524 
             zlognbexp |   .1534281   .0263557     5.82   0.000      .101772    .2050843 
              zmfi_mem |   .0648948   .0187172     3.47   0.001     .0282098    .1015798 
                 _cons |   .0634991   .0215488     2.95   0.003     .0212643     .105734 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ztrust <-              | 
             zlogasset |   .1422072   .0293147     4.85   0.000     .0847515    .1996628 
                zctype |   -.012241   .0233877    -0.52   0.601    -.0580801    .0335982 
             zcity_cat |   .0817926   .0186308     4.39   0.000     .0452769    .1183083 
              zlandown |  -.0257298   .0188179    -1.37   0.172    -.0626122    .0111525 
             zfreq_nei |   .6914849   .0166168    41.61   0.000     .6589166    .7240531 
              zmfi_mem |   .0874361   .0183548     4.76   0.000     .0514614    .1234109 
                 _cons |  -.0158566   .0169893    -0.93   0.351     -.049155    .0174418 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zftrust_nei <-         | 
                ztrust |   .0174365   .0404828     0.43   0.667    -.0619083    .0967812 
             zlogasset |   -.107014   .0293568    -3.65   0.000    -.1645523   -.0494756 
          zformal_edu1 |   .0685204   .0287458     2.38   0.017     .0121796    .1248612 
                  zage |   .0619644   .0275896     2.25   0.025     .0078898     .116039 
             zfreq_nei |   .0728704   .0376515     1.94   0.053    -.0009251     .146666 
                 _cons |   .0241268   .0257844     0.94   0.349    -.0264097    .0746634 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zliv_period <-         | 
             zlogasset |   .3861347   .0239408    16.13   0.000     .3392116    .4330578 
                 _cons |   .0034378   .0218518     0.16   0.875     -.039391    .0462667 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop_neihg <-    | 
                 zcoop |   .0721303   .1084943     0.66   0.506    -.1405146    .2847753 
           zftrust_nei |   .0060433   .0650116     0.09   0.926    -.1213771    .1334638 
          zformal_edu1 |   .0894291   .0648069     1.38   0.168    -.0375901    .2164482 
             zlogincom |   .1715411   .0761718     2.25   0.024     .0222471    .3208352 
               znneigh |   .3129563   .1218789     2.57   0.010      .074078    .5518346 
             zfreq_nei |  -.0199377   .0451272    -0.44   0.659    -.1083854    .0685101 
                 _cons |  -.2249375   .0682631    -3.30   0.001    -.3587307   -.0911444 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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zlogasset <-           | 
             zlogincom |    .390177   .0220824    17.67   0.000     .3468964    .4334577 
                 _cons |  -.0009447   .0219661    -0.04   0.966    -.0439974    .0421081 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   var(e.zr_incomeloss)|   .9436712   .0322308                      .8825681    1.009005 
     var(e.zr_eviction)|   .8924167   .0306608                      .8343014    .9545803 
           var(e.zcoop)|   .2458477   .0121883                      .2230829    .2709355 
          var(e.ztrust)|   .4446301   .0161989                      .4139879    .4775403 
     var(e.zftrust_nei)|   .9553361   .0356042                      .8880408    1.027731 
     var(e.zliv_period)|   .8404056   .0292801                      .7849332    .8997982 
var(e.zlev_fcoop_neihg)|   .8930707   .0794037                      .7502478    1.063082 
       var(e.zlogasset)|   .8492035   .0286362                      .7948921    .9072257 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
D7.2. A Social capital predetermined (the case of financial cooperation from neighbours) 
. *predetermined socil capital  
.  
. reg $y1list $y2list $x1list 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,   510) =   17.69 
       Model |  63.2503593     4  15.8125898           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  455.993019   510   .89410396           R-squared     =  0.1218 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1149 
       Total |  519.243379   514  1.01020113           Root MSE      =  .94557 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
zlev_fcoop~g |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       zcoop |    .120221   .0484989     2.48   0.014     .0249388    .2155033 
zformal_edu1 |   .2926271   .0481607     6.08   0.000     .1980092    .3872449 
 zliv_period |    .134359   .0479172     2.80   0.005     .0402195    .2284985 
      zctype |  -.2264852    .047125    -4.81   0.000    -.3190682   -.1339022 
       _cons |   .0394023   .0430406     0.92   0.360    -.0451564    .1239611 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
. reg3 ($y1list=$y2list $x1list)($y2list=$y3list $x2list)($y3list=$y4list $x3list) 
($x4list=$y4list) 
 
Three-stage least-squares regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop~g      265      4     .969886    0.0846      53.22   0.0000 
zcoop             265      7    .4473627    0.7196     702.50   0.0000 
ztrust            265      6     1.02076    0.0977      27.85   0.0001 
zr_incomel~s      265      1    .9059682    0.0961      27.17   0.0000 
zr_eviction       265      1    .8182752    0.2766     100.40   0.0000 
zlogincom         265      1    .9092721    0.0951      28.30   0.0000 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop_neihg | 
           zcoop |   .5054177   .0940767     5.37   0.000     .3210307    .6898047 
    zformal_edu1 |   .2160542   .0677725     3.19   0.001     .0832225    .3488858 
     zliv_period |   -.003425   .0723789    -0.05   0.962     -.145285     .138435 
          zctype |  -.2340987   .0724543    -3.23   0.001    -.3761064    -.092091 
           _cons |  -.1929334    .063344    -3.05   0.002    -.3170853   -.0687816 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zcoop            | 
          ztrust |   .0967235   .1203681     0.80   0.422    -.1391937    .3326407 
         znneigh |   .7671623   .0407459    18.83   0.000     .6873017    .8470229 
       zlogincom |   .3149821   .0348383     9.04   0.000     .2467003    .3832638      
   zmfi_mem |   .0918586   .0377618     2.43   0.015     .0178469    .1658703 
            zage |   .1384578   .0310913     4.45   0.000     .0775199    .1993956 
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        zlandown |  -.0256091   .0337624    -0.76   0.448    -.0917821    .0405639 
       zlognbexp |   .0421307   .0346361     1.22   0.224    -.0257548    .1100162 
           _cons |    .090385   .0356434     2.54   0.011     .0205253    .1602448 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ztrust           | 
       zlogasset |   .1710583   .0758192     2.26   0.024     .0224554    .3196612 
            zage |   .1452377   .0632564     2.30   0.022     .0212574    .2692179 
         mfi_mem |   .3756253   .1485628     2.53   0.011     .0844477     .666803 
       zlogincom |   .1717946   .0722539     2.38   0.017     .0301794    .3134097 
        ztot_mem |  -.0887207   .0634338    -1.40   0.162    -.2130486    .0356072 
       zcity_cat |   .0876067   .0768087     1.14   0.254    -.0629355     .238149 
           _cons |  -.0819052   .1020971    -0.80   0.422    -.2820118    .1182015 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_incomeloss    | 
       zlogasset |  -.3056213    .058632    -5.21   0.000    -.4205378   -.1907048 
           _cons |  -.1017002   .0556728    -1.83   0.068     -.210817    .0074165 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_eviction      | 
       zlogasset |  -.5362852   .0535212   -10.02   0.000    -.6411849   -.4313854 
           _cons |   .3816352   .0502866     7.59   0.000     .2830752    .4801952 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlogincom        | 
       zlogasset |   .3173838   .0596655     5.32   0.000     .2004416     .434326 
           _cons |   -.237863   .0558794    -4.26   0.000    -.3473847   -.1283414 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Endogenous variables:  zlev_fcoop_neihg zcoop ztrust zr_incomeloss  
     zr_eviction zlogincom  
Exogenous variables:   zformal_edu1 zliv_period zctype znneigh zmfi_mem zage  
     zlandown zlognbexp zlogasset mfi_mem ztot_mem zcity_cat  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. gsem ($y1list<-$y2list $x1list)($y2list<-$y3list $x2list)($y3list<-$y4list $x3list) 
($y4lis 
> t->$x4list) 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -10246.745   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -10246.745   
 
Generalized structural equation model             Number of obs   =       1784 
Log likelihood = -10246.745 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                       |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
zlev_fcoop_neihg <-    | 
                 zcoop |   .2770049   .0750588     3.69   0.000     .1298924    .4241174 
          zformal_edu1 |   .2212731   .0695519     3.18   0.001      .084954    .3575922 
           zliv_period |   .0703662   .0705749     1.00   0.319     -.067958    .2086904 
                zctype |  -.2188568   .0742428    -2.95   0.003    -.3643699   -.0733437 
                 _cons |    -.19242   .0630783    -3.05   0.002    -.3160511   -.0687889 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zcoop <-               | 
                ztrust |   .3001543   .0141369    21.23   0.000     .2724465    .3278621 
             zlogincom |   .2380195   .0157753    15.09   0.000     .2071006    .2689384 
               znneigh |   .6820323   .0153336    44.48   0.000     .6519789    .7120856 
              zmfi_mem |   .0383239   .0155159     2.47   0.014     .0079132    .0687346 
                  zage |   .1029447   .0163455     6.30   0.000     .0709081    .1349812 
              zlandown |  -.0313228   .0165214    -1.90   0.058    -.0637042    .0010586 
             zlognbexp |    .071003   .0191416     3.71   0.000     .0334862    .1085197 
                 _cons |   .0719877   .0162546     4.43   0.000     .0401293    .1038461 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ztrust <-              | 
             zlogincom |   .1429902   .0259769     5.50   0.000     .0920765    .1939039 
             zlogasset |   .1296476   .0256042     5.06   0.000     .0794643    .1798308 
                  zage |   .1761926   .0248318     7.10   0.000     .1275233     .224862 
               mfi_mem |   .2436874   .0529466     4.60   0.000     .1399139    .3474609 
              ztot_mem |   .0719959   .0248386     2.90   0.004     .0233132    .1206787 
             zcity_cat |   .1333262   .0246897     5.40   0.000     .0849354    .1817171 
                 _cons |  -.0789159   .0286651    -2.75   0.006    -.1350984   -.0227334 
-----------------------+----------------------------------------------------------------      
            _cons |   -.001356   .0231415    -0.06   0.953    -.0467126    .0440005 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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zr_eviction <-         | 
             zlogasset |  -.3283601   .0224302   -14.64   0.000    -.3723225   -.2843978 
                 _cons |  -.0002651   .0224452    -0.01   0.991    -.0442568    .0437266 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlogincom <-           | 
             zlogasset |   .3861347   .0218536    17.67   0.000     .3433025     .428967 
                 _cons |   .0034378   .0218518     0.16   0.875     -.039391    .0462667 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
var(e.zlev_fcoop_neihg)|   .9070124   .0786489                      .7652508    1.075035 
           var(e.zcoop)|   .1915931   .0095028                      .1738447    .2111536 
          var(e.ztrust)|   .8639963   .0303237                       .806561    .9255215 
   var(e.zr_incomeloss)|   .9462664   .0318354                      .8858829    1.010766 
     var(e.zr_eviction)|   .8922028   .0299826                      .8353315    .9529461 
       var(e.zlogincom)|   .8404056   .0283301                      .7866741    .8978069 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
D7.2 B Social capital is codetermined (the case of financial cooperation from neighbours) 
 
. reg $y1list $y1list2 $y2list $x1list 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     471 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,   465) =   11.62 
       Model |  52.7961233     5  10.5592247           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  422.381541   465  .908347399           R-squared     =  0.1111 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1016 
       Total |  475.177664   470  1.01101631           Root MSE      =  .95307 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
zlev_fcoop~g |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 zftrust_nei |  -.0078853   .0477694    -0.17   0.869     -.101756    .0859854 
       zcoop |   .1406779   .0501949     2.80   0.005      .042041    .2393147 
zformal_edu1 |   .2585297   .0507308     5.10   0.000     .1588396    .3582197 
 zliv_period |   .1400526   .0499224     2.81   0.005     .0419513     .238154 
      zctype |  -.1998236   .0504335    -3.96   0.000    -.2989294   -.1007178 
       _cons |  -.0013144    .046052    -0.03   0.977    -.0918102    .0891815 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. reg3 ($y1list=$y1list2 $y2list $x1list)($y2list=$y3list $x2list)($y3list=$y4list $x3list) 
( 
> $x4list=$y4list) ($y1list2= $y3list $y4list $x1list2) 
 
Three-stage least-squares regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"       chi2        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop~g      252      5    1.258477   -0.5695      79.63   0.0000 
zcoop             252      7    .4479162    0.7253     662.59   0.0000 
ztrust            252      6    1.041555    0.0959      31.89   0.0000 
zr_incomel~s      252      1     .881187    0.0701      19.42   0.0000 
zr_eviction       252      1    .8192001    0.2551      86.75   0.0000 
zlogincom         252      1    .9025744    0.0859      23.97   0.0000 
zftrust_nei       252      3    .9805349   -0.0871      14.54   0.0023 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop_neihg | 
     zftrust_nei |  -.8756345   .2161808    -4.05   0.000    -1.299341    -.451928 
           zcoop |   .6018034   .0956254     6.29   0.000     .4143811    .7892258 
    zformal_edu1 |   .2420578   .0769948     3.14   0.002     .0911507    .3929648 
     zliv_period |  -.0826088   .0738666    -1.12   0.263    -.2273847    .0621671 
          zctype |  -.1961918    .074574    -2.63   0.009    -.3423541   -.0500295 
           _cons |  -.0215299   .0907868    -0.24   0.813    -.1994688    .1564089 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zcoop            | 
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          ztrust |   .1089576   .1218949     0.89   0.371    -.1299521    .3478673 
         znneigh |    .764005   .0418442    18.26   0.000      .681992    .8460181 
       zlogincom |   .3101939   .0361159     8.59   0.000      .239408    .3809798 
        zmfi_mem |   .0986353   .0394316     2.50   0.012     .0213507    .1759198 
            zage |   .1370812   .0318652     4.30   0.000     .0746265    .1995359 
        zlandown |  -.0219217   .0352961    -0.62   0.535    -.0911008    .0472574 
       zlognbexp |   .0437739   .0357803     1.22   0.221    -.0263542     .113902 
           _cons |    .084117    .037509     2.24   0.025     .0106006    .1576334 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ztrust           | 
       zlogasset |    .184906   .0784755     2.36   0.018     .0310968    .3387152 
            zage |   .1843368   .0641571     2.87   0.004     .0585911    .3100824 
         mfi_mem |   .3940497   .1508776     2.61   0.009     .0983351    .6897643 
       zlogincom |   .1684322   .0731904     2.30   0.021     .0249817    .3118826 
        ztot_mem |  -.1353815   .0640768    -2.11   0.035    -.2609696   -.0097933 
       zcity_cat |   .1173122   .0767128     1.53   0.126    -.0330421    .2676665 
           _cons |  -.1027359   .1055779    -0.97   0.331    -.3096647    .1041929 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_incomeloss    | 
       zlogasset |  -.2579883   .0585384    -4.41   0.000    -.3727214   -.1432552 
           _cons |  -.1456573   .0555099    -2.62   0.009    -.2544547   -.0368599 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_eviction      | 
       zlogasset |  -.5138613   .0551695    -9.31   0.000    -.6219915   -.4057311 
           _cons |   .3745526   .0516051     7.26   0.000     .2734083    .4756968 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlogincom        | 
       zlogasset |   .2986538   .0610049     4.90   0.000     .1790864    .4182212 
           _cons |  -.2466436   .0568572    -4.34   0.000    -.3580817   -.1352056 
-----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zftrust_nei      | 
          ztrust |   .4219449   .1464021     2.88   0.004      .135002    .7088878 
       zlogasset |  -.1897599   .0677677    -2.80   0.005    -.3225821   -.0569376 
    zformal_edu1 |   .0452053   .0642838     0.70   0.482    -.0807886    .1711992 
           _cons |   .2141034   .0630432     3.40   0.001      .090541    .3376658 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Endogenous variables:  zlev_fcoop_neihg zcoop ztrust zr_incomeloss  
     zr_eviction zlogincom zftrust_nei  
Exogenous variables:   zformal_edu1 zliv_period zctype znneigh zmfi_mem zage  
     zlandown zlognbexp zlogasset mfi_mem ztot_mem zcity_cat  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
. gsem ($y1list<-$y1list2 $y2list $x1list)($y2list<-$y3list $x2list)($y3list<-$y4list 
$x3list 
> ) ($y4list->$x4list) ($y1list2<-$y3list $y4list $x1list2) 
 
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -12344.586   
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -12344.586   
 
Generalized structural equation model             Number of obs   =       1784 
Log likelihood = -12344.586 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlev_fcoop_neihg <-    | 
                 zcoop |   .2883269   .0752659     3.83   0.000     .1408086    .4358453 
           zftrust_nei |   -.016312   .0635081    -0.26   0.797    -.1407856    .1081615 
          zformal_edu1 |   .1922423   .0704845     2.73   0.006     .0540952    .3303894 
           zliv_period |   .0734477   .0726258     1.01   0.312    -.0688963    .2157916 
                zctype |  -.2057586   .0755631    -2.72   0.006    -.3538596   -.0576577 
                 _cons |  -.2345967   .0664571    -3.53   0.000    -.3648502   -.1043431 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zcoop <-               | 
                ztrust |   .3001543   .0141498    21.21   0.000     .2724212    .3278874 
             zlogincom |   .2380195    .015775    15.09   0.000      .207101    .2689379 
               znneigh |   .6820323   .0153337    44.48   0.000     .6519787    .7120858 
              zmfi_mem |   .0383239   .0155162     2.47   0.014     .0079127    .0687351 
                  zage |   .1029447   .0163458     6.30   0.000     .0709076    .1349818 
              zlandown |  -.0313228   .0165216    -1.90   0.058    -.0637045    .0010589 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ztrust <-              | 
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             zlogincom |   .1429902   .0259807     5.50   0.000     .0920691    .1939114 
             zlogasset |   .1296476   .0256047     5.06   0.000     .0794633    .1798318 
                  zage |   .1761926   .0248318     7.10   0.000     .1275233     .224862 
               mfi_mem |   .2436874   .0529467     4.60   0.000     .1399138     .347461 
              ztot_mem |   .0719959   .0248387     2.90   0.004      .023313    .1206789 
             zcity_cat |   .1333262   .0246897     5.40   0.000     .0849353    .1817172 
                 _cons |  -.0789159   .0286651    -2.75   0.006    -.1350984   -.0227333 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_incomeloss <-       | 
             zlogasset |  -.2187068   .0231228    -9.46   0.000    -.2640266    -.173387 
                 _cons |   -.001356   .0231415    -0.06   0.953    -.0467126    .0440005 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zr_eviction <-         | 
             zlogasset |  -.3283601   .0224302   -14.64   0.000    -.3723225   -.2843978 
                 _cons |  -.0002651   .0224452    -0.01   0.991    -.0442568    .0437266 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zlogincom <-           | 
             zlogasset |   .3861347   .0218536    17.67   0.000     .3433025     .428967 
                 _cons |   .0034378   .0218518     0.16   0.875     -.039391    .0462667 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
zftrust_nei <-         | 
                ztrust |   .0858373   .0247401     3.47   0.001     .0373475     .134327 
             zlogasset |   -.096928   .0278844    -3.48   0.001    -.1515805   -.0422755 
          zformal_edu1 |   .0818328   .0270548     3.02   0.002     .0288064    .1348592 
                 _cons |   .0233198   .0246045     0.95   0.343    -.0249042    .0715437 
-----------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
var(e.zlev_fcoop_neihg)|   .8901343   .0791437                      .7477793     1.05959 
           var(e.zcoop)|   .1915931    .009503                      .1738443    .2111541 
          var(e.ztrust)|   .8639963   .0303241                      .8065603    .9255223 
   var(e.zr_incomeloss)|   .9462664   .0318354                      .8858829    1.010766 
     var(e.zr_eviction)|   .8922028   .0299826                      .8353315    .9529461 
       var(e.zlogincom)|   .8404056   .0283303                      .7866737    .8978074 
     var(e.zftrust_nei)|    .926416   .0334512                       .863119    .9943549 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix E: Major occupations of the poor household heads (%) 
Year Occupation  Dhaka Chittagong Kushtia Khulna Rajshahi Sylhet Barisal 
2
0
0
5
 
Transport worker 24.0 23.0 - 31.3 30.4 41.3 5.6 
Daylabour 18.6 25.3 - 32.0 32.8 29.1 54.3 
Factory worker 22.4 21.3 - 13.8 0.3 0.6 7.4 
Service 10.8 10.2 - 5.0 8.6 8.9 9.2 
Domestic worker 5.0 2.6 - 3.1 1.5 3.2 1.7 
Small business 10.1 9.4 - 9.5 20.3 6.1 14.0 
Hawker 3.7 1.5 - 1.9 0.6 2.3 2.3 
2
0
0
9
 
Transport & others 23.2 23.2 26.0 33.5 33.8 17.0 12.0 
Daylabour 4.1 2.8 7.0 8.0 0.7 4.0 2.0 
Service 21.5 22.4 9.0 19.0 18.5 7.0 17.0 
Domestic Worker  3.8 2.8 4.0 3.0 1.3 0 3.0 
Small business 38.5 43.2 39.0 24.0 40.4 49.0 50.0 
Rickshaw pulling 4.4 2.8 13.0 8.0 4.0 21.0 13.0 
No occupation 4.6 2.8 2.0 4.5 1.3 2.0 3.0 
2
0
1
4
 
Transport & others  12.7 14.8 13.0 - - - - 
Daylabour 13.1 15.2 23.5 - - - - 
Service 21.0 28.6 16.8 - - - - 
Domestic worker  13.7 9.7 4.4 - - - - 
Small business 16.8 14.4 27.5 - - - - 
Rickshaw pulling 17.9 11.9 10.4 - - - - 
No occupation 4.9 5.3 4.4 - - - - 
 
 Source: CUS (2005); InM (2009; 2014) 
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